main/wpa_supplicant: security fix (CVE-2018-14526)

fixes #9219

2 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
index bc1a2c208c..fa5528926f 100644
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ source="http://w1.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
 	rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
 	rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+	rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 
 	wpa_supplicant.initd
 	wpa_supplicant.confd
@@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ source="http://w1.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	wpa_cli.sh"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   2.6-r14:
+#     - CVE-2018-14526
 #   2.6-r7:
 #     - CVE-2017-13077
 #     - CVE-2017-13078
@@ -106,6 +109,7 @@ a6382d8e84b4829be33c46bf2f4c6f3232c9d924a4547a21dfe023bf5be8ee1c635920295f52be28
 37d050b2e4a3598484912667d8b2705fbe84c5c562267f900d42b0c7b606fb1fed09ddca8b80e2131768baa8f3690aab6ba7a232dee6ff1e66150fdb8816c927  rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
 111e655cfbb3a86e3792040e0ea375490d31c42c9d43cbe911290d54df5f4db437e4c8ad0e937c51729dcefeb0db0989b8ab55b9523398683abd08ebfec18076  rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
 fc84edd8b30305cc42053c872554098f3f077292ec980ed6a442f37884087ff2f055738fd55977ed792bef1887dcc8c4626586465d78dd0258edb83dcd50a65a  rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+c275cb1a41901d3e5389ca301809baa16a73b40afdcd3a24b63b294e1b9e5eaead148b30742273deecbdd03c6b387a6b3da74de2ae6c49a499b5dd326ff4da9f  rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 11eed22f6e793f40c788d586c715deecae03c421d11761b7b4a376660bce812c54cc6f353c7d4d5da9c455aeffd778baefb9e76d380027a729574a756e54ddcc  wpa_supplicant.initd
 cbfc6b80cb47d4e33415018054a0d8ba39acbadbc3e44776afa918cc4c1e4d36ed3dd809b3448332575ac4fa0b82ad77d7530563f0b9f5e1374a5deea73a3b93  wpa_supplicant.confd
 c3db077fa78dd296d90d07626cb4e684f87618a77ffd51c1ae04b47be7bc0db1e9a3e0f7442acef21c081f6bb782f150cbbd3d0bf245d6ab43f19da3899b53b9  wpa_cli.confd
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a62b52c6b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+ 
+ 	if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ 	    (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++		/*
++		 * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++		 * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++		 * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++		 * which is the case in this code branch.
++		 */
++		if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++				"WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ 						    &key_data_len))
+ 			goto out;