main/tiff: security fix es for CVE-2013-4243 and CVE-2013-4244

ref #3081

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/tiff/libtiff-CVE-2013-4243.patch b/main/tiff/libtiff-CVE-2013-4243.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c365d992b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/libtiff-CVE-2013-4243.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff --git a/tools/gif2tiff.c b/tools/gif2tiff.c
+index 2731273..ca824e2 100644
+--- a/tools/gif2tiff.c
++++ b/tools/gif2tiff.c
+@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ readgifimage(char* mode)
+         fprintf(stderr, "no colormap present for image\n");
+         return (0);
+     }
++    if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid value of width or height\n");
++        return(0);
++    }
+     if ((raster = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(width*height+EXTRAFUDGE)) == NULL) {
+         fprintf(stderr, "not enough memory for image\n");
+         return (0);
+@@ -406,7 +410,11 @@ process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
+             fprintf(stderr, "bad input: code=%d is larger than clear=%d\n",code, clear);
+             return 0;
+         }
+-	*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
++        if (*fill >= raster + width*height) {
++            fprintf(stderr, "raster full before eoi code\n");
++            return 0;
++        }
++        *(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
+ 	firstchar = oldcode = code;
+ 	return 1;
+     }
+@@ -436,7 +444,11 @@ process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
+     }
+     oldcode = incode;
+     do {
+-	*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
++        if (*fill >= raster + width*height) {
++            fprintf(stderr, "raster full before eoi code\n");
++            return 0;
++        }
++        *(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
+     } while (stackp > stack);
+     return 1;
+ }