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authorNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2014-02-18 12:35:50 +0000
committerNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2014-02-18 12:35:50 +0000
commitd683fd4dd8ffe042856746069278555cdb19fb7e (patch)
tree942f60b4798cffab6a2c17070a0305940469c340 /main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch
parentb6871bbe78796726224de69ce7328b85b4d9a106 (diff)
downloadaports-d683fd4dd8ffe042856746069278555cdb19fb7e.tar.bz2
aports-d683fd4dd8ffe042856746069278555cdb19fb7e.tar.xz
main/openswan: remove
replaced by strongswan and libreswan
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch')
-rw-r--r--main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch346
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 346 deletions
diff --git a/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch b/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a34a67789b..0000000000
--- a/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,346 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
-Hash: SHA256
-
-commit 7d0ca355a5c7f8337130d4b0b3e7686f2fa4d4c2
-Author: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu Apr 25 12:44:55 2013 -0400
-
- * security: atodn() / atoid() buffer overflow
-
- lib/libswan/x509dn.c:atodn() does not perform any length checking
- whatsoever on the output buffer.
-
- Affected:
- - Libreswan 3.0 and 3.1 (3.2 disabled the oe= option)
- - Openswan versions up to and including 2.6.38
- - Possibly certain strongswan 3.x/4.x versions
-
- This overflow is exposed (pre-authentication) only in opportunistic
- encryption mode. When it is called via receiving a certificate
- via IKEv1 or IKEv2, and when it is loaded from disk, the buffers
- passed to atodn() are big enough.
-
- This means this vulnerability can only be triggered when:
- - Opportunistic Encryption is enabled (oe=yes)
- - The attacker is local in the same network and adds a malicious
- reverse DNS record to the client's IP, or
- - The attacker can trigger an OE DNS lookup to a client fully
- configured with OE and their own key.
-
- Libreswan and openswan versions do not enable Opportunistic Encryption
- per default. Most distributions like RHEL, Fedora, Debian and Ubuntu
- also do not enable OE per default.
-
- This patch addresses the vulnerability in atodn() and further limits the
- atoid() call not to traverse into the ASN1 case when triggered by non-cert
- cases such as opportunistic encryption.
-
- Vulnerability discoverd by Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> of the
- Red Hat Product Security Team.
-
- Patch by D. Hugh Redelmeier <hugh@mimosa.com> and Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
-
-diff --git a/include/asn1.h b/include/asn1.h
-index d69ebf9..b812488 100644
-- --- a/include/asn1.h
-+++ b/include/asn1.h
-@@ -84,8 +84,10 @@ typedef enum {
- #define ASN1_BODY 0x20
- #define ASN1_RAW 0x40
-
-- -#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH 0xffffffff
-+#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH (~(size_t) 0) /* largest size_t */
-
-+#define ASN1_MAX_LEN (1U << (8*3)) /* don't handle objects with length greater than this */
-+#define ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN 4 /* no coded length takes more than 4 bytes. */
-
- /* definition of an ASN.1 object */
-
-diff --git a/include/id.h b/include/id.h
-index d1825b4..b440a11 100644
-- --- a/include/id.h
-+++ b/include/id.h
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ extern const struct id *resolve_myid(const struct id *id);
- extern void set_myFQDN(void);
- extern void free_myFQDN(void);
-
-- -extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok);
-+extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only);
- extern void iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id);
- extern unsigned char* temporary_cyclic_buffer(void);
- extern int idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/id.c b/lib/libswan/id.c
-index 4442971..31ca7e5 100644
-- --- a/lib/libswan/id.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/id.c
-@@ -58,27 +58,29 @@ temporary_cyclic_buffer(void)
-
- /* Convert textual form of id into a (temporary) struct id.
- * Note that if the id is to be kept, unshare_id_content will be necessary.
-+ * This function should be split into parts so the boolean arguments can be
-+ * removed -- Paul
- */
- err_t
-- -atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
-+atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only)
- {
- err_t ugh = NULL;
-
- *id = empty_id;
-
-- - if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
-+ if (!oe_only && myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
- {
- id->kind = ID_MYID;
- }
-- - else if (streq("%fromcert", src))
-+ else if (!oe_only && streq("%fromcert", src))
- {
- id->kind = ID_FROMCERT;
- }
-- - else if (streq("%none", src))
-+ else if (!oe_only && streq("%none", src))
- {
- id->kind = ID_NONE;
- }
-- - else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
-+ else if (!oe_only && strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
- {
- /* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
- id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
-@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
- {
- if (*src == '@')
- {
-- - if (*(src+1) == '#')
-+ if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '#')
- {
- /* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
- * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
-@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
- ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
- , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
- }
-- - else if (*(src+1) == '~')
-+ else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '~')
- {
- /* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
- * we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
-@@ -134,7 +136,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
- ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
- , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
- }
-- - else if (*(src+1) == '[')
-+ else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '[')
- {
- /* if there is a second specifier ([) on the line
- * we interprete this as a text ID_KEY_ID, and we remove
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/secrets.c b/lib/libswan/secrets.c
-index 6e9466b..8ff80e0 100644
-- --- a/lib/libswan/secrets.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/secrets.c
-@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ lsw_process_secret_records(struct secret **psecrets, int verbose,
- }
- else
- {
-- - ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE);
-+ ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
- }
-
- if (ugh != NULL)
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-index 61407e5..7731856 100644
-- --- a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
- {"TCGID" , {oid_TCGID, 12}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING}
- };
-
-- -#define X501_RDN_ROOF 24
-+#define X501_RDN_ROOF elemsof(x501rdns)
-
- /* Maximum length of ASN.1 distinquished name */
- #define ASN1_BUF_LEN 512
-@@ -775,11 +775,11 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
- UNKNOWN_OID = 4
- } state_t;
-
-- - u_char oid_len_buf[3];
-- - u_char name_len_buf[3];
-- - u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
-- - u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
-- - u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
-+ u_char oid_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
-+ u_char name_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
-+ u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
-+ u_char rdn_set_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
-+ u_char dn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
-
- chunk_t asn1_oid_len = { oid_len_buf, 0 };
- chunk_t asn1_name_len = { name_len_buf, 0 };
-@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
-
- err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-- - u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
-+ u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 1 + ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN; /* leave room for prefix */
-
- state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
-
-@@ -885,25 +885,37 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
- code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
-
- /* encode the relative distinguished name */
-- - *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
-- - *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
-- - *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
-- - /* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
-- - *dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
-- - && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
-- - chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
-- -
-- - /* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
-- - dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
-- -
-- - /* reset name and change state */
-- - name = empty_chunk;
-- - state = SEARCH_OID;
-+ if (IDTOA_BUF < dn_ptr - dn->ptr
-+ + 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len /* set */
-+ + 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len /* sequence */
-+ + 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len /* oid len, oid */
-+ + 1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len /* type name */
-+ ) {
-+ /* no room! */
-+ ugh = "DN is too big";
-+ state = UNKNOWN_OID;
-+ /* I think that it is safe to continue (but perhaps pointless) */
-+ } else {
-+ *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
-+ *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
-+ *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
-+ /* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
-+ *dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
-+ && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
-+ chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
-+
-+ /* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
-+ dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
-+
-+ /* reset name and change state */
-+ name = empty_chunk;
-+ state = SEARCH_OID;
-+ }
- }
- break;
- case UNKNOWN_OID:
-@@ -911,9 +923,9 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
- }
- } while (*src++ != '\0');
-
-- - /* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
-- - code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
-- - dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
-+ /* complete the distinguished name sequence: prefix it with ASN1_SEQUENCE and length */
-+ code_asn1_length((size_t)dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
-+ dn->ptr += ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN + 1 - 1 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
- dn->len = 1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
- dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
- *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/connections.c b/programs/pluto/connections.c
-index e8d326b..f08521b 100644
-- --- a/programs/pluto/connections.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/connections.c
-@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ extract_end(struct end *dst, const struct whack_end *src, const char *which)
- }
- else
- {
-- - err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
-+ err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE, FALSE);
-
- if (ugh != NULL)
- {
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/dnskey.c b/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
-index 5525d12..78f1d0a 100644
-- --- a/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
-@@ -277,8 +277,12 @@ decode_iii(char **pp, struct id *gw_id)
- if (*p == '@')
- {
- /* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
-- - err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
-
-+ if(strspn(p,' ') >= IDTOA_BUF) {
-+ return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": ID too large for IDTOA_BUF");
-+ }
-+
-+ err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE, TRUE); /* only run OE related parts of atoid() */
- if (ugh != NULL)
- return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
- , ugh);
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/myid.c b/programs/pluto/myid.c
-index bdd0e12..2e92f25 100644
-- --- a/programs/pluto/myid.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/myid.c
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *idstr)
- if (idstr != NULL)
- {
- struct id id;
-- - err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
-+ err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
-
- if (ugh != NULL)
- {
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c b/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
-index 1725357..7d5072c 100644
-- --- a/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
-@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static void
- key_add_request(const struct whack_message *msg)
- {
- struct id keyid;
-- - err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
-+ err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE, FALSE);
-
- if (ugh != NULL)
- {
-diff --git a/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c b/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
-index c9fe9cf..bf87080 100644
-- --- a/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
-+++ b/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct secret *pick_key(struct secret *host_secrets
- struct secret *s;
- err_t e;
-
-- - e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE);
-+ e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
- if(e) {
- printf("%s: key '%s' is invalid\n", progname, idname);
- exit(4);
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