main/openssh: security fix for CVE-2014-2653

fixes #2860

this also makes sure that CVE-2014-2532 is actually applied

2 files changed, 92 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssh/APKBUILD b/main/openssh/APKBUILD
index 70b5103e6c..9e5ca57dfe 100644
--- a/main/openssh/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssh/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 pkgname=openssh
 pkgver=6.4_p1
 _myver=${pkgver%_*}${pkgver#*_}
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release"
 url="http://www.openssh.org/portable.html"
 arch="all"
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ source="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/$pkgname-$_myver.tar.
 	sshd.initd
 	sshd.confd
 	CVE-2014-2532.patch
+	CVE-2014-2653.patch
 	"
 # HPN patches are from: http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh
 
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ prepare() {
 			msg "Applying $i"
 			gunzip -c "$srcdir"/"${i##*/}" | patch -p1 -N || return 1
 			;;
-		*.diff)
+		*.diff|*.patch)
 			msg "Applying $i"
 			patch -p1 -N -i "$srcdir"/${i##*/} || return 1
 			;;
@@ -110,7 +111,8 @@ c65d454dc5b149647273485fc184636d  openssh-hmac-accel.diff
 f7d9d6f96940ef66bd3c3a0aa27e57a7  openssh-fix-utmp.diff
 cb0dd08c413fad346f0c594107b4a2e0  sshd.initd
 b35e9f3829f4cfca07168fcba98749c7  sshd.confd
-e4cf579145106ce3d4465453b70ea50d  CVE-2014-2532.patch"
+e4cf579145106ce3d4465453b70ea50d  CVE-2014-2532.patch
+02a7de5652d9769576e3b252d768cd0f  CVE-2014-2653.patch"
 sha256sums="5530f616513b14aea3662c4c373bafd6a97a269938674c006377e381f68975d2  openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
 4f78f16807c6b6a3a3773c000b85df0c56ea8a93dc35eaa6bbdffe6e30328e58  openssh6.2-dynwindows.diff
 6e803be3b3569eedfe69d9e9aeabef2e3fec2ed28f75bc456dfd69c2ef2c8198  openssh-peaktput.diff
@@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ c3189ba0e17e60e83851ac2d6f18ad5b08cb90cccfce31d61cccb9fd76d44d59  openssh-fix-in
 f2748da45d0bc31055727f8c80d93e1872cc043ced3202e2f6d150aca3c08dde  openssh-fix-utmp.diff
 3fa062fd4bfac64abf21f3c1d0548f1dfcf3c6e56e84ece14c848f53a293024e  sshd.initd
 29c6d57ac3ec6018cadc6ba6cd9b90c9ed46e20049b970fdcc68ee2481a2ee41  sshd.confd
-323d1a7a0ff72143580ac1b0ce2a28b9640f956368bc6629890c22c79af28aaa  CVE-2014-2532.patch"
+323d1a7a0ff72143580ac1b0ce2a28b9640f956368bc6629890c22c79af28aaa  CVE-2014-2532.patch
+03826427d72f86c68f079acab6c9c86e8f27f7514b66428f404c2f235fd0c0bd  CVE-2014-2653.patch"
 sha512sums="f87b3e1d3110b87c1dfff729459ff26024863480c8eb4449b9e3b0b750d187acdfedb199ca4ea133b5dfa436bed0e2eea7607392d451b18c626c4dc1d38bb52a  openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
 773cc0629e17a8f78e82be56e579855ea9b3ca8fd26360964aee854d717a7cfc2c9d4d654cf0fda5723c3aabe96e48ee2cfe6d1fd64b5717f0ef5eb997d00293  openssh6.2-dynwindows.diff
 64f5aff3fc1a0d2f7c65ea875d1c2c4d98a3d305ff2677d9d4ca82f20778df9e317b1bfc428cee2b0df1bfa01a65dfcf83b68435a227a23a2cf3400fef35d656  openssh-peaktput.diff
@@ -128,4 +131,5 @@ aaa128126400171d0755038a846672aa7b1e87340edf73a672962d403abf404ef1821466b17da51d
 cc909f68d9da1b264926973b96d36162b5c588299c98d62f526faf2ef1273d98bb8d8dea4d482770a2aef88bcbf15fa61144401aef9ab916c15e1623bcf449b5  openssh-fix-utmp.diff
 1483e2bcd700da9b02f04508d490b472c816344787bf1675fef2f7e27f72b91e4323e4e8c1db701e47d81d37d6d4b0623eaeac46b2cf589ae5ad69f363baa594  sshd.initd
 b9ae816af54a55e134a9307e376f05367b815f1b3fd545c2a2c312d18aedcf907f413e8bad8db980cdd9aad4011a72a79e1e94594f69500939a9cb46287f2f81  sshd.confd
-4521052ef55b77a2932484fa52f4a7688e8dbd4e6aa1e210ce24a59b8501775ca7e844108e36c06a9e3a47b70cd8d59007c12ca7a7bb8af27ae1e31e7b0de34d  CVE-2014-2532.patch"
+4521052ef55b77a2932484fa52f4a7688e8dbd4e6aa1e210ce24a59b8501775ca7e844108e36c06a9e3a47b70cd8d59007c12ca7a7bb8af27ae1e31e7b0de34d  CVE-2014-2532.patch
+be48059ae1715669f970a19acde14f262588172c5a8d8d1c84159bc69a60c5750b21c98f39f65df72ae071f7f918046000a2499b9ef16ba2cb4bcd8399bc8e40  CVE-2014-2653.patch"
diff --git a/main/openssh/CVE-2014-2653.patch b/main/openssh/CVE-2014-2653.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b453081c5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssh/CVE-2014-2653.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 08a63152deb5deda168aaef870bdb9f56425acb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Vernon <mcv21@cam.ac.uk>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 15:32:23 +0000
+Subject: Attempt SSHFP lookup even if server presents a certificate
+
+If an ssh server presents a certificate to the client, then the client
+does not check the DNS for SSHFP records. This means that a malicious
+server can essentially disable DNS-host-key-checking, which means the
+client will fall back to asking the user (who will just say "yes" to
+the fingerprint, sadly).
+
+This patch is by Damien Miller (of openssh upstream). It's simpler
+than the patch by Mark Wooding which I applied yesterday; a copy is
+taken of the proffered key/cert, the key extracted from the cert (if
+necessary), and then the DNS consulted.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/742513
+Patch-Name: sshfp_with_server_cert_upstr
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 87c3770..324f5e0 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1224,29 +1224,39 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	int flags = 0;
+ 	char *fp;
++	Key *plain = NULL;
+ 
+ 	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+-	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
+-	if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+-	    verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
+-		if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+-
+-			if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+-			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+-			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
+-				return 0;
+-
+-			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+-				matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+-			} else {
+-				warn_changed_key(host_key);
+-				error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
+-				    "host key to get rid of this message.");
++	if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
++		/*
++		 * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
++		 * them and try the plain key.
++		 */
++		plain = key_from_private(host_key);
++		if (key_is_cert(plain))
++			key_drop_cert(plain);
++		if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
++			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
++				if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
++				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
++				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
++					key_free(plain);
++					return 0;
++				}
++				if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
++					matching_host_key_dns = 1;
++				} else {
++					warn_changed_key(plain);
++					error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
++					    "with the new host key to get rid "
++					    "of this message.");
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
++		key_free(plain);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,