main/wpa_supplicant: upgrade to 2.5

10 files changed, 17 insertions, 446 deletions

diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 91627fb7b7..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	u16 offset;
- 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
- 	 *	prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5dca20b277..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- 	int res = 0;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
- 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
- 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
- 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d2f9d8aef..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index a629437..1d2079b 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
- 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7edef099eb..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * the first fragment has a total length
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
- 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a601323f14..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-
-The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
-whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
-fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
-for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
-triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
-due to invalid buffer allocation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
- 	 */
-+	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
- 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
- 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
index 781c07c8d6..5a08ac66c5 100644
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Contributor: Sören Tempel <soeren+alpine@soeren-tempel.net>
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=wpa_supplicant
-pkgver=2.4
-pkgrel=8
+pkgver=2.5
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks"
 url="https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
 arch="all"
@@ -11,15 +11,6 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-gui"
 depends="dbus"
 makedepends="openssl-dev dbus-dev libnl3-dev qt-dev pcsc-lite-dev"
 source="http://w1.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
-	CVE-2015-1863.patch
-	CVE-2015-4141.patch
-	CVE-2015-4142.patch
-	0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
-	0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
-	0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
-	0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
-	0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
-
 	wpa_supplicant.initd
 	wpa_supplicant.confd
 
@@ -88,42 +79,18 @@ gui() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/wpa_gui "$subpkgdir"/usr/bin/
 }
 
-md5sums="f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
-8e8c34267fefcc4142ee142e5515b5df  CVE-2015-1863.patch
-222ec96a8dc73c41608cc463beac3966  CVE-2015-4141.patch
-d3688697f81ca1e684a79dfa3682a111  CVE-2015-4142.patch
-87d611a9b704402f66fa59ba1458928d  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
-bafcec421e4f5c6a8383893d029a79e5  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
-fa2aed3cf49f7e6c7b17bf9db9a001f5  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
-de0fca4d74a1883d15ef5754f13a5226  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
-9d854969af23b207f9f3dff38ef78770  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+md5sums="96ff75c3a514f1f324560a2376f13110  wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz
 a8da41f58b8b4779d666ab7bd8233c18  wpa_supplicant.initd
 bc117427f2c538439f3f1481a028ee06  wpa_supplicant.confd
-b461dfd45a3bb9a4efde08abf32f4f82  config
+4e3dea6c543b6d296e0b5123d5608499  config
 707c26fbf3fa46a6410732efa7128eee  wpa_cli.sh"
-sha256sums="058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
-a3abf75801f02199ff48c316a7b6598860e6ca20ce2fe79b0bec873905e5c8a4  CVE-2015-1863.patch
-eb63d845fdc38b6310c527ad1705b6fe3b74f90e263188da2aca97468cc55142  CVE-2015-4141.patch
-cc6c488afab4ccfdaedd9e224989b5fe713d6b0415ea94579190bd8ba60c9be5  CVE-2015-4142.patch
-a204bc37f52e5346780a306c01706689eb46263dedcdcb1eb2f4c0b291a0db93  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
-298fc3b89f987922fb2600d0c95e8c868d6da30d24643748afd47bcd30da7b44  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
-2fd42fb53be793c54343aa18a84afebe4603aa6ce8b6969ad6b3a8d327c6b142  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
-c28ca6303a562809dfd1812f9b918808b3b0f0c52cc43070fd1777e1cfc88f18  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
-04ef66fbd5b2167274cd7123d7f7252963b9a9c1ec2f5edf6558a6ad92d47689  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+sha256sums="cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316  wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz
 5d6ee43b7752d15013fb31298087e9d82caa2568064e59e6ed6230d7de403867  wpa_supplicant.initd
 61ec59007f66ac5bacc0aa095d1f2ccbc977a687038e161a463d1727223d5a90  wpa_supplicant.confd
-0a3b037afdb0c7af94c135dc7518451b6a2e53214ca7381d6f7c6f0f2cf4953a  config
+0811f6315663b9cf9e5218e7a8ac96d0145e20055a56fff05cd1973aace5e41d  config
 dec1d357d8db5067bdba39a300760b06667a6d1b59f15fdb93063d61bf11b596  wpa_cli.sh"
-sha512sums="03d8199325b3910f77013ddb7edd803ab4444542230484e1cb465dc3df9372b39ee3307d823ce88730e8f5a5231ef3183954c54cf07297b70432f526e45aac2b  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
-61f90d06bd42fb7ea17ba147db861303f5b1fdce2cda35492cec578214da5ea5d654a1df99dee4d4a0c07ef3e8b3bfb65ab4b98eff21c2013adf536766136ce1  CVE-2015-1863.patch
-4633a96a91e151407e4c62b74b4e78d37e4fba586278c6ae4340ce149bee0c644a4d62675256839c3130374a4dc7531beaeed8282946e7dcd3faf1ed74bf99be  CVE-2015-4141.patch
-dc561d90f3f329ebb201abbb53eea161603fb2abba6b2fc5c79298d97c84f2d65d401608cd7bb2fb82abf909661c56699bf4bcbf902f6f8c7d5b1853b0277353  CVE-2015-4142.patch
-9440f8d9d18d20b95d236c1a4467d86dfbbc17d8f26b0caa48d6737c6231d1ff14793c6fc8a1e4508f3ad38c9a5d710fd49b85c7de16634dbe6685af05f44f7c  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
-0887017bfdb4632baa49bb849b732eed7eec9a498247fdd5ef8448e4a6df10380c06d68fa706e0b2624c04eb6f5a327cdb71c5c71c3476dc383f889ee7372702  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
-341901aa94c44ae725b6d4dddac2a52b6457234189554fc282c9cf5fa0254125d7323553a7b8118f9a3e2020f039267ed4c912f84ac6f2cb12670b40c28ac652  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
-b752f91c3d6dcf0784d9cb20a0c7f8de6c837c38ff62cf77b136d9b818890b13f55eeed1d6097f244181b480be953e1bdfb5651116dc5d62a2d02c018e19042a  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
-07a21f0cc7d00e17bed8ef5ced36159020a410a4606aa0ca24e47223835ab0cc5fbeed3075c4f17d2ce1aee437eedf9fea8f4b95252b2fa255d54a195637cb6f  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+sha512sums="e3ca36ed10b4dae8f663e98ad230c8c059c952316c21a6b0638ecb1b40a5ef1b9083138ab45207cb764a17e870b4bd0625dd6efdb65856cb4dca13ccc0559e81  wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz
 cfe9de2813d5ec778c7f5cb404c23aad371dee9922dea172358a8ea95ab4e5dd01a3b9fc1a452dd3c3c9a2f02e8b12ffe162b69767f95faa18480fb79499301b  wpa_supplicant.initd
 29103161ec2b9631fca9e8d9a97fafd60ffac3fe78cf613b834395ddcaf8be1e253c22e060d7d9f9b974b2d7ce794caa932a2125e29f6494b75bce475f7b30e1  wpa_supplicant.confd
-bf66c0f49437f0bd6c04b3520cb27e64086a24e01bee7a679d1a713d7907c6b15ff68631749204a386bb70581f571c7eb0afd19dbca89054d868a732c16fed6b  config
+5eeb7308ea1a89f4bc015c2e8baf9ee30bb08c550b3f36729fac6ad82acb9faed15b99a6fb5864acd4b186625232c435f2d65e44f60324f6d2280a7cc49e2861  config
 44d33cfe419cdb65cc14f2ac05aa9f8a1b9f2f432181e498071e41ef835662db1e4c5142adf4cfab2475e7b606696169936bd159d1d711f803322db93f242361  wpa_cli.sh"
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-1863.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-1863.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de1964ca76..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-1863.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
- 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
- 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- 	if (msg.ssid &&
-+	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
- 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
- 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
- 	     != 0)) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 36b4ca2946..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- 						goto bad;
- 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+							   h->chunk_size);
-+						goto bad;
-+					}
- 					/* throw away chunk header
- 					 * so we have only real data
- 					 */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 79c5af8906..0000000000
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (left < 0)
-+		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
- 	/* extract the tspec info element */
- 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
- 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/config b/main/wpa_supplicant/config
index 701c073f8c..eb40831d10 100644
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/config
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/config
@@ -495,3 +495,12 @@ CONFIG_P2P=y
 #
 # External password backend for testing purposes (developer use)
 #CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y
+
+# Enable Fast Session Transfer (FST)
+#CONFIG_FST=y
+
+# Enable CLI commands for FST testing
+#CONFIG_FST_TEST=y
+
+# OS X builds. This is only for building eapol_test.
+#CONFIG_OSX=y