main/hostapd: security fixes (CVE-2019-13377)

Ref #10731

Remove uneeded patch

8 files changed, 350 insertions, 47 deletions

diff --git a/main/hostapd/0001-SAE-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-compar.patch b/main/hostapd/0001-SAE-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-compar.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..073f1e3ce1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0001-SAE-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-compar.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From e43f08991f00820c1f711ca254021d5f83b5cd7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 18:52:34 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] SAE: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
+ comparison
+
+This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
+operation that could depend on the used password.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8e14b030e558d23f65d761895c07089404e61cf1)
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 5a50294a6..0d56e5505 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
+ 			pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ 
+-	if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
++	if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-co.patch b/main/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-co.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e27cd827e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-co.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 20d7bd83c43fb24c4cf84d3045254d3ee1957166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:07:05 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] EAP-pwd: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
+ comparison
+
+This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
+operation that could depend on the used password.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7958223fdcfe82479e6ed71019a84f6d4cbf799c)
+---
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+index 884150e6c..6ca2c8bad 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 	u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
+ 	struct crypto_hash *hash;
+ 	unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
+@@ -161,6 +162,11 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
+ 
+ 	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
++	primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
++	primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
++	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
++				 primebytelen) < 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
+ 	tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
+ 	pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
+@@ -170,8 +176,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
+-	primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
+ 	if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
+ 			   "buffer");
+@@ -237,6 +241,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		if (primebitlen % 8)
+ 			buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
+ 					8 - primebitlen % 8);
++		if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
++			continue;
+ 
+ 		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
+ 		x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
+@@ -246,9 +252,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
+-			continue;
+-
+ 		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
+ 				prfbuf, primebytelen);
+ 		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0003-OpenSSL-Use-BN_bn2binpad-or-BN_bn2bin_padded-if-avai.patch b/main/hostapd/0003-OpenSSL-Use-BN_bn2binpad-or-BN_bn2bin_padded-if-avai.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..16feeaabb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0003-OpenSSL-Use-BN_bn2binpad-or-BN_bn2bin_padded-if-avai.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From ee34d8cfbd0fbf7ba7429531d4bee1c43b074d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:23:05 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] OpenSSL: Use BN_bn2binpad() or BN_bn2bin_padded() if
+ available
+
+This converts crypto_bignum_to_bin() to use the OpenSSL/BoringSSL
+functions BN_bn2binpad()/BN_bn2bin_padded(), when available, to avoid
+differences in runtime and memory access patterns depending on the
+leading bytes of the BIGNUM value.
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.2 and LibreSSL do not include such functions, so those cases
+are still using the previous implementation where the BN_num_bytes()
+call may result in different memory access pattern.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 1e237903f5b5d3117342daf006c5878cdb45e3d3)
+---
+ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index 1b0c1ec96..23ae5462d 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -1295,7 +1295,13 @@ void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear)
+ int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 			 u8 *buf, size_t buflen, size_t padlen)
+ {
++#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
++#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++#else
+ 	int num_bytes, offset;
++#endif
++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ 
+ 	if (TEST_FAIL())
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -1303,6 +1309,14 @@ int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	if (padlen > buflen)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
++	if (BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, padlen, (const BIGNUM *) a) == 0)
++		return -1;
++	return padlen;
++#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++	return BN_bn2binpad((const BIGNUM *) a, buf, padlen);
++#else
+ 	num_bytes = BN_num_bytes((const BIGNUM *) a);
+ 	if ((size_t) num_bytes > buflen)
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -1315,6 +1329,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	BN_bn2bin((const BIGNUM *) a, buf + offset);
+ 
+ 	return num_bytes + offset;
++#endif
++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0004-SAE-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it-pri.patch b/main/hostapd/0004-SAE-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it-pri.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a2f398527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0004-SAE-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it-pri.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From a25b48118d75f3c2d7cb1b2c3b4cffb13091a34c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:01:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] SAE: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
+ prime
+
+This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
+hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
+close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+(cherry picked from commit 147bf7b88a9c231322b5b574263071ca6dbb0503)
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 0d56e5505..759e48e22 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
+ 	int res;
+ 	size_t bits;
++	int cmp_prime;
++	unsigned int in_range;
+ 
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ 
+@@ -317,8 +319,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
+ 			pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ 
+-	if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
+-		return 0;
++	cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len);
++	/* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
++	 * being smaller than prime. */
++	in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
++	/* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
++	 * cmp_prime >= 0 (reutnr 0 here), but go through them regardless to
++	 * minimize externally observable differences in behavior. */
+ 
+ 	x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ 	if (!x_cand)
+@@ -330,7 +337,9 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 
+ 	res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
+-	return res;
++	if (res < 0)
++		return res;
++	return const_time_select_int(in_range, res, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0005-EAP-pwd-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it.patch b/main/hostapd/0005-EAP-pwd-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d5ebe59aec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0005-EAP-pwd-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 00a6cc73da61b03c146b6c341d0d1e572bcef432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:02:51 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] EAP-pwd: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
+ prime
+
+This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
+hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
+close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+(cherry picked from commit cd803299ca485eb857e37c88f973fccfbb8600e5)
+---
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+index 6ca2c8bad..fec251472 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
+ 	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
+ 	u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
++	int cmp_prime;
++	unsigned int in_range;
+ 
+ 	if (grp->pwe)
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -241,8 +243,13 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		if (primebitlen % 8)
+ 			buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
+ 					8 - primebitlen % 8);
+-		if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
+-			continue;
++		cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen);
++		/* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
++		 * being smaller than prime. */
++		in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
++		/* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
++		 * cmp_prime >= 0, but go through them regardless to minimize
++		 * externally observable differences in behavior. */
+ 
+ 		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
+ 		x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
+@@ -306,7 +313,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
+ 		found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
+-		found |= mask;
++		found |= mask & in_range;
+ 	}
+ 	if (found == 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0006-dragonfly-Disable-use-of-groups-using-Brainpool-curv.patch b/main/hostapd/0006-dragonfly-Disable-use-of-groups-using-Brainpool-curv.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8dce92fffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/0006-dragonfly-Disable-use-of-groups-using-Brainpool-curv.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 558518ed63202e5358116ab7e0afd5e85490f2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2019 23:19:17 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] dragonfly: Disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
+
+Disable groups that use Brainpool curves for now since they leak more
+timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of two.
+This removes use of groups 28, 29, and 30 from SAE and EAP-pwd.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+(cherry picked from commit 876c5eaa6dae1a87a17603fc489a44c29eedc2e3)
+---
+ src/common/sae.c                | 6 ++++--
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 3 +--
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 759e48e22..2dbc251a4 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@ static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
+ 	 * purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
+ 	 * defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
+ 	 * ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
+-	 * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
++	 * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. Disable
++	 * groups that use Brainpool curves as well for now since they leak more
++	 * timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of
++	 * two. */
+ 	return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
+-		group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
+ 		group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ }
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+index fec251472..4a5eb2599 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
+ {
+ 	/* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
+ 	 * for the similar design in SAE. */
+-	return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
+-		num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
++	return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/APKBUILD b/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
index ca1b1cf93f..2c979ac729 100644
--- a/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=hostapd
 pkgver=2.8
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="daemon for wireless software access points"
 url="http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd/"
 arch="all"
 license="custom"
 makedepends="openssl-dev libnl3-dev linux-headers"
 subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-openrc"
-patches=""
+patches="0001-SAE-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-compar.patch
+	0002-EAP-pwd-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-co.patch
+	0003-OpenSSL-Use-BN_bn2binpad-or-BN_bn2bin_padded-if-avai.patch
+	0004-SAE-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it-pri.patch
+	0005-EAP-pwd-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it.patch
+	0006-dragonfly-Disable-use-of-groups-using-Brainpool-curv.patch
+"
 source="http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	$patches
 	$pkgname.initd
@@ -17,6 +23,8 @@ options="!check" #no testsuite
 builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver/hostapd
 
 # secfixes:
+#   2.8-r1:
+#     - CVE-2019-13377
 #   2.8-r0:
 #     - CVE-2019-11555
 #     - CVE-2019-9496
@@ -92,5 +100,11 @@ package() {
 			"$pkgdir"/usr/share/man/man1/hostapd_cli
 }
 sha512sums="5a352517470912bcb87755a592238eac2d814a7089d4ba1ecb7969f172dbb746a4e9a6c0d47c0d7c4a6a86b04b14ac39147d729fdf3163371c1067490a4897aa  hostapd-2.8.tar.gz
+0dfc8728cfc3a86f7a182a7f71213b94f64880ee4470e2a939c83059df5af7a60d56ec0a8a5f2f717838995f4ef2c6a8fb909324875b0f12a52040239092d115  0001-SAE-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-compar.patch
+88b28f73267b5031417e527b4e2eea117e62649862bafbe99b83b77bade56612283279906c8d1a4c997fb8f32fc7a6cf8c88931a64e9520d1bf45fbdb0e6c381  0002-EAP-pwd-Use-const_time_memcmp-for-pwd_value-prime-co.patch
+01389b9d3951bf1148894c0f4b45d22ef8352a8fe1090721d17216506581305726f6a6c0ebff88479e5342330e75fc04db9201d7d65d4cc6b01a5f7258dc26f9  0003-OpenSSL-Use-BN_bn2binpad-or-BN_bn2bin_padded-if-avai.patch
+1fabc83a5e05ce3d09c89e37365d038bd0eec3a76683966ad172eac3c2c884dbc24fc6ca11c27a8f4582e886d0f1cde73bbede4484352b42a3f686d89d088fff  0004-SAE-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it-pri.patch
+bcae73930c35d441c5615970c305abb3dff293fdec16df50823e57419b22d1aac0e780970619e0c78b4482b7d07962bcf6162706a20e20f7b21a3a10f500eff1  0005-EAP-pwd-Run-through-prf-result-processing-even-if-it.patch
+4734a8ab8ba1e91fc9e3d729f34527c14c291df238b02adea5acc04b0361b41d4bffca2fb13a4f464e9f007fa624117af4f50d755cb41a3129b4868da91bdf9a  0006-dragonfly-Disable-use-of-groups-using-Brainpool-curv.patch
 b54b7c6aa17e5cb86a9b354a516eb2dbefb544df18471339c61d82776de447011a2ac290bea1e6c8beae4b6cebefafb8174683ea42fb773e9e8fe6c679f33ba3  hostapd.initd
 0882263bbd7c0b05bf51f51d66e11a23a0b8ca7da2a3b8a30166d2c5f044c0c134e6bccb1d02c9e81819ca8fb0c0fb55c7121a08fe7233ccaa73ff8ab9a238fe  hostapd.confd"
diff --git a/main/hostapd/CVE-2012-4445.patch b/main/hostapd/CVE-2012-4445.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 552307d279..0000000000
--- a/main/hostapd/CVE-2012-4445.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2012 17:06:29 +0000 (+0300)
-Subject: EAP-TLS server: Fix TLS Message Length validation
-X-Git-Url: http://w1.fi/gitweb/gitweb.cgi?p=hostap.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=586c446e0ff42ae00315b014924ec669023bd8de
-
-EAP-TLS server: Fix TLS Message Length validation
-
-EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST server implementation did not validate TLS
-Message Length value properly and could end up trying to store more
-information into the message buffer than the allocated size if the first
-fragment is longer than the indicated size. This could result in hostapd
-process terminating in wpabuf length validation. Fix this by rejecting
-messages that have invalid TLS Message Length value.
-
-This would affect cases that use the internal EAP authentication server
-in hostapd either directly with IEEE 802.1X or when using hostapd as a
-RADIUS authentication server and when receiving an incorrectly
-constructed EAP-TLS message. Cases where hostapd uses an external
-authentication are not affected.
-
-Thanks to Timo Warns for finding and reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-intended-for: hostap-1
----
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_tls_common.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_tls_common.c
-index 31be2ec..46f282b 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_tls_common.c
-@@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ static int eap_server_tls_process_fragment(struct eap_ssl_data *data,
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 
-+		if (len > message_length) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SSL: Too much data (%d bytes) in "
-+				   "first fragment of frame (TLS Message "
-+				   "Length %d bytes)",
-+				   (int) len, (int) message_length);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+
- 		data->tls_in = wpabuf_alloc(message_length);
- 		if (data->tls_in == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: No memory for message");