main/openssl: security fixes

fixes #6119
fixes #6180

- CVE-2016-2179
- CVE-2016-2180
- CVE-2016-2181
- CVE-2016-6302
- CVE-2016-6303

6 files changed, 761 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
index 386862f157..7880242ebc 100644
--- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
 pkgname=openssl
 pkgver=1.0.1t
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1"
 url="http://openssl.org"
 depends=
@@ -31,8 +31,24 @@ source="http://www.openssl.org/source/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz
 	1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch
 	CVE-2016-2177.patch
 	CVE-2016-2178.patch
+	CVE-2016-2179.patch
+	CVE-2016-2180.patch
+	CVE-2016-2181.patch
+	CVE-2016-6302.patch
+	CVE-2016-6303.patch
 	"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   1.0.1t-r1:
+#     - CVE-2016-2177
+#     - CVE-2016-2178
+#   1.0.1t-r2:
+#     - CVE-2016-2179
+#     - CVE-2016-2180
+#     - CVE-2016-2181
+#     - CVE-2016-6302
+#     - CVE-2016-6303
+
 _builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
 
 prepare() {
@@ -136,7 +152,12 @@ aa16c89b283faf0fe546e3f897279c44  1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-mo
 57cca845e22c178c3b317010be56edf0  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
 2ac874d1249f5f68d8c7cd58d157d29a  1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch
 b0eb90bff760a38cca1fd096c630ce4d  CVE-2016-2177.patch
-625769139b7a7321e70266b18467ae1b  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
+625769139b7a7321e70266b18467ae1b  CVE-2016-2178.patch
+548bddfb24e64868ed8f55d057d1f39e  CVE-2016-2179.patch
+2fffebea71addf58cb0bb2774647419b  CVE-2016-2180.patch
+3061d63f56082f27fe2e16015f916901  CVE-2016-2181.patch
+ff6f4883d444574f69dd8831ac1cb7c9  CVE-2016-6302.patch
+21168cefdf2c016651205cfe3c0dc32d  CVE-2016-6303.patch"
 sha256sums="4a6ee491a2fdb22e519c76fdc2a628bb3cec12762cd456861d207996c8a07088  openssl-1.0.1t.tar.gz
 df795e988fb9d55b4ddd775fbb2d5f0a3bd77af8c46f04d4199c0f75a56c0386  0001-fix-manpages.patch
 b449fb998b5f60a3a1779ac2f432b2c7f08ae52fc6dfa98bca37d735f863d400  0002-busybox-basename.patch
@@ -153,7 +174,12 @@ aee88a24622ce9d71e38deeb874e58435dcf8ff5690f56194f0e4a00fb09b260  1002-backport-
 c10b8aaf56a4f4f79ca195fc587e0bb533f643e777d7a3e6fb0350399a6060ea  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
 2f7c850af078a3ae71b2dd38d5d0b3964ea4262e52673e36ff33498cc6223e6c  1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch
 285019f7c51bc968e6655f5ef573d6a9a7165ab45e89977ea097b882a14c83e3  CVE-2016-2177.patch
-4e1883eb0d4e38d56ed9fcc2e566323da500c384fcdfe4be186b3bda5b99ccca  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
+4e1883eb0d4e38d56ed9fcc2e566323da500c384fcdfe4be186b3bda5b99ccca  CVE-2016-2178.patch
+f108f22e7954fa6b6d074bc8f32678b9e04f36744a1fd5f337c7c64d6fbef0eb  CVE-2016-2179.patch
+06a9add56874bd1647704352906420acc62e889eca27e576588f2c6440043fe5  CVE-2016-2180.patch
+17b8055b08cb93332aa01c35e04c1fb9a557d0ca7003145185da720129c1b4a7  CVE-2016-2181.patch
+4ff50c874f457b460630c3529e467d3f74ecd9bf4d8a1fba6a405c5f2f5fd55e  CVE-2016-6302.patch
+363a2ee3e3763084ae7d117c83fbd874cb10ce19156b8ca7f5c89a55f3a94d97  CVE-2016-6303.patch"
 sha512sums="31f0689e71ce2ec3ebbe01c481368d58d4fb2cb2444efcb47c869d3f1a2accc573f1e0cbc8f45faf437437639bf3a86a5f2e3dd1698ec08c009ab5b560e74b73  openssl-1.0.1t.tar.gz
 5f31d53b5658d96a760020fff2f350a3fe50b96b33fb52ace935e3f3c1c011b93a6abd1e9bc1376c5f91dd32daa25b58483491cc43639b31e3e5cb7a73477767  0001-fix-manpages.patch
 2244f46cb18e6b98f075051dd2446c47f7590abccd108fbab707f168a20cad8d32220d704635973f09e3b2879f523be5160f1ffbc12ab3900f8a8891dc855c5c  0002-busybox-basename.patch
@@ -170,4 +196,9 @@ a3555440b5f544bfd6b9ad97557d8f4c1d673f6a35219f65056a72035d186be5f354717ddf978489
 6353c7a94016c20db5d683dde37775f6780952ecdb1a5f39f878d04ba37f6ad79ae10fb6d65d181d912505a5d1e22463004cd855d548b364c00b120da2b0fdbc  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
 b72436eb8d4dac42d8da76a51d46cfc03e92e162f692a7a1761201221b9c6d66b738c08270b2260f02ce47b42043538474df73a7185dd4a809dd3b14cc8af7c3  1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch
 39650e019bf283b4fdb9c679643d3b84a21f90e0682a2abd8800a03c57ce1ffe02d7a98d427f746aa07fdda52ec149d73df50d430c5ef081dad9d7f69e7ceb3b  CVE-2016-2177.patch
-4e9d66380d81f015c64f027c73029ad3042f19ae3f30b558b8a2313fb56a1374dc8924341968cd29def84b573fce7a8d3890c51fa25311b24c4e7ddd6c152905  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
+4e9d66380d81f015c64f027c73029ad3042f19ae3f30b558b8a2313fb56a1374dc8924341968cd29def84b573fce7a8d3890c51fa25311b24c4e7ddd6c152905  CVE-2016-2178.patch
+b78911bbc8e56a7fda29dabdc1cfabfb53e57e5b0f0415869716fd60cadbf96ee1a6e901fc6ffd57566346c83e212703f6df75befad350939637496dbe2ca817  CVE-2016-2179.patch
+c595caf4a775ba10c47f17a8898665c5a5eee73d4449a2b360592a728febfeca8537989272e1e4a144cd438e1b0a329814dec01f785d345d56b197b245e2da5e  CVE-2016-2180.patch
+b8a953814dec821ad1111ae8e6188752867dcebb56783acb58f776fc48e037335e1074e26e2fe1b144d32abe10a57a6ecf83fce8bf39345a443ad973aa056299  CVE-2016-2181.patch
+3b542a2a1efd58cb722069568e1b4cbd060b458a09ecd047c8c11cd26e2264ec12cfbc1c9769d201460770b49680aa06c29968aba756d667f9fada549014f7bd  CVE-2016-6302.patch
+33e92f3ee9699601ef81edcd08928101e51672c65b3dc149c0ff57d24ec301209f552f96761c59c88715c996dccce341377883b98c3014f3b31f08d44c33bf78  CVE-2016-6303.patch"
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0bab19c8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2179.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+From 00a4c1421407b6ac796688871b0a49a179c694d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 13:17:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
+
+DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
+handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
+messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
+That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
+reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
+future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
+early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
+or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.
+
+The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
+when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
+point that we need to use it.
+
+However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
+messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
+message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
+that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
+non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
+removed.
+
+Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
+in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
+(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
+message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
+However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
+greater than that in the queue is just left there.
+
+So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
+that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
+that point all the queues are flushed.
+
+An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
+lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
+attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.
+
+I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
+seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
+client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
+an issue.
+
+A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
+incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
+CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
+to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
+Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
+that could get orphaned would typically be 15.
+
+The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
+max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
+"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.
+
+Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
+renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
+orphaned per connection.
+
+As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
+Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
+to open many simultaneous connections.
+
+Issue reported by Quan Luo.
+
+CVE-2016-2179
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c  | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
+ ssl/d1_clnt.c  |  1 +
+ ssl/d1_lib.c   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ ssl/d1_srvr.c  |  3 ++-
+ ssl/ssl_locl.h |  3 ++-
+ 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 1614d88..ae292c4 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -614,11 +614,23 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+     int al;
+ 
+     *ok = 0;
+-    item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+-    if (item == NULL)
+-        return 0;
++    do {
++        item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
++        if (item == NULL)
++            return 0;
++
++        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
++
++        if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
++            /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */
++            pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
++            dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
++            pitem_free(item);
++            item = NULL;
++            frag = NULL;
++        }
++    } while (item == NULL);
+ 
+-    frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ 
+     /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+     if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+@@ -1416,18 +1428,6 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
+-{
+-    pitem *item;
+-
+-    for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
+-         item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
+-        dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+-        pitem_free(item);
+-    }
+-}
+-
+ unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+                                         unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
+                                         unsigned long frag_off,
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+index eb371a2..e1f167b 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
+             /* done with handshaking */
+             s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+             s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
++            dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+             goto end;
+             /* break; */
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+index 011d7b7..99984df 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+@@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
+ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+ {
+     pitem *item = NULL;
+-    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+     DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ 
+     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
+@@ -165,28 +164,44 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+         pitem_free(item);
+     }
+ 
++    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
++        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
++        if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
++            OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
++        }
++        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
++        pitem_free(item);
++    }
++
++    dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
++    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
++}
++
++void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s)
++{
++    pitem *item = NULL;
++    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
++
+     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
+         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+         dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+         pitem_free(item);
+     }
++}
++
++void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s)
++{
++    pitem *item = NULL;
++    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ 
+     while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
+         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+         dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+         pitem_free(item);
+     }
+-
+-    while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
+-        rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+-        if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
+-            OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+-        }
+-        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+-        pitem_free(item);
+-    }
+ }
+ 
++
+ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+     ssl3_free(s);
+@@ -420,7 +435,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
+     BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
+              &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+     /* Clear retransmission buffer */
+-    dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
++    dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+ }
+ 
+ int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+index 60af230..bc30433 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+         case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+ 
+             s->shutdown = 0;
+-            dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
++            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+             dtls1_start_timer(s);
+             ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+             if (ret <= 0)
+@@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+             /* next message is server hello */
+             s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+             s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
++            dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+             goto end;
+             /* break; */
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index d57b902..7b1fd1f 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -1026,7 +1026,8 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
+                              unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
+ int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
+ int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
+-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
++void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s);
++void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s);
+ void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
+                               struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
+ void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4d3a7cb84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2180.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 6adf409c7432b90c06d9890787fe56c48f2a16e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 15:24:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
+
+TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
+as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
+length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
+data written.
+
+CVE-2016-2180
+
+Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acce328ec16a3aa635f1ca37365e8c7403a)
+---
+ crypto/ts/ts_lib.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
+index c51538a..e0f1063 100644
+--- a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
+@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+ {
+     char obj_txt[128];
+ 
+-    int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
+-    BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
+-    BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
++    OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
++    BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt);
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2181.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2181.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51a02e9c84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2181.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+From fa75569758298e2930c78989b516cac937118acc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 11:46:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug
+
+During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
+arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
+verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
+the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.
+
+Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
+that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
+epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
+buffered records if we've not got any data left.
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_pkt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+index ea93a8e..78a2a7d 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+ {
+     pitem *item;
++    SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+ 
+     item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+     if (item) {
+@@ -326,6 +327,19 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+         if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+             return (1);         /* Nothing to do. */
+ 
++        rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
++
++        if (rb->left > 0) {
++            /*
++             * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
++             * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
++             * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
++             * finished reading the current packet).
++             */
++            return 1;
++        }
++
++
+         /* Process all the records. */
+         while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+@@ -581,6 +595,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ 
+     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ 
++ again:
+     /*
+      * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
+      * This is a non-blocking operation.
+@@ -593,7 +608,6 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+         return 1;
+ 
+     /* get something from the wire */
+- again:
+     /* check if we have the header */
+     if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+         (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+@@ -1815,8 +1829,13 @@ static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+     if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
+         return &s->d1->bitmap;
+ 
+-    /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
++    /*
++     * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
++     * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
++     * epoch
++     */
+     else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
++             s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch &&
+              (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+         *is_next_epoch = 1;
+         return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+From b77ab018b79a00f789b0fb85596b446b08be4c9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 12:04:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS replay protection
+
+The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
+in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.
+
+A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
+the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
+have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
+edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
+against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
+we also reject the new record.
+
+If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
+the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
+If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
+the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
+of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
+is in line with the newly received sequence number.
+
+Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
+sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
+have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
+validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
+unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
+even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
+currently in a handshake/renegotiation.
+
+This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
+epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
+large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
+moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
+dropped causing a denial of service.
+
+A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
+case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
+message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
+will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
+(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
+so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
+handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
+legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
+security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
+initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
+injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
+the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
+to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
+Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
+issue isn't addressed here though.
+
+This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.
+
+CVE-2016-2181
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_pkt.c  | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ ssl/ssl.h     |  1 +
+ ssl/ssl_err.c |  4 +++-
+ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+index 78a2a7d..d3ceae0 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ #endif
+ static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
+                                unsigned char *priority);
+-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
++static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+ 
+ /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
+ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
+@@ -320,13 +320,18 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+ {
+     pitem *item;
+     SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
++    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
++    DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
++    unsigned int is_next_epoch;
++    int replayok = 1;
+ 
+     item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+     if (item) {
+         /* Check if epoch is current. */
+         if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+-            return (1);         /* Nothing to do. */
++            return 1;         /* Nothing to do. */
+ 
++        rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+         rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
+ 
+         if (rb->left > 0) {
+@@ -343,11 +348,41 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+         /* Process all the records. */
+         while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+-            if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
+-                return (0);
++            bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
++            if (bitmap == NULL) {
++                /*
++                 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
++                 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
++                 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
++                 */
++                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
++                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                 return 0;
++            }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
++            /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
++            if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
++#endif
++            {
++                /*
++                 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
++                 * check once already when we first received the record - but
++                 * we might have updated the window since then due to
++                 * records we subsequently processed.
++                 */
++                replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
++            }
++
++            if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
++                /* dump this record */
++                rr->length = 0;
++                s->packet_length = 0;
++                continue;
++            }
++
+             if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
+                                     s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
+-                return -1;
++                return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -358,7 +393,7 @@ static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+     s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
+     s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
+ 
+-    return (1);
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ #if 0
+@@ -405,7 +440,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
++static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+ {
+     int i, al;
+     int enc_err;
+@@ -565,6 +600,10 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+ 
+     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+     s->packet_length = 0;
++
++    /* Mark receipt of record. */
++    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
++
+     return (1);
+ 
+  f_err:
+@@ -600,7 +639,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+      * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
+      * This is a non-blocking operation.
+      */
+-    if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
++    if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
+         return -1;
+ 
+     /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+@@ -731,20 +770,17 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+             if (dtls1_buffer_record
+                 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
+                 return -1;
+-            /* Mark receipt of record. */
+-            dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+         }
+         rr->length = 0;
+         s->packet_length = 0;
+         goto again;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
++    if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+         rr->length = 0;
+         s->packet_length = 0;   /* dump this record */
+         goto again;             /* get another record */
+     }
+-    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
+ 
+     return (1);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
+index d6c475c..8094450 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -2256,6 +2256,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT                            305
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                    255
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                  288
++# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             404
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE           256
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                       257
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                           258
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
+index caa671a..ed679d1 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
+ /* ====================================================================
+- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "DTLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
+     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
++    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS),
++     "DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS"},
+     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),
+      "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
+     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+From 5802758eb480c5f14a768f6a061df1dd20aec8c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 17:55:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Update function error code
+
+A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/ssl.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
+index 8094450..114ee97 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -2256,7 +2256,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT                            305
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                    255
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                  288
+-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             404
++# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS             424
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE           256
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                       257
+ # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                           258
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52233b9023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6302.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 1bbe48ab149893a78bf99c8eb8895c928900a16f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 18:14:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Sanity check ticket length.
+
+If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing
+sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS
+attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on
+HMAC size.
+
+Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
+
+CVE-2016-6302
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit baaabfd8fdcec04a691695fad9a664bea43202b6)
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index d961e4a..7680491 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2273,9 +2273,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+     HMAC_CTX hctx;
+     EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+     SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+-    /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+-    if (eticklen < 48)
+-        return 2;
++
+     /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+     HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+@@ -2309,6 +2307,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+     if (mlen < 0) {
+         goto err;
+     }
++    /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
++    if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
++        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
++        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++        return 2;
++    }
++
+     eticklen -= mlen;
+     /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+     if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45b69c8bcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-6303.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 2b4029e68fd7002d2307e6c3cde0f3784eef9c83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 23:28:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update()
+
+Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
+
+CVE-2016-6303
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7c10c7b205fffa23fa7c3977491e56c07)
+---
+ crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
+index 6615cf8..2dce493 100644
+--- a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
++++ b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+ 
+     i = c->num;
+     if (i != 0) {
+-        if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
++        if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
+             /* partial block */
+             memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
+             c->num += (int)len;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+