diff options
author | Leonardo Arena <rnalrd@alpinelinux.org> | 2018-11-07 10:32:50 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Leonardo Arena <rnalrd@alpinelinux.org> | 2018-11-07 10:35:15 +0000 |
commit | 8c2d71dd458536e9d5a49d021487f3e805b9d190 (patch) | |
tree | a7c090ac7c140f6d9489bf9b55bab1b900cc9067 | |
parent | 2c95720d66c8167a4dbe82ef7f5e9e5a05a9d8f1 (diff) | |
download | aports-8c2d71dd458536e9d5a49d021487f3e805b9d190.tar.bz2 aports-8c2d71dd458536e9d5a49d021487f3e805b9d190.tar.xz |
main/dropbear: security fix (CVE-2018-15599)
Fixes #9351
-rw-r--r-- | main/dropbear/APKBUILD | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch | 232 |
2 files changed, 238 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/main/dropbear/APKBUILD b/main/dropbear/APKBUILD index 24d97f38db..dfda23714b 100644 --- a/main/dropbear/APKBUILD +++ b/main/dropbear/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=dropbear pkgver=2017.75 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="small SSH 2 client/server designed for small memory environments" url="http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html" arch="all" @@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ source="http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.bz2 dropbear.confd dropbear-0.53.1-static_build_fix.patch dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch + CVE-2018-15599.patch " builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver _progs="dropbear dropbearkey dbclient dropbearconvert scp" # secfixes: +# 2017.75-r1: +# - CVE-2018-15599 # 2017.75-r0: # - CVE-2017-9078 # - CVE-2017-9079 @@ -96,4 +99,5 @@ sha512sums="9c2f2a5e718339f83abc0ad7719bda12bfc75e5bcb87a7c0eec0afefc743e5c0a157 9c55ab3d8b61955cde1ccc1b8acbd3d2ef123feb9489e92737304c35315d07b7f85fad8a12ac7b0ec2c1dcee3d76b8bc4aa18518f4ddd963917805db33e48826 dropbear.initd 83f2c1eaf7687917a4b2bae7d599d4378c4bd64f9126ba42fc5d235f2b3c9a474d1b3168d70ed64bb4101cc251d30bc9ae20604da9b5d819fcd635ee4d0ebb0f dropbear.confd c9b0f28eb9653de21da4e8646fc27870a156112bce3d8a13baa6154ebf4baada3dee4f75bd5fdf5b6cd24a43fb80fb009e917d139d9e65d35118b082de0ebfbf dropbear-0.53.1-static_build_fix.patch -7fed3e2566f56f0445df185437afaddf7a029df0e4d5f265c1e97a89ce4a8d61b1b4aaae8ecaf25d94251fa9d14bb5b01b4cf7afa1a52289a4f8c7d042029d3c dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch" +7fed3e2566f56f0445df185437afaddf7a029df0e4d5f265c1e97a89ce4a8d61b1b4aaae8ecaf25d94251fa9d14bb5b01b4cf7afa1a52289a4f8c7d042029d3c dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch +51ba4866bf42aeb4ab756f7a3f9f425362ae74184ae3ae327e0c55c4cd29311aa6b9831126f2238cd88f2fda624e8494230efda3dbec5828c0259b3a93ade102 CVE-2018-15599.patch" diff --git a/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch b/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..233e99287d --- /dev/null +++ b/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +commit 52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 +Author: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> +Date: Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800 + + Wait to fail invalid usernames + +--- + auth.h | 6 +++--- + svr-auth.c | 19 +++++-------------- + svr-authpam.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- + svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- + svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index da498f5..98f5468 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void); + void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail); + void send_msg_userauth_success(); + void send_msg_userauth_banner(buffer *msg); +-void svr_auth_password(void); +-void svr_auth_pubkey(void); +-void svr_auth_pam(void); ++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user); ++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user); ++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user); + + #ifdef ENABLE_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS + int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(); +diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c +index c19c090..edde86b 100644 +--- a/svr-auth.c ++++ b/svr-auth.c +@@ -176,10 +176,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { + if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN && + strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD, + AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) { +- if (valid_user) { +- svr_auth_password(); +- goto out; +- } ++ svr_auth_password(valid_user); ++ goto out; + } + } + #endif +@@ -191,10 +189,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { + if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN && + strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD, + AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) { +- if (valid_user) { +- svr_auth_pam(); +- goto out; +- } ++ svr_auth_pam(valid_user); ++ goto out; + } + } + #endif +@@ -204,12 +200,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { + if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN && + strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY, + AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) { +- if (valid_user) { +- svr_auth_pubkey(); +- } else { +- /* pubkey has no failure delay */ +- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); +- } ++ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user); + goto out; + } + #endif +diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c +index 05e4f3e..d201bc9 100644 +--- a/svr-authpam.c ++++ b/svr-authpam.c +@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg, + * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it + * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the + * interactive responses, over the network. */ +-void svr_auth_pam() { ++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) { + + struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL}; + struct pam_conv pamConv = { + pamConvFunc, + &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */ + }; ++ const char* printable_user = NULL; + + pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL; + +@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { + + password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen); + ++ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is valid ++ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay. ++ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name. ++ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */ ++ + /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother with + * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation + * function (above) which takes care of it */ +- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name; ++ userData.user = ses.authstate.username; + userData.passwd = password; + ++ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) { ++ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name; ++ } else { ++ printable_user = "<invalid username>"; ++ } ++ + /* Init pam */ + if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { + dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s", +@@ -236,7 +248,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { + rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc)); + dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, + "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s", +- ses.authstate.pw_name, ++ printable_user, + svr_ses.addrstring); + send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); + goto cleanup; +@@ -247,12 +259,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { + rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc)); + dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, + "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s", +- ses.authstate.pw_name, ++ printable_user, + svr_ses.addrstring); + send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); + goto cleanup; + } + ++ if (!valid_user) { ++ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for another reason ++ (checkusername() failed) */ ++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); ++ } ++ + /* successful authentication */ + dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s", + ses.authstate.pw_name, +diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c +index bdee2aa..69c7d8a 100644 +--- a/svr-authpasswd.c ++++ b/svr-authpasswd.c +@@ -46,22 +46,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char* b) { + + /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as + * appropriate */ +-void svr_auth_password() { ++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) { + + char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow */ + char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password sent */ +- char * password; ++ unsigned char * password = NULL; + unsigned int passwordlen; +- + unsigned int changepw; + +- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd; +- +-#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT +- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */ +- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT; +-#endif +- + /* check if client wants to change password */ + changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload); + if (changepw) { +@@ -71,12 +63,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() { + } + + password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen); +- +- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */ +- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt); ++ if (valid_user) { ++ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */ ++ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd; ++ testcrypt = crypt((char*)password, passwdcrypt); ++ } + m_burn(password, passwordlen); + m_free(password); + ++ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username ++ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */ ++ if (!valid_user) { ++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (testcrypt == NULL) { + /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */ + dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked", +diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c +index aa6087c..ff481c8 100644 +--- a/svr-authpubkey.c ++++ b/svr-authpubkey.c +@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename); + + /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as + * appropriate */ +-void svr_auth_pubkey() { ++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) { + + unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is usable */ + unsigned char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */ +@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() { + keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload); + keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen); + ++ if (!valid_user) { ++ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet ++ required to validate a public key. ++ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to prevent ++ testing for user existence if the public key is known */ ++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + /* check if the key is valid */ + if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); |