main/libxext: fix CVE-2013-1982

ref #1931

8 files changed, 748 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/main/libxext/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch b/main/libxext/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58f29757e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+From ca84a813716f9de691dc3f60390d83af4b5ae534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 09:32:12 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] Use _XEatDataWords to avoid overflow of rep.length bit
+ shifting
+
+rep.length is a CARD32, so rep.length << 2 could overflow in 32-bit builds
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ COPYING         |  3 ++-
+ configure.ac    |  6 ++++++
+ src/Makefile.am |  1 +
+ src/XEVI.c      |  4 +++-
+ src/XMultibuf.c |  3 ++-
+ src/XSecurity.c |  3 ++-
+ src/XShape.c    |  3 ++-
+ src/XSync.c     |  3 ++-
+ src/Xcup.c      |  7 ++++---
+ src/eat.h       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 src/eat.h
+
+diff --git a/COPYING b/COPYING
+index 80622a0..e3a63ef 100644
+--- a/COPYING
++++ b/COPYING
+@@ -160,7 +160,8 @@ makes no representations about the suitability for any purpose
+ of the information in this document.  This documentation is
+ provided ``as is'' without express or implied warranty.
+ 
+-Copyright (c) 1999, 2005, 2006, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
++Copyright (c) 1999, 2005, 2006, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
++All rights reserved.
+ 
+ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
+ copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 63775de..fb9888d 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ AC_SUBST(XEXT_SOREV)
+ # Obtain compiler/linker options for depedencies
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XEXT, [xproto >= 7.0.13] [x11 >= 1.1.99.1] [xextproto >= 7.1.99])
+ 
++# Check for _XEatDataWords function that may be patched into older Xlib releases
++SAVE_LIBS="$LIBS"
++LIBS="$XEXT_LIBS"
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_XEatDataWords])
++LIBS="$SAVE_LIBS"
++
+ # Allow checking code with lint, sparse, etc.
+ XORG_WITH_LINT
+ XORG_LINT_LIBRARY([Xext])
+diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
+index e236c33..b828547 100644
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ libXext_la_LDFLAGS = -version-number $(XEXT_SOREV) -no-undefined
+ libXext_la_LIBADD = $(XEXT_LIBS)
+ 
+ libXext_la_SOURCES = \
++	eat.h \
+ 	DPMS.c \
+ 	MITMisc.c \
+ 	XAppgroup.c \
+diff --git a/src/XEVI.c b/src/XEVI.c
+index eb09daa..0125c51 100644
+--- a/src/XEVI.c
++++ b/src/XEVI.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/Xutil.h>
++#include "eat.h"
++
+ static XExtensionInfo *xevi_info;/* needs to move to globals.c */
+ static const char *xevi_extension_name = EVINAME;
+ #define XeviCheckExtension(dpy,i,val) \
+@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ Status XeviGetVisualInfo(
+     xInfoPtr = temp_xInfo = (xExtendedVisualInfo *)Xmalloc(sz_xInfo);
+     xConflictPtr = temp_conflict = (VisualID32 *)Xmalloc(sz_xConflict);
+     if (!*evi_return || !temp_xInfo || !temp_conflict) {
+-        _XEatData(dpy, (sz_xInfo + sz_xConflict + 3) & ~3);
++	_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ 	SyncHandle();
+ 	if (evi_return)
+diff --git a/src/XMultibuf.c b/src/XMultibuf.c
+index 7a746ba..43d56d3 100644
+--- a/src/XMultibuf.c
++++ b/src/XMultibuf.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/multibufproto.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/multibuf.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _multibuf_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *multibuf_info = &_multibuf_info_data;
+@@ -408,7 +409,7 @@ Status XmbufGetWindowAttributes (
+ 	attr->buffers = (Multibuffer *) Xmalloc((unsigned) nbytes);
+ 	nbytes = rep.length << 2;
+ 	if (! attr->buffers) {
+-	    _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ 	    SyncHandle();
+ 	    return (0);
+diff --git a/src/XSecurity.c b/src/XSecurity.c
+index f8c7da1..ab17755 100644
+--- a/src/XSecurity.c
++++ b/src/XSecurity.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/securproto.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/security.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _Security_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *Security_info = &_Security_info_data;
+@@ -282,7 +283,7 @@ XSecurityGenerateAuthorization(
+     }
+     else
+     {
+-	_XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) (rep.dataLength + 3) & ~3);
++	_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+     }
+ 
+     UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+diff --git a/src/XShape.c b/src/XShape.c
+index 6e8fbae..3987876 100644
+--- a/src/XShape.c
++++ b/src/XShape.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/shape.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/shapeproto.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _shape_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *shape_info = &_shape_info_data;
+@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ XRectangle *XShapeGetRectangles (
+ 		Xfree (xrects);
+ 	    if (rects)
+ 		Xfree (rects);
+-	    _XEatData (dpy, *count * sizeof (xRectangle));
++	    _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    rects = NULL;
+ 	    *count = 0;
+ 	} else {
+diff --git a/src/XSync.c b/src/XSync.c
+index 5775293..3ca1308 100644
+--- a/src/XSync.c
++++ b/src/XSync.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/sync.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/syncproto.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _sync_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *sync_info = &_sync_info_data;
+@@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ XSyncListSystemCounters(Display *dpy, int *n_counters_return)
+ 	{
+ 	    if (list) Xfree((char *) list);
+ 	    if (pWireSysCounter)   Xfree((char *) pWireSysCounter);
+-	    _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) replylen);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    list = NULL;
+ 	    goto bail;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/Xcup.c b/src/Xcup.c
+index bb9e90f..1f1d625 100644
+--- a/src/Xcup.c
++++ b/src/Xcup.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/cupproto.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _xcup_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *xcup_info = &_xcup_info_data;
+@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ XcupGetReservedColormapEntries(
+ 	    rbufp = rbuf;
+ 
+ 	if (rbufp == NULL) {
+-	    _XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+ 	    SyncHandle ();
+ 	    return False;
+@@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ XcupStoreColors(
+ 	nbytes = nentries * SIZEOF (xColorItem);
+ 
+ 	if (nentries != ncolors) {
+-	    _XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+ 	    SyncHandle ();
+ 	    return False;
+@@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ XcupStoreColors(
+ 	    rbufp = rbuf;
+ 
+ 	if (rbufp == NULL) {
+-	    _XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+ 	    SyncHandle ();
+ 	    return False;
+diff --git a/src/eat.h b/src/eat.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..239532b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/eat.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
++ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
++ * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
++ * the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
++ * and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
++ * Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice (including the next
++ * paragraph) shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the
++ * Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.  IN NO EVENT SHALL
++ * THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
++ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
++ * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
++# include "config.h"
++#endif
++
++#ifndef HAVE__XEATDATAWORDS
++#include <X11/Xmd.h>  /* for LONG64 on 64-bit platforms */
++#include <limits.h>
++
++static inline void _XEatDataWords(Display *dpy, unsigned long n)
++{
++# ifndef LONG64
++    if (n >= (ULONG_MAX >> 2))
++        _XIOError(dpy);
++# endif
++    _XEatData (dpy, n << 2);
++}
++#endif
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch b/main/libxext/0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d974de57af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From d05f27a6f74cb419ad5a437f2e4690b17e7faee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] integer overflow in XcupGetReservedColormapEntries()
+ [CVE-2013-1982 1/6]
+
+If the computed number of entries is large enough that it overflows when
+multiplied by the size of a xColorItem struct, or is treated as negative
+when compared to the size of the stack allocated buffer, then memory
+corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the
+size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/Xcup.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/Xcup.c b/src/Xcup.c
+index 1f1d625..670f356 100644
+--- a/src/Xcup.c
++++ b/src/Xcup.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/cupproto.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _xcup_info_data;
+@@ -134,15 +135,19 @@ XcupGetReservedColormapEntries(
+     req->xcupReqType = X_XcupGetReservedColormapEntries;
+     req->screen = screen;
+     if (_XReply(dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
+-	long nbytes;
++	unsigned long nbytes;
+ 	xColorItem* rbufp;
+-	int nentries = rep.length / 3;
++	unsigned int nentries = rep.length / 3;
+ 
+-	nbytes = nentries * SIZEOF (xColorItem);
+-	if (nentries > TYP_RESERVED_ENTRIES)
+-	    rbufp = (xColorItem*) Xmalloc (nbytes);
+-	else
+-	    rbufp = rbuf;
++	if (nentries < (INT_MAX / SIZEOF (xColorItem))) {
++	    nbytes = nentries * SIZEOF (xColorItem);
++
++	    if (nentries > TYP_RESERVED_ENTRIES)
++		rbufp = Xmalloc (nbytes);
++	    else
++		rbufp = rbuf;
++	} else
++	    rbufp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (rbufp == NULL) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch b/main/libxext/0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0be477d23d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 082d70b19848059ba78c9d1c315114fb07e8c0ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] integer overflow in XcupStoreColors() [CVE-2013-1982 2/6]
+
+If the computed number of entries is large enough that it overflows when
+multiplied by the size of a xColorItem struct, or is treated as negative
+when compared to the size of the stack allocated buffer, then memory
+corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the
+size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+The requirement to match the number of colors specified by the caller makes
+this much harder to hit than the one in XcupGetReservedColormapEntries()
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/Xcup.c | 25 +++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/Xcup.c b/src/Xcup.c
+index 670f356..cdc64c2 100644
+--- a/src/Xcup.c
++++ b/src/Xcup.c
+@@ -219,24 +219,21 @@ XcupStoreColors(
+     }
+ 
+     if (_XReply(dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
+-	long nbytes;
++	unsigned long nbytes;
+ 	xColorItem* rbufp;
+ 	xColorItem* cs;
+-	int nentries = rep.length / 3;
+-
+-	nbytes = nentries * SIZEOF (xColorItem);
++	unsigned int nentries = rep.length / 3;
+ 
+-	if (nentries != ncolors) {
+-	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+-	    UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+-	    SyncHandle ();
+-	    return False;
+-	}
++	if ((nentries == ncolors) &&
++	    (nentries < (INT_MAX / SIZEOF (xColorItem)))) {
++	    nbytes = nentries * SIZEOF (xColorItem);
+ 
+-	if (ncolors > 256)
+-	    rbufp = (xColorItem*) Xmalloc (nbytes);
+-	else
+-	    rbufp = rbuf;
++	    if (ncolors > 256)
++		rbufp = Xmalloc (nbytes);
++	    else
++		rbufp = rbuf;
++	} else
++	    rbufp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (rbufp == NULL) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch b/main/libxext/0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..75c50e0025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 96d1da55a08c4cd52b763cb07bdce5cdcbec4da8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] several integer overflows in XdbeGetVisualInfo()
+ [CVE-2013-1982 3/6]
+
+If the number of screens or visuals reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server
+than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/Xdbe.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/Xdbe.c b/src/Xdbe.c
+index 4b5fa18..016886c 100644
+--- a/src/Xdbe.c
++++ b/src/Xdbe.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xdbe.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/dbeproto.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _dbe_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *dbe_info = &_dbe_info_data;
+@@ -352,9 +354,12 @@ XdbeScreenVisualInfo *XdbeGetVisualInfo (
+        *num_screens = rep.m;
+ 
+     /* allocate list of visual information to be returned */
+-    if (!(scrVisInfo =
+-        (XdbeScreenVisualInfo *)Xmalloc(
+-        (unsigned)(*num_screens * sizeof(XdbeScreenVisualInfo))))) {
++    if ((*num_screens > 0) && (*num_screens < 65536))
++        scrVisInfo = Xmalloc(*num_screens * sizeof(XdbeScreenVisualInfo));
++    else
++        scrVisInfo = NULL;
++    if (scrVisInfo == NULL) {
++        _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+         UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+         SyncHandle ();
+         return NULL;
+@@ -362,25 +367,27 @@ XdbeScreenVisualInfo *XdbeGetVisualInfo (
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < *num_screens; i++)
+     {
+-        int nbytes;
+         int j;
+-        long c;
++        unsigned long c;
+ 
+-        _XRead32 (dpy, &c, sizeof(CARD32));
+-        scrVisInfo[i].count = c;
++        _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) &c, sizeof(CARD32));
+ 
+-        nbytes = scrVisInfo[i].count * sizeof(XdbeVisualInfo);
++        if (c < 65536) {
++            scrVisInfo[i].count = c;
++            scrVisInfo[i].visinfo = Xmalloc(c * sizeof(XdbeVisualInfo));
++        } else
++            scrVisInfo[i].visinfo = NULL;
+ 
+         /* if we can not allocate the list of visual/depth info
+          * then free the lists that we already allocate as well
+          * as the visual info list itself
+          */
+-        if (!(scrVisInfo[i].visinfo = (XdbeVisualInfo *)Xmalloc(
+-            (unsigned)nbytes))) {
++        if (scrVisInfo[i].visinfo == NULL) {
+             for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+                 Xfree ((char *)scrVisInfo[j].visinfo);
+             }
+             Xfree ((char *)scrVisInfo);
++            _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+             UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+             SyncHandle ();
+             return NULL;
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch b/main/libxext/0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1aa4cc383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 67ecdcf7e29de9fa78b421122620525ed2c7db88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] integer overflow in XeviGetVisualInfo() [CVE-2013-1982
+ 4/6]
+
+If the number of visuals or conflicts reported by the server is large
+enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate
+struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from
+the X server than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/XEVI.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XEVI.c b/src/XEVI.c
+index 0125c51..5a95583 100644
+--- a/src/XEVI.c
++++ b/src/XEVI.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/Xutil.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo *xevi_info;/* needs to move to globals.c */
+@@ -165,13 +166,20 @@ Status XeviGetVisualInfo(
+ 	return BadAccess;
+     }
+     Xfree(temp_visual);
+-    sz_info = rep.n_info * sizeof(ExtendedVisualInfo);
+-    sz_xInfo = rep.n_info * sz_xExtendedVisualInfo;
+-    sz_conflict = rep.n_conflicts * sizeof(VisualID);
+-    sz_xConflict = rep.n_conflicts * sz_VisualID32;
+-    infoPtr = *evi_return = (ExtendedVisualInfo *)Xmalloc(sz_info + sz_conflict);
+-    xInfoPtr = temp_xInfo = (xExtendedVisualInfo *)Xmalloc(sz_xInfo);
+-    xConflictPtr = temp_conflict = (VisualID32 *)Xmalloc(sz_xConflict);
++    if ((rep.n_info < 65536) && (rep.n_conflicts < 65536)) {
++	sz_info = rep.n_info * sizeof(ExtendedVisualInfo);
++	sz_xInfo = rep.n_info * sz_xExtendedVisualInfo;
++	sz_conflict = rep.n_conflicts * sizeof(VisualID);
++	sz_xConflict = rep.n_conflicts * sz_VisualID32;
++	*evi_return = Xmalloc(sz_info + sz_conflict);
++	temp_xInfo = Xmalloc(sz_xInfo);
++	temp_conflict = Xmalloc(sz_xConflict);
++    } else {
++	sz_xInfo = sz_xConflict = 0;
++	*evi_return = NULL;
++	temp_xInfo = NULL;
++	temp_conflict = NULL;
++    }
+     if (!*evi_return || !temp_xInfo || !temp_conflict) {
+ 	_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+@@ -188,6 +196,9 @@ Status XeviGetVisualInfo(
+     _XRead(dpy, (char *)temp_conflict, sz_xConflict);
+     UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+     SyncHandle();
++    infoPtr = *evi_return;
++    xInfoPtr = temp_xInfo;
++    xConflictPtr = temp_conflict;
+     n_data = rep.n_info;
+     conflict = (VisualID *)(infoPtr + n_data);
+     while (n_data-- > 0) {
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch b/main/libxext/0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01f40d7b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 6ecd96e8be3c33e2ffad6631cea4aa0a030d93c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] integer overflow in XShapeGetRectangles() [CVE-2013-1982
+ 5/6]
+
+If the number of rectangles reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then
+memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server
+than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/XShape.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XShape.c b/src/XShape.c
+index 3987876..d025020 100644
+--- a/src/XShape.c
++++ b/src/XShape.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/shape.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/shapeproto.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _shape_info_data;
+@@ -443,7 +444,7 @@ XRectangle *XShapeGetRectangles (
+     xShapeGetRectanglesReply	    rep;
+     XRectangle			    *rects;
+     xRectangle			    *xrects;
+-    int				    i;
++    unsigned int		    i;
+ 
+     ShapeCheckExtension (dpy, info, (XRectangle *)NULL);
+ 
+@@ -461,20 +462,23 @@ XRectangle *XShapeGetRectangles (
+     *count = rep.nrects;
+     *ordering = rep.ordering;
+     rects = NULL;
+-    if (*count) {
+-	xrects = (xRectangle *) Xmalloc (*count * sizeof (xRectangle));
+-	rects = (XRectangle *) Xmalloc (*count * sizeof (XRectangle));
++    if (rep.nrects) {
++	if (rep.nrects < (INT_MAX / sizeof (XRectangle))) {
++	    xrects = Xmalloc (rep.nrects * sizeof (xRectangle));
++	    rects = Xmalloc (rep.nrects * sizeof (XRectangle));
++	} else {
++	    xrects = NULL;
++	    rects = NULL;
++	}
+ 	if (!xrects || !rects) {
+-	    if (xrects)
+-		Xfree (xrects);
+-	    if (rects)
+-		Xfree (rects);
++	    Xfree (xrects);
++	    Xfree (rects);
+ 	    _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    rects = NULL;
+ 	    *count = 0;
+ 	} else {
+-	    _XRead (dpy, (char *) xrects, *count * sizeof (xRectangle));
+-	    for (i = 0; i < *count; i++) {
++	    _XRead (dpy, (char *) xrects, rep.nrects * sizeof (xRectangle));
++	    for (i = 0; i < rep.nrects; i++) {
+ 	    	rects[i].x = (short) cvtINT16toInt (xrects[i].x);
+ 	    	rects[i].y = (short) cvtINT16toInt (xrects[i].y);
+ 	    	rects[i].width = xrects[i].width;
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch b/main/libxext/0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95382256d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/libxext/0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From dfe6e1f3b8ede3d0bab7a5fa57f73513a09ec649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 14:40:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] integer overflow in XSyncListSystemCounters()
+ [CVE-2013-1982 6/6]
+
+If the number of counters or amount of data reported by the server is
+large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the
+appropriate struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes
+are read from the X server than the size of the buffers we allocated
+to hold them.
+
+V2: Make sure we don't walk past the end of the reply when converting
+data from wire format to the structures returned to the caller.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+---
+ src/XSync.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XSync.c b/src/XSync.c
+index 3ca1308..ce4ab44 100644
+--- a/src/XSync.c
++++ b/src/XSync.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/sync.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/syncproto.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include "eat.h"
+ 
+ static XExtensionInfo _sync_info_data;
+@@ -352,19 +353,28 @@ XSyncListSystemCounters(Display *dpy, int *n_counters_return)
+     if (rep.nCounters > 0)
+     {
+ 	xSyncSystemCounter *pWireSysCounter, *pNextWireSysCounter;
++	xSyncSystemCounter *pLastWireSysCounter;
+ 	XSyncCounter counter;
+-	int replylen;
++	unsigned int replylen;
+ 	int i;
+ 
+-	list = Xmalloc(rep.nCounters * sizeof(XSyncSystemCounter));
+-	replylen = rep.length << 2;
+-	pWireSysCounter = Xmalloc ((unsigned) replylen + sizeof(XSyncCounter));
+-        /* +1 to leave room for last counter read-ahead */
++	if (rep.nCounters < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XSyncSystemCounter)))
++	    list = Xmalloc(rep.nCounters * sizeof(XSyncSystemCounter));
++	if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++	    replylen = rep.length << 2;
++	    pWireSysCounter = Xmalloc (replylen + sizeof(XSyncCounter));
++	    /* +1 to leave room for last counter read-ahead */
++	    pLastWireSysCounter = (xSyncSystemCounter *)
++		((char *)pWireSysCounter) + replylen;
++	} else {
++	    replylen = 0;
++	    pWireSysCounter = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((!list) || (!pWireSysCounter))
+ 	{
+-	    if (list) Xfree((char *) list);
+-	    if (pWireSysCounter)   Xfree((char *) pWireSysCounter);
++	    Xfree(list);
++	    Xfree(pWireSysCounter);
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    list = NULL;
+ 	    goto bail;
+@@ -388,6 +398,14 @@ XSyncListSystemCounters(Display *dpy, int *n_counters_return)
+ 	    pNextWireSysCounter = (xSyncSystemCounter *)
+ 		(((char *)pWireSysCounter) + ((SIZEOF(xSyncSystemCounter) +
+ 				     pWireSysCounter->name_length + 3) & ~3));
++	    /* Make sure we haven't gone too far */
++	    if (pNextWireSysCounter > pLastWireSysCounter) {
++		Xfree(list);
++		Xfree(pWireSysCounter);
++		list = NULL;
++		goto bail;
++	    }
++
+ 	    counter = pNextWireSysCounter->counter;
+ 
+ 	    list[i].name = ((char *)pWireSysCounter) +
+-- 
+1.8.2.3
+
diff --git a/main/libxext/APKBUILD b/main/libxext/APKBUILD
index 1561fa3735..b5cbc1d92a 100644
--- a/main/libxext/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/libxext/APKBUILD
@@ -1,17 +1,39 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=libxext
 pkgver=1.3.1
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="X11 miscellaneous extensions library"
 url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/"
 arch="all"
 license="custom"
 depends=
-makedepends="pkgconfig xproto xextproto libx11-dev libxau-dev"
+depends_dev="xextproto libx11-dev libxau-dev"
+makedepends="$depends_dev xproto
+	libtool autoconf automake util-macros"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc"
-source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXext-$pkgver.tar.bz2"
+source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXext-$pkgver.tar.bz2
+	0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
+	0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
+	0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
+	0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
+	0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
+	0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
+	0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch
+	"
+
+
+_builddir="$srcdir"/libXext-$pkgver
+prepare() {
+	cd "$_builddir"
+	for i in $source; do
+		case $i in
+		*.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;;
+		esac
+	done
+	libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoheader && autoconf \
+		&& automake --add-missing
+}
 
-depends_dev="xextproto libx11-dev libxau-dev"
 build() {
 	cd "$srcdir"/libXext-$pkgver
 	./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc
@@ -23,4 +45,27 @@ package() {
 	make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install || return 1
 	rm "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.la || return 1
 }
-md5sums="71251a22bc47068d60a95f50ed2ec3cf  libXext-1.3.1.tar.bz2"
+md5sums="71251a22bc47068d60a95f50ed2ec3cf  libXext-1.3.1.tar.bz2
+e8571e1188293644413df6beb332c209  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
+3ae33cae5c48fa8cfaa2669a2f474377  0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
+be5437299e95d870d0c2555e994f9e99  0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
+f10d0d95cd02a31b42ebd9c71b098e00  0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
+30d0d1e0d7e47444d767101c789129c6  0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
+0684b2e3ac5875c1642a77ba6194ec81  0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
+1c60dbeb9032d3823616e7fcf1162c15  0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch"
+sha256sums="56229c617eb7bfd6dec40d2805bc4dfb883dfe80f130d99b9a2beb632165e859  libXext-1.3.1.tar.bz2
+a403c890692475a9e1a99c50bae893c150695a75f8ba7f415da2a165a54b1a14  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
+46b3466a51fa040f39ae7e3fbf7d4d590dd6f3c246990cb5fb91eb40a547e156  0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
+b1c4b9308e140458a1e010b874d68fdc646ebf9c16b8adf573bbe05ab3e266a1  0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
+1ddc2cd6d47b77247fc67831d81b33df287b9042bffec4fceeb1014ea08462be  0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
+f25b13702696eb15bbcc903e6900a08f61ab39a9e79972ff1666dc32671082cb  0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
+438dec8cc7e02d70318631b8c094a238a88a049eea8187a83f1b34cf859de333  0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
+660c78e986fc227845dea5aeef00d91e328a52e3268a852160fe4056d4c13c1f  0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch"
+sha512sums="e8536d5a93ae6718c459c013abef0660085b4014fa5db7614f847e75dc4ea87a6235593201c144c424c9f809c8f1275eeadd858fd8915ca34ea1713cf367110a  libXext-1.3.1.tar.bz2
+3944b42305c7686e815bf11f996a48ed605f6f6cbac525e44dd42f0a6e1f9d7ed03b53bf0cc540fd0e1528128a1895ab8683f659d04670cf4c98fe784763ec50  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-b.patch
+10f5c15281aa9d5e6e18511243e020f3d943bd7421defc2c0e5c68cca36d2e0fdd55f1cc58955ba8f2e2ba5983c18ff6610d5b2b2e6a0877f23f446bf2a6c4ed  0002-integer-overflow-in-XcupGetReservedColormapEntries-C.patch
+dfc93f726ae0298c2b3ff43be24509904882de8d87e450e0292b32358211e961be72bca0d7af50afb955fa5ac4679598eb72526c9436d6f3fb0973b3ab6c2f08  0003-integer-overflow-in-XcupStoreColors-CVE-2013-1982-2-.patch
+26699071127642cf32763be2823fcf57e4bfa7766f60c432154e569f5fb91cf7bb8fb9bd9033190fec0c74cc62aad75f73418d48a7218fe37792ca0584a990e3  0004-several-integer-overflows-in-XdbeGetVisualInfo-CVE-2.patch
+6019357b85646c1c97426d03be5146a0af7a05e90af5fcee713cd2f5cd228b3634f896c76d66e174d55ea095f083b5afbb53ae4ea266979c9cdbb2813a4e5013  0005-integer-overflow-in-XeviGetVisualInfo-CVE-2013-1982-.patch
+4701c06782c7fb69b4eae19a7e6e1d88f8243fc3353f8be72d820bfa36761ad98ee0e5359e55c4e45a1fbf440cfd63e6d2732dd6d68564da3c707e85184e5a41  0006-integer-overflow-in-XShapeGetRectangles-CVE-2013-198.patch
+741a7716aa955c618b526f063919b7268e467f65d125a13dc72f4fd237550e2085e176f08375e8f01829341f9e967963d6d82f95bbc1cda80831c5c0691dbc91  0007-integer-overflow-in-XSyncListSystemCounters-CVE-2013.patch"