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author | Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> | 2016-05-30 19:17:31 +0200 |
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committer | Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> | 2016-05-30 17:21:32 +0000 |
commit | 2806116f403724817d994e53a2ab9cc9dd330867 (patch) | |
tree | 1848c6f66a4f2b8ab9649110855b46fa04d9e5f9 /main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch | |
parent | d089f392f1b48a8facd3f415e911f14d3c696d6a (diff) | |
download | aports-2806116f403724817d994e53a2ab9cc9dd330867.tar.bz2 aports-2806116f403724817d994e53a2ab9cc9dd330867.tar.xz |
main/wpa_supplicant: security fix for CVE-2016-4476, CVE-2016-4477
fixes #5638
Diffstat (limited to 'main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2dd38fee31 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without +filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, +unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the credential value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + + if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && + os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { ++ if (has_newline(value)) ++ return -1; + str_clear_free(cred->password); + cred->password = os_strdup(value); + cred->ext_password = 1; +@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + } + + val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); +- if (val == NULL) { ++ if (val == NULL || ++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ has_newline(val))) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " + "value '%s'.", line, var, value); ++ os_free(val); + return -1; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + |