main/musl: cherry-pick upstream fixes

1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/musl/0047-set-errno-when-getpw-_r-getgr-_r-and-getspnam_r-fail.patch b/main/musl/0047-set-errno-when-getpw-_r-getgr-_r-and-getspnam_r-fail.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa687c429d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/musl/0047-set-errno-when-getpw-_r-getgr-_r-and-getspnam_r-fail.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 2d7d05f031e014068a61d3076c6178513395d2ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 13:01:34 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] set errno when getpw*_r, getgr*_r, and getspnam_r fail
+
+these functions return an error code, and are not explicitly
+documented to set errno, but they are nonstandard and the historical
+implementations do set errno as well, and some applications expect
+this behavior. do likewise for compatibility.
+
+patch by Rudolph Pereira.
+---
+ src/passwd/getgr_r.c    | 1 +
+ src/passwd/getpw_r.c    | 1 +
+ src/passwd/getspnam_r.c | 8 +++++---
+ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/passwd/getgr_r.c b/src/passwd/getgr_r.c
+index 7246e8a4..f3e8f603 100644
+--- a/src/passwd/getgr_r.c
++++ b/src/passwd/getgr_r.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static int getgr_r(const char *name, gid_t gid, struct group *gr, char *buf, siz
+  	free(mem);
+  	free(line);
+ 	pthread_setcancelstate(cs, 0);
++	if (rv) errno = rv;
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/passwd/getpw_r.c b/src/passwd/getpw_r.c
+index e8cc811e..0c87ab05 100644
+--- a/src/passwd/getpw_r.c
++++ b/src/passwd/getpw_r.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static int getpw_r(const char *name, uid_t uid, struct passwd *pw, char *buf, si
+ 	}
+  	free(line);
+ 	pthread_setcancelstate(cs, 0);
++	if (rv) errno = rv;
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c b/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
+index 92339528..e488b67f 100644
+--- a/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
++++ b/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
+@@ -72,14 +72,15 @@ int getspnam_r(const char *name, struct spwd *sp, char *buf, size_t size, struct
+ 
+ 	/* Disallow potentially-malicious user names */
+ 	if (*name=='.' || strchr(name, '/') || !l)
+-		return EINVAL;
++		return errno = EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	/* Buffer size must at least be able to hold name, plus some.. */
+-	if (size < l+100) return ERANGE;
++	if (size < l+100)
++		return errno = EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	/* Protect against truncation */
+ 	if (snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/etc/tcb/%s/shadow", name) >= sizeof path)
+-		return EINVAL;
++		return errno = EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC);
+ 	if (fd >= 0) {
+@@ -112,5 +113,6 @@ int getspnam_r(const char *name, struct spwd *sp, char *buf, size_t size, struct
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
++	if (rv) errno = rv;
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+-- 
+2.13.0
+