main/cyrus-sasl: security fix for CVE-2013-4122

we should not be affected but the fix looks correct so we apply it just
in case.

fixes #4696

2 files changed, 125 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/main/cyrus-sasl/APKBUILD b/main/cyrus-sasl/APKBUILD
index 90b6879200..951bce5459 100644
--- a/main/cyrus-sasl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/cyrus-sasl/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=cyrus-sasl
 pkgver=2.1.26
-pkgrel=6
+pkgrel=7
 pkgdesc="Cyrus Simple Authentication Service Layer (SASL)"
 url="http://cyrusimap.web.cmu.edu/downloads.html#sasl"
 arch="all"
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ source="ftp://ftp.cyrusimap.org/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	saslauthd.initd
 	cyrus-sasl-2.1.25-avoid_pic_overwrite.patch
 	cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch
+	CVE-2013-4122.patch
 	"
 
 _builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -96,12 +97,15 @@ libsasl() {
 md5sums="a7f4e5e559a0e37b3ffc438c9456e425  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26.tar.gz
 6e7cbe301015777bf53d5f08ac4362f0  saslauthd.initd
 085acdc345bcce896f3eea8956cc0892  cyrus-sasl-2.1.25-avoid_pic_overwrite.patch
-bcaafcbc79054e8356217213d6eda16d  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch"
+bcaafcbc79054e8356217213d6eda16d  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch
+8b3f65a7c8fbcbd7b7da2865f71b8aa7  CVE-2013-4122.patch"
 sha256sums="8fbc5136512b59bb793657f36fadda6359cae3b08f01fd16b3d406f1345b7bc3  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26.tar.gz
 d6d23c360d52cf35bf266ce32b7c0eccafd79f55daa3e97733a899c97211a90c  saslauthd.initd
 80cb9cf22b0507b503ff0cf6c5946a44eb5c3808e0a77e66d56d5a53e5e76fa7  cyrus-sasl-2.1.25-avoid_pic_overwrite.patch
-b85b20bdd25b42098e07a8ba7e435f02b5cd882dcf69572c4d32de4a5e4f41bb  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch"
+b85b20bdd25b42098e07a8ba7e435f02b5cd882dcf69572c4d32de4a5e4f41bb  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch
+e32013e7ba1d9a80c18524a413f3b3c4bfc325e1c07b1552908b631edb803346  CVE-2013-4122.patch"
 sha512sums="78819cb9bb38bea4537d6770d309deeeef09ff44a67526177609d3e1257ff4334d2b5e5131d5a1e4dea7430d8db1918ea9d171f0dee38b5e8337f4b72ed068f0  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26.tar.gz
 71a00a22f91f0fb6ba2796acede321a0f071b1d7a99616f0e36c354213777f30575c340b6df392dcbfc103ba7640d046144882f6a7b505f59709bb5c429b44d8  saslauthd.initd
 033e3634116e1d3b316052dbe0b671cca0fcfb6063fca1a97d990c422c2ce05109a1e424e84ed9928dc0312a325a7248f2d2e3f9547f84453b36331c01f63be5  cyrus-sasl-2.1.25-avoid_pic_overwrite.patch
-fe4c3e6d5230eb50b9e6885129760a12e7bce316b41a3e58b2c550fa83526b91205cd827f7d1367751313559875d32982b95b024b1a22300ac5b35214e7c2b78  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch"
+fe4c3e6d5230eb50b9e6885129760a12e7bce316b41a3e58b2c550fa83526b91205cd827f7d1367751313559875d32982b95b024b1a22300ac5b35214e7c2b78  cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-size_t.patch
+08964bc3ad713e137b8f05f9bac345d79676d14784bc37525f195e8e2a3e6740428237b64f7eeeacc0c71ed6cf1664c6e9c2267ac6df327761d92174a1853744  CVE-2013-4122.patch"
diff --git a/main/cyrus-sasl/CVE-2013-4122.patch b/main/cyrus-sasl/CVE-2013-4122.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38f2595a5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/cyrus-sasl/CVE-2013-4122.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100
+Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
+
+Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
+(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
+on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
+passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
+
+When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
+NULL pointer dereference.
+
+Patch by mancha1@hush.com.
+
+diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+index 4b34222..400289c 100644
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     char* r;
++    char* crpt_passwd;
+     struct passwd *pwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getpwnam(userid);
+@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
+     else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
+ 	r = "Account disabled";
+     }
+-    else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	r = "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     struct spwd *pwd;
++    char *crpt_passwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getspnam(userid);
+     if (!pwd) {
+ 	return "Userid not found";
+     }
+     
+-    if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	return "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ {
+     /* VARIABLES */
+     struct passwd *pw;			/* pointer to passwd file entry */
++    char *crpt_passwd;			/* encrypted password */
+     int errnum;
+     /* END VARIABLES */
+   
+@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+index 677131b..1988afd 100644
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");
+     }
+ 
+-    cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
+-    if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
++    cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    /*
+ 	     * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an
+@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
+ 		   sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
+ 	}
+-	free(cpw);
+ 	RETURN("NO Incorrect password");
+     }
+-    free(cpw);
+ 
+     /*
+      * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
+@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Invalid username");
+     }
+   
+-    if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
+ 		   password, upw->upw_passwd);
+-- 
+cgit v0.10.2
+