main/gnutls: security fix (CVE-2013-1619)

Patch from ubuntu:
https://launchpadlibrarian.net/132499561/gnutls26_2.10.5-1ubuntu3.2_2.10.5-1ubuntu3.3.diff.gz

fixes #1657

5 files changed, 236 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/main/gnutls/APKBUILD b/main/gnutls/APKBUILD
index 4eb2c53630..31999f7f6a 100644
--- a/main/gnutls/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/gnutls/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=gnutls
 pkgver=2.10.5
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=4
 pkgdesc="A library which provides a secure connection"
 url="http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/"
 arch="all"
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ makedepends="$depends_dev perl"
 install=
 subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev"
 source="http://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/gnutls/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
-	cve-2012-1573.patch
+	CVE-2011-4128.patch
+	CVE-2012-1573.patch
+	CVE-2013-1619.patch
 	"
 
 prepare() {
@@ -42,4 +44,6 @@ package() {
 }
 
 md5sums="1b032e07ccd22f71a5df78aa73bd91f2  gnutls-2.10.5.tar.bz2
-b37bbb419598cf04d3cc9b9d9d5dd79e  cve-2012-1573.patch"
+fce93a1175f9af9bc8db02e4fe2eeabf  CVE-2011-4128.patch
+6c3fbdd0fe2cb7519284350363edc432  CVE-2012-1573.patch
+846e66213a5b854053151f1ef8e6f097  CVE-2013-1619.patch"
diff --git a/main/gnutls/CVE-2011-4128.patch b/main/gnutls/CVE-2011-4128.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e9c5f88a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gnutls/CVE-2011-4128.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Description: Check buffer size passed in from caller prior to overwriting it
+Origin: upstream, http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=190cef6eed37d0e73a73c1e205eb31d45ab60a3c
+Origin: upstream, http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=e82ef4545e9e98cbcb032f55d7c750b81e3a0450
+
+Index: gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_session.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnutls26-2.10.5.orig/lib/gnutls_session.c	2010-08-01 15:37:30.000000000 -0500
++++ gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_session.c	2012-04-04 03:25:20.382796666 -0500
+@@ -65,13 +65,14 @@
+       gnutls_assert ();
+       return ret;
+     }
+-  *session_data_size = psession.size;
+ 
+   if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
+     {
++      *session_data_size = psession.size;
+       ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
+       goto error;
+     }
++  *session_data_size = psession.size;
+ 
+   if (session_data != NULL)
+     memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
diff --git a/main/gnutls/CVE-2012-1573.patch b/main/gnutls/CVE-2012-1573.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4cd5fe9ff8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gnutls/CVE-2012-1573.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Description: Validate record size when parsing GenericBlockCipher structure
+Origin: backport, http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commit;h=422214868061370aeeb0ac9cd0f021a5c350a57d
+
+Index: gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_cipher.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnutls26-2.10.5.orig/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2012-04-04 04:17:33.902871139 -0500
++++ gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2012-04-04 04:17:56.666871679 -0500
+@@ -515,14 +515,13 @@
+ 	{
+ 	  ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
+ 	  ciphertext.data += blocksize;
+-
+-	  if (ciphertext.size == 0)
+-	    {
+-	      gnutls_assert ();
+-	      return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+-	    }
+ 	}
+ 
++      if (ciphertext.size < hash_size)
++	{
++	  gnutls_assert ();
++	  return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
++	}
+       pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1;	/* pad */
+ 
+       if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
diff --git a/main/gnutls/CVE-2013-1619.patch b/main/gnutls/CVE-2013-1619.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b9938c600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gnutls/CVE-2013-1619.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+Description: fix "Lucky Thirteen" timing side-channel TLS attack
+Origin: backport, https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/7b65049a81ea02a92fef934318a680afd55e98d2
+Origin: backport, https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/458c67cf98740e7b12404f6c30e0d5317d56fd30
+Origin: backport, https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/93b7fcfa3297a9123630704668b2946f602b910e
+
+Index: gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_cipher.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnutls26-2.10.5.orig/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2013-02-25 11:52:27.670965684 -0500
++++ gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2013-02-25 12:04:38.642984400 -0500
+@@ -447,6 +447,49 @@
+   return length;
+ }
+ 
++static void dummy_wait(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_datum_t* plaintext, 
++                       unsigned pad_failed, unsigned int pad, unsigned total, int ver)
++{
++  /* this hack is only needed on CBC ciphers */
++  if (_gnutls_cipher_is_block (session->security_parameters.read_bulk_cipher_algorithm) == CIPHER_BLOCK)
++    {
++      uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
++      unsigned len;
++      digest_hd_st td;
++      int ret;
++
++      ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
++                      session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
++                      session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
++
++      if (ret < 0)
++        return;
++
++      /* force an additional hash compression function evaluation to prevent timing 
++       * attacks that distinguish between wrong-mac + correct pad, from wrong-mac + incorrect pad.
++       */
++      if (pad_failed == 0 && pad > 0) 
++        {
++          len = _gnutls_get_hash_block_len(session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm);
++          if (len > 0)
++            {
++              /* This is really specific to the current hash functions.
++               * It should be removed once a protocol fix is in place.
++               */
++	      if ((pad+total) % len > len-9 && total % len <= len-9) 
++	        {
++	          if (len < plaintext->size)
++                    mac_hash (&td, plaintext->data, len, ver);
++                  else
++                    mac_hash (&td, plaintext->data, plaintext->size, ver);
++                }
++            }
++        }
++
++      mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
++    }
++}
++
+ /* Deciphers the ciphertext packet, and puts the result to compress_data, of compress_size.
+  * Returns the actual compressed packet size.
+  */
+@@ -458,12 +501,12 @@
+ {
+   uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
+   uint16_t c_length;
+-  uint8_t pad;
++  unsigned int pad = 0;
+   int length;
+   uint16_t blocksize;
+   int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
+   opaque preamble[PREAMBLE_SIZE];
+-  int preamble_size;
++  int preamble_size = 0;
+   int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
+   int hash_size =
+     _gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (session->
+@@ -522,31 +565,23 @@
+ 	  gnutls_assert ();
+ 	  return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ 	}
+-      pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1;	/* pad */
++      pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1];   /* pad */
+ 
+-      if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
+-	{
+-	  gnutls_assert ();
+-	  _gnutls_record_log
+-	    ("REC[%p]: Short record length %d > %d - %d (under attack?)\n",
+-	     session, pad, ciphertext.size, hash_size);
+-	  /* We do not fail here. We check below for the
+-	   * the pad_failed. If zero means success.
+-	   */
+-	  pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+-	}
+-
+-      length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
+-
+-      /* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
++      /* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x). 
++       * Note that we access all 256 bytes of ciphertext for padding check
++       * because there is a timing channel in that memory access (in certain CPUs).
+        */
+       if (_gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (ver) && pad_failed == 0)
+-	for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
++	for (i = 2; i <= pad; i++)
+ 	  {
+-	    if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
+-		ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
++            if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] != pad)
+ 	      pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ 	  }
++          
++      if (pad_failed)
++        pad = 0;
++      length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad - 1;
++
+       break;
+     default:
+       gnutls_assert ();
+@@ -585,24 +620,19 @@
+       mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
+     }
+ 
+-  /* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
+-   * 1.0 protocol.
+-   */
+-  if (pad_failed != 0)
+-    {
+-      gnutls_assert ();
+-      return pad_failed;
+-    }
+-
+   /* HMAC was not the same. 
+    */
+-  if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0)
++  if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0 || pad_failed != 0)
+     {
++      gnutls_datum_t compressed = {compress_data, compress_size};
++      /* HMAC was not the same. */
++      dummy_wait(session, &compressed, pad_failed, pad, length+preamble_size, ver);
++
+       gnutls_assert ();
+       return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+     }
+ 
+-  /* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
++  /* copy the decrypted stuff to compressed_data.
+    */
+   if (compress_size < length)
+     {
+Index: gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_hash_int.h
+===================================================================
+--- gnutls26-2.10.5.orig/lib/gnutls_hash_int.h	2013-02-25 11:52:27.670965684 -0500
++++ gnutls26-2.10.5/lib/gnutls_hash_int.h	2013-02-25 11:52:27.666965683 -0500
+@@ -98,4 +98,25 @@
+ 
+ int _gnutls_hash_copy (digest_hd_st * dst_handle, digest_hd_st * src_handle);
+ 
++/* We shouldn't need to know that, but a work-around in decoding
++ * TLS record padding requires that.
++ */
++inline static size_t
++_gnutls_get_hash_block_len (gnutls_digest_algorithm_t algo)
++{
++  switch (algo)
++    {
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_MD5:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
++    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA224:
++      return 64;
++    default:
++      return 0;
++    }
++}
++
+ #endif /* GNUTLS_HASH_INT_H */
diff --git a/main/gnutls/cve-2012-1573.patch b/main/gnutls/cve-2012-1573.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b377c391c2..0000000000
--- a/main/gnutls/cve-2012-1573.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
---- ./lib/gnutls_cipher.c.orig
-+++ ./lib/gnutls_cipher.c
-@@ -515,14 +515,13 @@
- 	{
- 	  ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
- 	  ciphertext.data += blocksize;
--
--	  if (ciphertext.size == 0)
--	    {
--	      gnutls_assert ();
--	      return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
--	    }
- 	}
- 
-+      if (ciphertext.size < hash_size)
-+        {
-+          gnutls_assert ();
-+          return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
-+        }
-       pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1;	/* pad */
- 
-       if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)