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authorNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2017-04-13 11:11:48 +0200
committerNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2017-04-13 11:11:48 +0200
commit0daf1361a8d912518e1827808f4023ef26153ba0 (patch)
tree980432b66c9dea9185ed76d6345cfa35308e9b21
parent5466e2e8d58f16242930f6c33e85870504de9484 (diff)
downloadaports-0daf1361a8d912518e1827808f4023ef26153ba0.tar.bz2
aports-0daf1361a8d912518e1827808f4023ef26153ba0.tar.xz
main/libxml2: upgrade to 2.9.4
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/APKBUILD86
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2014-0191.patch36
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-1819.patch176
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-5312.patch32
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7497.patch32
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7498.patch82
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-1.patch81
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-2.patch36
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7500.patch106
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_1.patch32
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_2.patch49
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942-2.patch28
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942.patch32
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8035.patch31
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8241.patch35
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8242.patch42
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-1.patch38
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-2.patch35
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch129
-rw-r--r--main/libxml2/libxml2-pthread.patch11
20 files changed, 5 insertions, 1124 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxml2/APKBUILD b/main/libxml2/APKBUILD
index f5ad97777f..505cfff9f0 100644
--- a/main/libxml2/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/libxml2/APKBUILD
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# Contributor: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@gmail.com>
# Maintainer: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@gmail.com>
pkgname=libxml2
-pkgver=2.9.2
-pkgrel=2
+pkgver=2.9.4
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="XML parsing library, version 2"
url="http://www.xmlsoft.org/"
arch="all"
@@ -12,25 +12,6 @@ depends_dev="zlib-dev python-dev"
makedepends="zlib-dev python-dev"
subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev py-$pkgname:py $pkgname-utils"
source="ftp://ftp.xmlsoft.org/${pkgname}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz
- libxml2-pthread.patch
- CVE-2014-0191.patch
- CVE-2015-1819.patch
- CVE-2015-5312.patch
- CVE-2015-7497.patch
- CVE-2015-7498.patch
- CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
- CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
- CVE-2015-7500.patch
- CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
- CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
- CVE-2015-7942.patch
- CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
- CVE-2015-8035.patch
- CVE-2015-8241.patch
- CVE-2015-8242.patch
- CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
- CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
- CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch
"
options="!strip"
@@ -82,63 +63,6 @@ utils() {
mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
}
-md5sums="9e6a9aca9d155737868b3dc5fd82f788 libxml2-2.9.2.tar.gz
-cc0da520c5296e87407d24166480da73 libxml2-pthread.patch
-e6f432aea642badcb848e5791bcf6df7 CVE-2014-0191.patch
-44b96e4a7c675f103628d7decfa56d37 CVE-2015-1819.patch
-a6fdca7e058fe6fbaa248e8c0aae7424 CVE-2015-5312.patch
-70b52327b3bbc473cfde89730f829aeb CVE-2015-7497.patch
-5cfa24ef6c26ad780bcdd7dfad831fd1 CVE-2015-7498.patch
-d876337f727521061309722c9d16ba9a CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
-2852386b8844d628e6680e054fbbba4e CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
-0be954db9ac4cf9055b95eed5077fb2e CVE-2015-7500.patch
-286111441eed116f2edc489e9788d573 CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
-44ad838bfb10784f016bf35ead4e1beb CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
-7304667ea636d829feed9cc6747d5efb CVE-2015-7942.patch
-ffdfbe9d5d7d334c5baca09060d56e78 CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
-66f5aa382028e125202f6ac70f507c0a CVE-2015-8035.patch
-6f8105eed1006d1d5587d3d88b7c5bbd CVE-2015-8241.patch
-f5dc37a7162905c53ec86d06e20cb9b3 CVE-2015-8242.patch
-f767ce95f29c9b63c31eaf6afb36e376 CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
-017edcbd0f90ca13b23565f55f6c09e3 CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
-3595e925283de7aa4ef4a90e71ec0c89 CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch"
-sha256sums="5178c30b151d044aefb1b08bf54c3003a0ac55c59c866763997529d60770d5bc libxml2-2.9.2.tar.gz
-97d5e152580774483c47b28483282a4180c2c375bb7716a807ec859e59c3ec2f libxml2-pthread.patch
-288a762e8b115cecc02d920e4b36ebfa5249b8a6713a1a948e344d881d094ea8 CVE-2014-0191.patch
-18cc94e2d1917e6e7b959d1ad1a1b1a907cdbd6fc7cfd52bfd2a7aaec7816bf2 CVE-2015-1819.patch
-8676498e81d8f973c02bb0c8d56486be593c0179a0cc9d0c6e9bcdfff068bb05 CVE-2015-5312.patch
-b63be023398e8d89068b968bacb8c50d9cac0b32eeec29c972d4b9a54f7288cd CVE-2015-7497.patch
-56bf3c58cd388bdabf3b47613cfb2d84be564954d86836e815679ad4151923dc CVE-2015-7498.patch
-ad99f8442cc6dc5127cb67c8b6277995f301b739ec8a60a474746c846e360ece CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
-4c44c22a5f3156aff40a029d656caca55cc095cf3cbaeeabc0b6e09b03fcf08c CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
-a482436a040e0c94efc669ac71bfd42427efd33a9e7d755897a6b0ae8b42e41f CVE-2015-7500.patch
-86d575ab1273f9a182a5c589db3e7a93b7c4bed63ca3588a8a99a84235b990be CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
-53c2adf000f8716a9e96aef9018cd824bb4cd24169d62686c1631bbee6ec60c8 CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
-9095165d17db7e66060307fea16872ce5be63bd9f52e858f05200d6f12391ee4 CVE-2015-7942.patch
-bd98845e4fb4405ae45f4dbdac097ac40db4e8ac8d2ff7194ac0997404ca37bf CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
-3b4d7e17929e8cb4ce078a7358450b308e15c9b9aa9d125a4d945ef6623e9bae CVE-2015-8035.patch
-fc8c07b99a5bb456a720eafc2393eb6b299930dc5cb1781494f692681e9818ac CVE-2015-8241.patch
-e4a1441afcd4379455ed683216dfbee49b7ef5480f57c449481fb3928190b41f CVE-2015-8242.patch
-81777f53a343a9d0dcf88c7871d52a2b7b5e7fc793ec3538cbe923d0919b2ae1 CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
-0ef449496e8054809a653d33591326aaaf18aeffe8e2cfea28ede63b134e4430 CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
-4e3fbfe5a596c725f4a857146ac2ed60b0dae60153d5ba0b02aacef5fb9c86a1 CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch"
-sha512sums="a4e3b20e2efceed39c20379b32b746d4a1cf65c0cf7719d26c9bf7483c1f04a4e5a442ae2f36dc4ae8a4d011b67cfb58d9f6d0be034fa3e897a49059c9289565 libxml2-2.9.2.tar.gz
-bda49c5e09605acc2bb36203521f750903d81345cc38af54b977e3ce71e288267fb3ab98f1813d846ab45461490482337f7af8b0f1a8a5e0b2c09e03bbadc7f7 libxml2-pthread.patch
-41b6737b5cfe6392e3d781ebde48db0bf221bde89701742408afe625a88a67f6f6aed5cf04c1983ba2e7e04c2d819a8011908d23060365225571691c5e61cf11 CVE-2014-0191.patch
-61c512e2f43bd0791e05a60c6bfa41a8a53bc95b2e45f983e6a87964246a6ab596955f9c9956d1f7ffd08fff774ab8d54222eeebb1e14cd5e54378e65ff677ce CVE-2015-1819.patch
-3a1f95a681fed8ae26327246c767d332d863d401318e246cd97b79f63ac09aef7e9a82a6185e60e7de9d4489a9f21ed519d015ea9748da2ed065ab579c596b25 CVE-2015-5312.patch
-50dcf87ddce80643d7bb0e622d3d67a095549571da5866c9b6f8867c28aa3b41fe43ae12e4c2aa2ddb4d084908dfb79cd84995089fead447c1f1db1bff6a0ca3 CVE-2015-7497.patch
-6c3c7dbc23380f53d6a5122bd2d55cf2352822974d6cf7921dbe07f11b5396cdc5f1812263e10d53c41610989bbf7c5266f6751eb987c0fd93ff068e8f4348a2 CVE-2015-7498.patch
-17c62e675e64366079a44753aaf460a026a0716b5a1bc7bace4156dc693639bf842c0be326877eebf4661943f93f43866967e1989603499233ae280f93c79d37 CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
-9a51143edb520491653bf44c8cdce3a359d4ada33bb1352b2985a1e00bf6367941f7f41983b126fb1eca531811473966b20d03338873490ab328af6647a2d4e0 CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
-1bddc8789cc37b015abee0659cafdb60936a38a4ec7d39e23ecc4c8ca0bf5fc73aefeb9a16f480749dc73bc9c752986dc5df6dc92d041d17677bce64b9d4588a CVE-2015-7500.patch
-c86c62704b527e5b3e0834586a4a05e5acc059ececf80e45135bf9d00ed0531aa268366c9bdac1fb4f5fa98a03175f33d98e3edde4d351095b8aae456656579f CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
-3711688706751455818ac29ecc49f221ce747173145ff076bc1a2223d8c00287362f0b5bfc6351583bc3edabe1f05546295d78633c0ccf9cfa4d48a5594e09d8 CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
-bbf93ce9f9277f049ccac6644f72e4c2d42a7513762950c928bbdab3813a9a20123a3aef5c83b8448213026761150bc4ad5a2a89dd9eb770793b642a54ca3fd0 CVE-2015-7942.patch
-40837e2cc46aa8972818aa4526926cffd213e4c5a689c66f4c4b864c339582588e03d98f4fcf5781977b3a71a2a0850de17540b0293e58755f07346471e76aa4 CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
-071577d6d2f4fa2df1894fab3379ac461f79a785a3c54b04c729a1e06982d3ae0158526d213a4b375fa878fa7bb2a257cf9070092f8228ad5dc159f99ea71ea1 CVE-2015-8035.patch
-baec4095aae6e272e8d6dc6b820af8fdc73fe50d7ae5bad12a3fc550cdf73d03e949e00eb81ea15c796f0b454400d88190edd0c59a8dd0606f8d21419ae4ebdf CVE-2015-8241.patch
-98c83b942f718a765821771eb32aef70086edaedc44b83ecf291e8c65afdca63ec204b50d4dbfb87c13e6ded12cce3a7cfd3291449e9daa4d30d025525605e4d CVE-2015-8242.patch
-eccf558670f2458ce087c4211dc911463427b9722a5e6aee2ba1b008636bde967c6f88d7751f7586a8d338111520d64d2480e36d8a284180b9f867fad7f9957b CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
-04538232684bc44825b664d963aae41e4297a657404a4ea2b276a51f8f02f8334af35d630adccb48aa27a23b0aee328d41b1d4deff69aa28bed8f9f4cf1fae0b CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
-943b30b6373192759e92b5fd354002c5b93a68f465ef43333f23e190674bf7e92d5461feb74f6c090b0eb68fcb1eb9957b44ade331b341182109cc95fbdac646 CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch"
+md5sums="ae249165c173b1ff386ee8ad676815f5 libxml2-2.9.4.tar.gz"
+sha256sums="ffb911191e509b966deb55de705387f14156e1a56b21824357cdf0053233633c libxml2-2.9.4.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="f5174ab1a3a0ec0037a47f47aa47def36674e02bfb42b57f609563f84c6247c585dbbb133c056953a5adb968d328f18cbc102eb0d00d48eb7c95478389e5daf9 libxml2-2.9.4.tar.gz"
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2014-0191.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2014-0191.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d5fe1a7aa..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2014-0191.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 9cd1c3cfbd32655d60572c0a413e017260c854df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 15:30:56 +0800
-Subject: Do not fetch external parameter entities
-
-Unless explicitely asked for when validating or replacing entities
-with their value. Problem pointed out by Daniel Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index 9347ac9..c0dea05 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -2598,6 +2598,20 @@ xmlParserHandlePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- xmlCharEncoding enc;
-
- /*
-+ * Note: external parsed entities will not be loaded, it is
-+ * not required for a non-validating parser, unless the
-+ * option of validating, or substituting entities were
-+ * given. Doing so is far more secure as the parser will
-+ * only process data coming from the document entity by
-+ * default.
-+ */
-+ if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
-+ ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
-+ ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
-+ (ctxt->validate == 0))
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
- * handle the extra spaces added before and after
- * c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
- * this is done independently.
---
-cgit v0.10.1
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-1819.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-1819.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e77202b56e..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-1819.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-From 213f1fe0d76d30eaed6e5853057defc43e6df2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 17:41:48 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-1819 Enforce the reader to run in constant memory
-
-One of the operation on the reader could resolve entities
-leading to the classic expansion issue. Make sure the
-buffer used for xmlreader operation is bounded.
-Introduce a new allocation type for the buffers for this effect.
----
- buf.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- include/libxml/tree.h | 3 ++-
- xmlreader.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/buf.c b/buf.c
-index 6efc7b6..07922ff 100644
---- a/buf.c
-+++ b/buf.c
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #include <libxml/tree.h>
- #include <libxml/globals.h>
- #include <libxml/tree.h>
-+#include <libxml/parserInternals.h> /* for XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH */
- #include "buf.h"
-
- #define WITH_BUFFER_COMPAT
-@@ -299,7 +300,8 @@ xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(xmlBufPtr buf,
- if ((scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_DOUBLEIT) ||
- (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_EXACT) ||
- (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID) ||
-- (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)) {
-+ (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
-+ (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED)) {
- buf->alloc = scheme;
- if (buf->buffer)
- buf->buffer->alloc = scheme;
-@@ -458,6 +460,18 @@ xmlBufGrowInternal(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t len) {
- size = buf->use + len + 100;
- #endif
-
-+ if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED) {
-+ /*
-+ * Used to provide parsing limits
-+ */
-+ if ((buf->use + len >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) ||
-+ (buf->size >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH)) {
-+ xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "buffer error: text too long\n");
-+ return(0);
-+ }
-+ if (size >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH)
-+ size = XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
-+ }
- if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
- size_t start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
-
-@@ -739,6 +753,15 @@ xmlBufResize(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t size)
- CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
-
- if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) return(0);
-+ if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED) {
-+ /*
-+ * Used to provide parsing limits
-+ */
-+ if (size >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
-+ xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "buffer error: text too long\n");
-+ return(0);
-+ }
-+ }
-
- /* Don't resize if we don't have to */
- if (size < buf->size)
-@@ -867,6 +890,15 @@ xmlBufAdd(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar *str, int len) {
-
- needSize = buf->use + len + 2;
- if (needSize > buf->size){
-+ if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED) {
-+ /*
-+ * Used to provide parsing limits
-+ */
-+ if (needSize >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
-+ xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "buffer error: text too long\n");
-+ return(-1);
-+ }
-+ }
- if (!xmlBufResize(buf, needSize)){
- xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
- return XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
-@@ -938,6 +970,15 @@ xmlBufAddHead(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar *str, int len) {
- }
- needSize = buf->use + len + 2;
- if (needSize > buf->size){
-+ if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED) {
-+ /*
-+ * Used to provide parsing limits
-+ */
-+ if (needSize >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
-+ xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "buffer error: text too long\n");
-+ return(-1);
-+ }
-+ }
- if (!xmlBufResize(buf, needSize)){
- xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
- return XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
-diff --git a/include/libxml/tree.h b/include/libxml/tree.h
-index 2f90717..4a9b3bc 100644
---- a/include/libxml/tree.h
-+++ b/include/libxml/tree.h
-@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ typedef enum {
- XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_EXACT, /* grow only to the minimal size */
- XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE, /* immutable buffer */
- XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO, /* special allocation scheme used for I/O */
-- XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID /* exact up to a threshold, and doubleit thereafter */
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID, /* exact up to a threshold, and doubleit thereafter */
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED /* limit the upper size of the buffer */
- } xmlBufferAllocationScheme;
-
- /**
-diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
-index f19e123..471e7e2 100644
---- a/xmlreader.c
-+++ b/xmlreader.c
-@@ -2091,6 +2091,9 @@ xmlNewTextReader(xmlParserInputBufferPtr input, const char *URI) {
- "xmlNewTextReader : malloc failed\n");
- return(NULL);
- }
-+ /* no operation on a reader should require a huge buffer */
-+ xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(ret->buffer,
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED);
- ret->sax = (xmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
- if (ret->sax == NULL) {
- xmlBufFree(ret->buffer);
-@@ -3616,6 +3619,7 @@ xmlTextReaderConstValue(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
- return(((xmlNsPtr) node)->href);
- case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:{
- xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
-+ const xmlChar *ret;
-
- if ((attr->children != NULL) &&
- (attr->children->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
-@@ -3629,10 +3633,21 @@ xmlTextReaderConstValue(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
- "xmlTextReaderSetup : malloc failed\n");
- return (NULL);
- }
-+ xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(reader->buffer,
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED);
- } else
- xmlBufEmpty(reader->buffer);
- xmlBufGetNodeContent(reader->buffer, node);
-- return(xmlBufContent(reader->buffer));
-+ ret = xmlBufContent(reader->buffer);
-+ if (ret == NULL) {
-+ /* error on the buffer best to reallocate */
-+ xmlBufFree(reader->buffer);
-+ reader->buffer = xmlBufCreateSize(100);
-+ xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(reader->buffer,
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED);
-+ ret = BAD_CAST "";
-+ }
-+ return(ret);
- }
- break;
- }
-@@ -5131,6 +5146,9 @@ xmlTextReaderSetup(xmlTextReaderPtr reader,
- "xmlTextReaderSetup : malloc failed\n");
- return (-1);
- }
-+ /* no operation on a reader should require a huge buffer */
-+ xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(reader->buffer,
-+ XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED);
- if (reader->sax == NULL)
- reader->sax = (xmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
- if (reader->sax == NULL) {
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-5312.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-5312.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ab9f31f016..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-5312.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 69030714cde66d525a8884bda01b9e8f0abf8e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 11:13:45 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-5312 Another entity expansion issue
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756733
-It is one case where the code in place to detect entities expansions
-failed to exit when the situation was detected, leading to DoS
-Problem reported by Kostya Serebryany @ Google
-Patch provided by David Drysdale @ Google
----
- parser.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index b7b6668..da6e729 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -2806,6 +2806,10 @@ xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
- 0, 0, 0);
- ctxt->depth--;
-
-+ if ((ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) ||
-+ (ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR))
-+ goto int_error;
-+
- if (rep != NULL) {
- current = rep;
- while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming loop */
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7497.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7497.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d734c606c8..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7497.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 6360a31a84efe69d155ed96306b9a931a40beab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 10:47:12 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-7497 Avoid an heap buffer overflow in xmlDictComputeFastQKey
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756528
-It was possible to hit a negative offset in the name indexing
-used to randomize the dictionary key generation
-Reported and fix provided by David Drysdale @ Google
----
- dict.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/dict.c b/dict.c
-index 5f71d55..8c8f931 100644
---- a/dict.c
-+++ b/dict.c
-@@ -486,7 +486,10 @@ xmlDictComputeFastQKey(const xmlChar *prefix, int plen,
- value += 30 * (*prefix);
-
- if (len > 10) {
-- value += name[len - (plen + 1 + 1)];
-+ int offset = len - (plen + 1 + 1);
-+ if (offset < 0)
-+ offset = len - (10 + 1);
-+ value += name[offset];
- len = 10;
- if (plen > 10)
- plen = 10;
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7498.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7498.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9682926e39..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7498.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From afd27c21f6b36e22682b7da20d726bce2dcb2f43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 18:07:18 +0800
-Subject: Avoid processing entities after encoding conversion failures
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756527
-and was also raised by Chromium team in the past
-
-When we hit a convwersion failure when switching encoding
-it is bestter to stop parsing there, this was treated as a
-fatal error but the parser was continuing to process to extract
-more errors, unfortunately that makes little sense as the data
-is obviously corrupt and can potentially lead to unexpected behaviour.
----
- parser.c | 7 +++++--
- parserInternals.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index 134afe7..c79b4e8 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -10665,7 +10665,8 @@ xmlParseXMLDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
- }
- xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
-- if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
-+ if ((ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) ||
-+ (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
- /*
- * The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
- */
-@@ -10789,6 +10790,7 @@ xmlParseDocument(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-
- if (CUR == 0) {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
-+ return(-1);
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -10806,7 +10808,8 @@ xmlParseDocument(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- * Note that we will switch encoding on the fly.
- */
- xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
-- if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
-+ if ((ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) ||
-+ (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
- /*
- * The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
- */
-diff --git a/parserInternals.c b/parserInternals.c
-index df204fd..c8230c1 100644
---- a/parserInternals.c
-+++ b/parserInternals.c
-@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ xmlSwitchEncoding(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlCharEncoding enc)
- {
- xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr handler;
- int len = -1;
-+ int ret;
-
- if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
- switch (enc) {
-@@ -1097,7 +1098,15 @@ xmlSwitchEncoding(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlCharEncoding enc)
- if (handler == NULL)
- return(-1);
- ctxt->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_UTF8;
-- return(xmlSwitchToEncodingInt(ctxt, handler, len));
-+ ret = xmlSwitchToEncodingInt(ctxt, handler, len);
-+ if ((ret < 0) || (ctxt->errNo == XML_I18N_CONV_FAILED)) {
-+ /*
-+ * on encoding conversion errors, stop the parser
-+ */
-+ xmlStopParser(ctxt);
-+ ctxt->errNo = XML_I18N_CONV_FAILED;
-+ }
-+ return(ret);
- }
-
- /**
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-1.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d3e95d8291..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 28cd9cb747a94483f4aea7f0968d202c20bb4cfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 14:55:30 +0800
-Subject: Add xmlHaltParser() to stop the parser
-
-The problem is doing it in a consistent and safe fashion
-It's more complex than just setting ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF
-Update the public function to reuse that new internal routine
----
- parser.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index da6e729..b6e99b1 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ static xmlParserCtxtPtr
- xmlCreateEntityParserCtxtInternal(const xmlChar *URL, const xmlChar *ID,
- const xmlChar *base, xmlParserCtxtPtr pctx);
-
-+static void xmlHaltParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt);
-+
- /************************************************************************
- * *
- * Arbitrary limits set in the parser. See XML_PARSE_HUGE *
-@@ -12625,25 +12627,47 @@ xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
- #endif /* LIBXML_PUSH_ENABLED */
-
- /**
-- * xmlStopParser:
-+ * xmlHaltParser:
- * @ctxt: an XML parser context
- *
-- * Blocks further parser processing
-+ * Blocks further parser processing don't override error
-+ * for internal use
- */
--void
--xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-+static void
-+xmlHaltParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- if (ctxt == NULL)
- return;
- ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
-- ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_USER_STOP;
- ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
- if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
-+ /*
-+ * in case there was a specific allocation deallocate before
-+ * overriding base
-+ */
-+ if (ctxt->input->free != NULL) {
-+ ctxt->input->free((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->base);
-+ ctxt->input->free = NULL;
-+ }
- ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
- ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
- }
- }
-
- /**
-+ * xmlStopParser:
-+ * @ctxt: an XML parser context
-+ *
-+ * Blocks further parser processing
-+ */
-+void
-+xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-+ if (ctxt == NULL)
-+ return;
-+ xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
-+ ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_USER_STOP;
-+}
-+
-+/**
- * xmlCreateIOParserCtxt:
- * @sax: a SAX handler
- * @user_data: The user data returned on SAX callbacks
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-2.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 741b81b677..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7499-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 35bcb1d758ed70aa7b257c9c3b3ff55e54e3d0da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 15:04:09 +0800
-Subject: Detect incoherency on GROW
-
-the current pointer to the input has to be between the base and end
-if not stop everything we have an internal state error.
----
- parser.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index 1810f99..ab007aa 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -2075,9 +2075,16 @@ static void xmlGROW (xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- ((ctxt->input->buf) && (ctxt->input->buf->readcallback != (xmlInputReadCallback) xmlNop)) &&
- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "Huge input lookup");
-- ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
-+ xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
-+ return;
- }
- xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
-+ if ((ctxt->input->cur > ctxt->input->end) ||
-+ (ctxt->input->cur < ctxt->input->base)) {
-+ xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
-+ xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "cur index out of bound");
-+ return;
-+ }
- if ((ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (*ctxt->input->cur == 0) &&
- (xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK) <= 0))
- xmlPopInput(ctxt);
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7500.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7500.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1c031e2e80..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7500.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From f1063fdbe7fa66332bbb76874101c2a7b51b519f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 16:06:59 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-7500 Fix memory access error due to incorrect entities
- boundaries
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756525
-handle properly the case where we popped out of the current entity
-while processing a start tag
-Reported by Kostya Serebryany @ Google
-
-This slightly modifies the output of 754946 in regression tests
----
- parser.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index c7e4574..c5741e3 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -9348,7 +9348,7 @@ xmlParseStartTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar **pref,
- const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
- int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
- int nratts, nbatts, nbdef;
-- int i, j, nbNs, attval, oldline, oldcol;
-+ int i, j, nbNs, attval, oldline, oldcol, inputNr;
- const xmlChar *base;
- unsigned long cur;
- int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
-@@ -9367,6 +9367,7 @@ reparse:
- SHRINK;
- base = ctxt->input->base;
- cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
-+ inputNr = ctxt->inputNr;
- oldline = ctxt->input->line;
- oldcol = ctxt->input->col;
- nbatts = 0;
-@@ -9392,7 +9393,8 @@ reparse:
- */
- SKIP_BLANKS;
- GROW;
-- if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
-+ if ((ctxt->input->base != base) || (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr))
-+ goto base_changed;
-
- while (((RAW != '>') &&
- ((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
-@@ -9403,7 +9405,7 @@ reparse:
-
- attname = xmlParseAttribute2(ctxt, prefix, localname,
- &aprefix, &attvalue, &len, &alloc);
-- if (ctxt->input->base != base) {
-+ if ((ctxt->input->base != base) || (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr)) {
- if ((attvalue != NULL) && (alloc != 0))
- xmlFree(attvalue);
- attvalue = NULL;
-@@ -9552,7 +9554,8 @@ skip_ns:
- break;
- }
- SKIP_BLANKS;
-- if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
-+ if ((ctxt->input->base != base) || (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr))
-+ goto base_changed;
- continue;
- }
-
-@@ -9589,7 +9592,8 @@ failed:
- GROW
- if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
- break;
-- if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
-+ if ((ctxt->input->base != base) || (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr))
-+ goto base_changed;
- if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
- break;
- if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
-@@ -9605,7 +9609,8 @@ failed:
- break;
- }
- GROW;
-- if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
-+ if ((ctxt->input->base != base) || (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr))
-+ goto base_changed;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -9772,6 +9777,17 @@ base_changed:
- if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
- xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
- }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We can't switch from one entity to another in the middle
-+ * of a start tag
-+ */
-+ if (inputNr != ctxt->inputNr) {
-+ xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
-+ "Start tag doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
-+ return(NULL);
-+ }
-+
- ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + cur;
- ctxt->input->line = oldline;
- ctxt->input->col = oldcol;
---
-cgit v0.11.2
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_1.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d688149f95..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From a7dfab7411cbf545f359dd3157e5df1eb0e7ce31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 11:17:35 +0800
-Subject: Stop parsing on entities boundaries errors
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=744980
-
-There are times, like on unterminated entities that it's preferable to
-stop parsing, even if that means less error reporting. Entities are
-feeding the parser on further processing, and if they are ill defined
-then it's possible to get the parser to bug. Also do the same on
-Conditional Sections if the input is broken, as the structure of
-the document can't be guessed.
----
- parser.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index a8d1b67..bbe97eb 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -5658,6 +5658,7 @@ xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- if (RAW != '>') {
- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
- "xmlParseEntityDecl: entity %s not terminated\n", name);
-+ xmlStopParser(ctxt);
- } else {
- if (input != ctxt->input) {
- xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_2.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 36b43bacf8..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7941_2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 9b8512337d14c8ddf662fcb98b0135f225a1c489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 11:29:20 +0800
-Subject: Cleanup conditional section error handling
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=744980
-
-The error handling of Conditional Section also need to be
-straightened as the structure of the document can't be
-guessed on a failure there and it's better to stop parsing
-as further errors are likely to be irrelevant.
----
- parser.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index bbe97eb..fe603ac 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -6770,6 +6770,8 @@ xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- SKIP_BLANKS;
- if (RAW != '[') {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID, NULL);
-+ xmlStopParser(ctxt);
-+ return;
- } else {
- if (ctxt->input->id != id) {
- xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
-@@ -6830,6 +6832,8 @@ xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- SKIP_BLANKS;
- if (RAW != '[') {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID, NULL);
-+ xmlStopParser(ctxt);
-+ return;
- } else {
- if (ctxt->input->id != id) {
- xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
-@@ -6885,6 +6889,8 @@ xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-
- } else {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID_KEYWORD, NULL);
-+ xmlStopParser(ctxt);
-+ return;
- }
-
- if (RAW == 0)
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942-2.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1a059fe40b..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 41ac9049a27f52e7a1f3b341f8714149fc88d450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 10:53:44 +0800
-Subject: Fix an error in previous Conditional section patch
-
-an off by one mistake in the change, led to error on correct
-document where the end of the included entity was exactly
-the end of the conditional section, leading to regtest failure
----
- parser.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index b9217ff..d67b300 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -6916,7 +6916,7 @@ xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- NULL, NULL);
- }
- if ((ctxt-> instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
-- ((ctxt->input->cur + 3) < ctxt->input->end))
-+ ((ctxt->input->cur + 3) <= ctxt->input->end))
- SKIP(3);
- }
- }
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb0766a559..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-7942.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From bd0526e66a56e75a18da8c15c4750db8f801c52d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 19:02:28 +0800
-Subject: Another variation of overflow in Conditional sections
-
-Which happen after the previous fix to
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756456
-
-But stopping the parser and exiting we didn't pop the intermediary entities
-and doing the SKIP there applies on an input which may be too small
----
- parser.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index a65e4cc..b9217ff 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -6915,7 +6915,9 @@ xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- "All markup of the conditional section is not in the same entity\n",
- NULL, NULL);
- }
-- SKIP(3);
-+ if ((ctxt-> instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
-+ ((ctxt->input->cur + 3) < ctxt->input->end))
-+ SKIP(3);
- }
- }
-
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8035.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8035.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 92c26ca56d..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8035.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From f0709e3ca8f8947f2d91ed34e92e38a4c23eae63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 15:31:25 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-8035 Fix XZ compression support loop
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=757466
-DoS when parsing specially crafted XML document if XZ support
-is compiled in (which wasn't the case for 2.9.2 and master since
-Nov 2013, fixed in next commit !)
----
- xzlib.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xzlib.c b/xzlib.c
-index 0dcb9f4..1fab546 100644
---- a/xzlib.c
-+++ b/xzlib.c
-@@ -581,6 +581,10 @@ xz_decomp(xz_statep state)
- xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "compressed data error");
- return -1;
- }
-+ if (ret == LZMA_PROG_ERROR) {
-+ xz_error(state, LZMA_PROG_ERROR, "compression error");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
- } while (strm->avail_out && ret != LZMA_STREAM_END);
-
- /* update available output and crc check value */
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8241.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8241.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2108f569b3..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8241.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From ab2b9a93ff19cedde7befbf2fcc48c6e352b6cbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hugh Davenport <hugh@allthethings.co.nz>
-Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 20:40:49 +0800
-Subject: Avoid extra processing of MarkupDecl when EOF
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756263
-
-One place where ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF whic was set up
-by entity detection issues doesn't get noticed, and even overrided
----
- parser.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index d67b300..134afe7 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -6972,6 +6972,14 @@ xmlParseMarkupDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- xmlParsePI(ctxt);
- }
- }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * detect requirement to exit there and act accordingly
-+ * and avoid having instate overriden later on
-+ */
-+ if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
-+ return;
-+
- /*
- * This is only for internal subset. On external entities,
- * the replacement is done before parsing stage
---
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8242.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8242.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b009ae16ac..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8242.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 8fb4a770075628d6441fb17a1e435100e2f3b1a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hugh Davenport <hugh@allthethings.co.nz>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 17:16:06 +0800
-Subject: CVE-2015-8242 Buffer overead with HTML parser in push mode
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=756372
-Error in the code pointing to the codepoint in the stack for the
-current char value instead of the pointer in the input that the SAX
-callback expects
-Reported and fixed by Hugh Davenport
----
- HTMLparser.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/HTMLparser.c b/HTMLparser.c
-index bdf7807..b729197 100644
---- a/HTMLparser.c
-+++ b/HTMLparser.c
-@@ -5735,17 +5735,17 @@ htmlParseTryOrFinish(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int terminate) {
- if (ctxt->keepBlanks) {
- if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
- ctxt->sax->characters(
-- ctxt->userData, &cur, 1);
-+ ctxt->userData, &in->cur[0], 1);
- } else {
- if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
- ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(
-- ctxt->userData, &cur, 1);
-+ ctxt->userData, &in->cur[0], 1);
- }
- } else {
- htmlCheckParagraph(ctxt);
- if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
- ctxt->sax->characters(
-- ctxt->userData, &cur, 1);
-+ ctxt->userData, &in->cur[0], 1);
- }
- }
- ctxt->token = 0;
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-1.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3075d527e9..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 9aa37588ee78a06ca1379a9d9356eab16686099c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 09:08:25 +0800
-Subject: Do not process encoding values if the declaration if broken
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=751603
-
-If the string is not properly terminated do not try to convert
-to the given encoding.
----
- parser.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index fe603ac..a3a9568 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -10404,6 +10404,8 @@ xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
- if (RAW != '"') {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
-+ xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
-+ return(NULL);
- } else
- NEXT;
- } else if (RAW == '\''){
-@@ -10411,6 +10413,8 @@ xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
- if (RAW != '\'') {
- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
-+ xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
-+ return(NULL);
- } else
- NEXT;
- } else {
---
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-2.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f4241d542..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2015-8317-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 709a952110e98621c9b78c4f26462a9d8333102e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 16:10:26 +0800
-Subject: Fail parsing early on if encoding conversion failed
-
-For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=751631
-
-If we fail conversing the current input stream while
-processing the encoding declaration of the XMLDecl
-then it's safer to just abort there and not try to
-report further errors.
----
- parser.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index a3a9568..0edd53b 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -10471,7 +10471,11 @@ xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-
- handler = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler((const char *) encoding);
- if (handler != NULL) {
-- xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler);
-+ if (xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler) < 0) {
-+ /* failed to convert */
-+ ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING;
-+ return(NULL);
-+ }
- } else {
- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
- "Unsupported encoding %s\n", encoding);
---
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4ee17e5711..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/CVE-2016-1839-2073.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-From a820dbeac29d330bae4be05d9ecd939ad6b4aa33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pranjal Jumde <pjumde@apple.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 11:34:04 -0800
-Subject: Bug 758605: Heap-based buffer overread in xmlDictAddString
- <https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758605>
-
-Reviewed by David Kilzer.
-
-* HTMLparser.c:
-(htmlParseName): Add bounds check.
-(htmlParseNameComplex): Ditto.
-* result/HTML/758605.html: Added.
-* result/HTML/758605.html.err: Added.
-* result/HTML/758605.html.sax: Added.
-* runtest.c:
-(pushParseTest): The input for the new test case was so small
-(4 bytes) that htmlParseChunk() was never called after
-htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(), thereby creating a false positive
-test failure. Fixed by using a do-while loop so we always call
-htmlParseChunk() at least once.
-* test/HTML/758605.html: Added.
----
- HTMLparser.c | 8 ++++++++
- result/HTML/758605.html | 3 +++
- result/HTML/758605.html.err | 3 +++
- result/HTML/758605.html.sax | 13 +++++++++++++
- runtest.c | 4 ++--
- test/HTML/758605.html | 1 +
- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 result/HTML/758605.html
- create mode 100644 result/HTML/758605.html.err
- create mode 100644 result/HTML/758605.html.sax
- create mode 100644 test/HTML/758605.html
-
-diff --git a/HTMLparser.c b/HTMLparser.c
-index 69eed2b..1c112cc 100644
---- a/HTMLparser.c
-+++ b/HTMLparser.c
-@@ -2471,6 +2471,10 @@ htmlParseName(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- (*in == '_') || (*in == '-') ||
- (*in == ':') || (*in == '.'))
- in++;
-+
-+ if (in == ctxt->input->end)
-+ return(NULL);
-+
- if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
- count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
- ret = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur, count);
-@@ -2514,6 +2518,10 @@ htmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
- NEXTL(l);
- c = CUR_CHAR(l);
- }
-+
-+ if (ctxt->input->base > ctxt->input->cur - len)
-+ return(NULL);
-+
- return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
- }
-
-diff --git a/result/HTML/758605.html b/result/HTML/758605.html
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a085cce
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/HTML/758605.html
-@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd">
-+<html><body><p>&amp;
-+</p></body></html>
-diff --git a/result/HTML/758605.html.err b/result/HTML/758605.html.err
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2b82be6
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/HTML/758605.html.err
-@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+./test/HTML/758605.html:1: HTML parser error : htmlParseEntityRef: no name
-+ê
-+ ^
-diff --git a/result/HTML/758605.html.sax b/result/HTML/758605.html.sax
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1f5cd32
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/HTML/758605.html.sax
-@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
-+SAX.setDocumentLocator()
-+SAX.startDocument()
-+SAX.error: htmlParseEntityRef: no name
-+SAX.startElement(html)
-+SAX.startElement(body)
-+SAX.startElement(p)
-+SAX.characters(&amp;, 1)
-+SAX.ignorableWhitespace(
-+, 1)
-+SAX.endElement(p)
-+SAX.endElement(body)
-+SAX.endElement(html)
-+SAX.endDocument()
-diff --git a/runtest.c b/runtest.c
-index 36fbe5a..bb74d2a 100644
---- a/runtest.c
-+++ b/runtest.c
-@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@ pushParseTest(const char *filename, const char *result,
- ctxt = xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(NULL, NULL, base + cur, 4, filename);
- xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
- cur += 4;
-- while (cur < size) {
-+ do {
- if (cur + 1024 >= size) {
- #ifdef LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED
- if (options & XML_PARSE_HTML)
-@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ pushParseTest(const char *filename, const char *result,
- xmlParseChunk(ctxt, base + cur, 1024, 0);
- cur += 1024;
- }
-- }
-+ } while (cur < size);
- doc = ctxt->myDoc;
- #ifdef LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED
- if (options & XML_PARSE_HTML)
-diff --git a/test/HTML/758605.html b/test/HTML/758605.html
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9b1b3c2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/test/HTML/758605.html
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+&:ê
---
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/main/libxml2/libxml2-pthread.patch b/main/libxml2/libxml2-pthread.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 77d7b3849b..0000000000
--- a/main/libxml2/libxml2-pthread.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- libxml2-2.9.1/threads.c.orig
-+++ libxml2-2.9.1/threads.c
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_PTHREAD_H
-
- static int libxml_is_threaded = -1;
--#ifdef __GNUC__
-+#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GLIBC__)
- #ifdef linux
- #if (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 3) || (__GNUC__ > 3)
- extern int pthread_once (pthread_once_t *__once_control,