main/rsync: security fixes

CVE-2017-16548, CVE-2017-17433, CVE-2017-17434

Fixes #8317

5 files changed, 149 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/main/rsync/APKBUILD b/main/rsync/APKBUILD
index 4c64067326..0b89574fb3 100644
--- a/main/rsync/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/rsync/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=rsync
 pkgver=3.1.2
-pkgrel=6
+pkgrel=7
 pkgdesc="A file transfer program to keep remote files in sync"
 url="https://rsync.samba.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -14,9 +14,21 @@ source="https://download.samba.org/pub/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	rsyncd.confd
 	rsyncd.conf
 	rsyncd.logrotate
+
+	CVE-2017-16548.patch
+	CVE-2017-17433.patch
+	CVE-2017-17434-1.patch
+	CVE-2017-17434-2.patch
 	"
 builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   3.1.2-r7:
+#     - CVE-2017-16548
+#     - CVE-2017-17433
+#     - CVE-2017-17434-1
+#     - CVE-2017-17434-2
+
 build() {
 	cd "$builddir"
 	# Force IPv6 enabled, upstream bug https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10715
@@ -56,4 +68,8 @@ sha512sums="4c55fd69f436ead0cb5a0b7c6fdfef9bb28ddb9c63534eb619e756b118d5b08cfc5e
 638d87c9a753b35044f6321ccd09d2c0addaab3c52c40863eb6905905576b5268bec67b496df81225528c9e39fbd92e9225d7b3037ab1fda78508d452c78158f  rsyncd.initd
 c7527e289c81bee5e4c14b890817cdb47d14f0d26dd8dcdcbe85c7199cf27c57a0b679bdd1b115bfe00de77b52709cc5d97522a47f63c1bb5104f4a7220c9961  rsyncd.confd
 3db8a2b364fc89132af6143af90513deb6be3a78c8180d47c969e33cb5edde9db88aad27758a6911f93781e3c9846aeadc80fffc761c355d6a28358853156b62  rsyncd.conf
-b8d6c0bb467a5c963317dc55478d2c10874564cd264d943d4a42037e2fce134fe001fabc92af5c6b5775e84dc310b1c8da147afaa61c99e5663c36580d8651a5  rsyncd.logrotate"
+b8d6c0bb467a5c963317dc55478d2c10874564cd264d943d4a42037e2fce134fe001fabc92af5c6b5775e84dc310b1c8da147afaa61c99e5663c36580d8651a5  rsyncd.logrotate
+a2f571bfdb5e37021ff8fee8bc80d624ccd83020e3fd5cf4119d477bb0fcdc57dab7d0f433a95136a1e259ba136e05f28d1a052ae2237805ddc611329ecb5679  CVE-2017-16548.patch
+3cfc9ea4abdf288e2f524570f9f115a34f089a44eec5a73a3d5da34d64a8843d729c5cbcaecfcadb5f309ee98c11583a7d607d3eb55011cf77f9df49886f6eff  CVE-2017-17433.patch
+f678175eb524505823e8ae7760c2a8e5189d2e09c03244ca88e6e2294707a76d430f52096fb1e498a13ddb8943a80ed588df66d682233c0e5243b52f57a1b5f5  CVE-2017-17434-1.patch
+065f79b8b9c0ae827b0ba9abddc37af75f7e8759b4f51551182e21e07ea030e6704233540515e0745b54117899b8fc259f40b30b04a558b54306aa2e2a37e36a  CVE-2017-17434-2.patch"
diff --git a/main/rsync/CVE-2017-16548.patch b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-16548.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de6feba88e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-16548.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 47a63d90e71d3e19e0e96052bb8c6b9cb140ecc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <wayned@samba.org>
+Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 11:33:15 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Enforce trailing \0 when receiving xattr name values. Fixes
+ bug 13112.
+
+---
+ xattrs.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
+index 68305d7..4867e6f 100644
+--- a/xattrs.c
++++ b/xattrs.c
+@@ -824,6 +824,10 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
+ 			out_of_memory("receive_xattr");
+ 		name = ptr + dget_len + extra_len;
+ 		read_buf(f, name, name_len);
++		if (name_len < 1 || name[name_len-1] != '\0') {
++			rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid xattr name received (missing trailing \\0).\n");
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
++		}
+ 		if (dget_len == datum_len)
+ 			read_buf(f, ptr, dget_len);
+ 		else {
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17433.patch b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17433.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecfad8c79f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17433.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 3e06d40029cfdce9d0f73d87cfd4edaf54be9c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
+Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 23:44:19 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Check fname in recv_files sooner.
+
+---
+ receiver.c | 12 ++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index baae3a9..9fdafa1 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -574,6 +574,12 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
+ 		fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
+ 
++		if (daemon_filter_list.head
++		    && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
++			rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
++
+ 		if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
+ 			rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
+ 
+@@ -645,12 +651,6 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ 
+ 		cleanup_got_literal = 0;
+ 
+-		if (daemon_filter_list.head
+-		    && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
+-			rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
+-			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+-		}
+-
+ 		if (read_batch) {
+ 			int wanted = redoing
+ 				   ? we_want_redo(ndx)
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-1.patch b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..466ea16d3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 5509597decdbd7b91994210f700329d8a35e70a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
+Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 17:26:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Check daemon filter against fnamecmp in recv_files().
+
+---
+ receiver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 9fdafa1..9c46242 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
+-			  && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0)) {
++			  && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fnamecmp, 0) < 0)) {
+ 				fnamecmp = fname;
+ 				fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
+ 			}
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-2.patch b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a372d2a615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/rsync/CVE-2017-17434-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 70aeb5fddd1b2f8e143276f8d5a085db16c593b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
+Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 17:05:42 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Sanitize xname in read_ndx_and_attrs.
+
+---
+ rsync.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c
+index b82e598..a0945ba 100644
+--- a/rsync.c
++++ b/rsync.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ extern int flist_eof;
+ extern int file_old_total;
+ extern int keep_dirlinks;
+ extern int make_backups;
++extern int sanitize_paths;
+ extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
+ extern struct chmod_mode_struct *daemon_chmod_modes;
+ #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
+@@ -396,6 +397,11 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_out, int *iflag_ptr, uchar *type_ptr,
+ 	if (iflags & ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS) {
+ 		if ((len = read_vstring(f_in, buf, MAXPATHLEN)) < 0)
+ 			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++
++		if (sanitize_paths) {
++			sanitize_path(buf, buf, "", 0, SP_DEFAULT);
++			len = strlen(buf);
++		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		*buf = '\0';
+ 		len = -1;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+