main/libxres: fix CVE-2013-1988

ref #1931

1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch b/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bca2bb0260
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From f468184963e53feda848853c4aefd0197b2cc116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2013 23:36:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] integer overflow in XResQueryClientResources()
+ [CVE-2013-1988 2/2]
+
+The CARD32 rep.num_types needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
+by sizeof(XResType) to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation
+and writing data from the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/XRes.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XRes.c b/src/XRes.c
+index c989985..51e905f 100644
+--- a/src/XRes.c
++++ b/src/XRes.c
+@@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ Status XResQueryClientResources (
+     }
+ 
+     if(rep.num_types) {
+-        if((typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types))) {
++        if (rep.num_types < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XResType)))
++            typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types);
++        else
++            typs = NULL;
++
++        if (typs != NULL) {
+             xXResType scratch;
+             int i;
+ 
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+