main/libarchive: security upgrade to 3.2.0 (CVE-2016-1541)

fixes #5561

3 files changed, 5 insertions, 188 deletions

diff --git a/main/libarchive/APKBUILD b/main/libarchive/APKBUILD
index 75a6954e01..94403ce710 100644
--- a/main/libarchive/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/libarchive/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=libarchive
-pkgver=3.1.2
-pkgrel=2
+pkgver=3.2.0
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="library that can create and read several streaming archive formats"
 url="http://libarchive.googlecode.com/"
 arch="all"
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-tools"
 makedepends="zlib-dev bzip2-dev xz-dev acl-dev openssl-dev expat-dev"
 depends_dev="$makedepends"
 source="http://www.libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-$pkgver.tar.gz
-	CVE-2013-0211.patch
-	CVE-2015-2304.patch
 	"
 
 _builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -47,12 +45,6 @@ tools() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
 }
 
-md5sums="efad5a503f66329bb9d2f4308b5de98a  libarchive-3.1.2.tar.gz
-fc5f5158d414e3a7e9f085d8d1470014  CVE-2013-0211.patch
-b27c60d9288780261410366994103278  CVE-2015-2304.patch"
-sha256sums="eb87eacd8fe49e8d90c8fdc189813023ccc319c5e752b01fb6ad0cc7b2c53d5e  libarchive-3.1.2.tar.gz
-75f30c3867d3924461bb764ea2ca3c1b1e43240aeb5b0dd93a103fd7a7ca7fe9  CVE-2013-0211.patch
-5a862586b4684d819add1df9d747bc47f9a4f2fecd069175bf00f6927c9633bf  CVE-2015-2304.patch"
-sha512sums="1f3c2a675031f93c7d42ae2ed06742b0b1e2236ff57d9117791d62fb8ae77d6cafffbcb5d45b5bd98daa908bd18c576cf82e01a9b1eba699705e23eff3688114  libarchive-3.1.2.tar.gz
-c10470ab67dd94944489f72e4d6f39d98163f5d7a92bcd550aa323e9a1b96148588bd04ac7d8c6ff232dc388559fb3e67552bb5c83ac7626ad714517f5022fce  CVE-2013-0211.patch
-ae3161b36605c81622d4d4c44f33c31e596506dc60ffb43a91b0f7b831d15d48abdd64725cd770bca6795230f1505d301a74db63903c91507195ccdea0737b63  CVE-2015-2304.patch"
+md5sums="596210b5a9c2ff74a0f7ca34838d655f  libarchive-3.2.0.tar.gz"
+sha256sums="7bce45fd71ff01dc20d19edd78322d4965583d81b8bed8e26cacb65d6f5baa87  libarchive-3.2.0.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="e6a0ada8102c1b738115ccd0ffd8e64d2b9c2fa2eda813fddaa5b7e5021d6c063e868263292d9cae5f571482db332c9d49a42827b8ae71ffe14c182d6d214bfc  libarchive-3.2.0.tar.gz"
diff --git a/main/libarchive/CVE-2013-0211.patch b/main/libarchive/CVE-2013-0211.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c927a860e2..0000000000
--- a/main/libarchive/CVE-2013-0211.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 22531545514043e04633e1c015c7540b9de9dbe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
-Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 23:48:41 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX. This prevents a
- certain common programming error (passing -1 to write) from leading to other
- problems deeper in the library.
-
----
- libarchive/archive_write.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write.c b/libarchive/archive_write.c
-index eede5e0..be85621 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_write.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_write.c
-@@ -673,8 +673,13 @@ struct archive_write_filter *
- _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
- {
- 	struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
-+	const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
-+
- 	archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
- 	    ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
-+	/* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
-+	if (s > max_write)
-+		s = max_write;
- 	archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
- 	return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
- }
--- 
-1.8.1.6
-
diff --git a/main/libarchive/CVE-2015-2304.patch b/main/libarchive/CVE-2015-2304.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cb7be5f18c..0000000000
--- a/main/libarchive/CVE-2015-2304.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-From 59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
-Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 12:07:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
-
-This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
----
- cpio/bsdcpio.1                           |  3 ++-
- cpio/cpio.c                              |  2 ++
- libarchive/archive.h                     |  2 ++
- libarchive/archive_write_disk.3          |  3 +++
- libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c    | 14 +++++++++++---
- libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
- 6 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/cpio/bsdcpio.1 b/cpio/bsdcpio.1
-index f966aa0..e52546e 100644
---- a/cpio/bsdcpio.1
-+++ b/cpio/bsdcpio.1
-@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ See above for description.
- .It Fl Fl insecure
- (i and p mode only)
- Disable security checks during extraction or copying.
--This allows extraction via symbolic links and path names containing
-+This allows extraction via symbolic links, absolute paths,
-+and path names containing
- .Sq ..
- in the name.
- .It Fl J , Fl Fl xz
-diff --git a/cpio/cpio.c b/cpio/cpio.c
-index 0acde11..b267e9b 100644
---- a/cpio/cpio.c
-+++ b/cpio/cpio.c
-@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
-+	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
- 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
-@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 		case OPTION_INSECURE:
- 			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
- 			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
-+			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
- 			break;
- 		case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
- 			cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive.h b/libarchive/archive.h
-index 1f0fc38..ef635ac 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive.h
-+++ b/libarchive/archive.h
-@@ -649,6 +649,8 @@ __LA_DECL int archive_read_set_passphrase_callback(struct archive *,
- /* Default: Do not use HFS+ compression if it was not compressed. */
- /* This has no effect except on Mac OS v10.6 or later. */
- #define	ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_HFS_COMPRESSION_FORCED	(0x8000)
-+/* Default: Do not reject entries with absolute paths */
-+#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS (0x10000)
- 
- __LA_DECL int archive_read_extract(struct archive *, struct archive_entry *,
- 		     int flags);
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3 b/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
-index fa925cc..a2e7afa 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
-@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ The default is to not refuse such paths.
- Note that paths ending in
- .Pa ..
- always cause an error, regardless of this flag.
-+.It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
-+Refuse to extract an absolute path.
-+The default is to not refuse such paths.
- .It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE
- Scan data for blocks of NUL bytes and try to recreate them with holes.
- This results in sparse files, independent of whether the archive format
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
-index ab3bdac..c1290eb 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
-@@ -2509,8 +2509,9 @@ cleanup_pathname_win(struct archive_write_disk *a)
- /*
-  * Canonicalize the pathname.  In particular, this strips duplicate
-  * '/' characters, '.' elements, and trailing '/'.  It also raises an
-- * error for an empty path, a trailing '..' or (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
-- * set) any '..' in the path.
-+ * error for an empty path, a trailing '..', (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
-+ * set) any '..' in the path or (if ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
-+ * is set) if the path is absolute.
-  */
- static int
- cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
-@@ -2529,8 +2530,15 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
- 	cleanup_pathname_win(a);
- #endif
- 	/* Skip leading '/'. */
--	if (*src == '/')
-+	if (*src == '/') {
-+		if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
-+			archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
-+			                  "Path is absolute");
-+			return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
-+		}
-+
- 		separator = *src++;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
- 	for (;;) {
-diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c b/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
-index 31c5bfd..2c94206 100644
---- a/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
-+++ b/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
-@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure)
- 	assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
- 	archive_entry_free(ae);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Without security checks, we should be able to
-+	 * extract an absolute path.
-+	 */
-+	assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
-+	archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
-+	archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
-+	assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
-+	assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
-+	assertFileExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
-+	assert(0 == unlink("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp"));
-+
-+	/* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
-+	assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
-+	archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
-+	archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
-+	archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS);
-+	failure("Extracting an absolute path should fail here.");
-+	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
-+	archive_entry_free(ae);
-+	assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
-+	assertFileNotExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
-+
- 	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_free(a));
- 
- 	/* Test the entries on disk. */