main/wpa_supplicant: various security fixes

CVE-2015-4141
CVE-2015-4142
CVE-2015-4143
CVE-2015-4144
CVE-2015-4145
CVE-2015-4146

ref #4339
ref #4266

8 files changed, 392 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..91627fb7b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index f2b0926..a629437 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	u16 offset;
+ 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
++
++	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
+@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
+ 	 *	prf
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5dca20b277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ 	int res = 0;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ 
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d2f9d8aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index a629437..1d2079b 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
+ 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7edef099eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * the first fragment has a total length
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
+ 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a601323f14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
+
+The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
+whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
+fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
+for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
+triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
+due to invalid buffer allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
+ 	 */
++	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
+ 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
+ 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
+ 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
index a59abecffb..c2f2bcc232 100644
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=wpa_supplicant
 pkgver=2.4
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks"
 url="http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant"
 arch="all"
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ depends="dbus"
 makedepends="openssl-dev dbus-dev libnl3-dev qt-dev"
 source="http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	CVE-2015-1863.patch
+	CVE-2015-4141.patch
+	CVE-2015-4142.patch
+	0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+	0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+	0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+	0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+	0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
 
 	wpa_supplicant.initd
 	wpa_supplicant.confd
@@ -155,13 +162,34 @@ gui() {
 
 md5sums="f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
 8e8c34267fefcc4142ee142e5515b5df  CVE-2015-1863.patch
+222ec96a8dc73c41608cc463beac3966  CVE-2015-4141.patch
+d3688697f81ca1e684a79dfa3682a111  CVE-2015-4142.patch
+87d611a9b704402f66fa59ba1458928d  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+bafcec421e4f5c6a8383893d029a79e5  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+fa2aed3cf49f7e6c7b17bf9db9a001f5  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+de0fca4d74a1883d15ef5754f13a5226  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+9d854969af23b207f9f3dff38ef78770  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
 5ee64e2494a9e83740d2344dd5b9bb19  wpa_supplicant.initd
 bc117427f2c538439f3f1481a028ee06  wpa_supplicant.confd"
 sha256sums="058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
 a3abf75801f02199ff48c316a7b6598860e6ca20ce2fe79b0bec873905e5c8a4  CVE-2015-1863.patch
+eb63d845fdc38b6310c527ad1705b6fe3b74f90e263188da2aca97468cc55142  CVE-2015-4141.patch
+cc6c488afab4ccfdaedd9e224989b5fe713d6b0415ea94579190bd8ba60c9be5  CVE-2015-4142.patch
+a204bc37f52e5346780a306c01706689eb46263dedcdcb1eb2f4c0b291a0db93  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+298fc3b89f987922fb2600d0c95e8c868d6da30d24643748afd47bcd30da7b44  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+2fd42fb53be793c54343aa18a84afebe4603aa6ce8b6969ad6b3a8d327c6b142  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+c28ca6303a562809dfd1812f9b918808b3b0f0c52cc43070fd1777e1cfc88f18  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+04ef66fbd5b2167274cd7123d7f7252963b9a9c1ec2f5edf6558a6ad92d47689  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
 131828768c8f334b39bb5294398105ed4cd6d031908e6e9b00bb4a0938f5f7f2  wpa_supplicant.initd
 61ec59007f66ac5bacc0aa095d1f2ccbc977a687038e161a463d1727223d5a90  wpa_supplicant.confd"
 sha512sums="03d8199325b3910f77013ddb7edd803ab4444542230484e1cb465dc3df9372b39ee3307d823ce88730e8f5a5231ef3183954c54cf07297b70432f526e45aac2b  wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
 61f90d06bd42fb7ea17ba147db861303f5b1fdce2cda35492cec578214da5ea5d654a1df99dee4d4a0c07ef3e8b3bfb65ab4b98eff21c2013adf536766136ce1  CVE-2015-1863.patch
+4633a96a91e151407e4c62b74b4e78d37e4fba586278c6ae4340ce149bee0c644a4d62675256839c3130374a4dc7531beaeed8282946e7dcd3faf1ed74bf99be  CVE-2015-4141.patch
+dc561d90f3f329ebb201abbb53eea161603fb2abba6b2fc5c79298d97c84f2d65d401608cd7bb2fb82abf909661c56699bf4bcbf902f6f8c7d5b1853b0277353  CVE-2015-4142.patch
+9440f8d9d18d20b95d236c1a4467d86dfbbc17d8f26b0caa48d6737c6231d1ff14793c6fc8a1e4508f3ad38c9a5d710fd49b85c7de16634dbe6685af05f44f7c  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+0887017bfdb4632baa49bb849b732eed7eec9a498247fdd5ef8448e4a6df10380c06d68fa706e0b2624c04eb6f5a327cdb71c5c71c3476dc383f889ee7372702  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+341901aa94c44ae725b6d4dddac2a52b6457234189554fc282c9cf5fa0254125d7323553a7b8118f9a3e2020f039267ed4c912f84ac6f2cb12670b40c28ac652  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+b752f91c3d6dcf0784d9cb20a0c7f8de6c837c38ff62cf77b136d9b818890b13f55eeed1d6097f244181b480be953e1bdfb5651116dc5d62a2d02c018e19042a  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+07a21f0cc7d00e17bed8ef5ced36159020a410a4606aa0ca24e47223835ab0cc5fbeed3075c4f17d2ce1aee437eedf9fea8f4b95252b2fa255d54a195637cb6f  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
 4a62879f6eb37226a2009a4bceb123c6e610c366c2369ee2fc84b66b79e8dddee5185a64cebe0331bafe13d61cf44c0bbbe3dce2620c0f4525c96afcb58dd362  wpa_supplicant.initd
 29103161ec2b9631fca9e8d9a97fafd60ffac3fe78cf613b834395ddcaf8be1e253c22e060d7d9f9b974b2d7ce794caa932a2125e29f6494b75bce475f7b30e1  wpa_supplicant.confd"
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..36b4ca2946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4141.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
+index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ 						goto bad;
+ 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++							   h->chunk_size);
++						goto bad;
++					}
+ 					/* throw away chunk header
+ 					 * so we have only real data
+ 					 */
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79c5af8906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2015-4142.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
+
+The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
+length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
+negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
+buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
+so, resulting in segmentation fault.
+
+This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
+attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
+hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
+drivers).
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
+index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
+@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (left < 0)
++		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
++
+ 	/* extract the tspec info element */
+ 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
+ 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+