main/libasr: rebuild against openssl 1.1

use libbsd for arc4random

1 files changed, 419 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/libasr/arc4random.patch b/main/libasr/arc4random.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f102726702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libasr/arc4random.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+From 87c9d4de14d6d97b08db95ff4fcd7611508d3018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan Curran <jonathan@curran.in>
+Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 12:54:21 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Use arc4random instead of res_randomid.
+
+arc4random implementation was copied from opensmtpd/openbsd-compat
+---
+ configure.ac                    |   4 +
+ openbsd-compat/NOTES            |   1 +
+ openbsd-compat/arc4random.c     | 294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/defines.h        |   9 +
+ openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h |  19 ++-
+ src/res_mkquery.c               |   2 +-
+ src/res_send_async.c            |   2 +-
+ 7 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 10aff04..a5e2681 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -442,6 +442,10 @@ fi
+ #l1572 (customized)
+ dnl    Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
++	arc4random \
++	arc4random_buf \
++	arc4random_stir \
++	arc4random_uniform \
+ 	asprintf \
+ 	bcopy \
+ 	explicit_bzero \
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/NOTES b/openbsd-compat/NOTES
+index baa60ec..869b045 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/NOTES
++++ b/openbsd-compat/NOTES
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ List of files and where they come from
+ 
++arc4random.c		portable openssh
+ clock_gettime.c		handmade
+ defines.h		portable openssh
+ fgetln.c		part of /usr/src/usr.bin/make/util.c
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fa0d630
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
++/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */
++
++/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $	*/
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
++ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
++ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
++
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++
++#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
++#include "chacha_private.h"
++
++#ifdef __GNUC__
++#define inline __inline
++#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
++#define inline
++#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
++
++/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
++#define _ARC4_LOCK()
++#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
++
++#define KEYSZ	32
++#define IVSZ	8
++#define BLOCKSZ	64
++#define RSBUFSZ	(16*BLOCKSZ)
++static int rs_initialized;
++static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
++static chacha_ctx rs;		/* chacha context for random keystream */
++static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ];	/* keystream blocks */
++static size_t rs_have;		/* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
++static size_t rs_count;		/* bytes till reseed */
++
++static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
++
++static inline void
++_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
++{
++	if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
++		return;
++	chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
++	chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ);
++}
++
++static void
++_rs_stir(void)
++{
++	u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
++
++	if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
++		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
++		    ERR_get_error());
++
++	if (!rs_initialized) {
++		rs_initialized = 1;
++		_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
++	} else
++		_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
++	memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd));
++
++	/* invalidate rs_buf */
++	rs_have = 0;
++	memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
++
++	rs_count = 1600000;
++}
++
++static inline void
++_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
++{
++	pid_t pid = getpid();
++
++	if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
++		rs_stir_pid = pid;
++		_rs_stir();
++	} else
++		rs_count -= len;
++}
++
++static inline void
++_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
++{
++#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
++	memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
++#endif
++	/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
++	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
++	/* mix in optional user provided data */
++	if (dat) {
++		size_t i, m;
++
++		m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
++		for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
++			rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
++	}
++	/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
++	_rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
++	memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
++	rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
++}
++
++static inline void
++_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
++{
++	u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
++	size_t m;
++
++	_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
++	while (n > 0) {
++		if (rs_have > 0) {
++			m = MIN(n, rs_have);
++			memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
++			memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
++			buf += m;
++			n -= m;
++			rs_have -= m;
++		}
++		if (rs_have == 0)
++			_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
++	}
++}
++
++static inline void
++_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
++{
++	_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
++	if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
++		_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
++	memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
++	memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
++	rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++arc4random_stir(void)
++{
++	_ARC4_LOCK();
++	_rs_stir();
++	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
++}
++
++void
++arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen)
++{
++	int m;
++
++	_ARC4_LOCK();
++	if (!rs_initialized)
++		_rs_stir();
++	while (datlen > 0) {
++		m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
++		_rs_rekey(dat, m);
++		dat += m;
++		datlen -= m;
++	}
++	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
++}
++
++u_int32_t
++arc4random(void)
++{
++	u_int32_t val;
++
++	_ARC4_LOCK();
++	_rs_random_u32(&val);
++	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
++	return val;
++}
++
++/*
++ * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient 
++ * arc4random_buf().
++ */
++# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
++void
++arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
++{
++	_ARC4_LOCK();
++	_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
++	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
++}
++# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
++#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
++
++/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
++#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
++void
++arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
++{
++	size_t i;
++	u_int32_t r = 0;
++	char *buf = (char *)_buf;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++		if (i % 4 == 0)
++			r = arc4random();
++		buf[i] = r & 0xff;
++		r >>= 8;
++	}
++	explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
++}
++#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
++
++#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
++/*
++ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
++ * avoiding "modulo bias".
++ *
++ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
++ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
++ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
++ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
++ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
++ */
++u_int32_t
++arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
++{
++	u_int32_t r, min;
++
++	if (upper_bound < 2)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
++	min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
++
++	/*
++	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
++	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
++	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
++	 * to re-roll.
++	 */
++	for (;;) {
++		r = arc4random();
++		if (r >= min)
++			break;
++	}
++
++	return r % upper_bound;
++}
++#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
++
++#if 0
++/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <machine/pctr.h>
++int
++main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	const int iter = 1000000;
++	int     i;
++	pctrval v;
++
++	v = rdtsc();
++	for (i = 0; i < iter; i++)
++		arc4random();
++	v = rdtsc() - v;
++	v /= iter;
++
++	printf("%qd cycles\n", v);
++	exit(0);
++}
++#endif
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/defines.h b/openbsd-compat/defines.h
+index da7a42c..e79ef51 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/defines.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/defines.h
+@@ -745,6 +745,15 @@ struct winsize {
+ #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+ #endif
+ 
++/*
++ * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
++ * shouldn't need the latter.
++ */
++#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
++    !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
++# define arc4random_stir()
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
+ # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+ #  define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+index c30591c..a08502d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+@@ -63,7 +63,24 @@ char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+ int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
+-#endif 
++#endif
++
++#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
++# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
++#  define arc4random_stir()
++# endif
++#else
++unsigned int arc4random(void);
++void arc4random_stir(void);
++#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
++
++#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
++void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
++#endif
++
++#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
++u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
++#endif
+ 
+ /* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
+ 
+diff --git a/src/res_mkquery.c b/src/res_mkquery.c
+index 27ed21e..cce4029 100644
+--- a/src/res_mkquery.c
++++ b/src/res_mkquery.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ res_mkquery(int op, const char *dname, int class, int type,
+ 	ac = asr_use_resolver(NULL);
+ 
+ 	memset(&h, 0, sizeof h);
+-	h.id = res_randomid();
++	h.id = arc4random();
+ 	if (ac->ac_options & RES_RECURSE)
+ 		h.flags |= RD_MASK;
+ 	h.qdcount = 1;
+diff --git a/src/res_send_async.c b/src/res_send_async.c
+index a60aa0d..a0f4704 100644
+--- a/src/res_send_async.c
++++ b/src/res_send_async.c
+@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ setup_query(struct asr_query *as, const char *name, const char *dom,
+ 	as->as.dns.obuflen = 0;
+ 
+ 	memset(&h, 0, sizeof h);
+-	h.id = res_randomid();
++	h.id = arc4random();
+ 	if (as->as_ctx->ac_options & RES_RECURSE)
+ 		h.flags |= RD_MASK;
+ 	h.qdcount = 1;