main/xen: upgrade to 4.7.6

While at it, drop unused patches and patch files

rombios-no-pie.patch: not needed due to upstream:
 b704b1a09b rombios: prevent building with PIC/PIE

53 files changed, 17 insertions, 6145 deletions

diff --git a/main/xen/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch b/main/xen/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bba280c926..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-From f345ca185e0c042ed12bf929a9e93efaf33397bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 16:53:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] p2m: Always check to see if removing a p2m entry actually
- worked
-
-The PoD zero-check functions speculatively remove memory from the p2m,
-then check to see if it's completely zeroed, before putting it in the
-cache.
-
-Unfortunately, the p2m_set_entry() calls may fail if the underlying
-pagetable structure needs to change and the domain has exhausted its
-p2m memory pool: for instance, if we're removing a 2MiB region out of
-a 1GiB entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() case), or a 4k
-region out of a 2MiB or larger entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check()
-case); and the return value is not checked.
-
-The underlying mfn will then be added into the PoD cache, and at some
-point mapped into another location in the p2m.  If the guest
-afterwards ballons out this memory, it will be freed to the hypervisor
-and potentially reused by another domain, in spite of the fact that
-the original domain still has writable mappings to it.
-
-There are several places where p2m_set_entry() shouldn't be able to
-fail, as it is guaranteed to write an entry of the same order that
-succeeded before.  Add a backstop of crashing the domain just in case,
-and an ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() to flag up the broken assumption on debug
-builds.
-
-While we're here, use PAGE_ORDER_2M rather than a magic constant.
-
-This is part of XSA-247.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-v4:
-- Removed some training whitespace
-v3:
-- Reformat reset clause to be more compact
-- Make sure to set map[i] = NULL when unmapping in case we need to bail
-v2:
-- Crash a domain if a p2m_set_entry we think cannot fail fails anyway.
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-index 87082cf65f..5ec8a37949 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-@@ -754,8 +754,10 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn)
-     }
- 
-     /* Try to remove the page, restoring old mapping if it fails. */
--    p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M,
--                  p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access);
-+    if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M,
-+                       p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access) )
-+        goto out;
-+
-     p2m_tlb_flush_sync(p2m);
- 
-     /* Make none of the MFNs are used elsewhere... for example, mapped
-@@ -812,9 +814,18 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn)
-     ret = SUPERPAGE_PAGES;
- 
- out_reset:
--    if ( reset )
--        p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn0, 9, type0, p2m->default_access);
--    
-+    /*
-+     * This p2m_set_entry() call shouldn't be able to fail, since the same order
-+     * on the same gfn succeeded above.  If that turns out to be false, crashing
-+     * the domain should be the safest way of making sure we don't leak memory.
-+     */
-+    if ( reset && p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn0, PAGE_ORDER_2M,
-+                                type0, p2m->default_access) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        domain_crash(d);
-+    }
-+
- out:
-     gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, SUPERPAGE_ORDER);
-     return ret;
-@@ -871,19 +882,30 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count)
-         }
- 
-         /* Try to remove the page, restoring old mapping if it fails. */
--        p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
--                      p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access);
-+        if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
-+                           p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access) )
-+            goto skip;
- 
-         /* See if the page was successfully unmapped.  (Allow one refcount
-          * for being allocated to a domain.) */
-         if ( (mfn_to_page(mfns[i])->count_info & PGC_count_mask) > 1 )
-         {
-+            /*
-+             * If the previous p2m_set_entry call succeeded, this one shouldn't
-+             * be able to fail.  If it does, crashing the domain should be safe.
-+             */
-+            if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K,
-+                               types[i], p2m->default_access) )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+                goto out_unmap;
-+            }
-+
-+        skip:
-             unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
-             map[i] = NULL;
- 
--            p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K,
--                types[i], p2m->default_access);
--
-             continue;
-         }
-     }
-@@ -902,12 +924,25 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count)
- 
-         unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
- 
--        /* See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab
--         * check timing.  */
--        if ( j < PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(*map[i]) )
-+        map[i] = NULL;
-+
-+        /*
-+         * See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab
-+         * check timing.
-+         */
-+        if ( j < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*map[i])) )
-         {
--            p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K,
--                types[i], p2m->default_access);
-+            /*
-+             * If the previous p2m_set_entry call succeeded, this one shouldn't
-+             * be able to fail.  If it does, crashing the domain should be safe.
-+             */
-+            if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K,
-+                               types[i], p2m->default_access) )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+                goto out_unmap;
-+            }
-         }
-         else
-         {
-@@ -931,7 +966,17 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long *gfns, int count)
-             p2m->pod.entry_count++;
-         }
-     }
--    
-+
-+    return;
-+
-+out_unmap:
-+    /*
-+     * Something went wrong, probably crashing the domain.  Unmap
-+     * everything and return.
-+     */
-+    for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
-+        if ( map[i] )
-+            unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
- }
- 
- #define POD_SWEEP_LIMIT 1024
--- 
-2.15.0
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch b/main/xen/0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b3edeb54fe..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device
-
-MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the
-respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain
-controlling that guest).
-
-This is part of XSA-237.
-
-Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-@@ -1964,7 +1964,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-         if ( !cpu_has_apic )
-             goto done;
- 
--        pdev = pci_get_pdev(msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn);
-+        pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn);
-+        if ( !pdev )
-+            goto done;
-+
-         ret = pci_enable_msi(msi, &msi_desc);
-         if ( ret )
-         {
diff --git a/main/xen/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch b/main/xen/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ce922a7cb2..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-From 5a013cb9851d1deeaeaa8564f292940a99dbb1d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 17:22:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/4] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs
- frames
-
-Save all GPRs on entry to Xen.
-
-The entry_int82() path is via a DPL1 gate, only usable by 32bit PV guests, so
-can get away with only saving the 32bit registers.  All other entrypoints can
-be reached from 32 or 64bit contexts.
-
-This is part of XSA-254.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: f9eb74789af77e985ae653193f3622263499f674
-master date: 2018-01-05 19:57:07 +0000
-
-(cherry picked from commit 0e6c6fc449000d97f9fa87ed1fbe23f0cf21406b)
----
- tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86_emulate.c |   1 -
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c                  |   1 -
- xen/arch/x86/traps.c                   |   2 -
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S     |   7 ++-
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S            |  12 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c            |  13 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c             |   1 -
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c |   8 +--
- xen/common/wait.c                      |   1 -
- xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h        | 107 +++------------------------------
- 10 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86_emulate.c b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86_emulate.c
-index 10e3f61baa..c12527a50b 100644
---- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ typedef bool bool_t;
- #endif
- 
- #define cpu_has_amd_erratum(nr) 0
--#define mark_regs_dirty(r) ((void)(r))
- 
- #define __packed __attribute__((packed))
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 452748dd5b..c9328f804e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ static void noreturn continue_idle_domain(struct vcpu *v)
- static void noreturn continue_nonidle_domain(struct vcpu *v)
- {
-     check_wakeup_from_wait();
--    mark_regs_dirty(guest_cpu_user_regs());
-     reset_stack_and_jump(ret_from_intr);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-index 90b6071796..1ec0d48cce 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -2456,7 +2456,6 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-             goto fail;
-         if ( admin_io_okay(port, op_bytes, currd) )
-         {
--            mark_regs_dirty(regs);
-             io_emul(regs);            
-         }
-         else
-@@ -2486,7 +2485,6 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-             goto fail;
-         if ( admin_io_okay(port, op_bytes, currd) )
-         {
--            mark_regs_dirty(regs);
-             io_emul(regs);            
-             if ( (op_bytes == 1) && pv_post_outb_hook )
-                 pv_post_outb_hook(port, regs->eax);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index 794bb44266..7ee01597a3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
- ENTRY(compat_hypercall)
-         ASM_CLAC
-         pushq $0
--        SAVE_VOLATILE type=TRAP_syscall compat=1
-+        movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+        SAVE_ALL compat=1 /* DPL1 gate, restricted to 32bit PV guests only. */
-         CR4_PV32_RESTORE
- 
-         cmpb  $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
-@@ -127,7 +128,6 @@ compat_test_guest_events:
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- compat_process_softirqs:
-         sti
--        andl  $~TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-         call  do_softirq
-         jmp   compat_test_all_events
- 
-@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
-         pushq $FLAT_USER_CS32
-         pushq %rcx
-         pushq $0
--        SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+        movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+        SAVE_ALL
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         movq  VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx
-         cmpb  $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 708d9b9402..cebb1e4f4f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter)
-         pushq $FLAT_KERNEL_CS64
-         pushq %rcx
-         pushq $0
--        SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+        movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+        SAVE_ALL
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         testb $TF_kernel_mode,VCPU_thread_flags(%rbx)
-         jz    switch_to_kernel
-@@ -192,7 +193,6 @@ test_guest_events:
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- process_softirqs:
-         sti       
--        SAVE_PRESERVED
-         call do_softirq
-         jmp  test_all_events
- 
-@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
-         pushq $3 /* ring 3 null cs */
-         pushq $0 /* null rip */
-         pushq $0
--        SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+        movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+        SAVE_ALL
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         cmpb  $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx)
-         movq  VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax
-@@ -263,7 +264,6 @@ UNLIKELY_END(sysenter_nt_set)
-         leal  (,%rcx,TBF_INTERRUPT),%ecx
- UNLIKELY_START(z, sysenter_gpf)
-         movq  VCPU_trap_ctxt(%rbx),%rsi
--        SAVE_PRESERVED
-         movl  $TRAP_gp_fault,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-         movl  %eax,TRAPBOUNCE_error_code(%rdx)
-         movq  TRAP_gp_fault * TRAPINFO_sizeof + TRAPINFO_eip(%rsi),%rax
-@@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ UNLIKELY_END(sysenter_gpf)
- ENTRY(int80_direct_trap)
-         ASM_CLAC
-         pushq $0
--        SAVE_VOLATILE 0x80
-+        movl  $0x80, 4(%rsp)
-+        SAVE_ALL
- 
-         cmpb  $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
- UNLIKELY_START(ne, msi_check)
-@@ -309,7 +310,6 @@ int80_slow_path:
-          * IDT entry with DPL==0.
-          */
-         movl  $((0x80 << 3) | X86_XEC_IDT),UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
--        SAVE_PRESERVED
-         movl  $TRAP_gp_fault,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-         /* A GPF wouldn't have incremented the instruction pointer. */
-         subq  $2,UREGS_rip(%rsp)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-index 5b71537a9d..3161dcc18b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-@@ -65,15 +65,10 @@ static void _show_registers(
-            regs->rbp, regs->rsp, regs->r8);
-     printk("r9:  %016lx   r10: %016lx   r11: %016lx\n",
-            regs->r9,  regs->r10, regs->r11);
--    if ( !(regs->entry_vector & TRAP_regs_partial) )
--    {
--        printk("r12: %016lx   r13: %016lx   r14: %016lx\n",
--               regs->r12, regs->r13, regs->r14);
--        printk("r15: %016lx   cr0: %016lx   cr4: %016lx\n",
--               regs->r15, crs[0], crs[4]);
--    }
--    else
--        printk("cr0: %016lx   cr4: %016lx\n", crs[0], crs[4]);
-+    printk("r12: %016lx   r13: %016lx   r14: %016lx\n",
-+           regs->r12, regs->r13, regs->r14);
-+    printk("r15: %016lx   cr0: %016lx   cr4: %016lx\n",
-+           regs->r15, crs[0], crs[4]);
-     printk("cr3: %016lx   cr2: %016lx\n", crs[3], crs[2]);
-     printk("ds: %04x   es: %04x   fs: %04x   gs: %04x   "
-            "ss: %04x   cs: %04x\n",
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-index 28132b5dbc..43730026c2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
- 
- #include <xen/domain_page.h>
- #include <asm/x86_emulate.h>
--#include <asm/asm_defns.h> /* mark_regs_dirty() */
- #include <asm/processor.h> /* current_cpu_info */
- #include <asm/amd.h> /* cpu_has_amd_erratum() */
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 5db017b1b0..81e8bc6ace 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1424,10 +1424,10 @@ decode_register(
-     case  9: p = &regs->r9;  break;
-     case 10: p = &regs->r10; break;
-     case 11: p = &regs->r11; break;
--    case 12: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r12; break;
--    case 13: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r13; break;
--    case 14: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r14; break;
--    case 15: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r15; break;
-+    case 12: p = &regs->r12; break;
-+    case 13: p = &regs->r13; break;
-+    case 14: p = &regs->r14; break;
-+    case 15: p = &regs->r15; break;
- #endif
-     default: BUG(); p = NULL; break;
-     }
-diff --git a/xen/common/wait.c b/xen/common/wait.c
-index 4ac98c07fe..398f653174 100644
---- a/xen/common/wait.c
-+++ b/xen/common/wait.c
-@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ static void __prepare_to_wait(struct waitqueue_vcpu *wqv)
-     unsigned long dummy;
-     u32 entry_vector = cpu_info->guest_cpu_user_regs.entry_vector;
- 
--    cpu_info->guest_cpu_user_regs.entry_vector &= ~TRAP_regs_partial;
-     ASSERT(wqv->esp == 0);
- 
-     /* Save current VCPU affinity; force wakeup on *this* CPU only. */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-index 279d70298f..6e5c079ad8 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-@@ -17,15 +17,6 @@
- void ret_from_intr(void);
- #endif
- 
--#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
--/* Indicate special exception stack frame by inverting the frame pointer. */
--#define SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(offs)     \
--        leaq  offs(%rsp),%rbp;                  \
--        notq  %rbp
--#else
--#define SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(offs)
--#endif
--
- #ifndef NDEBUG
- #define ASSERT_INTERRUPT_STATUS(x, msg)         \
-         pushf;                                  \
-@@ -42,31 +33,6 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
- #define ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED \
-     ASSERT_INTERRUPT_STATUS(z, "INTERRUPTS DISABLED")
- 
--/*
-- * This flag is set in an exception frame when registers R12-R15 did not get
-- * saved.
-- */
--#define _TRAP_regs_partial 16
--#define TRAP_regs_partial  (1 << _TRAP_regs_partial)
--/*
-- * This flag gets set in an exception frame when registers R12-R15 possibly
-- * get modified from their originally saved values and hence need to be
-- * restored even if the normal call flow would restore register values.
-- *
-- * The flag being set implies _TRAP_regs_partial to be unset. Restoring
-- * R12-R15 thus is
-- * - required when this flag is set,
-- * - safe when _TRAP_regs_partial is unset.
-- */
--#define _TRAP_regs_dirty   17
--#define TRAP_regs_dirty    (1 << _TRAP_regs_dirty)
--
--#define mark_regs_dirty(r) ({ \
--        struct cpu_user_regs *r__ = (r); \
--        ASSERT(!((r__)->entry_vector & TRAP_regs_partial)); \
--        r__->entry_vector |= TRAP_regs_dirty; \
--})
--
- #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
- # define _ASM_EX(p) p-.
- #else
-@@ -236,7 +202,7 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
--.macro SAVE_ALL op
-+.macro SAVE_ALL op, compat=0
- .ifeqs "\op", "CLAC"
-         ASM_CLAC
- .else
-@@ -255,40 +221,6 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
-         movq  %rdx,UREGS_rdx(%rsp)
-         movq  %rcx,UREGS_rcx(%rsp)
-         movq  %rax,UREGS_rax(%rsp)
--        movq  %r8,UREGS_r8(%rsp)
--        movq  %r9,UREGS_r9(%rsp)
--        movq  %r10,UREGS_r10(%rsp)
--        movq  %r11,UREGS_r11(%rsp)
--        movq  %rbx,UREGS_rbx(%rsp)
--        movq  %rbp,UREGS_rbp(%rsp)
--        SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(UREGS_rbp)
--        movq  %r12,UREGS_r12(%rsp)
--        movq  %r13,UREGS_r13(%rsp)
--        movq  %r14,UREGS_r14(%rsp)
--        movq  %r15,UREGS_r15(%rsp)
--.endm
--
--/*
-- * Save all registers not preserved by C code or used in entry/exit code. Mark
-- * the frame as partial.
-- *
-- * @type: exception type
-- * @compat: R8-R15 don't need saving, and the frame nevertheless is complete
-- */
--.macro SAVE_VOLATILE type compat=0
--.if \compat
--        movl  $\type,UREGS_entry_vector-UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
--.else
--        movl  $\type|TRAP_regs_partial,\
--              UREGS_entry_vector-UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
--.endif
--        addq  $-(UREGS_error_code-UREGS_r15),%rsp
--        cld
--        movq  %rdi,UREGS_rdi(%rsp)
--        movq  %rsi,UREGS_rsi(%rsp)
--        movq  %rdx,UREGS_rdx(%rsp)
--        movq  %rcx,UREGS_rcx(%rsp)
--        movq  %rax,UREGS_rax(%rsp)
- .if !\compat
-         movq  %r8,UREGS_r8(%rsp)
-         movq  %r9,UREGS_r9(%rsp)
-@@ -297,20 +229,17 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- .endif
-         movq  %rbx,UREGS_rbx(%rsp)
-         movq  %rbp,UREGS_rbp(%rsp)
--        SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(UREGS_rbp)
--.endm
--
--/*
-- * Complete a frame potentially only partially saved.
-- */
--.macro SAVE_PRESERVED
--        btrl  $_TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
--        jnc   987f
-+#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
-+/* Indicate special exception stack frame by inverting the frame pointer. */
-+        leaq  UREGS_rbp(%rsp), %rbp
-+        notq  %rbp
-+#endif
-+.if !\compat
-         movq  %r12,UREGS_r12(%rsp)
-         movq  %r13,UREGS_r13(%rsp)
-         movq  %r14,UREGS_r14(%rsp)
-         movq  %r15,UREGS_r15(%rsp)
--987:
-+.endif
- .endm
- 
- #define LOAD_ONE_REG(reg, compat) \
-@@ -351,33 +280,13 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
-  * @compat: R8-R15 don't need reloading
-  */
- .macro RESTORE_ALL adj=0 compat=0
--.if !\compat
--        testl $TRAP_regs_dirty,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
--.endif
-         LOAD_C_CLOBBERED \compat
- .if !\compat
--        jz    987f
-         movq  UREGS_r15(%rsp),%r15
-         movq  UREGS_r14(%rsp),%r14
-         movq  UREGS_r13(%rsp),%r13
-         movq  UREGS_r12(%rsp),%r12
--#ifndef NDEBUG
--        .subsection 1
--987:    testl $TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
--        jnz   987f
--        cmpq  UREGS_r15(%rsp),%r15
--        jne   789f
--        cmpq  UREGS_r14(%rsp),%r14
--        jne   789f
--        cmpq  UREGS_r13(%rsp),%r13
--        jne   789f
--        cmpq  UREGS_r12(%rsp),%r12
--        je    987f
--789:    BUG   /* Corruption of partial register state. */
--        .subsection 0
--#endif
- .endif
--987:
-         LOAD_ONE_REG(bp, \compat)
-         LOAD_ONE_REG(bx, \compat)
-         subq  $-(UREGS_error_code-UREGS_r15+\adj), %rsp
--- 
-2.11.3
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch b/main/xen/0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9310f01ba4..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,494 +0,0 @@
-From ea7513a3e3f28cfec59dda6e128b6b4968685762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:17:27 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86: limit linear page table use to a single level
-
-That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a
-restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be
-built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion,
-causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is
-being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a
-page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another
-same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction
-respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at
-the same time).
-
-Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number
-of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than
-32k of such uses are no longer possible.
-
-Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are
-replaced with open-coded equivalents.  This seemed preferrable to
-adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions.
-
-Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no
-longer permitted (they probably never should have been).
-
-This is XSA-240.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c        |   1 +
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c            | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h |   2 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h     |  25 +++++--
- 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 452748dd5b..44ed2ccd0a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1237,6 +1237,7 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
-                 case -EINTR:
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                 case -ERESTART:
-+                    v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     v->arch.old_guest_table =
-                         pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
-                     v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index e97ecccd93..e81a461b91 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -732,6 +732,61 @@ static void put_data_page(
-         put_page(page);
- }
- 
-+static bool_t inc_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg)
-+{
-+    typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc;
-+
-+    do {
-+        /*
-+         * The check below checks for the "linear use" count being non-zero
-+         * as well as overflow.  Signed integer overflow is undefined behavior
-+         * according to the C spec.  However, as long as linear_pt_count is
-+         * smaller in size than 'int', the arithmetic operation of the
-+         * increment below won't overflow; rather the result will be truncated
-+         * when stored.  Ensure that this is always true.
-+         */
-+        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int));
-+        oc = nc++;
-+        if ( nc <= 0 )
-+            return 0;
-+        nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc);
-+    } while ( oc != nc );
-+
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static void dec_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg)
-+{
-+    typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc;
-+
-+    oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, -1);
-+    ASSERT(oc > 0);
-+}
-+
-+static bool_t inc_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
-+{
-+    typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc;
-+
-+    do {
-+        /* See the respective comment in inc_linear_entries(). */
-+        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int));
-+        oc = nc--;
-+        if ( nc >= 0 )
-+            return 0;
-+        nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc);
-+    } while ( oc != nc );
-+
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
-+{
-+    typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc;
-+
-+    oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, 1);
-+    ASSERT(oc < 0);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * We allow root tables to map each other (a.k.a. linear page tables). It
-  * needs some special care with reference counts and access permissions:
-@@ -761,15 +816,35 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable(                                             \
-                                                                             \
-     if ( (pfn = level##e_get_pfn(pde)) != pde_pfn )                         \
-     {                                                                       \
-+        struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(pde_pfn);                      \
-+                                                                            \
-+        /* Make sure the page table belongs to the correct domain. */       \
-+        if ( unlikely(page_get_owner(ptpg) != d) )                          \
-+            return 0;                                                       \
-+                                                                            \
-         /* Make sure the mapped frame belongs to the correct domain. */     \
-         if ( unlikely(!get_page_from_pagenr(pfn, d)) )                      \
-             return 0;                                                       \
-                                                                             \
-         /*                                                                  \
--         * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table. \
-+         * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table  \
-+         * and is not itself having linear entries, as well as that the     \
-+         * containing page table is not iself in use as a linear page table \
-+         * elsewhere.                                                       \
-          * If so, atomically increment the count (checking for overflow).   \
-          */                                                                 \
-         page = mfn_to_page(pfn);                                            \
-+        if ( !inc_linear_entries(ptpg) )                                    \
-+        {                                                                   \
-+            put_page(page);                                                 \
-+            return 0;                                                       \
-+        }                                                                   \
-+        if ( !inc_linear_uses(page) )                                       \
-+        {                                                                   \
-+            dec_linear_entries(ptpg);                                       \
-+            put_page(page);                                                 \
-+            return 0;                                                       \
-+        }                                                                   \
-         y = page->u.inuse.type_info;                                        \
-         do {                                                                \
-             x = y;                                                          \
-@@ -777,6 +852,8 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable(                                             \
-                  unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_validated)) !=            \
-                           (PGT_##level##_page_table|PGT_validated)) )       \
-             {                                                               \
-+                dec_linear_uses(page);                                      \
-+                dec_linear_entries(ptpg);                                   \
-                 put_page(page);                                             \
-                 return 0;                                                   \
-             }                                                               \
-@@ -1201,6 +1278,9 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-             l3e_remove_flags((pl3e), _PAGE_USER|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_ACCESSED);   \
-     } while ( 0 )
- 
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool_t preemptible,
-+                          struct page_info *ptpg);
-+
- void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner)
- {
-     unsigned long     pfn = l1e_get_pfn(l1e);
-@@ -1270,17 +1350,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn)
-     if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE )
-         put_superpage(l2e_get_pfn(l2e));
-     else
--        put_page_and_type(l2e_get_page(l2e));
-+    {
-+        struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
-+        int rc = _put_page_type(pg, 0, mfn_to_page(pfn));
-+
-+        ASSERT(!rc);
-+        put_page(pg);
-+    }
- 
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *, int preemptible);
--
- static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-                              int partial, bool_t defer)
- {
-     struct page_info *pg;
-+    int rc;
- 
-     if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || (l3e_get_pfn(l3e) == pfn) )
-         return 1;
-@@ -1303,21 +1388,28 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-     if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-     {
-         ASSERT(!defer);
--        return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
-+        return _put_page_type(pg, 1, mfn_to_page(pfn));
-     }
- 
-     if ( defer )
-     {
-+        current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn);
-         current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
-+    rc = _put_page_type(pg, 1, mfn_to_page(pfn));
-+    if ( likely(!rc) )
-+        put_page(pg);
-+
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-                              int partial, bool_t defer)
- {
-+    int rc = 1;
-+
-     if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) && 
-          (l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) )
-     {
-@@ -1326,18 +1418,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-         if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-         {
-             ASSERT(!defer);
--            return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
-+            return _put_page_type(pg, 1, mfn_to_page(pfn));
-         }
- 
-         if ( defer )
-         {
-+            current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn);
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-             return 0;
-         }
- 
--        return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
-+        rc = _put_page_type(pg, 1, mfn_to_page(pfn));
-+        if ( likely(!rc) )
-+            put_page(pg);
-     }
--    return 1;
-+
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
-@@ -1535,6 +1631,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-         while ( i-- > 0 )
-@@ -1627,6 +1724,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-                 {
-                     if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
-                         page->nr_validated_ptes++;
-+                    current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                 }
-             }
-@@ -2369,14 +2467,20 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *pag
- }
- 
- 
--static int __put_final_page_type(
--    struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, int preemptible)
-+static int _put_final_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-+                                bool_t preemptible, struct page_info *ptpg)
- {
-     int rc = free_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
- 
-     /* No need for atomic update of type_info here: noone else updates it. */
-     if ( rc == 0 )
-     {
-+        if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(type, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
-+        {
-+            dec_linear_uses(page);
-+            dec_linear_entries(ptpg);
-+        }
-+        ASSERT(!page->linear_pt_count || page_get_owner(page)->is_dying);
-         /*
-          * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page tables
-          * when running in shadow mode:
-@@ -2412,8 +2516,8 @@ static int __put_final_page_type(
- }
- 
- 
--static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
--                           int preemptible)
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool_t preemptible,
-+                          struct page_info *ptpg)
- {
-     unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
-     int rc = 0;
-@@ -2440,12 +2544,28 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
-                                            x, nx)) != x) )
-                     continue;
-                 /* We cleared the 'valid bit' so we do the clean up. */
--                rc = __put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible);
-+                rc = _put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible, ptpg);
-+                ptpg = NULL;
-                 if ( x & PGT_partial )
-                     put_page(page);
-                 break;
-             }
- 
-+            if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
-+            {
-+                /*
-+                 * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
-+                 * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages,
-+                 * however, should occur during domain destruction only
-+                 * anyway.  Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not
-+                 * necessary anymore for a dying domain.
-+                 */
-+                ASSERT(page_get_owner(page)->is_dying);
-+                ASSERT(page->linear_pt_count < 0);
-+                ASSERT(ptpg->linear_pt_count > 0);
-+                ptpg = NULL;
-+            }
-+
-             /*
-              * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page
-              * tables when running in shadow mode:
-@@ -2465,6 +2585,13 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
-             return -EINTR;
-     }
- 
-+    if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(!rc);
-+        dec_linear_uses(page);
-+        dec_linear_entries(ptpg);
-+    }
-+
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -2599,6 +2726,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = 0;
-             page->partial_pte = 0;
-         }
-+        page->linear_pt_count = 0;
-         rc = alloc_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
-     }
- 
-@@ -2610,7 +2738,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
- void put_page_type(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    int rc = __put_page_type(page, 0);
-+    int rc = _put_page_type(page, 0, NULL);
-     ASSERT(rc == 0);
-     (void)rc;
- }
-@@ -2626,7 +2754,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- 
- int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    return __put_page_type(page, 1);
-+    return _put_page_type(page, 1, NULL);
- }
- 
- int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-@@ -2832,11 +2960,14 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
-         return 0;
- 
--    switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table) )
-+    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, 1,
-+                                 v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
-     {
-     case -EINTR:
-     case -ERESTART:
-         return -ERESTART;
-+    case 0:
-+        put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
-     }
- 
-     v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
-@@ -2993,6 +3124,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
-                 rc = -ERESTART;
-                 /* fallthrough */
-             case -ERESTART:
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                 break;
-             default:
-@@ -3260,7 +3392,10 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                     if ( type == PGT_l1_page_table )
-                         put_page_and_type(page);
-                     else
-+                    {
-+                        curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                    }
-                 }
-             }
- 
-@@ -3293,6 +3428,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-             {
-             case -EINTR:
-             case -ERESTART:
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                 rc = 0;
-                 break;
-@@ -3371,6 +3507,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                         rc = -ERESTART;
-                         /* fallthrough */
-                     case -ERESTART:
-+                        curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                         break;
-                     default:
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-index 165e533ab3..5ef761be8b 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-@@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu
-     pagetable_t guest_table_user;       /* (MFN) x86/64 user-space pagetable */
-     pagetable_t guest_table;            /* (MFN) guest notion of cr3 */
-     struct page_info *old_guest_table;  /* partially destructed pagetable */
-+    struct page_info *old_guest_ptpg;   /* containing page table of the */
-+                                        /* former, if any */
-     /* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
-      * shadow refcounts are in use */
-     pagetable_t shadow_table[4];        /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index a30e76db1e..905c7971f2 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ struct page_info
-         u32 tlbflush_timestamp;
- 
-         /*
--         * When PGT_partial is true then this field is valid and indicates
--         * that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been validated.
--         * An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped) whenever
--         * PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag gets
--         * cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially
-+         * When PGT_partial is true then the first two fields are valid and
-+         * indicate that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been
-+         * validated. An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped)
-+         * whenever PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag
-+         * gets cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially
-          * validated state (where the caller would drop the reference acquired
-          * due to the getting of the type [apparently] failing [-ERESTART])
-          * would not accidentally result in a page left with zero general
-@@ -153,10 +153,18 @@ struct page_info
-          * put_page_from_lNe() (due to the apparent failure), and hence it
-          * must be dropped when the put operation is resumed (and completes),
-          * but it must not be acquired if picking up the page for validation.
-+         *
-+         * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
-+         * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
-+         *   table has,
-+         * - by a negative value, in how many same-level page tables a page is
-+         *   in use.
-          */
-         struct {
--            u16 nr_validated_ptes;
--            s8 partial_pte;
-+            u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
-+            u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
-+            s16 partial_pte:2;
-+            s16 linear_pt_count;
-         };
- 
-         /*
-@@ -207,6 +215,9 @@ struct page_info
- #define PGT_count_width   PG_shift(9)
- #define PGT_count_mask    ((1UL<<PGT_count_width)-1)
- 
-+/* Are the 'type mask' bits identical? */
-+#define PGT_type_equal(x, y) (!(((x) ^ (y)) & PGT_type_mask))
-+
-  /* Cleared when the owning guest 'frees' this page. */
- #define _PGC_allocated    PG_shift(1)
- #define PGC_allocated     PG_mask(1, 1)
--- 
-2.14.1
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch b/main/xen/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e72d7511b3..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From 01feeda5363dd8d2fea8395c2c435203751c8ba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 16:53:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] p2m: Check return value of p2m_set_entry() when
- decreasing reservation
-
-If the entire range specified to p2m_pod_decrease_reservation() is marked
-populate-on-demand, then it will make a single p2m_set_entry() call,
-reducing its PoD entry count.
-
-Unfortunately, in the right circumstances, this p2m_set_entry() call
-may fail.  It that case, repeated calls to decrease_reservation() may
-cause p2m->pod.entry_count to fall below zero, potentially tripping
-over BUG_ON()s to the contrary.
-
-Instead, check to see if the entry succeeded, and return false if not.
-The caller will then call guest_remove_page() on the gfns, which will
-return -EINVAL upon finding no valid memory there to return.
-
-Unfortunately if the order > 0, the entry may have partially changed.
-A domain_crash() is probably the safest thing in that case.
-
-Other p2m_set_entry() calls in the same function should be fine,
-because they are writing the entry at its current order.  Nonetheless,
-check the return value and crash if our assumption turns otu to be
-wrong.
-
-This is part of XSA-247.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-v2: Crash the domain if we're not sure it's safe (or if we think it
-can't happen)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-index 5ec8a37949..91d309647e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-@@ -557,11 +557,23 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
- 
-     if ( !nonpod )
-     {
--        /* All PoD: Mark the whole region invalid and tell caller
--         * we're done. */
--        p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), order, p2m_invalid,
--                      p2m->default_access);
--        p2m->pod.entry_count-=(1<<order);
-+        /*
-+         * All PoD: Mark the whole region invalid and tell caller
-+         * we're done.
-+         */
-+        if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), order, p2m_invalid,
-+                           p2m->default_access) )
-+        {
-+            /*
-+             * If this fails, we can't tell how much of the range was changed.
-+             * Best to crash the domain unless we're sure a partial change is
-+             * impossible.
-+             */
-+            if ( order != 0 )
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+            goto out_unlock;
-+        }
-+        p2m->pod.entry_count -= 1UL << order;
-         BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
-         ret = 1;
-         goto out_entry_check;
-@@ -602,8 +614,14 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
-         n = 1UL << cur_order;
-         if ( t == p2m_populate_on_demand )
-         {
--            p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), cur_order,
--                          p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access);
-+            /* This shouldn't be able to fail */
-+            if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), cur_order,
-+                               p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access) )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+                goto out_unlock;
-+            }
-             p2m->pod.entry_count -= n;
-             BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
-             pod -= n;
-@@ -624,8 +642,14 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
- 
-             page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
- 
--            p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), cur_order,
--                          p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access);
-+            /* This shouldn't be able to fail */
-+            if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), cur_order,
-+                               p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access) )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+                goto out_unlock;
-+            }
-             p2m_tlb_flush_sync(p2m);
-             for ( j = 0; j < n; ++j )
-                 set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_x(mfn), INVALID_M2P_ENTRY);
--- 
-2.15.0
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch b/main/xen/0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa7b95038c..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s
-
-(Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE*
-actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET.
-This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq()
-for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq().
-The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM
-guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to
-enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM
-guests only.
-
-This is part of XSA-237.
-
-Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
-@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
-     if ( d == NULL )
-         return -ESRCH;
- 
--    ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d);
-+    ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d);
-     if ( ret )
-         goto free_domain;
- 
-@@ -255,13 +255,14 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
- int physdev_unmap_pirq(domid_t domid, int pirq)
- {
-     struct domain *d;
--    int ret;
-+    int ret = 0;
- 
-     d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid);
-     if ( d == NULL )
-         return -ESRCH;
- 
--    ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d);
-+    if ( domid != DOMID_SELF || !is_hvm_domain(d) )
-+        ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d);
-     if ( ret )
-         goto free_domain;
- 
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_irq_sid
- 
- static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
-@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_irq
- 
- static XSM_INLINE int xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
diff --git a/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch b/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b0d00c273..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 828e290b7dfb90c266ccf53d75ac2b68dc206647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 17:23:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/mm: Always set _PAGE_ACCESSED on L4e updates
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: bd61fe94bee0556bc2f64999a4a8315b93f90f21
-master date: 2018-01-15 13:53:16 +0000
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9b76908e6e074d7efbeafe6bad066ecc5f3c3c43)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 0426b6e00d..8b611022db 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1187,11 +1187,23 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-                                          _PAGE_USER|_PAGE_RW);      \
-     } while ( 0 )
- 
-+/*
-+ * When shadowing an L4 behind the guests back (e.g. for per-pcpu
-+ * purposes), we cannot efficiently sync access bit updates from hardware
-+ * (on the shadow tables) back into the guest view.
-+ *
-+ * We therefore unconditionally set _PAGE_ACCESSED even in the guests
-+ * view.  This will appear to the guest as a CPU which proactively pulls
-+ * all valid L4e's into its TLB, which is compatible with the x86 ABI.
-+ *
-+ * At the time of writing, all PV guests set the access bit anyway, so
-+ * this is no actual change in their behaviour.
-+ */
- #define adjust_guest_l4e(pl4e, d)                               \
-     do {                                                        \
-         if ( likely(l4e_get_flags((pl4e)) & _PAGE_PRESENT) &&   \
-              likely(!is_pv_32bit_domain(d)) )                   \
--            l4e_add_flags((pl4e), _PAGE_USER);                  \
-+            l4e_add_flags((pl4e), _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED); \
-     } while ( 0 )
- 
- #define unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e, d)                                         \
--- 
-2.11.3
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch b/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a5c06af6dd..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 9a4b34729f1bb92eea1e1efe52e6face9f0b17ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:46:55 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Disable PV linear pagetables by default
-
-Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level
-(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its
-inception.  But it is not used by the most common PV guests (Linux,
-NetBSD, minios), and has been the source of a number of subtle
-reference-counting bugs.
-
-Add a command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are
-allowed (disabled by default).
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
-Changes since v2:
-- s/_/-/; in command-line option
-- Added __read_mostly
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 15 +++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                   |  9 +++++++++
- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 73f5265fc6..061aff5edc 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1280,6 +1280,21 @@ The following resources are available:
-     CDP, one COS will corespond two CBMs other than one with CAT, due to the
-     sum of CBMs is fixed, that means actual `cos_max` in use will automatically
-     reduce to half when CDP is enabled.
-+
-+### pv-linear-pt
-+> `= <boolean>`
-+
-+> Default: `false`
-+
-+Allow PV guests to have pagetable entries pointing to other pagetables
-+of the same level (i.e., allowing L2 PTEs to point to other L2 pages).
-+This technique is often called "linear pagetables", and is sometimes
-+used to allow operating systems a simple way to consistently map the
-+current process's pagetables into its own virtual address space.
-+
-+None of the most common PV operating systems (Linux, NetBSD, MiniOS)
-+use this technique, but there may be custom operating systems which
-+do.
- 
- ### reboot
- > `= t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | p[ci] | P[ower] | e[fi] | n[o] [, [w]arm | [c]old]`
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index e81a461b91..f748d4a221 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -799,6 +799,9 @@ static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
-  *     frame if it is mapped by a different root table. This is sufficient and
-  *     also necessary to allow validation of a root table mapping itself.
-  */
-+static bool_t __read_mostly pv_linear_pt_enable = 0;
-+boolean_param("pv-linear-pt", pv_linear_pt_enable);
-+
- #define define_get_linear_pagetable(level)                                  \
- static int                                                                  \
- get_##level##_linear_pagetable(                                             \
-@@ -808,6 +811,12 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable(                                             \
-     struct page_info *page;                                                 \
-     unsigned long pfn;                                                      \
-                                                                             \
-+    if ( !pv_linear_pt_enable )                                             \
-+    {                                                                       \
-+        MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. (feature disabled)");        \
-+        return 0;                                                           \
-+    }                                                                       \
-+                                                                            \
-     if ( (level##e_get_flags(pde) & _PAGE_RW) )                             \
-     {                                                                       \
-         MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. with write perms");          \
--- 
-2.14.1
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch b/main/xen/0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c69c48265..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling
-
-At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by
-having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI
-descriptor, when the msi already exists.
-
-Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup
-paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and
-hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that
-function without also undoing other setup that would normally
-occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq()
-itself).
-
-Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just
-forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI
-is already set up.
-
-This is part of XSA-237.
-
-Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
-@@ -1050,11 +1050,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msi(struct msi_i
-     old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
-     if ( old_desc )
-     {
--        printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
-+        printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
-                msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus,
-                PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn));
--        *desc = old_desc;
--        return 0;
-+        return -EEXIST;
-     }
- 
-     old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
-@@ -1118,11 +1117,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msix(struct msi_
-     old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
-     if ( old_desc )
-     {
--        printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
-+        printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
-                msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus,
-                PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn));
--        *desc = old_desc;
--        return 0;
-+        return -EEXIST;
-     }
- 
-     old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
diff --git a/main/xen/0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch b/main/xen/0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 12af08f144..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,760 +0,0 @@
-From 50c9c86f4b02bbebbacfa812dd25f8e9176633b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 17:24:12 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests
-
-This is a very simplistic change limiting the amount of memory a running
-64-bit PV guest has mapped (and hence available for attacking): Only the
-mappings of stack, IDT, and TSS are being cloned from the direct map
-into per-CPU page tables. Guest controlled parts of the page tables are
-being copied into those per-CPU page tables upon entry into the guest.
-Cross-vCPU synchronization of top level page table entry changes is
-being effected by forcing other active vCPU-s of the guest into the
-hypervisor.
-
-The change to context_switch() isn't strictly necessary, but there's no
-reason to keep switching page tables once a PV guest is being scheduled
-out.
-
-This isn't providing full isolation yet, but it should be covering all
-pieces of information exposure of which would otherwise require an XSA.
-
-There is certainly much room for improvement, especially of performance,
-here - first and foremost suppressing all the negative effects on AMD
-systems. But in the interest of backportability (including to really old
-hypervisors, which may not even have alternative patching) any such is
-being left out here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 5784de3e2067ed73efc2fe42e62831e8ae7f46c4
-master date: 2018-01-16 17:49:03 +0100
-
-(cherry picked from commit e19517a3355acaaa2ff83018bc41e7fd044161e5)
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c              |   5 +
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                  |  19 +++-
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c             | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c  |   2 +
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S |  11 +++
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S        | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h    |  30 ++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/current.h      |  12 +++
- xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h    |   1 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h  |   5 +-
- 10 files changed, 425 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index c9328f804e..512b77a5d0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1930,6 +1930,9 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
- 
-     switch_kernel_stack(v);
- 
-+    this_cpu(root_pgt)[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
-+        l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
-+
-     cr4 = pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v);
-     if ( unlikely(cr4 != read_cr4()) )
-         write_cr4(cr4);
-@@ -2077,6 +2080,8 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
- 
-     ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
- 
-+    get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+
-     cpumask_copy(&dirty_mask, next->vcpu_dirty_cpumask);
-     /* Allow at most one CPU at a time to be dirty. */
-     ASSERT(cpumask_weight(&dirty_mask) <= 1);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 8b611022db..22cd8550fc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3659,6 +3659,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
-     struct vcpu *curr = current, *v = curr;
-     struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner;
-     struct domain_mmap_cache mapcache;
-+    bool_t sync_guest = 0;
-     uint32_t xsm_needed = 0;
-     uint32_t xsm_checked = 0;
-     int rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
-@@ -3844,7 +3845,9 @@ long do_mmu_update(
-                 case PGT_l4_page_table:
-                     rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
-                                       cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
--                break;
-+                    if ( !rc )
-+                        sync_guest = 1;
-+                    break;
-                 case PGT_writable_page:
-                     perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
-                     if ( paging_write_guest_entry(v, va, req.val, _mfn(mfn)) )
-@@ -3946,6 +3949,20 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- 
-     domain_mmap_cache_destroy(&mapcache);
- 
-+    if ( sync_guest )
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Force other vCPU-s of the affected guest to pick up L4 entry
-+         * changes (if any). Issue a flush IPI with empty operation mask to
-+         * facilitate this (including ourselves waiting for the IPI to
-+         * actually have arrived). Utilize the fact that FLUSH_VA_VALID is
-+         * meaningless without FLUSH_CACHE, but will allow to pass the no-op
-+         * check in flush_area_mask().
-+         */
-+        flush_area_mask(pt_owner->domain_dirty_cpumask,
-+                        ZERO_BLOCK_PTR, FLUSH_VA_VALID);
-+    }
-+
-     perfc_add(num_page_updates, i);
- 
-  out:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index 1c02681fb6..dc212710cd 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
-      */
-     spin_debug_disable();
- 
-+    get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
-+
-     load_system_tables();
- 
-     /* Full exception support from here on in. */
-@@ -628,6 +631,187 @@ void cpu_exit_clear(unsigned int cpu)
-     set_cpu_state(CPU_STATE_DEAD);
- }
- 
-+static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt)
-+{
-+    unsigned long linear = (unsigned long)ptr, pfn;
-+    unsigned int flags;
-+    l3_pgentry_t *pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(linear)]) +
-+                         l3_table_offset(linear);
-+    l2_pgentry_t *pl2e;
-+    l1_pgentry_t *pl1e;
-+
-+    if ( linear < DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START )
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    flags = l3e_get_flags(*pl3e);
-+    ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT);
-+    if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE )
-+    {
-+        pfn = (l3e_get_pfn(*pl3e) & ~((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1)) |
-+              (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1));
-+        flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE;
-+    }
-+    else
-+    {
-+        pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e) + l2_table_offset(linear);
-+        flags = l2e_get_flags(*pl2e);
-+        ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT);
-+        if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE )
-+        {
-+            pfn = (l2e_get_pfn(*pl2e) & ~((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1)) |
-+                  (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1));
-+            flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE;
-+        }
-+        else
-+        {
-+            pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e) + l1_table_offset(linear);
-+            flags = l1e_get_flags(*pl1e);
-+            if ( !(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+                return 0;
-+            pfn = l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e);
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+    {
-+        pl3e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+        if ( !pl3e )
-+            return -ENOMEM;
-+        clear_page(pl3e);
-+        l4e_write(&rpt[root_table_offset(linear)],
-+                  l4e_from_paddr(__pa(pl3e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+    }
-+    else
-+        pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]);
-+
-+    pl3e += l3_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+    if ( !(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+    {
-+        pl2e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+        if ( !pl2e )
-+            return -ENOMEM;
-+        clear_page(pl2e);
-+        l3e_write(pl3e, l3e_from_paddr(__pa(pl2e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+    }
-+    else
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+        pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e);
-+    }
-+
-+    pl2e += l2_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+    if ( !(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+    {
-+        pl1e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+        if ( !pl1e )
-+            return -ENOMEM;
-+        clear_page(pl1e);
-+        l2e_write(pl2e, l2e_from_paddr(__pa(pl1e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+    }
-+    else
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+        pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e);
-+    }
-+
-+    pl1e += l1_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+    if ( l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e) == pfn);
-+        ASSERT(l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) == flags);
-+    }
-+    else
-+        l1e_write(pl1e, l1e_from_pfn(pfn, flags));
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
-+
-+static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+    root_pgentry_t *rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+    unsigned int off;
-+    int rc;
-+
-+    if ( !rpt )
-+        return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+    clear_page(rpt);
-+    per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = rpt;
-+
-+    rpt[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] =
-+        idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)];
-+    /* SH_LINEAR_PT inserted together with guest mappings. */
-+    /* PERDOMAIN inserted during context switch. */
-+    rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] =
-+        idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)];
-+
-+    /* Install direct map page table entries for stack, IDT, and TSS. */
-+    for ( off = rc = 0; !rc && off < STACK_SIZE; off += PAGE_SIZE )
-+        rc = clone_mapping(__va(__pa(stack_base[cpu])) + off, rpt);
-+
-+    if ( !rc )
-+        rc = clone_mapping(idt_tables[cpu], rpt);
-+    if ( !rc )
-+        rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), rpt);
-+
-+    return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+    root_pgentry_t *rpt = per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu);
-+    unsigned int r;
-+
-+    if ( !rpt )
-+        return;
-+
-+    per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = NULL;
-+
-+    for ( r = root_table_offset(DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START);
-+          r < root_table_offset(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END); ++r )
-+    {
-+        l3_pgentry_t *l3t;
-+        unsigned int i3;
-+
-+        if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[r]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+            continue;
-+
-+        l3t = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[r]);
-+
-+        for ( i3 = 0; i3 < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i3 )
-+        {
-+            l2_pgentry_t *l2t;
-+            unsigned int i2;
-+
-+            if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+                continue;
-+
-+            ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+            l2t = l3e_to_l2e(l3t[i3]);
-+
-+            for ( i2 = 0; i2 < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i2 )
-+            {
-+                if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+                    continue;
-+
-+                ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+                free_xen_pagetable(l2e_to_l1e(l2t[i2]));
-+            }
-+
-+            free_xen_pagetable(l2t);
-+        }
-+
-+        free_xen_pagetable(l3t);
-+    }
-+
-+    free_xen_pagetable(rpt);
-+}
-+
- static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
- {
-     unsigned int order, socket = cpu_to_socket(cpu);
-@@ -664,6 +848,8 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
-             free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn));
-     }
- 
-+    cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu);
-+
-     order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES);
-     free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order);
- 
-@@ -716,6 +902,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
-         goto oom;
-     memcpy(idt_tables[cpu], idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
- 
-+    if ( setup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu) )
-+        goto oom;
-+
-     for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1);
-           i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i )
-         if ( cpu_online(i) && cpu_to_node(i) == node )
-@@ -770,6 +959,8 @@ static struct notifier_block cpu_smpboot_nfb = {
- 
- void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
- {
-+    int rc;
-+
-     register_cpu_notifier(&cpu_smpboot_nfb);
- 
-     mtrr_aps_sync_begin();
-@@ -783,6 +974,11 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
- 
-     stack_base[0] = stack_start;
- 
-+    rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0);
-+    if ( rc )
-+        panic("Error %d setting up PV root page table\n", rc);
-+    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
-+
-     set_nr_sockets();
- 
-     socket_cpumask = xzalloc_array(cpumask_t *, nr_sockets);
-@@ -847,6 +1043,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
- {
-     cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &cpu_online_map);
-     cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &cpu_present_map);
-+
-+    get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
- }
- 
- static void
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-index a3ae7a475f..4f2ba28520 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ void __dummy__(void)
-     OFFSET(CPUINFO_processor_id, struct cpu_info, processor_id);
-     OFFSET(CPUINFO_current_vcpu, struct cpu_info, current_vcpu);
-     OFFSET(CPUINFO_cr4, struct cpu_info, cr4);
-+    OFFSET(CPUINFO_xen_cr3, struct cpu_info, xen_cr3);
-+    OFFSET(CPUINFO_pv_cr3, struct cpu_info, pv_cr3);
-     DEFINE(CPUINFO_sizeof, sizeof(struct cpu_info));
-     BLANK();
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index 7ee01597a3..f7e53fb3cb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -270,6 +270,17 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
-         pushq $0
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Lcstar_cr3_okay
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        movq  $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lcstar_cr3_okay:
-+
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         movq  VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx
-         cmpb  $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index cebb1e4f4f..d63e734bb3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -36,6 +36,32 @@ ENTRY(switch_to_kernel)
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
- restore_all_guest:
-         ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
-+
-+        /* Copy guest mappings and switch to per-CPU root page table. */
-+        mov   %cr3, %r9
-+        GET_STACK_END(dx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rdx), %rdi
-+        movabs $PADDR_MASK & PAGE_MASK, %rsi
-+        movabs $DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START, %rcx
-+        mov   %rdi, %rax
-+        and   %rsi, %rdi
-+        and   %r9, %rsi
-+        add   %rcx, %rdi
-+        add   %rcx, %rsi
-+        mov   $ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT, %ecx
-+        mov   root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rsi), %r8
-+        mov   %r8, root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rdi)
-+        rep movsq
-+        mov   $ROOT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - \
-+               ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1, %ecx
-+        sub   $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \
-+                ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rsi
-+        sub   $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \
-+                ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rdi
-+        rep movsq
-+        mov   %r9, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rdx)
-+        write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+
-         RESTORE_ALL
-         testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
-         jz    iret_exit_to_guest
-@@ -70,6 +96,22 @@ iret_exit_to_guest:
-         ALIGN
- /* No special register assumptions. */
- restore_all_xen:
-+        /*
-+         * Check whether we need to switch to the per-CPU page tables, in
-+         * case we return to late PV exit code (from an NMI or #MC).
-+         */
-+        GET_STACK_END(ax)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rax), %rdx
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rax), %rax
-+        test  %rdx, %rdx
-+        /*
-+         * Ideally the condition would be "nsz", but such doesn't exist,
-+         * so "g" will have to do.
-+         */
-+UNLIKELY_START(g, exit_cr3)
-+        write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+UNLIKELY_END(exit_cr3)
-+
-         RESTORE_ALL adj=8
-         iretq
- 
-@@ -99,7 +141,18 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter)
-         pushq $0
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
--        GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Llstar_cr3_okay
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        write_cr3 rcx, r11, r12
-+        movq  $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Llstar_cr3_okay:
-+
-+        __GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         testb $TF_kernel_mode,VCPU_thread_flags(%rbx)
-         jz    switch_to_kernel
- 
-@@ -248,7 +301,18 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
-         pushq $0
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
--        GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Lsyse_cr3_okay
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        movq  $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lsyse_cr3_okay:
-+
-+        __GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         cmpb  $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx)
-         movq  VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax
-         setne %cl
-@@ -284,13 +348,23 @@ ENTRY(int80_direct_trap)
-         movl  $0x80, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
- 
-+        GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Lint80_cr3_okay
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        movq  $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lint80_cr3_okay:
-+
-         cmpb  $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
- UNLIKELY_START(ne, msi_check)
-         movl  $0x80,%edi
-         call  check_for_unexpected_msi
- UNLIKELY_END(msi_check)
- 
--        GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+        __GET_CURRENT(bx)
- 
-         /* Check that the callback is non-null. */
-         leaq  VCPU_int80_bounce(%rbx),%rdx
-@@ -441,9 +515,27 @@ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
- 
- ENTRY(common_interrupt)
-         SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(14)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+        mov   %rcx, %r15
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Lintr_cr3_okay
-+        jns   .Lintr_cr3_load
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+.Lintr_cr3_load:
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        xor   %ecx, %ecx
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+        testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-+        cmovnz %rcx, %r15
-+.Lintr_cr3_okay:
-+
-         CR4_PV32_RESTORE
-         movq %rsp,%rdi
-         callq do_IRQ
-+        mov   %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-         jmp ret_from_intr
- 
- /* No special register assumptions. */
-@@ -461,6 +553,23 @@ ENTRY(page_fault)
- /* No special register assumptions. */
- GLOBAL(handle_exception)
-         SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(14)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+        mov   %rcx, %r15
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .Lxcpt_cr3_okay
-+        jns   .Lxcpt_cr3_load
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+.Lxcpt_cr3_load:
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        xor   %ecx, %ecx
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+        testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-+        cmovnz %rcx, %r15
-+.Lxcpt_cr3_okay:
-+
- handle_exception_saved:
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
-         testb $X86_EFLAGS_IF>>8,UREGS_eflags+1(%rsp)
-@@ -525,6 +634,7 @@ handle_exception_saved:
-         leaq  exception_table(%rip),%rdx
-         PERFC_INCR(exceptions, %rax, %rbx)
-         callq *(%rdx,%rax,8)
-+        mov   %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-         testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-         jz    restore_all_xen
-         leaq  VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx
-@@ -557,6 +667,7 @@ exception_with_ints_disabled:
-         rep;  movsq                     # make room for ec/ev
- 1:      movq  UREGS_error_code(%rsp),%rax # ec/ev
-         movq  %rax,UREGS_kernel_sizeof(%rsp)
-+        mov   %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-         jmp   restore_all_xen           # return to fixup code
- 
- /* No special register assumptions. */
-@@ -634,6 +745,17 @@ ENTRY(double_fault)
-         movl  $TRAP_double_fault,4(%rsp)
-         /* Set AC to reduce chance of further SMAP faults */
-         SAVE_ALL STAC
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rbx
-+        test  %rbx, %rbx
-+        jz    .Ldblf_cr3_okay
-+        jns   .Ldblf_cr3_load
-+        neg   %rbx
-+.Ldblf_cr3_load:
-+        write_cr3 rbx, rdi, rsi
-+.Ldblf_cr3_okay:
-+
-         movq  %rsp,%rdi
-         call  do_double_fault
-         BUG   /* do_double_fault() shouldn't return. */
-@@ -652,10 +774,28 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
-         movl  $TRAP_nmi,4(%rsp)
- handle_ist_exception:
-         SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+        GET_STACK_END(14)
-+        mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+        mov   %rcx, %r15
-+        neg   %rcx
-+        jz    .List_cr3_okay
-+        jns   .List_cr3_load
-+        mov   %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+        neg   %rcx
-+.List_cr3_load:
-+        write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+        movq  $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+.List_cr3_okay:
-+
-         CR4_PV32_RESTORE
-         testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-         jz    1f
--        /* Interrupted guest context. Copy the context to stack bottom. */
-+        /*
-+         * Interrupted guest context. Clear the restore value for xen_cr3
-+         * and copy the context to stack bottom.
-+         */
-+        xor   %r15, %r15
-         GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs,di)
-         movq  %rsp,%rsi
-         movl  $UREGS_kernel_sizeof/8,%ecx
-@@ -665,6 +805,7 @@ handle_ist_exception:
-         movzbl UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp),%eax
-         leaq  exception_table(%rip),%rdx
-         callq *(%rdx,%rax,8)
-+        mov   %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-         cmpb  $TRAP_nmi,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-         jne   ret_from_intr
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-index 6e5c079ad8..6cfdaa1aa0 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-@@ -93,9 +93,30 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
-         UNLIKELY_DONE(mp, tag);   \
-         __UNLIKELY_END(tag)
- 
-+        .equ .Lrax, 0
-+        .equ .Lrcx, 1
-+        .equ .Lrdx, 2
-+        .equ .Lrbx, 3
-+        .equ .Lrsp, 4
-+        .equ .Lrbp, 5
-+        .equ .Lrsi, 6
-+        .equ .Lrdi, 7
-+        .equ .Lr8,  8
-+        .equ .Lr9,  9
-+        .equ .Lr10, 10
-+        .equ .Lr11, 11
-+        .equ .Lr12, 12
-+        .equ .Lr13, 13
-+        .equ .Lr14, 14
-+        .equ .Lr15, 15
-+
- #define STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(field) (1 - CPUINFO_sizeof + CPUINFO_##field)
- #define GET_STACK_END(reg)                        \
-+        .if .Lr##reg > 8;                         \
-+        movq $STACK_SIZE-1, %r##reg;              \
-+        .else;                                    \
-         movl $STACK_SIZE-1, %e##reg;              \
-+        .endif;                                   \
-         orq  %rsp, %r##reg
- 
- #define GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(field, reg)             \
-@@ -177,6 +198,15 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
- #define ASM_STAC ASM_AC(STAC)
- #define ASM_CLAC ASM_AC(CLAC)
- 
-+.macro write_cr3 val:req, tmp1:req, tmp2:req
-+        mov   %cr4, %\tmp1
-+        mov   %\tmp1, %\tmp2
-+        and   $~X86_CR4_PGE, %\tmp1
-+        mov   %\tmp1, %cr4
-+        mov   %\val, %cr3
-+        mov   %\tmp2, %cr4
-+.endm
-+
- #define CR4_PV32_RESTORE                                           \
-         667: ASM_NOP5;                                             \
-         .pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "ax";                  \
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-index e6587e684c..397fa4c38f 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-@@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ struct cpu_info {
-     struct vcpu *current_vcpu;
-     unsigned long per_cpu_offset;
-     unsigned long cr4;
-+    /*
-+     * Of the two following fields the latter is being set to the CR3 value
-+     * to be used on the given pCPU for loading whenever 64-bit PV guest
-+     * context is being entered. The value never changes once set.
-+     * The former is the value to restore when re-entering Xen, if any. IOW
-+     * its value being zero means there's nothing to restore. However, its
-+     * value can also be negative, indicating to the exit-to-Xen code that
-+     * restoring is not necessary, but allowing any nested entry code paths
-+     * to still know the value to put back into CR3.
-+     */
-+    unsigned long xen_cr3;
-+    unsigned long pv_cr3;
-     /* get_stack_bottom() must be 16-byte aligned */
- };
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-index ccd406a3fe..9906f38f2d 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ extern idt_entry_t idt_table[];
- extern idt_entry_t *idt_tables[];
- 
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
-+DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
- 
- extern void init_int80_direct_trap(struct vcpu *v);
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-index 589f22552e..afc77c3237 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@
- /* These are architectural limits. Current CPUs support only 40-bit phys. */
- #define PADDR_BITS              52
- #define VADDR_BITS              48
--#define PADDR_MASK              ((1UL << PADDR_BITS)-1)
--#define VADDR_MASK              ((1UL << VADDR_BITS)-1)
-+#define PADDR_MASK              ((_AC(1,UL) << PADDR_BITS) - 1)
-+#define VADDR_MASK              ((_AC(1,UL) << VADDR_BITS) - 1)
- 
- #define is_canonical_address(x) (((long)(x) >> 47) == ((long)(x) >> 63))
- 
-@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ typedef l4_pgentry_t root_pgentry_t;
-       : (((_s) < ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT) ||  \
-          ((_s) > ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT)))
- 
-+#define root_table_offset         l4_table_offset
- #define root_get_pfn              l4e_get_pfn
- #define root_get_flags            l4e_get_flags
- #define root_get_intpte           l4e_get_intpte
--- 
-2.11.3
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch b/main/xen/0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index acbbccc72e..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths
-
-Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when
-handling unrelated errors.
-
-This is part of XSA-237.
-
-Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-@@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static int prepare_domain_irq_pirq(struc
-         return -ENOMEM;
-     }
-     *pinfo = info;
--    return 0;
-+
-+    return !!err;
- }
- 
- static void set_domain_irq_pirq(struct domain *d, int irq, struct pirq *pirq)
-@@ -1295,7 +1296,10 @@ int init_domain_irq_mapping(struct domai
-             continue;
-         err = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, i, &info);
-         if ( err )
-+        {
-+            ASSERT(err < 0);
-             break;
-+        }
-         set_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, info);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1903,6 +1907,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-     struct pirq *info;
-     struct irq_desc *desc;
-     unsigned long flags;
-+    DECLARE_BITMAP(prepared, MAX_MSI_IRQS) = {};
- 
-     ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&d->event_lock));
- 
-@@ -1946,8 +1951,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-     }
- 
-     ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
--    if ( ret )
-+    if ( ret < 0 )
-         goto revoke;
-+    if ( !ret )
-+        __set_bit(0, prepared);
- 
-     desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
- 
-@@ -2019,8 +2026,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-             irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
-             ret = irq >= 0 ? prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq + nr, &info)
-                            : irq;
--            if ( ret )
-+            if ( ret < 0 )
-                 break;
-+            if ( !ret )
-+                __set_bit(nr, prepared);
-             msi_desc[nr].irq = irq;
- 
-             if ( irq_permit_access(d, irq) != 0 )
-@@ -2053,15 +2062,15 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-                 desc->msi_desc = NULL;
-                 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
-             }
--            while ( nr-- )
-+            while ( nr )
-             {
-                 if ( irq >= 0 && irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
-                     printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
-                            "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
-                            d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
--                if ( info )
-+                if ( info && test_bit(nr, prepared) )
-                     cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
--                info = pirq_info(d, pirq + nr);
-+                info = pirq_info(d, pirq + --nr);
-                 irq = info->arch.irq;
-             }
-             msi_desc->irq = -1;
-@@ -2077,12 +2086,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
-         spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
-         set_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
-         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
-+        ret = 0;
-     }
- 
- done:
-     if ( ret )
-     {
--        cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
-+        if ( test_bit(0, prepared) )
-+            cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
-  revoke:
-         if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
-             printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
---- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
-@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
-         }
-         else if ( type == MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MULTI_MSI )
-         {
--            if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > 32 )
-+            if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > MAX_MSI_IRQS )
-                 ret = -EDOM;
-             else if ( msi->entry_nr != 1 && !iommu_intremap )
-                 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
-@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
- /* MAX fixed pages reserved for mapping MSIX tables. */
- #define FIX_MSIX_MAX_PAGES              512
- 
-+#define MAX_MSI_IRQS 32 /* limited by MSI capability struct properties */
-+
- struct msi_info {
-     u16 seg;
-     u8 bus;
diff --git a/main/xen/0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch b/main/xen/0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 405c4f78ad..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-From 72428e7318bf6368883622142344dbebd895c161 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 17:24:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86: allow Meltdown band-aid to be disabled
-
-First of all we don't need it on AMD systems. Additionally allow its use
-to be controlled by command line option. For best backportability, this
-intentionally doesn't use alternative instruction patching to achieve
-the intended effect - while we likely want it, this will be later
-follow-up.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: e871e80c38547d9faefc6604532ba3e985e65873
-master date: 2018-01-16 17:50:59 +0100
-
-(cherry picked from commit e19d0af4ee2ae9e42a85db639fd6848e72f5658b)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 12 ++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c               |  7 +++++--
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                   |  2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c              | 17 ++++++++++++++---
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S         |  2 ++
- 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 73f5265fc6..ee9aa7b8d5 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1602,6 +1602,18 @@ In the case that x2apic is in use, this option switches between physical and
- clustered mode.  The default, given no hint from the **FADT**, is cluster
- mode.
- 
-+### xpti
-+> `= <boolean>`
-+
-+> Default: `false` on AMD hardware
-+> Default: `true` everywhere else
-+
-+Override default selection of whether to isolate 64-bit PV guest page
-+tables.
-+
-+** WARNING: Not yet a complete isolation implementation, but better than
-+nothing. **
-+
- ### xsave
- > `= <boolean>`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 512b77a5d0..534bf0161f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1926,12 +1926,15 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v)
- 
- static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
- {
-+    root_pgentry_t *root_pgt = this_cpu(root_pgt);
-     unsigned long cr4;
- 
-     switch_kernel_stack(v);
- 
--    this_cpu(root_pgt)[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
--        l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
-+    if ( root_pgt )
-+        root_pgt[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
-+            l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg,
-+                          __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
- 
-     cr4 = pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v);
-     if ( unlikely(cr4 != read_cr4()) )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 22cd8550fc..b5eac345af 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3846,7 +3846,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
-                     rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
-                                       cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
-                     if ( !rc )
--                        sync_guest = 1;
-+                        sync_guest = !!this_cpu(root_pgt);
-                     break;
-                 case PGT_writable_page:
-                     perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index dc212710cd..bed2758625 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
-     spin_debug_disable();
- 
-     get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
--    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
-+    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = this_cpu(root_pgt) ? __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt)) : 0;
- 
-     load_system_tables();
- 
-@@ -729,14 +729,20 @@ static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt)
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+static __read_mostly int8_t opt_xpti = -1;
-+boolean_param("xpti", opt_xpti);
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
- 
- static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
- {
--    root_pgentry_t *rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+    root_pgentry_t *rpt;
-     unsigned int off;
-     int rc;
- 
-+    if ( !opt_xpti )
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-     if ( !rpt )
-         return -ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -974,10 +980,14 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
- 
-     stack_base[0] = stack_start;
- 
-+    if ( opt_xpti < 0 )
-+        opt_xpti = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD;
-+
-     rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0);
-     if ( rc )
-         panic("Error %d setting up PV root page table\n", rc);
--    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
-+    if ( per_cpu(root_pgt, 0) )
-+        get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
- 
-     set_nr_sockets();
- 
-@@ -1045,6 +1055,7 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
-     cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &cpu_present_map);
- 
-     get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+    get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = 0;
- }
- 
- static void
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index d63e734bb3..2a569952e3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ restore_all_guest:
-         movabs $DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START, %rcx
-         mov   %rdi, %rax
-         and   %rsi, %rdi
-+        jz    .Lrag_keep_cr3
-         and   %r9, %rsi
-         add   %rcx, %rdi
-         add   %rcx, %rsi
-@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ restore_all_guest:
-         rep movsq
-         mov   %r9, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rdx)
-         write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+.Lrag_keep_cr3:
- 
-         RESTORE_ALL
-         testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
--- 
-2.11.3
-
diff --git a/main/xen/0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch b/main/xen/0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 622c6c7f25..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook
-
-The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq()
-disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case:
-Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device.
-
-This is part of XSA-237.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-@@ -2144,7 +2144,8 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d,
-         nr = msi_desc->msi.nvec;
-     }
- 
--    ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, msi_desc);
-+    ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq,
-+                               msi_desc ? msi_desc->dev : NULL);
-     if ( ret )
-         goto done;
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -915,8 +915,8 @@ static int flask_unmap_domain_msi (struc
-                                    u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
--    struct msi_info *msi = data;
--    u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
-+    const struct pci_dev *pdev = data;
-+    u32 machine_bdf = (pdev->seg << 16) | (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn;
- 
-     AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
-     ad->device = machine_bdf;
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD
index 58b98cb716..d21b6bc4d2 100644
--- a/main/xen/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 # Contributor: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@entel.upc.edu>
 # Maintainer: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
 pkgname=xen
-pkgver=4.7.3
-pkgrel=9
+pkgver=4.7.6
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor"
 url="http://www.xen.org/"
 arch="x86_64 armhf"
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ makedepends="$depends_dev autoconf automake libtool "
 #     - CVE-2017-15596 XSA-235
 #     - CVE-2017-15597 XSA-236
 #     - CVE-2017-15590 XSA-237
-#     - XSA-238
+#     - CVE-2017-15591 XSA-238
 #     - CVE-2017-15589 XSA-239
 #     - CVE-2017-15595 XSA-240
 #     - CVE-2017-15588 XSA-241
@@ -98,21 +98,29 @@ makedepends="$depends_dev autoconf automake libtool "
 #     - CVE-2017-15594 XSA-244
 #     - CVE-2017-17046 XSA-245
 #   4.7.3-r4:
-#     - XSA-254 XPTI
+#     - CVE-2017-5753
+#     - CVE-2017-5715
+#     - CVE-2017-5754 XSA-254
 #   4.7.3-r5:
 #     - CVE-2017-17566 XSA-248
 #     - CVE-2017-17563 XSA-249
 #     - CVE-2017-17564 XSA-250
 #     - CVE-2017-17565 XSA-251
 #   4.7.3-r7:
-#     - CVE-2018-7540, XSA-252
-#     - CVE-2018-7541, XSA-255
+#     - CVE-2018-7540 XSA-252
+#     - CVE-2018-7541 XSA-255
 #   4.7.3-r9:
 #     - CVE-2018-10472 XSA-258
 #     - CVE-2018-10471 XSA-259
 #     - CVE-2018-8897  XSA-260
 #     - CVE-2018-10982 XSA-261
 #     - CVE-2018-10981 XSA-262
+#   4.7.6-r0:
+#     - CVE-2018-3639  XSA-263
+#     - CVE-2018-12891 XSA-264
+#     - CVE-2018-12893 XSA-265
+#     - CVE-2018-12892 XSA-266
+#     - CVE-2018-3665  XSA-267
 
 case "$CARCH" in
 x86*)
@@ -156,61 +164,11 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.ta
 	http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/zlib-$_ZLIB_VERSION.tar.gz
 	http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-$_IPXE_GIT_TAG.tar.gz
 
-	xsa215.patch
-	xsa226-4.7.patch
-	xsa227.patch
-	xsa228-4.8.patch
-	xsa230.patch
-	xsa231-4.7.patch
-	xsa232.patch
-	xsa233.patch
-	xsa234-4.6.patch
-	xsa235-4.7.patch
-	xsa236-4.9.patch
-	0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch
-	0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch
-	0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch
-	0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch
-	0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch
-	xsa238.patch
-	xsa239.patch
-	0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch
-	0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch
-	xsa241-4.8.patch
-	xsa242-4.9.patch
-	xsa243-4.7-1.patch
-	xsa243-2.patch
-	xsa244-4.7.patch
-	xsa246-4.7.patch
-	0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch
-	0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch
-	xsa248-4.8.patch
-	xsa249.patch
-	xsa250.patch
-	xsa251-4.8.patch
-	xsa252-4.7.patch
-	xsa255-4.7-1.patch
-	xsa255-4.7-2.patch
-
-        0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch
-        0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch
-        0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch
-        0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch
-
-	xsa258-4.8.patch
-	xsa259.patch
-	xsa260-1.patch
-	xsa260-2.patch
-	xsa260-3.patch
-	xsa260-4.patch
-	xsa261-4.7.patch
-	xsa262-4.9.patch
 
 	qemu-coroutine-gthread.patch
 	qemu-xen_paths.patch
 
 	hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
-	rombios-no-pie.patch
 	0001-ipxe-dont-clobber-ebp.patch
 
 	musl-support.patch
@@ -426,7 +384,7 @@ hypervisor() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/boot "$subpkgdir"/
 }
 
-md5sums="d0bab56ef9c067bce3218a9f7a4b6f9c  xen-4.7.3.tar.gz
+md5sums="85924a96df2497a5a2343a1a05ed3da1  xen-4.7.6.tar.gz
 dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8  gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2
 cd3f3eb54446be6003156158d51f4884  grub-0.97.tar.gz
 36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb  lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
@@ -436,57 +394,9 @@ cec05e7785497c5e19da2f114b934ffd  pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
 e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8  tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz
 debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634  zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 7496268cebf47d5c9ccb0696e3b26065  ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz
-e5847b6c87c60de11ba7a128d7babe10  xsa215.patch
-7e9cd75651d13afebf35463ba810f1b6  xsa226-4.7.patch
-24e95e93fa29899b7b37fb9595b1d615  xsa227.patch
-f66e7149f5a579ead59cc416d23bdefb  xsa228-4.8.patch
-9230643cea68c0dea122b3631078059a  xsa230.patch
-0144a1d4b2c989231f36a7828c52261f  xsa231-4.7.patch
-d582d6a402935ea1aa2f6d9435ffef52  xsa232.patch
-2f027cddb9401ca25add6ae229cb52c6  xsa233.patch
-c07c078bb0b94783741c998d3afdabd8  xsa234-4.6.patch
-fd6fb62075d0fc4ba9a14bbbc010a41f  xsa235-4.7.patch
-f8797c74a1186f610835bd8bc5daaddb  xsa236-4.9.patch
-e96050a4d241ed8dc0c8a39beb6f3284  0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch
-24a503341fca703f851182bdf2bbbb3c  0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch
-9f849dab12ad214be8eb6682a0873856  0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch
-f3689ebfc50bb463c35a2556e39f762a  0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch
-5d119f231b38e61b2178cac637dc42d3  0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch
-1d7afbe5d47d87aebb2b4022d0be338e  xsa238.patch
-5c564209bd30cade592c8e3f39edc279  xsa239.patch
-4642495f2b5a1feeb42d014a04042246  0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch
-0a50531d1ce5e29e01bdcc468cb4c597  0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch
-c4e34874e6169cf3b68b0f1508e282a2  xsa241-4.8.patch
-e25e98c3e699d90ad617f6f7e0106a5c  xsa242-4.9.patch
-f7d66f6e40dec159b073000baf8a2b84  xsa243-4.7-1.patch
-93ffcf8e416b426f1b0088e61f538a3a  xsa243-2.patch
-1c81aebd57755934d0b88c082fe9020a  xsa244-4.7.patch
-ed39b07fbee1f07d767921732806578b  xsa246-4.7.patch
-5681e5bba8270223bf7ccd0beaf3ad12  0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch
-54a258e7b548fa656e7babc73fca394d  0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch
-389e8bf7400c826a957e82d1e80cd086  xsa248-4.8.patch
-bf2dee471f8b9d235005f62f8db581c1  xsa249.patch
-06cdce66d0fb6ae33e0fa05af8c7fc71  xsa250.patch
-486252987844bc59c4fb468cd485fdf3  xsa251-4.8.patch
-efeb810fffa753885ac657fd6b97abf7  xsa252-4.7.patch
-2adecabe0bff20c185be3893880940d3  xsa255-4.7-1.patch
-87544228dea9b96611239d7ff0f48223  xsa255-4.7-2.patch
-1d20f4010215c17329bfaa6fe015aa91  0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch
-0b606cb7490fdb1816294e4748440f8a  0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch
-d2017505b704d00b3d8bb91ff9c857ae  0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch
-7b507a4b0f6fc62862ab45a46a1f2903  0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch
-8305aad22ea230e1f921a6d6c6263743  xsa258-4.8.patch
-25aed044d315e02c1822b8802fb30ca1  xsa259.patch
-d6f0691c797496291ae5f9101d5d3d31  xsa260-1.patch
-331ec87a892835cee94f4bbec00d3f5b  xsa260-2.patch
-45130a2d6c47901e75a614a500cc7f7d  xsa260-3.patch
-07eeb2e08e445d9a33305d47aef1c099  xsa260-4.patch
-9db85300961126d32e1c3540c78bb4ff  xsa261-4.7.patch
-71a30d34a4d5e8fb7fcb1f183e398099  xsa262-4.9.patch
 de1a3db370b87cfb0bddb51796b50315  qemu-coroutine-gthread.patch
 08bfdf8caff5d631f53660bf3fd4edaf  qemu-xen_paths.patch
 e449bb3359b490804ffc7b0ae08d62a0  hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
-5fab5487fe92fa29302db9ccb04af564  rombios-no-pie.patch
 3a04998db5cc3c5c86f3b46e97e9cd82  0001-ipxe-dont-clobber-ebp.patch
 0984e3000de17a6d14b8014a3ced46a4  musl-support.patch
 513456607a2adfaa0baf1e3ae5124b23  musl-hvmloader-fix-stdint.patch
@@ -518,7 +428,7 @@ dcdd1de2c29e469e834a02ede4f47806  xendomains.confd
 9df68ac65dc3f372f5d61183abdc83ff  xen-consoles.logrotate
 6a2f777c16678d84039acf670d86fff6  xenqemu.confd
 e1c9e1c83a5cc49224608a48060bd677  xenqemu.initd"
-sha256sums="5b5385b476e59e4cf31ecc6dd605df38814b83432b8e8d917f18c8edfdfb708f  xen-4.7.3.tar.gz
+sha256sums="3ae4ddb4faa6c10dd020f12cfd868aef84efefa42e58e708cf4f4818e30aa788  xen-4.7.6.tar.gz
 936162c0312886c21581002b79932829aa048cfaf9937c6265aeaa14f1cd1775  gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2
 4e1d15d12dbd3e9208111d6b806ad5a9857ca8850c47877d36575b904559260b  grub-0.97.tar.gz
 772e4d550e07826665ed0528c071dd5404ef7dbe1825a38c8adbc2a00bca948f  lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
@@ -528,57 +438,9 @@ f60ae61cfbd5da1d849d0beaa21f593c38dac9359f0b3ddc612f447408265b24  pciutils-2.2.9
 4e48ea0d83dd9441cc1af04ab18cd6c961b9fa54d5cbf2c2feee038988dea459  tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz
 1795c7d067a43174113fdf03447532f373e1c6c57c08d61d9e4e9be5e244b05e  zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 632ce8c193ccacc3012bd354bdb733a4be126f7c098e111930aa41dad537405c  ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz
-5be4ff661dd22890b0120f86beee3ec809e2a29f833db8c48bd70ce98e9691ee  xsa215.patch
-fffcc0a4428723e6aea391ff4f1d27326b5a3763d2308cbde64e6a786502c702  xsa226-4.7.patch
-9923a47e5f86949800887596f098954a08ef73a01d74b1dbe16cab2e6b1fabb2  xsa227.patch
-5a7416f15ac9cd7cace354b6102ff58199fe0581f65a36a36869650c71784e48  xsa228-4.8.patch
-77a73f1c32d083e315ef0b1bbb119cb8840ceb5ada790cad76cbfb9116f725cc  xsa230.patch
-ce29b56a0480f4835b37835b351e704d204bb0ccd22325f487127aa2776cc2cf  xsa231-4.7.patch
-5068a78293daa58557c30c95141b775becfb650de6a5eda0d82a4a321ced551c  xsa232.patch
-f721cc49ba692b2f36299b631451f51d7340b8b4732f74c98f01cb7a80d8662b  xsa233.patch
-3df4ce173196111c1ff849039ea4927c0b4bd632b08a501fb26f64e31b951fba  xsa234-4.6.patch
-f30848eee71e66687b421b87be1d8e3f454c0eb395422546c62a689153d1e31c  xsa235-4.7.patch
-b6fe5604af26e93184f30127ebbb644f127ecc7116b093c161ca3044b44d2fe9  xsa236-4.9.patch
-1ae6aefb86ba0c48a45ecc14ff56ea0bc3d9d354937668bcacadaed1225017a8  0001-x86-dont-allow-MSI-pIRQ-mapping-on-unowned-device.patch
-bf2ca9cb99ee64d7db77d628cec1a84684c360fd36de433cbc78fbcde8095319  0002-x86-enforce-proper-privilege-when-mapping-pIRQ-s.patch
-494a79332fc5f854f0dc7606669201717a41e5b89b44db2fb30607a326930bfb  0003-x86-MSI-disallow-redundant-enabling.patch
-9a38899afd728d504382954de28657aa82af7da352eb4e45a5e615bd646834c5  0004-x86-IRQ-conditionally-preserve-irq-pirq-mapping-on-error.patch
-fef5c77f19e2c6229912f1fd19cbcb41c1ce554ff53be22198b2f34ea7a27314  0005-x86-FLASK-fix-unmap-domain-IRQ-XSM-hook.patch
-85d3f9713bef1bc86c682857dbd7388a1d1f20089363ddfc4cb9ecbd88eaffec  xsa238.patch
-087a8b3cf7ecbdbde593033c127cbcf6c37f532bf33d90f72c19e493970a799c  xsa239.patch
-5a9b8e0a4e55482826e6cf820ea01fbf6674fecf19b101f4578396e3fa98a8fd  0001-x86-limit-linear-page-table-use-to-a-single-level.patch
-acf9744b853c1c6ac071bcf5776d8d9463781bbdf658c2fecc59ee338c094750  0002-x86-mm-Disable-PV-linear-pagetables-by-default.patch
-443a5b0818045ada44fad0370ac01af0c96181be5a4078ae3b2575799e4a4e5b  xsa241-4.8.patch
-5e66b6b1d1cd400905d3abd3478144539c3afa24f5a744a11809d9c5eb517b98  xsa242-4.9.patch
-465ba9e3293591a3c84c122ffd73474fe96483f5e21565440d5fbc207fa4c4a9  xsa243-4.7-1.patch
-013cff90312305b7f4ce6818a25760bcfca61bfadd860b694afa04d56e60c563  xsa243-2.patch
-4d8cf754f760ef05488e9fb25a7ebd9a7e46f3742e91eee1a8385fd1e611ea8c  xsa244-4.7.patch
-b41550688e88a2a7a22349a07168f3a3ddf6fad8b3389fa27de44ae6731b6a8b  xsa246-4.7.patch
-d149342e4d40dfb550f8af6d05cd20a34889d64fb33f967fe77cf89b4ea8504a  0001-p2m-Always-check-to-see-if-removing-a-p2m-entry-actu.patch
-3c8a7bfdb408af0224cf6f5471b0fd9dd1a9a1ded7207e427b02268ca2906aa6  0002-p2m-Check-return-value-of-p2m_set_entry-when-decreas.patch
-3bbd9fd92e5ffab1ddd7ff804bfbab09c1c654af3aa7f80f742f321da120b715  xsa248-4.8.patch
-e99066b0171d4757c6a66e1223aabe01e990de2d0dc50416936e064e6e750d00  xsa249.patch
-adf4d8242dbddb4ec52fe1effc1f8b233d33d8d6a59c1bb677dcc6e2ed2bf711  xsa250.patch
-f8cecf013a3628038e0a4566778852a560b25a1ce2f3872a989087ab2fc9a913  xsa251-4.8.patch
-14f37eb6b7a9fb19b258ca3c0e2da71dbc4240e6273137d5eb4003b122101aa6  xsa252-4.7.patch
-9bfc4a33a0faeb36aec8449ea940cef52d523cc3d13529b4eeaae64bf5a7b644  xsa255-4.7-1.patch
-6d95ceb54298de7863dc7133c0f3adf85f7da9b8d326146ff46e641194a47fc0  xsa255-4.7-2.patch
-b10a98962ab23d9fe8203288e04071cde8bc92aad71b1afb366b0e9f1812930f  0001-x86-entry-Remove-support-for-partial-cpu_user_regs-f.patch
-db48f9f7ffbd7767083af19f19ca184f386ddc5736b661ad99c1776ced2f2fa0  0002-x86-mm-Always-set-_PAGE_ACCESSED-on-L4e-updates.patch
-0cd7c0e6211cafd8428e2b10a8ea2057a6f785ae3f86e4005c9ebafc887c6d63  0003-x86-Meltdown-band-aid-against-malicious-64-bit-PV-gu.patch
-2322c76a57baadbfd1b9bc39c3af5bf29e7ba9b537d4fd3e11a6462ef8c89ec0  0004-x86-allow-Meltdown-band-aid-to-be-disabled.patch
-ebba2f1f084249cd1e1c2f59e338412161884c31c83dbba03fc1e10bf4ba57a1  xsa258-4.8.patch
-ff2efb5eb2502ded988d0aa15351030a15494a9e2223eafbb88377a8e4d39dcb  xsa259.patch
-0c2552a36737975f4f46d7054b49fd018b68c302cef3b39b27c2f17cc60eb531  xsa260-1.patch
-a92ef233a83923d6a18d51528ff28630ae3f1134ee76f2347397e22da9c84c24  xsa260-2.patch
-8469af8ba5b6722738b27c328eccc1d341af49c2e2bb23fe7b327a3349267b0e  xsa260-3.patch
-0327c2ef7984a4aa000849c68a01181fdb01962637e78629c6fb34bb95414a74  xsa260-4.patch
-98fb28bac871aae7c2f897a5506a2b03f340bf122a3a7f65aa65f3b3c9a525b4  xsa261-4.7.patch
-ec2b6ba9ed1d5e97fed4b54767160a75fe19d67e4519f716739bebdb78816191  xsa262-4.9.patch
 3941f99b49c7e8dafc9fae8aad2136a14c6d84533cd542cc5f1040a41ef7c6fe  qemu-coroutine-gthread.patch
 e4e5e838e259a3116978aabbcebc1865a895179a7fcbf4bad195c83e9b4c0f98  qemu-xen_paths.patch
 dd1e784bc455eb62cb85b3fa24bfc34f575ceaab9597ef6a2f1ee7ff7b3cae0a  hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
-74cb62a4614dd042ea9169112fb677bfef751a760aae34c7e73391fa857a8429  rombios-no-pie.patch
 ac8bbd0b864c7de278fd9b68392b71863581ec21622c2e9b87e501e492e414d3  0001-ipxe-dont-clobber-ebp.patch
 2fea4ceec8872f5560023fa135e3ff03d6deee4299e53d3a33ec59c31779b2c5  musl-support.patch
 479b9605e85c865be6117b6d1993124dbbb7da7f95d0e896e4c0fe5cdfeb74d3  musl-hvmloader-fix-stdint.patch
@@ -610,7 +472,7 @@ d13719093a2c3824525f36ac91ac3c9bd1154e5ba0974e5441e4a2ab5e883521  xenconsoled.in
 0da87a4b9094f934e3de937e8ef8d3afc752e76793aa3d730182d0241e118b19  xen-consoles.logrotate
 4cfcddcade5d055422ab4543e8caa6e5c5eee7625c41880a9000b7a87c7c424e  xenqemu.confd
 c92bbb1166edd61141fdf678116974209c4422daf373cdd5bc438aa4adb25b8d  xenqemu.initd"
-sha512sums="df596bef7f0f0e7f35246fb025913721dae5aa91da27f1b47a49256e9faa8f7dcb80e8c4679345c19614093c02059b6ced54fc51e6900a372b0e76b4ad827126  xen-4.7.3.tar.gz
+sha512sums="53cc659908b9f229c8e352a3027212a1b3e8c8f5cb0a48d32f9e5fc6418fc2e23987394df4f465781c050179b763a31e6e397412915240e2ad5f42be3e41f7a2  xen-4.7.6.tar.gz
 2e0b0fd23e6f10742a5517981e5171c6e88b0a93c83da701b296f5c0861d72c19782daab589a7eac3f9032152a0fc7eff7f5362db8fccc4859564a9aa82329cf  gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2
 c2bc9ffc8583aeae71cee9ddcc4418969768d4e3764d47307da54f93981c0109fb07d84b061b3a3628bd00ba4d14a54742bc04848110eb3ae8ca25dbfbaabadb  grub-0.97.tar.gz
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@@ -620,57 +482,9 @@ c2bc9ffc8583aeae71cee9ddcc4418969768d4e3764d47307da54f93981c0109fb07d84b061b3a36
 4928b5b82f57645be9408362706ff2c4d9baa635b21b0d41b1c82930e8c60a759b1ea4fa74d7e6c7cae1b7692d006aa5cb72df0c3b88bf049779aa2b566f9d35  tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz
 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e  zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 c5cb1cdff40d2d71fd3e692a9d0efadf2aa17290daf5195391a1c81ddd9dfc913a8e44d5be2b12be85b2a5565ea31631c99c7053564f2fb2225c80ea0bb0e4a4  ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz
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 f095ea373f36381491ad36f0662fb4f53665031973721256b23166e596318581da7cbb0146d0beb2446729adfdb321e01468e377793f6563a67d68b8b0f7ffe3  hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
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 76bd60768b296752ca11195bb03a57584686461da45255cb540977111a73c42b5b92362fd46d97bfd20487c96971dd5aed7eae7d8bf1aad7d5199adb875d4962  musl-support.patch
 08cf7fac825dd3da5f33856abf6692da00d8928ab73050b3ae0a643ddb97c8ae323238a80152fd31595ac1c31678d559232264258c189e2c05ecaf33e295f13e  musl-hvmloader-fix-stdint.patch
diff --git a/main/xen/rombios-no-pie.patch b/main/xen/rombios-no-pie.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3e98bb497d..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/rombios-no-pie.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/Makefile b/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/Makefile
-index 396906c..07168eb 100644
---- a/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/Makefile
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/firmware/Rules.mk
- 
- TARGET = 32bitbios_flat.h
- 
--CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) -I..
-+CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) -I.. -fno-pie
- 
- SUBDIRS = tcgbios
- 
-diff --git a/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/Makefile b/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/Makefile
-index f6f2649..104496a 100644
---- a/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/Makefile
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/firmware/Rules.mk
- 
- TARGET  = tcgbiosext.o
- 
--CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) -I.. -I../..
-+CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) -I.. -I../.. -fno-pie
- 
- .PHONY: all
- all: $(TARGET)
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa215.patch b/main/xen/xsa215.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f18a1cd01f..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa215.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: correct create_bounce_frame
-
-We may push up to 96 bytes on the guest (kernel) stack, so we should
-also cover as much in the early range check. Note that this is the
-simplest possible patch, which has the theoretical potential of
-breaking a guest: We only really push 96 bytes when invoking the
-failsafe callback, ordinary exceptions only have 56 or 64 bytes pushed
-(without / with error code respectively). There is, however, no PV OS
-known to place a kernel stack there.
-
-This is XSA-215.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int80_slow_path:
-         jmp   handle_exception_saved
- 
- /* CREATE A BASIC EXCEPTION FRAME ON GUEST OS STACK:                     */
--/*   { RCX, R11, [DS-GS,] [CR2,] [ERRCODE,] RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS }   */
-+/*   { RCX, R11, [DS-GS,] [ERRCODE,] RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS }          */
- /* %rdx: trap_bounce, %rbx: struct vcpu                                  */
- /* On return only %rbx and %rdx are guaranteed non-clobbered.            */
- create_bounce_frame:
-@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ create_bounce_frame:
- 2:      andq  $~0xf,%rsi                # Stack frames are 16-byte aligned.
-         movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_START,%rax
-         cmpq  %rax,%rsi
--        movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END+60,%rax
-+        movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END+12*8,%rax
-         sbb   %ecx,%ecx                 # In +ve address space? Then okay.
-         cmpq  %rax,%rsi
-         adc   %ecx,%ecx                 # Above Xen private area? Then okay.
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa216-qemuu-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa216-qemuu-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bf66fab8f..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa216-qemuu-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: xen/disk: don't leak stack data via response ring
-
-Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
-the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other (Linux)
-backends do. Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are
-actually identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
-
-This is XSA-216.
-
-Reported-by: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
-Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-
---- a/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
-+++ b/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
-@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@
- struct blkif_common_request {
- 	char dummy;
- };
--struct blkif_common_response {
--	char dummy;
--};
- 
- /* i386 protocol version */
- #pragma pack(push, 4)
-@@ -26,13 +23,7 @@ struct blkif_x86_32_request {
- 	blkif_sector_t sector_number;/* start sector idx on disk (r/w only)  */
- 	struct blkif_request_segment seg[BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST];
- };
--struct blkif_x86_32_response {
--	uint64_t        id;              /* copied from request */
--	uint8_t         operation;       /* copied from request */
--	int16_t         status;          /* BLKIF_RSP_???       */
--};
- typedef struct blkif_x86_32_request blkif_x86_32_request_t;
--typedef struct blkif_x86_32_response blkif_x86_32_response_t;
- #pragma pack(pop)
- 
- /* x86_64 protocol version */
-@@ -44,17 +35,14 @@ struct blkif_x86_64_request {
- 	blkif_sector_t sector_number;/* start sector idx on disk (r/w only)  */
- 	struct blkif_request_segment seg[BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST];
- };
--struct blkif_x86_64_response {
--	uint64_t       __attribute__((__aligned__(8))) id;
--	uint8_t         operation;       /* copied from request */
--	int16_t         status;          /* BLKIF_RSP_???       */
--};
- typedef struct blkif_x86_64_request blkif_x86_64_request_t;
--typedef struct blkif_x86_64_response blkif_x86_64_response_t;
- 
--DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_common, struct blkif_common_request, struct blkif_common_response);
--DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_32, struct blkif_x86_32_request, struct blkif_x86_32_response);
--DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_64, struct blkif_x86_64_request, struct blkif_x86_64_response);
-+DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_common, struct blkif_common_request,
-+                  struct blkif_response);
-+DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_32, struct blkif_x86_32_request,
-+                  struct blkif_response QEMU_PACKED);
-+DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_64, struct blkif_x86_64_request,
-+                  struct blkif_response);
- 
- union blkif_back_rings {
- 	blkif_back_ring_t        native;
---- a/hw/block/xen_disk.c
-+++ b/hw/block/xen_disk.c
-@@ -614,31 +614,30 @@ static int blk_send_response_one(struct
-     struct XenBlkDev  *blkdev = ioreq->blkdev;
-     int               send_notify   = 0;
-     int               have_requests = 0;
--    blkif_response_t  resp;
--    void              *dst;
--
--    resp.id        = ioreq->req.id;
--    resp.operation = ioreq->req.operation;
--    resp.status    = ioreq->status;
-+    blkif_response_t  *resp;
- 
-     /* Place on the response ring for the relevant domain. */
-     switch (blkdev->protocol) {
-     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
--        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native, blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
-+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native,
-+                                 blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
-         break;
-     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
--        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
--                                blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
-+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
-+                                 blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
-         break;
-     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
--        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
--                                blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
-+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
-+                                 blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
-         break;
-     default:
--        dst = NULL;
-         return 0;
-     }
--    memcpy(dst, &resp, sizeof(resp));
-+
-+    resp->id        = ioreq->req.id;
-+    resp->operation = ioreq->req.operation;
-+    resp->status    = ioreq->status;
-+
-     blkdev->rings.common.rsp_prod_pvt++;
- 
-     RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&blkdev->rings.common, send_notify);
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa217.patch b/main/xen/xsa217.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d4eb01f23..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa217.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/mm: disallow page stealing from HVM domains
-
-The operation's success can't be controlled by the guest, as the device
-model may have an active mapping of the page. If we nevertheless
-permitted this operation, we'd have to add further TLB flushing to
-prevent scenarios like
-
-"Domains A (HVM), B (PV), C (PV); B->target==A
- Steps:
- 1. B maps page X from A as writable
- 2. B unmaps page X without a TLB flush
- 3. A sends page X to C via GNTTABOP_transfer
- 4. C maps page X as pagetable (potentially causing a TLB flush in C,
- but not in B)
-
- At this point, X would be mapped as a pagetable in C while being
- writable through a stale TLB entry in B."
-
-A similar scenario could be constructed for A using XENMEM_exchange and
-some arbitrary PV domain C then having this page allocated.
-
-This is XSA-217.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4449,6 +4449,9 @@ int steal_page(
-     bool_t drop_dom_ref = 0;
-     const struct domain *owner = dom_xen;
- 
-+    if ( paging_mode_external(d) )
-+        return -1;
-+
-     spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
- 
-     if ( is_xen_heap_page(page) || ((owner = page_get_owner(page)) != d) )
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa226-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa226-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e45e73a864..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa226-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: grant_table: Default to v1, and disallow transitive grants
-
-The reference counting and locking discipline for transitive grants is broken.
-Their use is therefore declared out of security support.
-
-This is XSA-226.
-
-Transitive grants are expected to be unconditionally available with grant
-table v2.  Hiding transitive grants alone is an ABI breakage for the guest.
-Modern versions of Linux and the Windows PV drivers use grant table v1, but
-older versions did use v2.
-
-In principle, disabling gnttab v2 entirely is the safer way to cause guests to
-avoid using transitive grants. However, some older guests which defaulted to
-using gnttab v2 don't tolerate falling back from v2 to v1 over migrate.
-
-This patch introduces a new command line option to control grant table
-behaviour.  One suboption allows a choice of the maximum grant table version
-Xen will allow the guest to use, and defaults to v2.  A different suboption
-independently controls whether transitive grants can be used.
-
-The default case is:
-
-    gnttab=max_ver:2
-
-To disable gnttab v2 entirely, use:
-
-    gnttab=max_ver:1
-
-To allow gnttab v2 and transitive grants, use:
-
-    gnttab=max_ver:2,transitive
-
-Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 73f5265..b792abf 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -758,6 +758,22 @@ Controls EPT related features.
- 
- Specify which console gdbstub should use. See **console**.
- 
-+### gnttab
-+> `= List of [ max_ver:<integer>, transitive ]`
-+
-+> Default: `gnttab=max_ver:2,no-transitive`
-+
-+Control various aspects of the grant table behaviour available to guests.
-+
-+* `max_ver` Select the maximum grant table version to offer to guests.  Valid
-+version are 1 and 2.
-+* `transitive` Permit or disallow the use of transitive grants.  Note that the
-+use of grant table v2 without transitive grants is an ABI breakage from the
-+guests point of view.
-+
-+*Warning:*
-+Due to XSA-226, the use of transitive grants is outside of security support.
-+
- ### gnttab\_max\_frames
- > `= <integer>`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index f06b664..109c552 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,42 @@ integer_param("gnttab_max_nr_frames", max_nr_grant_frames);
- unsigned int __read_mostly max_grant_frames;
- integer_param("gnttab_max_frames", max_grant_frames);
- 
-+static unsigned int __read_mostly opt_gnttab_max_version = 2;
-+static bool_t __read_mostly opt_transitive_grants;
-+
-+static void __init parse_gnttab(char *s)
-+{
-+    char *ss;
-+
-+    do {
-+        ss = strchr(s, ',');
-+        if ( ss )
-+            *ss = '\0';
-+
-+        if ( !strncmp(s, "max_ver:", 8) )
-+        {
-+            long ver = simple_strtol(s + 8, NULL, 10);
-+
-+            if ( ver >= 1 && ver <= 2 )
-+                opt_gnttab_max_version = ver;
-+        }
-+        else
-+        {
-+            bool_t val = !!strncmp(s, "no-", 3);
-+
-+            if ( !val )
-+                s += 3;
-+
-+            if ( !strcmp(s, "transitive") )
-+                opt_transitive_grants = val;
-+        }
-+
-+        s = ss + 1;
-+    } while ( ss );
-+}
-+
-+custom_param("gnttab", parse_gnttab);
-+
- /* The maximum number of grant mappings is defined as a multiplier of the
-  * maximum number of grant table entries. This defines the multiplier used.
-  * Pretty arbitrary. [POLICY]
-@@ -2188,6 +2224,10 @@ __acquire_grant_for_copy(
-         }
-         else if ( (shah->flags & GTF_type_mask) == GTF_transitive )
-         {
-+            if ( !opt_transitive_grants )
-+                PIN_FAIL(unlock_out_clear, GNTST_general_error,
-+                         "transitive grant disallowed by policy\n");
-+
-             if ( !allow_transitive )
-                 PIN_FAIL(unlock_out_clear, GNTST_general_error,
-                          "transitive grant when transitivity not allowed\n");
-@@ -3156,7 +3196,10 @@ do_grant_table_op(
-     }
-     case GNTTABOP_set_version:
-     {
--        rc = gnttab_set_version(guest_handle_cast(uop, gnttab_set_version_t));
-+        if ( opt_gnttab_max_version == 1 )
-+            rc = -ENOSYS; /* Behave as before set_version was introduced. */
-+        else
-+            rc = gnttab_set_version(guest_handle_cast(uop, gnttab_set_version_t));
-         break;
-     }
-     case GNTTABOP_get_status_frames:
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa227.patch b/main/xen/xsa227.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 86aa41e2d4..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa227.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From fa7268b94f8a0a7792ee12d5b8e23a60e52a3a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 19:18:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/grant: Disallow misaligned PTEs
-
-Pagetable entries must be aligned to function correctly.  Disallow attempts
-from the guest to have a grant PTE created at a misaligned address, which
-would result in corruption of the L1 table with largely-guest-controlled
-values.
-
-This is XSA-227
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 13 +++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 97b3b4b..00f517a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3763,6 +3763,9 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping(
-     l1_pgentry_t ol1e;
-     struct domain *d = v->domain;
- 
-+    if ( !IS_ALIGNED(pte_addr, sizeof(nl1e)) )
-+        return GNTST_general_error;
-+
-     adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, d);
- 
-     gmfn = pte_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-@@ -3819,6 +3822,16 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
-     struct page_info *page;
-     l1_pgentry_t ol1e;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * addr comes from Xen's active_entry tracking so isn't guest controlled,
-+     * but it had still better be PTE-aligned.
-+     */
-+    if ( !IS_ALIGNED(addr, sizeof(ol1e)) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return GNTST_general_error;
-+    }
-+
-     gmfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-     page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gmfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
- 
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa228-4.8.patch b/main/xen/xsa228-4.8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 57e6661cdb..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa228-4.8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-From cb91f4c43bd4158daa6561c73921a6455176f278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 15:17:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] gnttab: split maptrack lock to make it fulfill its purpose
- again
-
-The way the lock is currently being used in get_maptrack_handle(), it
-protects only the maptrack limit: The function acts on current's list
-only, so races on list accesses are impossible even without the lock.
-
-Otoh list access races are possible between __get_maptrack_handle() and
-put_maptrack_handle(), due to the invocation of the former for other
-than current from steal_maptrack_handle(). Introduce a per-vCPU lock
-for list accesses to become race free again. This lock will be
-uncontended except when it becomes necessary to take the steal path,
-i.e. in the common case there should be no meaningful performance
-impact.
-
-When in get_maptrack_handle adds a stolen entry to a fresh, empty,
-freelist, we think that there is probably no concurrency.  However,
-this is not a fast path and adding the locking there makes the code
-clearly correct.
-
-Also, while we are here: the stolen maptrack_entry's tail pointer was
-not properly set.  Set it.
-
-This is XSA-228.
-
-Reported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- docs/misc/grant-tables.txt    |  7 ++++++-
- xen/common/grant_table.c      | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- xen/include/xen/grant_table.h |  2 +-
- xen/include/xen/sched.h       |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt b/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-index 417ce2d..64da5cf 100644
---- a/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-+++ b/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ is complete.
-                                inconsistent grant table state such as current
-                                version, partially initialized active table pages,
-                                etc.
--  grant_table->maptrack_lock : spinlock used to protect the maptrack free list
-+  grant_table->maptrack_lock : spinlock used to protect the maptrack limit
-+  v->maptrack_freelist_lock  : spinlock used to protect the maptrack free list
-   active_grant_entry->lock   : spinlock used to serialize modifications to
-                                active entries
- 
-@@ -102,6 +103,10 @@ is complete.
-  The maptrack free list is protected by its own spinlock. The maptrack
-  lock may be locked while holding the grant table lock.
- 
-+ The maptrack_freelist_lock is an innermost lock.  It may be locked
-+ while holding other locks, but no other locks may be acquired within
-+ it.
-+
-  Active entries are obtained by calling active_entry_acquire(gt, ref).
-  This function returns a pointer to the active entry after locking its
-  spinlock. The caller must hold the grant table read lock before
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index f9654f1..593121c 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -304,11 +304,16 @@ __get_maptrack_handle(
- {
-     unsigned int head, next, prev_head;
- 
-+    spin_lock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     do {
-         /* No maptrack pages allocated for this VCPU yet? */
-         head = read_atomic(&v->maptrack_head);
-         if ( unlikely(head == MAPTRACK_TAIL) )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-             return -1;
-+        }
- 
-         /*
-          * Always keep one entry in the free list to make it easier to
-@@ -316,12 +321,17 @@ __get_maptrack_handle(
-          */
-         next = read_atomic(&maptrack_entry(t, head).ref);
-         if ( unlikely(next == MAPTRACK_TAIL) )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-             return -1;
-+        }
- 
-         prev_head = head;
-         head = cmpxchg(&v->maptrack_head, prev_head, next);
-     } while ( head != prev_head );
- 
-+    spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     return head;
- }
- 
-@@ -380,6 +390,8 @@ put_maptrack_handle(
-     /* 2. Add entry to the tail of the list on the original VCPU. */
-     v = currd->vcpu[maptrack_entry(t, handle).vcpu];
- 
-+    spin_lock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     cur_tail = read_atomic(&v->maptrack_tail);
-     do {
-         prev_tail = cur_tail;
-@@ -388,6 +400,8 @@ put_maptrack_handle(
- 
-     /* 3. Update the old tail entry to point to the new entry. */
-     write_atomic(&maptrack_entry(t, prev_tail).ref, handle);
-+
-+    spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
- }
- 
- static inline int
-@@ -411,10 +425,6 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-      */
-     if ( nr_maptrack_frames(lgt) >= max_maptrack_frames )
-     {
--        /*
--         * Can drop the lock since no other VCPU can be adding a new
--         * frame once they've run out.
--         */
-         spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
- 
-         /*
-@@ -426,8 +436,12 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-             handle = steal_maptrack_handle(lgt, curr);
-             if ( handle == -1 )
-                 return -1;
-+            spin_lock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+            maptrack_entry(lgt, handle).ref = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
-             curr->maptrack_tail = handle;
--            write_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head, handle);
-+            if ( curr->maptrack_head == MAPTRACK_TAIL )
-+                write_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head, handle);
-+            spin_unlock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-         }
-         return steal_maptrack_handle(lgt, curr);
-     }
-@@ -460,12 +474,15 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-     smp_wmb();
-     lgt->maptrack_limit += MAPTRACK_PER_PAGE;
- 
-+    spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
-+    spin_lock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     do {
-         new_mt[i - 1].ref = read_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head);
-         head = cmpxchg(&curr->maptrack_head, new_mt[i - 1].ref, handle + 1);
-     } while ( head != new_mt[i - 1].ref );
- 
--    spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
-+    spin_unlock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
- 
-     return handle;
- }
-@@ -3474,6 +3491,7 @@ grant_table_destroy(
- 
- void grant_table_init_vcpu(struct vcpu *v)
- {
-+    spin_lock_init(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-     v->maptrack_head = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
-     v->maptrack_tail = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-index 4e77899..100f2b3 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct grant_table {
-     /* Mapping tracking table per vcpu. */
-     struct grant_mapping **maptrack;
-     unsigned int          maptrack_limit;
--    /* Lock protecting the maptrack page list, head, and limit */
-+    /* Lock protecting the maptrack limit */
-     spinlock_t            maptrack_lock;
-     /* The defined versions are 1 and 2.  Set to 0 if we don't know
-        what version to use yet. */
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-index 1fbda87..ff0f38f 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ struct vcpu
-     int              controller_pause_count;
- 
-     /* Maptrack */
-+    spinlock_t       maptrack_freelist_lock;
-     unsigned int     maptrack_head;
-     unsigned int     maptrack_tail;
- 
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa228.patch b/main/xen/xsa228.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 65add3a588..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa228.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-From 9a52c78eb4ff7836bf7ac9ecd918b289cead1f3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 15:17:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] gnttab: split maptrack lock to make it fulfill its purpose
- again
-
-The way the lock is currently being used in get_maptrack_handle(), it
-protects only the maptrack limit: The function acts on current's list
-only, so races on list accesses are impossible even without the lock.
-
-Otoh list access races are possible between __get_maptrack_handle() and
-put_maptrack_handle(), due to the invocation of the former for other
-than current from steal_maptrack_handle(). Introduce a per-vCPU lock
-for list accesses to become race free again. This lock will be
-uncontended except when it becomes necessary to take the steal path,
-i.e. in the common case there should be no meaningful performance
-impact.
-
-When in get_maptrack_handle adds a stolen entry to a fresh, empty,
-freelist, we think that there is probably no concurrency.  However,
-this is not a fast path and adding the locking there makes the code
-clearly correct.
-
-Also, while we are here: the stolen maptrack_entry's tail pointer was
-not properly set.  Set it.
-
-This is XSA-228.
-
-Reported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- docs/misc/grant-tables.txt    |  7 ++++++-
- xen/common/grant_table.c      | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- xen/include/xen/grant_table.h |  2 +-
- xen/include/xen/sched.h       |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt b/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-index 417ce2d..64da5cf 100644
---- a/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-+++ b/docs/misc/grant-tables.txt
-@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ is complete.
-                                inconsistent grant table state such as current
-                                version, partially initialized active table pages,
-                                etc.
--  grant_table->maptrack_lock : spinlock used to protect the maptrack free list
-+  grant_table->maptrack_lock : spinlock used to protect the maptrack limit
-+  v->maptrack_freelist_lock  : spinlock used to protect the maptrack free list
-   active_grant_entry->lock   : spinlock used to serialize modifications to
-                                active entries
- 
-@@ -102,6 +103,10 @@ is complete.
-  The maptrack free list is protected by its own spinlock. The maptrack
-  lock may be locked while holding the grant table lock.
- 
-+ The maptrack_freelist_lock is an innermost lock.  It may be locked
-+ while holding other locks, but no other locks may be acquired within
-+ it.
-+
-  Active entries are obtained by calling active_entry_acquire(gt, ref).
-  This function returns a pointer to the active entry after locking its
-  spinlock. The caller must hold the grant table read lock before
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index ae34547..ee33bd8 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -304,11 +304,16 @@ __get_maptrack_handle(
- {
-     unsigned int head, next, prev_head;
- 
-+    spin_lock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     do {
-         /* No maptrack pages allocated for this VCPU yet? */
-         head = read_atomic(&v->maptrack_head);
-         if ( unlikely(head == MAPTRACK_TAIL) )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-             return -1;
-+        }
- 
-         /*
-          * Always keep one entry in the free list to make it easier to
-@@ -316,12 +321,17 @@ __get_maptrack_handle(
-          */
-         next = read_atomic(&maptrack_entry(t, head).ref);
-         if ( unlikely(next == MAPTRACK_TAIL) )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-             return -1;
-+        }
- 
-         prev_head = head;
-         head = cmpxchg(&v->maptrack_head, prev_head, next);
-     } while ( head != prev_head );
- 
-+    spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     return head;
- }
- 
-@@ -380,6 +390,8 @@ put_maptrack_handle(
-     /* 2. Add entry to the tail of the list on the original VCPU. */
-     v = currd->vcpu[maptrack_entry(t, handle).vcpu];
- 
-+    spin_lock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     cur_tail = read_atomic(&v->maptrack_tail);
-     do {
-         prev_tail = cur_tail;
-@@ -388,6 +400,8 @@ put_maptrack_handle(
- 
-     /* 3. Update the old tail entry to point to the new entry. */
-     write_atomic(&maptrack_entry(t, prev_tail).ref, handle);
-+
-+    spin_unlock(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
- }
- 
- static inline int
-@@ -411,10 +425,6 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-      */
-     if ( nr_maptrack_frames(lgt) >= max_maptrack_frames )
-     {
--        /*
--         * Can drop the lock since no other VCPU can be adding a new
--         * frame once they've run out.
--         */
-         spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
- 
-         /*
-@@ -426,8 +436,12 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-             handle = steal_maptrack_handle(lgt, curr);
-             if ( handle == -1 )
-                 return -1;
-+            spin_lock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+            maptrack_entry(lgt, handle).ref = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
-             curr->maptrack_tail = handle;
--            write_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head, handle);
-+            if ( curr->maptrack_head == MAPTRACK_TAIL )
-+                write_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head, handle);
-+            spin_unlock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-         }
-         return steal_maptrack_handle(lgt, curr);
-     }
-@@ -460,12 +474,15 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
-     smp_wmb();
-     lgt->maptrack_limit += MAPTRACK_PER_PAGE;
- 
-+    spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
-+    spin_lock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-+
-     do {
-         new_mt[i - 1].ref = read_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head);
-         head = cmpxchg(&curr->maptrack_head, new_mt[i - 1].ref, handle + 1);
-     } while ( head != new_mt[i - 1].ref );
- 
--    spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
-+    spin_unlock(&curr->maptrack_freelist_lock);
- 
-     return handle;
- }
-@@ -3475,6 +3492,7 @@ grant_table_destroy(
- 
- void grant_table_init_vcpu(struct vcpu *v)
- {
-+    spin_lock_init(&v->maptrack_freelist_lock);
-     v->maptrack_head = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
-     v->maptrack_tail = MAPTRACK_TAIL;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-index 4e77899..100f2b3 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct grant_table {
-     /* Mapping tracking table per vcpu. */
-     struct grant_mapping **maptrack;
-     unsigned int          maptrack_limit;
--    /* Lock protecting the maptrack page list, head, and limit */
-+    /* Lock protecting the maptrack limit */
-     spinlock_t            maptrack_lock;
-     /* The defined versions are 1 and 2.  Set to 0 if we don't know
-        what version to use yet. */
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-index 6673b27..8690f29 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ struct vcpu
-     int              controller_pause_count;
- 
-     /* Grant table map tracking. */
-+    spinlock_t       maptrack_freelist_lock;
-     unsigned int     maptrack_head;
-     unsigned int     maptrack_tail;
- 
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa229.patch b/main/xen/xsa229.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 47e9538436..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa229.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 84882133e793299f685991e20a9631acfd0a5608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:01:00 +0100
-Subject: xen: fix bio vec merging
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The current test for bio vec merging is not fully accurate and can be
-tricked into merging bios when certain grant combinations are used.
-The result of these malicious bio merges is a bio that extends past
-the memory page used by any of the originating bios.
-
-Take into account the following scenario, where a guest creates two
-grant references that point to the same mfn, ie: grant 1 -> mfn A,
-grant 2 -> mfn A.
-
-These references are then used in a PV block request, and mapped by
-the backend domain, thus obtaining two different pfns that point to
-the same mfn, pfn B -> mfn A, pfn C -> mfn A.
-
-If those grants happen to be used in two consecutive sectors of a disk
-IO operation becoming two different bios in the backend domain, the
-checks in xen_biovec_phys_mergeable will succeed, because bfn1 == bfn2
-(they both point to the same mfn). However due to the bio merging,
-the backend domain will end up with a bio that expands past mfn A into
-mfn A + 1.
-
-Fix this by making sure the check in xen_biovec_phys_mergeable takes
-into account the offset and the length of the bio, this basically
-replicates whats done in __BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE using mfns (bus
-addresses). While there also remove the usage of
-__BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE, since that's already checked by the callers
-of xen_biovec_phys_mergeable.
-
-Reported-by: "Jan H. Schönherr" <jschoenh@amazon.de>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
----
- drivers/xen/biomerge.c | 3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/xen/biomerge.c b/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
-index 4da69dbf7dca..1bdd02a6d6ac 100644
---- a/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
-+++ b/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
-@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ bool xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(const struct bio_vec *vec1,
- 	unsigned long bfn1 = pfn_to_bfn(page_to_pfn(vec1->bv_page));
- 	unsigned long bfn2 = pfn_to_bfn(page_to_pfn(vec2->bv_page));
- 
--	return __BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE(vec1, vec2) &&
--		((bfn1 == bfn2) || ((bfn1+1) == bfn2));
-+	return bfn1 + PFN_DOWN(vec1->bv_offset + vec1->bv_len) == bfn2;
- #else
- 	/*
- 	 * XXX: Add support for merging bio_vec when using different page
--- 
-2.11.0 (Apple Git-81)
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa230.patch b/main/xen/xsa230.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c3b50c8aaa..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa230.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: correct pin status fixup for copy
-
-Regardless of copy operations only setting GNTPIN_hst*, GNTPIN_dev*
-also need to be taken into account when deciding whether to clear
-_GTF_{read,writ}ing. At least for consistency with code elsewhere the
-read part better doesn't use any mask at all.
-
-This is XSA-230.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index ae34547..9c9d33c 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -2107,10 +2107,10 @@ __release_grant_for_copy(
- static void __fixup_status_for_copy_pin(const struct active_grant_entry *act,
-                                    uint16_t *status)
- {
--    if ( !(act->pin & GNTPIN_hstw_mask) )
-+    if ( !(act->pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask | GNTPIN_devw_mask)) )
-         gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_writing, status);
- 
--    if ( !(act->pin & GNTPIN_hstr_mask) )
-+    if ( !act->pin )
-         gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_reading, status);
- }
- 
-@@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ __acquire_grant_for_copy(
-  
-  unlock_out_clear:
-     if ( !(readonly) &&
--         !(act->pin & GNTPIN_hstw_mask) )
-+         !(act->pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask | GNTPIN_devw_mask)) )
-         gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_writing, status);
- 
-     if ( !act->pin )
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa231-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa231-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4474949a37..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa231-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Subject: xen/mm: make sure node is less than MAX_NUMNODES
-
-The output of MEMF_get_node(memflags) can be as large as nodeid_t can
-hold (currently 255).  This is then used as an index to arrays of size
-MAX_NUMNODE, which is 64 on x86 and 1 on ARM, can be passed in by an
-untrusted guest (via memory_exchange and increase_reservation) and is
-not currently bounds-checked.
-
-Check the value in page_alloc.c before using it, and also check the
-value in the hypercall call sites and return -EINVAL if appropriate.
-Don't permit domains other than the hardware or control domain to
-allocate node-constrained memory.
-
-This is XSA-231.
-
-Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -390,6 +390,31 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct
-     a->nr_done = i;
- }
- 
-+static bool_t propagate_node(unsigned int xmf, unsigned int *memflags)
-+{
-+    const struct domain *currd = current->domain;
-+
-+    BUILD_BUG_ON(XENMEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE);
-+    BUILD_BUG_ON(MEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE);
-+
-+    if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) == NUMA_NO_NODE )
-+        return 1;
-+
-+    if ( is_hardware_domain(currd) || is_control_domain(currd) )
-+    {
-+        if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) >= MAX_NUMNODES )
-+            return 0;
-+
-+        *memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(xmf));
-+        if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
-+            *memflags |= MEMF_exact_node;
-+    }
-+    else if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
- static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg)
- {
-     struct xen_memory_exchange exch;
-@@ -462,6 +487,12 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(exch.out.mem_flags, &memflags)) )
-+    {
-+        rc = -EINVAL;
-+        goto fail_early;
-+    }
-+
-     d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid);
-     if ( d == NULL )
-     {
-@@ -480,7 +511,6 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
-         d,
-         XENMEMF_get_address_bits(exch.out.mem_flags) ? :
-         (BITS_PER_LONG+PAGE_SHIFT)));
--    memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(exch.out.mem_flags));
- 
-     for ( i = (exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order);
-           i < (exch.in.nr_extents >> in_chunk_order);
-@@ -834,12 +864,8 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat
-         }
-         read_unlock(&d->vnuma_rwlock);
-     }
--    else
--    {
--        a->memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(r->mem_flags));
--        if ( r->mem_flags & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
--            a->memflags |= MEMF_exact_node;
--    }
-+    else if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(r->mem_flags, &a->memflags)) )
-+        return -EINVAL;
- 
-     return 0;
- }
---- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-@@ -711,9 +711,13 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
-         if ( node >= MAX_NUMNODES )
-             node = cpu_to_node(smp_processor_id());
-     }
-+    else if ( unlikely(node >= MAX_NUMNODES) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return NULL;
-+    }
-     first_node = node;
- 
--    ASSERT(node < MAX_NUMNODES);
-     ASSERT(zone_lo <= zone_hi);
-     ASSERT(zone_hi < NR_ZONES);
- 
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa232.patch b/main/xen/xsa232.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9e5f35c7d6..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa232.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: grant_table: fix GNTTABOP_cache_flush handling
-
-Don't fall over a NULL grant_table pointer when the owner of the domain
-is a system domain (DOMID_{XEN,IO} etc).
-
-This is XSA-232.
-
-Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -3053,7 +3053,7 @@ static int cache_flush(gnttab_cache_flus
- 
-     page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page);
--    if ( !owner )
-+    if ( !owner || !owner->grant_table )
-     {
-         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
-         return -EPERM;
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa233.patch b/main/xen/xsa233.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6013c52b41..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa233.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Subject: tools/xenstore: dont unlink connection object twice
-
-A connection object of a domain with associated stubdom has two
-parents: the domain and the stubdom. When cleaning up the list of
-active domains in domain_cleanup() make sure not to unlink the
-connection twice from the same domain. This could happen when the
-domain and its stubdom are being destroyed at the same time leading
-to the domain loop being entered twice.
-
-Additionally don't use talloc_free() in this case as it will remove
-a random parent link, leading eventually to a memory leak. Use
-talloc_unlink() instead specifying the context from which the
-connection object should be removed.
-
-This is XSA-233.
-
-Reported-by: Eric Chanudet <chanudete@ainfosec.com>
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -221,10 +221,11 @@ static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
- static void domain_cleanup(void)
- {
- 	xc_dominfo_t dominfo;
--	struct domain *domain, *tmp;
-+	struct domain *domain;
- 	int notify = 0;
- 
--	list_for_each_entry_safe(domain, tmp, &domains, list) {
-+ again:
-+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &domains, list) {
- 		if (xc_domain_getinfo(*xc_handle, domain->domid, 1,
- 				      &dominfo) == 1 &&
- 		    dominfo.domid == domain->domid) {
-@@ -236,8 +237,12 @@ static void domain_cleanup(void)
- 			if (!dominfo.dying)
- 				continue;
- 		}
--		talloc_free(domain->conn);
--		notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */
-+		if (domain->conn) {
-+			talloc_unlink(talloc_autofree_context(), domain->conn);
-+			domain->conn = NULL;
-+			notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */
-+			goto again;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (notify)
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa234-4.6.patch b/main/xen/xsa234-4.6.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6bd95f2d3a..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa234-4.6.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: also validate PTE permissions upon destroy/replace
-
-In order for PTE handling to match up with the reference counting done
-by common code, presence and writability of grant mapping PTEs must
-also be taken into account; validating just the frame number is not
-enough. This is in particular relevant if a guest fiddles with grant
-PTEs via non-grant hypercalls.
-
-Note that the flags being passed to replace_grant_host_mapping()
-already happen to be those of the existing mapping, so no new function
-parameter is needed.
-
-This is XSA-234.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3930,7 +3930,8 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping(
- }
- 
- static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
--    uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, struct domain *d)
-+    uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
-+    struct domain *d)
- {
-     int rc = GNTST_okay;
-     void *va;
-@@ -3976,16 +3977,27 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
- 
-     ol1e = *(l1_pgentry_t *)va;
-     
--    /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */
--    if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) )
-+    /*
-+     * Check that the PTE supplied actually maps frame (with appropriate
-+     * permissions).
-+     */
-+    if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ||
-+         unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
-+                  (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) )
-     {
-         page_unlock(page);
--        MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %"PRIx64" doesn't match frame %lx",
--                (unsigned long)l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr, frame);
-+        MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" at %"PRIx64" doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")",
-+                l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr,
-+                l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags)));
-         rc = GNTST_general_error;
-         goto failed;
-     }
- 
-+    if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
-+                  ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) )
-+        MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x at %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)\n",
-+                l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags);
-+
-     /* Delete pagetable entry. */
-     if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY
-                   (l1, 
-@@ -3994,7 +4006,7 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
-                    0)) )
-     {
-         page_unlock(page);
--        MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", va);
-+        MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %"PRIx64, addr);
-         rc = GNTST_general_error;
-         goto failed;
-     }
-@@ -4062,7 +4074,8 @@ static int create_grant_va_mapping(
- }
- 
- static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
--    unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v)
-+    unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
-+    l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v)
- {
-     l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, ol1e;
-     unsigned long gl1mfn;
-@@ -4098,19 +4111,30 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
- 
-     ol1e = *pl1e;
- 
--    /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */
--    if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) )
--    {
--        MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %lx doesn't match frame %lx",
--                l1e_get_pfn(ol1e), addr, frame);
-+    /*
-+     * Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame
-+     * (with appropriate permissions).
-+     */
-+    if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ||
-+         unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
-+                  (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) )
-+    {
-+        MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" for %lx doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")",
-+                l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr,
-+                l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags)));
-         rc = GNTST_general_error;
-         goto unlock_and_out;
-     }
- 
-+    if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
-+                  ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) )
-+        MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x for %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)",
-+                l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags);
-+
-     /* Delete pagetable entry. */
-     if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, v, 0)) )
-     {
--        MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", (unsigned long *)pl1e);
-+        MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry for %"PRIx64, addr);
-         rc = GNTST_general_error;
-         goto unlock_and_out;
-     }
-@@ -4124,9 +4148,11 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
- }
- 
- static int destroy_grant_va_mapping(
--    unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, struct vcpu *v)
-+    unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
-+    struct vcpu *v)
- {
--    return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, l1e_empty(), v);
-+    return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags,
-+                                    l1e_empty(), v);
- }
- 
- static int create_grant_p2m_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame,
-@@ -4219,21 +4245,40 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(
-     unsigned long gl1mfn;
-     struct page_info *l1pg;
-     int rc;
-+    unsigned int grant_pte_flags;
-     
-     if ( paging_mode_external(current->domain) )
-         return replace_grant_p2m_mapping(addr, frame, new_addr, flags);
- 
-+    grant_pte_flags =
-+        _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_GNTTAB | _PAGE_NX;
-+
-+    if ( flags & GNTMAP_application_map )
-+        grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_USER;
-+    if ( !(flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
-+        grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_RW;
-+    /*
-+     * On top of the explicit settings done by create_grant_host_mapping()
-+     * also open-code relevant parts of adjust_guest_l1e(). Don't mirror
-+     * available and cachability flags, though.
-+     */
-+    if ( !is_pv_32bit_domain(curr->domain) )
-+        grant_pte_flags |= (grant_pte_flags & _PAGE_USER)
-+                           ? _PAGE_GLOBAL
-+                           : _PAGE_GUEST_KERNEL | _PAGE_USER;
-+
-     if ( flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte )
-     {
-         if ( !new_addr )
--            return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, curr->domain);
-+            return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags,
-+                                             curr->domain);
-         
-         MEM_LOG("Unsupported grant table operation");
-         return GNTST_general_error;
-     }
- 
-     if ( !new_addr )
--        return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, curr);
-+        return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, curr);
- 
-     pl1e = guest_map_l1e(curr, new_addr, &gl1mfn);
-     if ( !pl1e )
-@@ -4281,7 +4326,7 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(
-     put_page(l1pg);
-     guest_unmap_l1e(curr, pl1e);
- 
--    rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, ol1e, curr);
-+    rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, ol1e, curr);
-     if ( rc && !paging_mode_refcounts(curr->domain) )
-         put_page_from_l1e(ol1e, curr->domain);
- 
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa235-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa235-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 54f3aa512d..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa235-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: arm/mm: release grant lock on xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() error paths
-
-Commit 55021ff9ab ("xen/arm: add_to_physmap_one: Avoid to map mfn 0 if
-an error occurs") introduced error paths not releasing the grant table
-lock. Replace them by a suitable check after the lock was dropped.
-
-This is XSA-235.
-
-Reported-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-             if ( idx < nr_status_frames(d->grant_table) )
-                 mfn = virt_to_mfn(d->grant_table->status[idx]);
-             else
--                return -EINVAL;
-+                mfn = INVALID_MFN;
-         }
-         else
-         {
-@@ -1092,14 +1092,21 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-             if ( idx < nr_grant_frames(d->grant_table) )
-                 mfn = virt_to_mfn(d->grant_table->shared_raw[idx]);
-             else
--                return -EINVAL;
-+                mfn = INVALID_MFN;
-         }
-         
--        d->arch.grant_table_gpfn[idx] = gpfn;
-+        if ( mfn != INVALID_MFN )
-+        {
-+            d->arch.grant_table_gpfn[idx] = gpfn;
- 
--        t = p2m_ram_rw;
-+            t = p2m_ram_rw;
-+        }
- 
-         grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
-+
-+        if ( mfn == INVALID_MFN )
-+            return -EINVAL;
-+
-         break;
-     case XENMAPSPACE_shared_info:
-         if ( idx != 0 )
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa236-4.9.patch b/main/xen/xsa236-4.9.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 203025dbae..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa236-4.9.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: fix pin count / page reference race
-
-Dropping page references before decrementing pin counts is a bad idea
-if assumptions are being made that a non-zero pin count implies a valid
-page. Fix the order of operations in gnttab_copy_release_buf(), but at
-the same time also remove the assertion that was found to trigger:
-map_grant_ref() also has the potential of causing a race here, and
-changing the order of operations there would likely be quite a bit more
-involved.
-
-This is XSA-236.
-
-Reported-by: Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@amazon.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -2330,9 +2330,20 @@ __acquire_grant_for_copy(
-         td = page_get_owner_and_reference(*page);
-         /*
-          * act->pin being non-zero should guarantee the page to have a
--         * non-zero refcount and hence a valid owner.
-+         * non-zero refcount and hence a valid owner (matching the one on
-+         * record), with one exception: If the owning domain is dying we
-+         * had better not make implications from pin count (map_grant_ref()
-+         * updates pin counts before obtaining page references, for
-+         * example).
-          */
--        ASSERT(td);
-+        if ( td != rd || rd->is_dying )
-+        {
-+            if ( td )
-+                put_page(*page);
-+            *page = NULL;
-+            rc = GNTST_bad_domain;
-+            goto unlock_out_clear;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     act->pin += readonly ? GNTPIN_hstr_inc : GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
-@@ -2451,6 +2462,11 @@ static void gnttab_copy_release_buf(stru
-         unmap_domain_page(buf->virt);
-         buf->virt = NULL;
-     }
-+    if ( buf->have_grant )
-+    {
-+        __release_grant_for_copy(buf->domain, buf->ptr.u.ref, buf->read_only);
-+        buf->have_grant = 0;
-+    }
-     if ( buf->have_type )
-     {
-         put_page_type(buf->page);
-@@ -2461,11 +2477,6 @@ static void gnttab_copy_release_buf(stru
-         put_page(buf->page);
-         buf->page = NULL;
-     }
--    if ( buf->have_grant )
--    {
--        __release_grant_for_copy(buf->domain, buf->ptr.u.ref, buf->read_only);
--        buf->have_grant = 0;
--    }
- }
- 
- static int gnttab_copy_claim_buf(const struct gnttab_copy *op,
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa238.patch b/main/xen/xsa238.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d7d48fef8..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa238.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From cdc2887076b19b39fab9faec495082586f3113df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: XenProject Security Team <security@xenproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 13:41:37 +0200
-Subject: x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus
- XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments
-
-Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/
-unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when
-specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in
-rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds.
-Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later
-while handling such bogus ranges.
-
-This is XSA-238.
-
-Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-index b2a8b0e986..8c8bf1f0ec 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-@@ -820,6 +820,9 @@ int hvm_map_io_range_to_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id,
-     struct hvm_ioreq_server *s;
-     int rc;
- 
-+    if ( start > end )
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+
-     spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock);
- 
-     rc = -ENOENT;
-@@ -872,6 +875,9 @@ int hvm_unmap_io_range_from_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id,
-     struct hvm_ioreq_server *s;
-     int rc;
- 
-+    if ( start > end )
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+
-     spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock);
- 
-     rc = -ENOENT;
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa239.patch b/main/xen/xsa239.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5daecb5e47..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa239.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths
-
-Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the
-example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads
-seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For
-consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of
-hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what
-guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers
-leaving data completely unitialized.
-
-This is XSA-239.
-
-Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
-@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
-         .count = *reps,
-         .dir = dir,
-         .df = df,
--        .data = data,
-+        .data = data_is_addr ? data : 0,
-         .data_is_ptr = data_is_addr, /* ioreq_t field name is misleading */
-         .state = STATE_IOREQ_READY,
-     };
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
-@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc
-             addr = (p->type == IOREQ_TYPE_COPY) ?
-                    p->addr + step * i :
-                    p->addr;
-+            data = 0;
-             rc = ops->read(handler, addr, p->size, &data);
-             if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-                 break;
-@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc
-         {
-             if ( p->data_is_ptr )
-             {
-+                data = 0;
-                 switch ( hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data, p->data + step * i,
-                                                   p->size) )
-                 {
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa241-4.8.patch b/main/xen/xsa241-4.8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e2370af761..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa241-4.8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp
-
-While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically
-possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush
-IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the
-per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts
-across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle.
-
-This is XSA-241.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/smp.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/smp.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- #include <xen/config.h>
-+#include <xen/mm.h>
- #include <asm/system.h>
- #include <asm/smp.h>
- #include <asm/cpregs.h>
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -2524,7 +2524,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p
-          */
-         if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
-                (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
--            page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+            page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
-         wmb();
-         page->u.inuse.type_info--;
-     }
-@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p
-                 (PGT_count_mask|PGT_validated|PGT_partial)) == 1);
-         if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
-                (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
--            page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+            page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
-         wmb();
-         page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_validated;
-     }
-@@ -2588,7 +2588,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
-             if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
-             {
-                 /*
--                 * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
-+                 * set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
-                  * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages,
-                  * however, should occur during domain destruction only
-                  * anyway.  Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not
-@@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
-              */
-             if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
-                    (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
--                page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+                page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
-         }
- 
-         if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t
-          * TLBs when we reuse the page.  Because the destructors leave the
-          * contents of the pages in place, we can delay TLB flushes until
-          * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */
--        sp->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+        page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp);
-         perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count);
-         page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-         sp = next;
---- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
-         /* If a page has no owner it will need no safety TLB flush. */
-         pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush = (page_get_owner(&pg[i]) != NULL);
-         if ( pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush )
--            pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+            page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(&pg[i]);
- 
-         /* This page is not a guest frame any more. */
-         page_set_owner(&pg[i], NULL); /* set_gpfn_from_mfn snoops pg owner */
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h
-@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ static inline void tlbflush_filter(cpuma
- 
- #define tlbflush_current_time()                 (0)
- 
-+static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page)
-+{
-+    page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+}
-+
- #if defined(CONFIG_ARM_32)
- # include <asm/arm32/flushtlb.h>
- #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM_64)
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, tlbflush_time);
- 
- #define tlbflush_current_time() tlbflush_clock
- 
-+static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * Prevent storing a stale time stamp, which could happen if an update
-+     * to tlbflush_clock plus a subsequent flush IPI happen between the
-+     * reading of tlbflush_clock and the writing of the struct page_info
-+     * field.
-+     */
-+    ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
-+    local_irq_disable();
-+    page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
-+    local_irq_enable();
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * @cpu_stamp is the timestamp at last TLB flush for the CPU we are testing.
-  * @lastuse_stamp is a timestamp taken when the PFN we are testing was last 
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa242-4.9.patch b/main/xen/xsa242-4.9.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8adfa61fd7..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa242-4.9.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference
-
-Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all
-domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around
-zombie domains) if we get this wrong.
-
-This is XSA-242.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1923,7 +1923,11 @@ void page_unlock(struct page_info *page)
- 
-     do {
-         x = y;
-+        ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) && (x & PGT_locked));
-+
-         nx = x - (1 | PGT_locked);
-+        /* We must not drop the last reference here. */
-+        ASSERT(nx & PGT_count_mask);
-     } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) != x );
- }
- 
-@@ -2611,6 +2615,17 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
-                    (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
-                 page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
-         }
-+        else if ( unlikely((nx & (PGT_locked | PGT_count_mask)) ==
-+                           (PGT_locked | 1)) )
-+        {
-+            /*
-+             * We must not drop the second to last reference when the page is
-+             * locked, as page_unlock() doesn't do any cleanup of the type.
-+             */
-+            cpu_relax();
-+            y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
-+            continue;
-+        }
- 
-         if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) )
-             break;
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa243-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa243-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1aca5d3dbd..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa243-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: correct SH_LINEAR mapping detection in sh_guess_wrmap()
-
-The fix for XSA-243 / CVE-2017-15592 (c/s bf2b4eadcf379) introduced a change
-in behaviour for sh_guest_wrmap(), where it had to cope with no shadow linear
-mapping being present.
-
-As the name suggests, guest_vtable is a mapping of the guests pagetable, not
-Xen's pagetable, meaning that it isn't the pagetable we need to check for the
-shadow linear slot in.
-
-The practical upshot is that a shadow HVM vcpu which switches into 4-level
-paging mode, with an L4 pagetable that contains a mapping which aliases Xen's
-SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START will fool the safety check for whether a SHADOW_LINEAR
-mapping is present.  As the check passes (when it should have failed), Xen
-subsequently falls over the missing mapping with a pagefault such as:
-
-    (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff8140a0503880:
-    (XEN)  L4[0x102] = 000000046c218063 ffffffffffffffff
-    (XEN)  L3[0x102] = 000000046c218063 ffffffffffffffff
-    (XEN)  L2[0x102] = 000000046c218063 ffffffffffffffff
-    (XEN)  L1[0x103] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff
-
-This is part of XSA-243.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -4350,11 +4350,18 @@ static int sh_guess_wrmap(struct vcpu *v
- 
-     /* Carefully look in the shadow linear map for the l1e we expect */
- #if SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
--    /* Is a shadow linear map is installed in the first place? */
--    sl4p  = v->arch.paging.shadow.guest_vtable;
--    sl4p += shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START);
--    if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
--        return 0;
-+    /*
-+     * Non-external guests (i.e. PV) have a SHADOW_LINEAR mapping from the
-+     * moment their shadows are created.  External guests (i.e. HVM) may not,
-+     * but always have a regular linear mapping, which we can use to observe
-+     * whether a SHADOW_LINEAR mapping is present.
-+     */
-+    if ( paging_mode_external(d) )
-+    {
-+        sl4p =  __linear_l4_table + l4_linear_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START);
-+        if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+            return 0;
-+    }
-     sl4p = sh_linear_l4_table(v) + shadow_l4_linear_offset(vaddr);
-     if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         return 0;
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa243-4.7-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa243-4.7-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9752737e27..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa243-4.7-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests
-
-When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't
-install a shadow-linear mapping.  This mapping is actually self-linear, and
-trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the
-guests' shadows it was expecting to follow.
-
-A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being
-no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a
-vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode.
-
-An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table
-either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3().
-
-While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings.  Despite
-appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for
-translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated
-domain.  Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests.
-
-This is XSA-243.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-index 428be37..c83932f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -1472,26 +1472,38 @@ void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct domain *d, mfn_t gl4mfn, mfn_t sl4mfn)
-         sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = shadow_l4e_empty();
-     }
- 
--    /* Shadow linear mapping for 4-level shadows.  N.B. for 3-level
--     * shadows on 64-bit xen, this linear mapping is later replaced by the
--     * monitor pagetable structure, which is built in make_monitor_table
--     * and maintained by sh_update_linear_entries. */
--    sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
--        shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
--
--    /* Self linear mapping.  */
--    if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) && !shadow_mode_external(d) )
-+    /*
-+     * Linear mapping slots:
-+     *
-+     * Calling this function with gl4mfn == sl4mfn is used to construct a
-+     * monitor table for translated domains.  In this case, gl4mfn forms the
-+     * self-linear mapping (i.e. not pointing into the translated domain), and
-+     * the shadow-linear slot is skipped.  The shadow-linear slot is either
-+     * filled when constructing lower level monitor tables, or via
-+     * sh_update_cr3() for 4-level guests.
-+     *
-+     * Calling this function with gl4mfn != sl4mfn is used for non-translated
-+     * guests, where the shadow-linear slot is actually self-linear, and the
-+     * guest-linear slot points into the guests view of its pagetables.
-+     */
-+    if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) )
-     {
--        // linear tables may not be used with translated PV guests
--        sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
-+        ASSERT(mfn_x(gl4mfn) == mfn_x(sl4mfn));
-+
-+        sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
-             shadow_l4e_empty();
-     }
-     else
-     {
--        sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
--            shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
-+        ASSERT(mfn_x(gl4mfn) != mfn_x(sl4mfn));
-+
-+        sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
-+            shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
-     }
- 
-+    sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
-+        shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
-+
-     unmap_domain_page(sl4e);
- }
- #endif
-@@ -4293,6 +4305,11 @@ static int sh_guess_wrmap(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr, mfn_t gmfn)
- 
-     /* Carefully look in the shadow linear map for the l1e we expect */
- #if SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
-+    /* Is a shadow linear map is installed in the first place? */
-+    sl4p  = v->arch.paging.shadow.guest_vtable;
-+    sl4p += shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START);
-+    if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+        return 0;
-     sl4p = sh_linear_l4_table(v) + shadow_l4_linear_offset(vaddr);
-     if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         return 0;
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa244-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa244-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c5e1e0619..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa244-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/cpu: fix IST handling during PCPU bringup
-
-Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs.  Nothing good will come of
-having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances
-of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim).
-
-Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place.  This fixes an
-issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context
-will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable
-to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM
-guest.
-
-This is XSA-244.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-@@ -617,6 +617,7 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
-  * - Sets up TSS with stack pointers, including ISTs
-  * - Inserts TSS selector into regular and compat GDTs
-  * - Loads GDT, IDT, TR then null LDT
-+ * - Sets up IST references in the IDT
-  */
- void load_system_tables(void)
- {
-@@ -663,6 +664,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
- 	asm volatile ("lidt %0"  : : "m"  (idtr) );
- 	asm volatile ("ltr  %w0" : : "rm" (TSS_ENTRY << 3) );
- 	asm volatile ("lldt %w0" : : "rm" (0) );
-+
-+	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_DF);
-+	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],	      IST_NMI);
-+	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE);
- }
- 
- /*
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned in
-     if ( idt_tables[cpu] == NULL )
-         goto oom;
-     memcpy(idt_tables[cpu], idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_NONE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],           IST_NONE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
- 
-     for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1);
-           i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i )
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa246-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa246-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb58d6e7c8..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa246-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
-Subject: x86/pod: prevent infinite loop when shattering large pages
-
-When populating pages, the PoD may need to split large ones using
-p2m_set_entry and request the caller to retry (see ept_get_entry for
-instance).
-
-p2m_set_entry may fail to shatter if it is not possible to allocate
-memory for the new page table. However, the error is not propagated
-resulting to the callers to retry infinitely the PoD.
-
-Prevent the infinite loop by return false when it is not possible to
-shatter the large mapping.
-
-This is XSA-246.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-@@ -1073,9 +1073,8 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
-          * NOTE: In a fine-grained p2m locking scenario this operation
-          * may need to promote its locking from gfn->1g superpage
-          */
--        p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M,
--                      p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access);
--        return 0;
-+        return p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_2M,
-+                             p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access);
-     }
- 
-     /* Only reclaim if we're in actual need of more cache. */
-@@ -1106,8 +1105,12 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
- 
-     gfn_aligned = (gfn >> order) << order;
- 
--    p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned, mfn, order, p2m_ram_rw,
--                  p2m->default_access);
-+    if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned, mfn, order, p2m_ram_rw,
-+                       p2m->default_access) )
-+    {
-+        p2m_pod_cache_add(p2m, p, order);
-+        goto out_fail;
-+    }
- 
-     for( i = 0; i < (1UL << order); i++ )
-     {
-@@ -1152,13 +1155,18 @@ remap_and_retry:
-     BUG_ON(order != PAGE_ORDER_2M);
-     pod_unlock(p2m);
- 
--    /* Remap this 2-meg region in singleton chunks */
--    /* NOTE: In a p2m fine-grained lock scenario this might
--     * need promoting the gfn lock from gfn->2M superpage */
-+    /*
-+     * Remap this 2-meg region in singleton chunks. See the comment on the
-+     * 1G page splitting path above for why a single call suffices.
-+     *
-+     * NOTE: In a p2m fine-grained lock scenario this might
-+     * need promoting the gfn lock from gfn->2M superpage.
-+     */
-     gfn_aligned = (gfn>>order)<<order;
--    for(i=0; i<(1<<order); i++)
--        p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned + i, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
--                      p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access);
-+    if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn_aligned, _mfn(INVALID_MFN), PAGE_ORDER_4K,
-+                       p2m_populate_on_demand, p2m->default_access) )
-+        return -1;
-+
-     if ( tb_init_done )
-     {
-         struct {
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa248-4.8.patch b/main/xen/xsa248-4.8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d15297e78d..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa248-4.8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/mm: don't wrongly set page ownership
-
-PV domains can obtain mappings of any pages owned by the correct domain,
-including ones that aren't actually assigned as "normal" RAM, but used
-by Xen internally.  At the moment such "internal" pages marked as owned
-by a guest include pages used to track logdirty bits, as well as p2m
-pages and the "unpaged pagetable" for HVM guests. Since the PV memory
-management and shadow code conflict in their use of struct page_info
-fields, and since shadow code is being used for log-dirty handling for
-PV domains, pages coming from the shadow pool must, for PV domains, not
-have the domain set as their owner.
-
-While the change could be done conditionally for just the PV case in
-shadow code, do it unconditionally (and for consistency also for HAP),
-just to be on the safe side.
-
-There's one special case though for shadow code: The page table used for
-running a HVM guest in unpaged mode is subject to get_page() (in
-set_shadow_status()) and hence must have its owner set.
-
-This is XSA-248.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -283,8 +283,7 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_p
-     {
-         d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages--;
-         d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages++;
--        page_set_owner(pg, d);
--        pg->count_info |= 1;
-+        ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
-     }
-     else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed )
-     {
-@@ -299,21 +298,23 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_p
- 
- static void hap_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
- {
-+    struct domain *owner = page_get_owner(pg);
-+
-     /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the 
-      * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-     paging_lock_recursive(d);
- 
--    ASSERT(page_get_owner(pg) == d);
--    /* Should have just the one ref we gave it in alloc_p2m_page() */
--    if ( (pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask) != 1 ) {
--        HAP_ERROR("Odd p2m page %p count c=%#lx t=%"PRtype_info"\n",
--                     pg, pg->count_info, pg->u.inuse.type_info);
-+    /* Should still have no owner and count zero. */
-+    if ( owner || (pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask) )
-+    {
-+        HAP_ERROR("d%d: Odd p2m page %"PRI_mfn" d=%d c=%lx t=%"PRtype_info"\n",
-+                  d->domain_id, mfn_x(page_to_mfn(pg)),
-+                  owner ? owner->domain_id : DOMID_INVALID,
-+                  pg->count_info, pg->u.inuse.type_info);
-         WARN();
-+        pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-+        page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-     }
--    pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
--    /* Free should not decrement domain's total allocation, since
--     * these pages were allocated without an owner. */
--    page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-     d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages--;
-     d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages++;
-     hap_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg));
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -1573,32 +1573,29 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
-     pg = mfn_to_page(shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 0));
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages++;
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages--;
-+    ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
- 
-     paging_unlock(d);
- 
--    /* Unlike shadow pages, mark p2m pages as owned by the domain.
--     * Marking the domain as the owner would normally allow the guest to
--     * create mappings of these pages, but these p2m pages will never be
--     * in the domain's guest-physical address space, and so that is not
--     * believed to be a concern. */
--    page_set_owner(pg, d);
--    pg->count_info |= 1;
-     return pg;
- }
- 
- static void
- shadow_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
- {
--    ASSERT(page_get_owner(pg) == d);
--    /* Should have just the one ref we gave it in alloc_p2m_page() */
--    if ( (pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask) != 1 )
-+    struct domain *owner = page_get_owner(pg);
-+
-+    /* Should still have no owner and count zero. */
-+    if ( owner || (pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask) )
-     {
--        SHADOW_ERROR("Odd p2m page count c=%#lx t=%"PRtype_info"\n",
-+        SHADOW_ERROR("d%d: Odd p2m page %"PRI_mfn" d=%d c=%lx t=%"PRtype_info"\n",
-+                     d->domain_id, mfn_x(page_to_mfn(pg)),
-+                     owner ? owner->domain_id : DOMID_INVALID,
-                      pg->count_info, pg->u.inuse.type_info);
-+        pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-+        page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-     }
--    pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-     pg->u.sh.type = SH_type_p2m_table; /* p2m code reuses type-info */
--    page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
- 
-     /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the
-      * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-@@ -3216,7 +3213,9 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32
-                     | _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER
-                     | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
-         unmap_domain_page(e);
-+        pg->count_info = 1;
-         pg->u.inuse.type_info = PGT_l2_page_table | 1 | PGT_validated;
-+        page_set_owner(pg, d);
-     }
- 
-     paging_lock(d);
-@@ -3254,7 +3253,11 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32
-     if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) )
-         p2m_teardown(p2m);
-     if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL )
-+    {
-+        pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-+        page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-         shadow_free_p2m_page(d, pg);
-+    }
-     domain_unpause(d);
-     return rv;
- }
-@@ -3363,7 +3366,22 @@ out:
- 
-     /* Must be called outside the lock */
-     if ( unpaged_pagetable )
-+    {
-+        if ( page_get_owner(unpaged_pagetable) == d &&
-+             (unpaged_pagetable->count_info & PGC_count_mask) == 1 )
-+        {
-+            unpaged_pagetable->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-+            page_set_owner(unpaged_pagetable, NULL);
-+        }
-+        /* Complain here in cases where shadow_free_p2m_page() won't. */
-+        else if ( !page_get_owner(unpaged_pagetable) &&
-+                  !(unpaged_pagetable->count_info & PGC_count_mask) )
-+            SHADOW_ERROR("d%d: Odd unpaged pt %"PRI_mfn" c=%lx t=%"PRtype_info"\n",
-+                         d->domain_id, mfn_x(page_to_mfn(unpaged_pagetable)),
-+                         unpaged_pagetable->count_info,
-+                         unpaged_pagetable->u.inuse.type_info);
-         shadow_free_p2m_page(d, unpaged_pagetable);
-+    }
- }
- 
- void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa249.patch b/main/xen/xsa249.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ecfa4305e5..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa249.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: fix refcount overflow check
-
-Commit c385d27079 ("x86 shadow: for multi-page shadows, explicitly track
-the first page") reduced the refcount width to 25, without adjusting the
-overflow check. Eliminate the disconnect by using a manifest constant.
-
-Interestingly, up to commit 047782fa01 ("Out-of-sync L1 shadows: OOS
-snapshot") the refcount was 27 bits wide, yet the check was already
-using 26.
-
-This is XSA-249.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
----
-v2: Simplify expression back to the style it was.
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static inline int sh_get_ref(struct doma
-     x = sp->u.sh.count;
-     nx = x + 1;
- 
--    if ( unlikely(nx >= 1U<<26) )
-+    if ( unlikely(nx >= (1U << PAGE_SH_REFCOUNT_WIDTH)) )
-     {
-         SHADOW_PRINTK("shadow ref overflow, gmfn=%lx smfn=%lx\n",
-                        __backpointer(sp), mfn_x(smfn));
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ struct page_info
-             unsigned long type:5;   /* What kind of shadow is this? */
-             unsigned long pinned:1; /* Is the shadow pinned? */
-             unsigned long head:1;   /* Is this the first page of the shadow? */
--            unsigned long count:25; /* Reference count */
-+#define PAGE_SH_REFCOUNT_WIDTH 25
-+            unsigned long count:PAGE_SH_REFCOUNT_WIDTH; /* Reference count */
-         } sh;
- 
-         /* Page is on a free list: ((count_info & PGC_count_mask) == 0). */
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa250.patch b/main/xen/xsa250.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 26aeb33fed..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa250.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: fix ref-counting error handling
-
-The old-Linux handling in shadow_set_l4e() mistakenly ORed together the
-results of sh_get_ref() and sh_pin(). As the latter failing is not a
-correctness problem, simply ignore its return value.
-
-In sh_set_toplevel_shadow() a failing sh_get_ref() must not be
-accompanied by installing the entry, despite the domain being crashed.
-
-This is XSA-250.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int shadow_set_l4e(struct domain
-                           shadow_l4e_t new_sl4e,
-                           mfn_t sl4mfn)
- {
--    int flags = 0, ok;
-+    int flags = 0;
-     shadow_l4e_t old_sl4e;
-     paddr_t paddr;
-     ASSERT(sl4e != NULL);
-@@ -938,15 +938,16 @@ static int shadow_set_l4e(struct domain
-     {
-         /* About to install a new reference */
-         mfn_t sl3mfn = shadow_l4e_get_mfn(new_sl4e);
--        ok = sh_get_ref(d, sl3mfn, paddr);
--        /* Are we pinning l3 shadows to handle wierd linux behaviour? */
--        if ( sh_type_is_pinnable(d, SH_type_l3_64_shadow) )
--            ok |= sh_pin(d, sl3mfn);
--        if ( !ok )
-+
-+        if ( !sh_get_ref(d, sl3mfn, paddr) )
-         {
-             domain_crash(d);
-             return SHADOW_SET_ERROR;
-         }
-+
-+        /* Are we pinning l3 shadows to handle weird Linux behaviour? */
-+        if ( sh_type_is_pinnable(d, SH_type_l3_64_shadow) )
-+            sh_pin(d, sl3mfn);
-     }
- 
-     /* Write the new entry */
-@@ -3965,14 +3966,15 @@ sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu *v,
- 
-     /* Take a ref to this page: it will be released in sh_detach_old_tables()
-      * or the next call to set_toplevel_shadow() */
--    if ( !sh_get_ref(d, smfn, 0) )
-+    if ( sh_get_ref(d, smfn, 0) )
-+        new_entry = pagetable_from_mfn(smfn);
-+    else
-     {
-         SHADOW_ERROR("can't install %#lx as toplevel shadow\n", mfn_x(smfn));
-         domain_crash(d);
-+        new_entry = pagetable_null();
-     }
- 
--    new_entry = pagetable_from_mfn(smfn);
--
-  install_new_entry:
-     /* Done.  Install it */
-     SHADOW_PRINTK("%u/%u [%u] gmfn %#"PRI_mfn" smfn %#"PRI_mfn"\n",
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa251-4.8.patch b/main/xen/xsa251-4.8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fffe54d0e1..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa251-4.8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/paging: don't unconditionally BUG() on finding SHARED_M2P_ENTRY
-
-PV guests can fully control the values written into the P2M.
-
-This is XSA-251.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void paging_mark_pfn_dirty(struct domain
-         return;
- 
-     /* Shared MFNs should NEVER be marked dirty */
--    BUG_ON(SHARED_M2P(pfn));
-+    BUG_ON(paging_mode_translate(d) && SHARED_M2P(pfn));
- 
-     /*
-      * Values with the MSB set denote MFNs that aren't really part of the
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa252-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa252-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 65ad8fc5df..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa252-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: memory: don't implicitly unpin for decrease-reservation
-
-It very likely was a mistake (copy-and-paste from domain cleanup code)
-to implicitly unpin here: The caller should really unpin itself before
-(or after, if they so wish) requesting the page to be removed.
-
-This is XSA-252.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -320,9 +320,6 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
- 
-     rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gmfn, mfn, 0);
- 
--    if ( !rc && test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
--        put_page_and_type(page);
--
-     /*
-      * With the lack of an IOMMU on some platforms, domains with DMA-capable
-      * device must retrieve the same pfn when the hypercall populate_physmap
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 72b2c41756..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab/ARM: don't corrupt shared GFN array
-
-... by writing status GFNs to it. Introduce a second array instead.
-Also implement gnttab_status_gmfn() properly now that the information is
-suitably being tracked.
-
-While touching it anyway, remove a misguided (but luckily benign) upper
-bound check from gnttab_shared_gmfn(): We should never access beyond the
-bounds of that array.
-
-This is part of XSA-255.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -438,19 +438,37 @@ void startup_cpu_idle_loop(void)
- struct domain *alloc_domain_struct(void)
- {
-     struct domain *d;
-+    unsigned int i, max_status_frames;
-+
-     BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*d) > PAGE_SIZE);
-     d = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, 0);
-     if ( d == NULL )
-         return NULL;
- 
-     clear_page(d);
--    d->arch.grant_table_gpfn = xzalloc_array(xen_pfn_t, max_grant_frames);
-+
-+    d->arch.grant_shared_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, max_grant_frames);
-+    max_status_frames = grant_to_status_frames(max_grant_frames);
-+    d->arch.grant_status_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, max_status_frames);
-+    if ( !d->arch.grant_shared_gfn || !d->arch.grant_status_gfn )
-+    {
-+        free_domain_struct(d);
-+        return NULL;
-+    }
-+
-+    for ( i = 0; i < max_grant_frames; ++i )
-+        d->arch.grant_shared_gfn[i] = _gfn(INVALID_GFN);
-+
-+    for ( i = 0; i < max_status_frames; ++i )
-+        d->arch.grant_status_gfn[i] = _gfn(INVALID_GFN);
-+
-     return d;
- }
- 
- void free_domain_struct(struct domain *d)
- {
--    xfree(d->arch.grant_table_gpfn);
-+    xfree(d->arch.grant_shared_gfn);
-+    xfree(d->arch.grant_status_gfn);
-     free_xenheap_page(d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-@@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-     int rc;
-     p2m_type_t t;
-     struct page_info *page = NULL;
-+    bool_t status = 0;
- 
-     switch ( space )
-     {
-@@ -1082,6 +1083,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-                 mfn = virt_to_mfn(d->grant_table->status[idx]);
-             else
-                 mfn = INVALID_MFN;
-+            status = 1;
-         }
-         else
-         {
-@@ -1097,7 +1099,10 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-         
-         if ( mfn != INVALID_MFN )
-         {
--            d->arch.grant_table_gpfn[idx] = gpfn;
-+            if ( status )
-+                d->arch.grant_status_gfn[idx] = _gfn(gpfn);
-+            else
-+                d->arch.grant_shared_gfn[idx] = _gfn(gpfn);
- 
-             t = p2m_ram_rw;
-         }
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
-@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ struct arch_domain
-     uint64_t vttbr;
- 
-     struct hvm_domain hvm_domain;
--    xen_pfn_t *grant_table_gpfn;
-+    gfn_t *grant_shared_gfn;
-+    gfn_t *grant_status_gfn;
- 
-     struct vmmio vmmio;
- 
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(unsigned
-         unsigned long new_gpaddr, unsigned int flags);
- void gnttab_mark_dirty(struct domain *d, unsigned long l);
- #define gnttab_create_status_page(d, t, i) do {} while (0)
--#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i) (0)
- #define gnttab_release_host_mappings(domain) 1
- static inline int replace_grant_supported(void)
- {
-@@ -29,8 +28,12 @@ static inline int replace_grant_supporte
-     } while ( 0 )
- 
- #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i)                                      \
--    ( ((i >= nr_grant_frames(d->grant_table)) &&                         \
--     (i < max_grant_frames)) ? 0 : (d->arch.grant_table_gpfn[i]))
-+    gfn_x(((i) >= nr_grant_frames(t)) ? _gfn(INVALID_GFN)                \
-+                                      : (d)->arch.grant_shared_gfn[i])
-+
-+#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i)                                      \
-+    gfn_x(((i) >= nr_status_frames(t)) ? _gfn(INVALID_GFN)               \
-+                                       : (d)->arch.grant_status_gfn[i])
- 
- #define gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(d)                    \
-     (is_domain_direct_mapped(d) && need_iommu(d))
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 57a6907c43..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa255-4.7-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: don't blindly free status pages upon version change
-
-There may still be active mappings, which would trigger the respective
-BUG_ON(). Split the loop into one dealing with the page attributes and
-the second (when the first fully passed) freeing the pages. Return an
-error if any pages still have pending references.
-
-This is part of XSA-255.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-@@ -1097,12 +1097,23 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-                 mfn = INVALID_MFN;
-         }
-         
-+        if ( mfn != INVALID_MFN &&
-+             gfn_x(gnttab_get_frame_gfn(d, status, idx)) != INVALID_GFN )
-+        {
-+            rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d,
-+                                           gfn_x(gnttab_get_frame_gfn(d, status,
-+                                                                      idx)),
-+                                           mfn, 0);
-+            if ( rc )
-+            {
-+                grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
-+                return rc;
-+            }
-+        }
-+
-         if ( mfn != INVALID_MFN )
-         {
--            if ( status )
--                d->arch.grant_status_gfn[idx] = _gfn(gpfn);
--            else
--                d->arch.grant_shared_gfn[idx] = _gfn(gpfn);
-+            gnttab_set_frame_gfn(d, status, idx, _gfn(gpfn));
- 
-             t = p2m_ram_rw;
-         }
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -1516,23 +1516,74 @@ status_alloc_failed:
-     return -ENOMEM;
- }
- 
--static void
-+static int
- gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
- {
--    int i;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
-     {
-         struct page_info *pg = virt_to_page(gt->status[i]);
-+        gfn_t gfn = gnttab_get_frame_gfn(d, 1, i);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * For translated domains, recovering from failure after partial
-+         * changes were made is more complicated than it seems worth
-+         * implementing at this time. Hence respective error paths below
-+         * crash the domain in such a case.
-+         */
-+        if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+        {
-+            int rc = gfn_x(gfn) == INVALID_GFN
-+                     ? 0
-+                     : guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn_x(gfn),
-+                                                 page_to_mfn(pg), 0);
-+
-+            if ( rc )
-+            {
-+                gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+                        "Could not remove status frame %u (GFN %#lx) from P2M\n",
-+                        i, gfn_x(gfn));
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+                return rc;
-+            }
-+            gnttab_set_frame_gfn(d, 1, i, _gfn(INVALID_GFN));
-+        }
- 
-         BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d);
-         if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
-             put_page(pg);
--        BUG_ON(pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap);
-+
-+        if ( pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap )
-+        {
-+            if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+            {
-+                gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+                        "Wrong page state %#lx of status frame %u (GFN %#lx)\n",
-+                        pg->count_info, i, gfn_x(gfn));
-+                domain_crash(d);
-+            }
-+            else
-+            {
-+                if ( get_page(pg, d) )
-+                    set_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info);
-+                while ( i-- )
-+                    gnttab_create_status_page(d, gt, i);
-+            }
-+            return -EBUSY;
-+        }
-+
-+        page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-+    }
-+
-+    for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
-+    {
-         free_xenheap_page(gt->status[i]);
-         gt->status[i] = NULL;
-     }
-     gt->nr_status_frames = 0;
-+
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -2773,8 +2824,9 @@ gnttab_set_version(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARA
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 )
--        gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt);
-+    if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 &&
-+         (res = gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt)) != 0 )
-+        goto out_unlock;
- 
-     /* Make sure there's no crud left over from the old version. */
-     for ( i = 0; i < nr_grant_frames(gt); i++ )
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-@@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ static inline int replace_grant_supporte
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-+#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(d, st, idx, gfn)                            \
-+    do {                                                                 \
-+        ((st) ? (d)->arch.grant_status_gfn                               \
-+              : (d)->arch.grant_shared_gfn)[idx] = (gfn);                \
-+    } while ( 0 )
-+
-+#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(d, st, idx) ({                              \
-+   _gfn((st) ? gnttab_status_gmfn(d, (d)->grant_table, idx)              \
-+             : gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, (d)->grant_table, idx));            \
-+})
-+
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i)                               \
-     do {                                                                 \
-         share_xen_page_with_guest(                                       \
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ int create_grant_host_mapping(uint64_t a
- int replace_grant_host_mapping(
-     uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, uint64_t new_addr, unsigned int flags);
- 
-+#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(d, st, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
-+#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(d, st, idx) ({                              \
-+    unsigned long mfn_ = (st) ? gnttab_status_mfn((d)->grant_table, idx) \
-+                              : gnttab_shared_mfn((d)->grant_table, idx); \
-+    unsigned long gpfn_ = get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_);                       \
-+    _gfn(VALID_M2P(gpfn_) ? gpfn_ : INVALID_GFN);                        \
-+})
-+
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i)                               \
-     do {                                                                 \
-         share_xen_page_with_guest(                                       \
-@@ -33,11 +41,11 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(
-     } while ( 0 )
- 
- 
--#define gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i)                      \
-+#define gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i)                         \
-     ((virt_to_maddr((t)->shared_raw[i]) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- 
- #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i)                     \
--    (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i)))
-+    (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i)))
- 
- 
- #define gnttab_status_mfn(t, i)                         \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa258-4.8.patch b/main/xen/xsa258-4.8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c6ba32ce0..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa258-4.8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From 437c3b3ad337c43056903e4824448428d3b5a956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 18:16:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] libxl: Specify format of inserted cdrom
-
-Without this extra parameter on the QMP command, QEMU will guess the
-format of the new file.
-
-This is XSA-258.
-
-Reported-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- tools/libxl/libxl_device.c   | 12 ++++++++++++
- tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c       | 16 ++--------------
- tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h |  1 +
- tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c      |  2 ++
- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
-index 3e7a1026c4..cd2a980f18 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
-@@ -425,6 +425,18 @@ char *libxl__device_disk_string_of_backend(libxl_disk_backend backend)
-     }
- }
- 
-+const char *libxl__qemu_disk_format_string(libxl_disk_format format)
-+{
-+    switch (format) {
-+    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_QCOW: return "qcow";
-+    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_QCOW2: return "qcow2";
-+    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_VHD: return "vpc";
-+    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_RAW: return "raw";
-+    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_EMPTY: return NULL;
-+    default: return NULL;
-+    }
-+}
-+
- int libxl__device_physdisk_major_minor(const char *physpath, int *major, int *minor)
- {
-     struct stat buf;
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-index ad366a8cd3..b6bc407795 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-@@ -669,18 +669,6 @@ static int libxl__build_device_model_args_old(libxl__gc *gc,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--static const char *qemu_disk_format_string(libxl_disk_format format)
--{
--    switch (format) {
--    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_QCOW: return "qcow";
--    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_QCOW2: return "qcow2";
--    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_VHD: return "vpc";
--    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_RAW: return "raw";
--    case LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_EMPTY: return NULL;
--    default: return NULL;
--    }
--}
--
- static char *dm_spice_options(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                     const libxl_spice_info *spice)
- {
-@@ -1342,9 +1330,9 @@ static int libxl__build_device_model_args_new(libxl__gc *gc,
-              * always raw
-              */
-             if (disks[i].backend == LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_QDISK)
--                format = qemu_disk_format_string(disks[i].format);
-+                format = libxl__qemu_disk_format_string(disks[i].format);
-             else
--                format = qemu_disk_format_string(LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_RAW);
-+                format = libxl__qemu_disk_format_string(LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_RAW);
- 
-             if (disks[i].format == LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_EMPTY) {
-                 if (!disks[i].is_cdrom) {
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
-index 8366fee25f..c32a40576a 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
-@@ -1170,6 +1170,7 @@ _hidden int libxl__domain_pvcontrol_write(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
- /* from xl_device */
- _hidden char *libxl__device_disk_string_of_backend(libxl_disk_backend backend);
- _hidden char *libxl__device_disk_string_of_format(libxl_disk_format format);
-+_hidden const char *libxl__qemu_disk_format_string(libxl_disk_format format);
- _hidden int libxl__device_disk_set_backend(libxl__gc*, libxl_device_disk*);
- 
- _hidden int libxl__device_physdisk_major_minor(const char *physpath, int *major, int *minor);
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
-index f8addf9ba6..6fc5454a6e 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
-@@ -982,6 +982,8 @@ int libxl__qmp_insert_cdrom(libxl__gc *gc, int domid,
-         return qmp_run_command(gc, domid, "eject", args, NULL, NULL);
-     } else {
-         qmp_parameters_add_string(gc, &args, "target", disk->pdev_path);
-+        qmp_parameters_add_string(gc, &args, "arg",
-+            libxl__qemu_disk_format_string(disk->format));
-         return qmp_run_command(gc, domid, "change", args, NULL, NULL);
-     }
- }
--- 
-2.16.2
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa259.patch b/main/xen/xsa259.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7848fa87e9..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa259.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: fix slow int80 path after XPTI additions
-
-For the int80 slow path to jump to handle_exception_saved, %r14 needs to
-be set up suitably for XPTI purposes. This is because of the difference
-in nature between the int80 path (which is synchronous WRT guest
-actions) and the exception path which is potentially asynchronous.
-
-This is XSA-259.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -396,6 +396,12 @@ int80_slow_path:
-         movl  $TRAP_gp_fault,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-         /* A GPF wouldn't have incremented the instruction pointer. */
-         subq  $2,UREGS_rip(%rsp)
-+        /*
-+         * While we've cleared xen_cr3 above already, normal exception handling
-+         * code has logic to restore the original value from %r15. Therefore we
-+         * need to set up %r14 here, while %r15 is required to still be zero.
-+         */
-+        GET_STACK_END(14)
-         jmp   handle_exception_saved
- 
-         /* create_bounce_frame & helpers don't need to be in .text.entry */
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa260-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa260-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 386ae0335c..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa260-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/traps: Fix %dr6 handing in #DB handler
-
-Most bits in %dr6 accumulate, rather than being set directly based on the
-current source of #DB.  Have the handler follow the manuals guidance, which
-avoids leaking hypervisor debugging activities into guest context.
-
-This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -3842,10 +3842,35 @@ static void ler_enable(void)
- 
- void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
-+    unsigned long dr6;
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
- 
-+    /* Stash dr6 as early as possible. */
-+    dr6 = read_debugreg(6);
-+
-     DEBUGGER_trap_entry(TRAP_debug, regs);
- 
-+    /*
-+     * At the time of writing (March 2018), on the subject of %dr6:
-+     *
-+     * The Intel manual says:
-+     *   Certain debug exceptions may clear bits 0-3. The remaining contents
-+     *   of the DR6 register are never cleared by the processor. To avoid
-+     *   confusion in identifying debug exceptions, debug handlers should
-+     *   clear the register (except bit 16, which they should set) before
-+     *   returning to the interrupted task.
-+     *
-+     * The AMD manual says:
-+     *   Bits 15:13 of the DR6 register are not cleared by the processor and
-+     *   must be cleared by software after the contents have been read.
-+     *
-+     * Some bits are reserved set, some are reserved clear, and some bits
-+     * which were previously reserved set are reused and cleared by hardware.
-+     * For future compatibility, reset to the default value, which will allow
-+     * us to spot any bit being changed by hardware to its non-default value.
-+     */
-+    write_debugreg(6, X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
-+
-     if ( !guest_mode(regs) )
-     {
-         if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF )
-@@ -3878,7 +3903,8 @@ void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs
-     }
- 
-     /* Save debug status register where guest OS can peek at it */
--    v->arch.debugreg[6] = read_debugreg(6);
-+    v->arch.debugreg[6] |= (dr6 & ~X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
-+    v->arch.debugreg[6] &= (dr6 | ~X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
- 
-     ler_enable();
-     do_guest_trap(TRAP_debug, regs, 0);
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/debugreg.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/debugreg.h
-@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
- #define DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ZERO (~0xffffeffful) /* Reserved, read as zero */
- #define DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ONE  0xffff0ff0ul /* Reserved, read as one */
- 
-+#define X86_DR6_DEFAULT 0xffff0ff0ul    /* Default %dr6 value. */
-+
- /* Now define a bunch of things for manipulating the control register.
-    The top two bytes of the control register consist of 4 fields of 4
-    bits - each field corresponds to one of the four debug registers,
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa260-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa260-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 81ebea165c..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa260-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/pv: Move exception injection into {,compat_}test_all_events()
-
-This allows paths to jump straight to {,compat_}test_all_events() and have
-injection of pending exceptions happen automatically, rather than requiring
-all calling paths to handle exceptions themselves.
-
-The normal exception path is simplified as a result, and
-compat_post_handle_exception() is removed entirely.
-
-This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ ENTRY(compat_test_all_events)
-         leaq  irq_stat+IRQSTAT_softirq_pending(%rip),%rcx
-         cmpl  $0,(%rcx,%rax,1)
-         jne   compat_process_softirqs
-+
-+        /* Inject exception if pending. */
-+        lea   VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx), %rdx
-+        testb $TBF_EXCEPTION, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
-+        jnz   .Lcompat_process_trapbounce
-+
-         testb $1,VCPU_mce_pending(%rbx)
-         jnz   compat_process_mce
- .Lcompat_test_guest_nmi:
-@@ -136,6 +142,15 @@ compat_process_softirqs:
-         call  do_softirq
-         jmp   compat_test_all_events
- 
-+        ALIGN
-+/* %rbx: struct vcpu, %rdx: struct trap_bounce */
-+.Lcompat_process_trapbounce:
-+        sti
-+.Lcompat_bounce_exception:
-+        call  compat_create_bounce_frame
-+        movb  $0, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
-+        jmp   compat_test_all_events
-+
- 	ALIGN
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- compat_process_mce:
-@@ -260,15 +275,6 @@ ENTRY(cr4_pv32_restore)
-         xor   %eax, %eax
-         ret
- 
--/* %rdx: trap_bounce, %rbx: struct vcpu */
--ENTRY(compat_post_handle_exception)
--        testb $TBF_EXCEPTION,TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
--        jz    compat_test_all_events
--.Lcompat_bounce_exception:
--        call  compat_create_bounce_frame
--        movb  $0,TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
--        jmp   compat_test_all_events
--
- /* See lstar_enter for entry register state. */
- ENTRY(cstar_enter)
-         /* sti could live here when we don't switch page tables below. */
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ test_all_events:
-         leaq  irq_stat+IRQSTAT_softirq_pending(%rip),%rcx
-         cmpl  $0,(%rcx,%rax,1)
-         jne   process_softirqs
-+
-+        /* Inject exception if pending. */
-+        lea   VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx), %rdx
-+        testb $TBF_EXCEPTION, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
-+        jnz   .Lprocess_trapbounce
-+
-         testb $1,VCPU_mce_pending(%rbx)
-         jnz   process_mce
- .Ltest_guest_nmi:
-@@ -281,6 +287,15 @@ process_softirqs:
-         jmp  test_all_events
- 
-         ALIGN
-+/* %rbx: struct vcpu, %rdx struct trap_bounce */
-+.Lprocess_trapbounce:
-+        sti
-+.Lbounce_exception:
-+        call  create_bounce_frame
-+        movb  $0, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
-+        jmp   test_all_events
-+
-+        ALIGN
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- process_mce:
-         testb $1 << VCPU_TRAP_MCE,VCPU_async_exception_mask(%rbx)
-@@ -698,15 +713,9 @@ handle_exception_saved:
-         mov   %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-         testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-         jz    restore_all_xen
--        leaq  VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx
-         movq  VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rax
-         testb $1,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rax)
--        jnz   compat_post_handle_exception
--        testb $TBF_EXCEPTION,TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
--        jz    test_all_events
--.Lbounce_exception:
--        call  create_bounce_frame
--        movb  $0,TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
-+        jnz   compat_test_all_events
-         jmp   test_all_events
- 
- /* No special register assumptions. */
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa260-3.patch b/main/xen/xsa260-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6efdd511ea..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa260-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/traps: Use an Interrupt Stack Table for #DB
-
-PV guests can use architectural corner cases to cause #DB to be raised after
-transitioning into supervisor mode.
-
-Use an interrupt stack table for #DB to prevent the exception being taken with
-a guest controlled stack pointer.
-
-This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-@@ -672,6 +672,7 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
- 	tss->ist[IST_MCE - 1] = stack_top + IST_MCE * PAGE_SIZE;
- 	tss->ist[IST_DF  - 1] = stack_top + IST_DF  * PAGE_SIZE;
- 	tss->ist[IST_NMI - 1] = stack_top + IST_NMI * PAGE_SIZE;
-+	tss->ist[IST_DB  - 1] = stack_top + IST_DB  * PAGE_SIZE;
- 
- 	_set_tssldt_desc(
- 		gdt + TSS_ENTRY,
-@@ -692,6 +693,7 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
- 	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_DF);
- 	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],	      IST_NMI);
- 	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE);
-+	set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_debug],         IST_DB);
- }
- 
- /*
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ static void svm_ctxt_switch_from(struct
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_DF);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],           IST_NMI);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_debug],         IST_DB);
- }
- 
- static void svm_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
-@@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ static void svm_ctxt_switch_to(struct vc
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_NONE);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],           IST_NONE);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_debug],         IST_NONE);
- 
-     svm_restore_dr(v);
- 
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -962,6 +962,7 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned in
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault],  IST_NONE);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi],           IST_NONE);
-     set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_debug],         IST_NONE);
- 
-     for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1);
-           i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static void show_guest_stack(struct vcpu
- /*
-  * Notes for get_stack_trace_bottom() and get_stack_dump_bottom()
-  *
-- * Stack pages 0, 1 and 2:
-+ * Stack pages 0 - 3:
-  *   These are all 1-page IST stacks.  Each of these stacks have an exception
-  *   frame and saved register state at the top.  The interesting bound for a
-  *   trace is the word adjacent to this, while the bound for a dump is the
-  *   very top, including the exception frame.
-  *
-- * Stack pages 3, 4 and 5:
-+ * Stack pages 4 and 5:
-  *   None of these are particularly interesting.  With MEMORY_GUARD, page 5 is
-  *   explicitly not present, so attempting to dump or trace it is
-  *   counterproductive.  Without MEMORY_GUARD, it is possible for a call chain
-@@ -286,12 +286,12 @@ unsigned long get_stack_trace_bottom(uns
- {
-     switch ( get_stack_page(sp) )
-     {
--    case 0 ... 2:
-+    case 0 ... 3:
-         return ROUNDUP(sp, PAGE_SIZE) -
-             offsetof(struct cpu_user_regs, es) - sizeof(unsigned long);
- 
- #ifndef MEMORY_GUARD
--    case 3 ... 5:
-+    case 4 ... 5:
- #endif
-     case 6 ... 7:
-         return ROUNDUP(sp, STACK_SIZE) -
-@@ -306,11 +306,11 @@ unsigned long get_stack_dump_bottom(unsi
- {
-     switch ( get_stack_page(sp) )
-     {
--    case 0 ... 2:
-+    case 0 ... 3:
-         return ROUNDUP(sp, PAGE_SIZE) - sizeof(unsigned long);
- 
- #ifndef MEMORY_GUARD
--    case 3 ... 5:
-+    case 4 ... 5:
- #endif
-     case 6 ... 7:
-         return ROUNDUP(sp, STACK_SIZE) - sizeof(unsigned long);
-@@ -4022,6 +4022,7 @@ void __init init_idt_traps(void)
-     set_ist(&idt_table[TRAP_double_fault],  IST_DF);
-     set_ist(&idt_table[TRAP_nmi],           IST_NMI);
-     set_ist(&idt_table[TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE);
-+    set_ist(&idt_table[TRAP_debug],         IST_DB);
- 
-     /* CPU0 uses the master IDT. */
-     idt_tables[0] = idt_table;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ ENTRY(device_not_available)
- ENTRY(debug)
-         pushq $0
-         movl  $TRAP_debug,4(%rsp)
--        jmp   handle_exception
-+        jmp   handle_ist_exception
- 
- ENTRY(int3)
-         pushq $0
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-@@ -498,7 +498,8 @@ struct __packed __cacheline_aligned tss_
- #define IST_DF   1UL
- #define IST_NMI  2UL
- #define IST_MCE  3UL
--#define IST_MAX  3UL
-+#define IST_DB   4UL
-+#define IST_MAX  4UL
- 
- /* Set the interrupt stack table used by a particular interrupt
-  * descriptor table entry. */
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa260-4.patch b/main/xen/xsa260-4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c2b77afc89..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa260-4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/traps: Fix handling of #DB exceptions in hypervisor context
-
-The WARN_ON() can be triggered by guest activities, and emits a full stack
-trace without rate limiting.  Swap it out for a ratelimited printk with just
-enough information to work out what is going on.
-
-Not all #DB exceptions are traps, so blindly continuing is not a safe action
-to take.  We don't let PV guests select these settings in the real %dr7 to
-begin with, but for added safety against unexpected situations, detect the
-fault cases and crash in an obvious manner.
-
-This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -3889,16 +3889,44 @@ void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs
-                 regs->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
-             }
-         }
--        else
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Check for fault conditions.  General Detect, and instruction
-+         * breakpoints are faults rather than traps, at which point attempting
-+         * to ignore and continue will result in a livelock.
-+         */
-+        if ( dr6 & DR_GENERAL_DETECT )
-+        {
-+            printk(XENLOG_ERR "Hit General Detect in Xen context\n");
-+            fatal_trap(regs);
-+        }
-+
-+        if ( dr6 & (DR_TRAP3 | DR_TRAP2 | DR_TRAP1 | DR_TRAP0) )
-         {
--            /*
--             * We ignore watchpoints when they trigger within Xen. This may
--             * happen when a buffer is passed to us which previously had a
--             * watchpoint set on it. No need to bump EIP; the only faulting
--             * trap is an instruction breakpoint, which can't happen to us.
--             */
--            WARN_ON(!search_exception_table(regs->eip));
-+            unsigned int bp, dr7 = read_debugreg(7) >> DR_CONTROL_SHIFT;
-+
-+            for ( bp = 0; bp < 4; ++bp )
-+            {
-+                if ( (dr6 & (1u << bp)) && /* Breakpoint triggered? */
-+                     ((dr7 & (3u << (bp * DR_CONTROL_SIZE))) == 0) /* Insn? */ )
-+                {
-+                    printk(XENLOG_ERR
-+                           "Hit instruction breakpoint in Xen context\n");
-+                    fatal_trap(regs);
-+                }
-+            }
-         }
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Whatever caused this #DB should be a trap.  Note it and continue.
-+         * Guests can trigger this in certain corner cases, so ensure the
-+         * message is ratelimited.
-+         */
-+        gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
-+                "Hit #DB in Xen context: %04x:%p [%ps], stk %04x:%p, dr6 %lx\n",
-+                regs->cs, _p(regs->rip), _p(regs->rip),
-+                regs->ss, _p(regs->rsp), dr6);
-+
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa261-4.7.patch b/main/xen/xsa261-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index eaa93f1cee..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa261-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-From 0ce5019f87abe20d1e714f8d983418ecfb0ad5df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Xen Project Security Team <security@xenproject.org>
-Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 16:56:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/vpt: add support for IO-APIC routed interrupts
-
-And modify the HPET code to make use of it. Currently HPET interrupts
-are always treated as ISA and thus injected through the vPIC. This is
-wrong because HPET interrupts when not in legacy mode should be
-injected from the IO-APIC.
-
-To make things worse, the supported interrupt routing values are set
-to [20..23], which clearly falls outside of the ISA range, thus
-leading to an ASSERT in debug builds or memory corruption in non-debug
-builds because the interrupt injection code will write out of the
-bounds of the arch.hvm_domain.vpic array.
-
-Since the HPET interrupt source can change between ISA and IO-APIC
-always destroy the timer before changing the mode, or else Xen risks
-changing it while the timer is active.
-
-Note that vpt interrupt injection is racy in the sense that the
-vIO-APIC RTE entry can be written by the guest in between the call to
-pt_irq_masked and hvm_ioapic_assert, or the call to pt_update_irq and
-pt_intr_post. Those are not deemed to be security issues, but rather
-quirks of the current implementation. In the worse case the guest
-might lose interrupts or get multiple interrupt vectors injected for
-the same timer source.
-
-This is part of XSA-261.
-
-Address actual and potential compiler warnings. Fix formatting.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c       |  7 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c        | 19 ++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c        | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h |  3 ++
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c
-index f7aed7f..2837709 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c
-@@ -264,13 +264,20 @@ static void hpet_set_timer(HPETState *h, unsigned int tn,
-         diff = (timer_is_32bit(h, tn) && (-diff > HPET_TINY_TIME_SPAN))
-             ? (uint32_t)diff : 0;
- 
-+    destroy_periodic_time(&h->pt[tn]);
-     if ( (tn <= 1) && (h->hpet.config & HPET_CFG_LEGACY) )
-+    {
-         /* if LegacyReplacementRoute bit is set, HPET specification requires
-            timer0 be routed to IRQ0 in NON-APIC or IRQ2 in the I/O APIC,
-            timer1 be routed to IRQ8 in NON-APIC or IRQ8 in the I/O APIC. */
-         irq = (tn == 0) ? 0 : 8;
-+        h->pt[tn].source = PTSRC_isa;
-+    }
-     else
-+    {
-         irq = timer_int_route(h, tn);
-+        h->pt[tn].source = PTSRC_ioapic;
-+    }
- 
-     /*
-      * diff is the time from now when the timer should fire, for a periodic
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
-index be1d4e8..2d1990b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,25 @@ static void assert_gsi(struct domain *d, unsigned ioapic_gsi)
-     vioapic_irq_positive_edge(d, ioapic_gsi);
- }
- 
-+int hvm_ioapic_assert(struct domain *d, unsigned int gsi, bool_t level)
-+{
-+    int vector;
-+
-+    if ( gsi >= VIOAPIC_NUM_PINS )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.irq_lock);
-+    if ( !level || d->arch.hvm_domain.irq.gsi_assert_count[gsi]++ == 0 )
-+        assert_gsi(d, gsi);
-+    vector = domain_vioapic(d)->redirtbl[gsi].fields.vector;
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.irq_lock);
-+
-+    return vector;
-+}
-+
- static void assert_irq(struct domain *d, unsigned ioapic_gsi, unsigned pic_irq)
- {
-     assert_gsi(d, ioapic_gsi);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
-index 358ec57..f0fe31c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
-@@ -97,22 +97,36 @@ static int pt_irq_vector(struct periodic_time *pt, enum hvm_intsrc src)
- static int pt_irq_masked(struct periodic_time *pt)
- {
-     struct vcpu *v = pt->vcpu;
--    unsigned int gsi, isa_irq;
--    uint8_t pic_imr;
-+    unsigned int gsi = pt->irq;
- 
--    if ( pt->source == PTSRC_lapic )
-+    switch ( pt->source )
-+    {
-+    case PTSRC_lapic:
-     {
-         struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
-+
-         return (!vlapic_enabled(vlapic) ||
-                 (vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, APIC_LVTT) & APIC_LVT_MASKED));
-     }
- 
--    isa_irq = pt->irq;
--    gsi = hvm_isa_irq_to_gsi(isa_irq);
--    pic_imr = v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.vpic[isa_irq >> 3].imr;
-+    case PTSRC_isa:
-+    {
-+        uint8_t pic_imr = v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.vpic[pt->irq >> 3].imr;
- 
--    return (((pic_imr & (1 << (isa_irq & 7))) || !vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v)) &&
--            domain_vioapic(v->domain)->redirtbl[gsi].fields.mask);
-+        /* Check if the interrupt is unmasked in the PIC. */
-+        if ( !(pic_imr & (1 << (pt->irq & 7))) && vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) )
-+            return 0;
-+
-+        gsi = hvm_isa_irq_to_gsi(pt->irq);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Fallthrough to check if the interrupt is masked on the IO APIC. */
-+    case PTSRC_ioapic:
-+        return domain_vioapic(v->domain)->redirtbl[gsi].fields.mask;
-+    }
-+
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+    return 1;
- }
- 
- static void pt_lock(struct periodic_time *pt)
-@@ -233,7 +247,7 @@ int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
-     struct list_head *head = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list;
-     struct periodic_time *pt, *temp, *earliest_pt;
-     uint64_t max_lag;
--    int irq, is_lapic;
-+    int irq, pt_vector = -1;
- 
-     spin_lock(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_lock);
- 
-@@ -269,29 +283,42 @@ int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
- 
-     earliest_pt->irq_issued = 1;
-     irq = earliest_pt->irq;
--    is_lapic = (earliest_pt->source == PTSRC_lapic);
- 
-     spin_unlock(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_lock);
- 
--    if ( is_lapic )
--        vlapic_set_irq(vcpu_vlapic(v), irq, 0);
--    else
-+    switch ( earliest_pt->source )
-     {
-+    case PTSRC_lapic:
-+        /*
-+         * If periodic timer interrupt is handled by lapic, its vector in
-+         * IRR is returned and used to set eoi_exit_bitmap for virtual
-+         * interrupt delivery case. Otherwise return -1 to do nothing.
-+         */
-+        vlapic_set_irq(vcpu_vlapic(v), irq, 0);
-+        pt_vector = irq;
-+        break;
-+
-+    case PTSRC_isa:
-         hvm_isa_irq_deassert(v->domain, irq);
-         hvm_isa_irq_assert(v->domain, irq);
-+
-+        if ( platform_legacy_irq(irq) && vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) &&
-+             v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.vpic[irq >> 3].int_output )
-+            return -1;
-+
-+        pt_vector = pt_irq_vector(earliest_pt, hvm_intsrc_lapic);
-+        break;
-+
-+    case PTSRC_ioapic:
-+        /*
-+         * NB: At the moment IO-APIC routed interrupts generated by vpt devices
-+         * (HPET) are edge-triggered.
-+         */
-+        pt_vector = hvm_ioapic_assert(v->domain, irq, 0);
-+        break;
-     }
- 
--    /*
--     * If periodic timer interrut is handled by lapic, its vector in
--     * IRR is returned and used to set eoi_exit_bitmap for virtual
--     * interrupt delivery case. Otherwise return -1 to do nothing.  
--     */ 
--    if ( !is_lapic &&
--         platform_legacy_irq(irq) && vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) &&
--         (&v->domain->arch.hvm_domain)->vpic[irq >> 3].int_output )
--        return -1;
--    else 
--        return pt_irq_vector(earliest_pt, hvm_intsrc_lapic);
-+    return pt_vector;
- }
- 
- static struct periodic_time *is_pt_irq(
-@@ -386,7 +413,13 @@ void create_periodic_time(
-     struct vcpu *v, struct periodic_time *pt, uint64_t delta,
-     uint64_t period, uint8_t irq, time_cb *cb, void *data)
- {
--    ASSERT(pt->source != 0);
-+    if ( !pt->source ||
-+         (pt->irq >= NR_ISAIRQS && pt->source == PTSRC_isa) ||
-+         (pt->irq >= VIOAPIC_NUM_PINS && pt->source == PTSRC_ioapic) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return;
-+    }
- 
-     destroy_periodic_time(pt);
- 
-@@ -466,7 +499,7 @@ static void pt_adjust_vcpu(struct periodic_time *pt, struct vcpu *v)
- {
-     int on_list;
- 
--    ASSERT(pt->source == PTSRC_isa);
-+    ASSERT(pt->source == PTSRC_isa || pt->source == PTSRC_ioapic);
- 
-     if ( pt->vcpu == NULL )
-         return;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h
-index 73b8fb0..c60036b 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h
-@@ -103,4 +103,7 @@ struct hvm_intack hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v);
- struct hvm_intack hvm_vcpu_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v,
-                                            struct hvm_intack intack);
- 
-+/* Assert an IO APIC pin. */
-+int hvm_ioapic_assert(struct domain *d, unsigned int gsi, bool_t level);
-+
- #endif /* __ASM_X86_HVM_IRQ_H__ */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
-index a27bea4..616f040 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct periodic_time {
-     bool_t warned_timeout_too_short;
- #define PTSRC_isa    1 /* ISA time source */
- #define PTSRC_lapic  2 /* LAPIC time source */
-+#define PTSRC_ioapic 3 /* IOAPIC time source */
-     u8 source;                  /* PTSRC_ */
-     u8 irq;
-     struct vcpu *vcpu;          /* vcpu timer interrupt delivers to */
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa262-4.9.patch b/main/xen/xsa262-4.9.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f9a7a4ce3a..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa262-4.9.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HVM: guard against emulator driving ioreq state in weird ways
-
-In the case where hvm_wait_for_io() calls wait_on_xen_event_channel(),
-p->state ends up being read twice in succession: once to determine that
-state != p->state, and then again at the top of the loop.  This gives a
-compromised emulator a chance to change the state back between the two
-reads, potentially keeping Xen in a loop indefinitely.
-
-Instead:
-* Read p->state once in each of the wait_on_xen_event_channel() tests,
-* re-use that value the next time around,
-* and insist that the states continue to transition "forward" (with the
-  exception of the transition to STATE_IOREQ_NONE).
-
-This is XSA-262.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-@@ -87,14 +87,17 @@ static void hvm_io_assist(struct hvm_ior
- 
- static bool_t hvm_wait_for_io(struct hvm_ioreq_vcpu *sv, ioreq_t *p)
- {
-+    unsigned int prev_state = STATE_IOREQ_NONE;
-+
-     while ( sv->pending )
-     {
-         unsigned int state = p->state;
- 
--        rmb();
--        switch ( state )
-+        smp_rmb();
-+
-+    recheck:
-+        if ( unlikely(state == STATE_IOREQ_NONE) )
-         {
--        case STATE_IOREQ_NONE:
-             /*
-              * The only reason we should see this case is when an
-              * emulator is dying and it races with an I/O being
-@@ -102,14 +105,30 @@ static bool_t hvm_wait_for_io(struct hvm
-              */
-             hvm_io_assist(sv, ~0ul);
-             break;
-+        }
-+
-+        if ( unlikely(state < prev_state) )
-+        {
-+            gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Weird HVM ioreq state transition %u -> %u\n",
-+                     prev_state, state);
-+            sv->pending = 0;
-+            domain_crash(sv->vcpu->domain);
-+            return 0; /* bail */
-+        }
-+
-+        switch ( prev_state = state )
-+        {
-         case STATE_IORESP_READY: /* IORESP_READY -> NONE */
-             p->state = STATE_IOREQ_NONE;
-             hvm_io_assist(sv, p->data);
-             break;
-         case STATE_IOREQ_READY:  /* IOREQ_{READY,INPROCESS} -> IORESP_READY */
-         case STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS:
--            wait_on_xen_event_channel(sv->ioreq_evtchn, p->state != state);
--            break;
-+            wait_on_xen_event_channel(sv->ioreq_evtchn,
-+                                      ({ state = p->state;
-+                                         smp_rmb();
-+                                         state != prev_state; }));
-+            goto recheck;
-         default:
-             gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Weird HVM iorequest state %u\n", state);
-             sv->pending = 0;