diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | main/samba/APKBUILD | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/samba/CVE-2018-1050.patch | 55 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/samba/samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch | 903 |
3 files changed, 970 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/main/samba/APKBUILD b/main/samba/APKBUILD index 66e434ee8d..5a4544529f 100644 --- a/main/samba/APKBUILD +++ b/main/samba/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=samba pkgver=4.4.16 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="Tools to access a server's filespace and printers via SMB" url="http://www.samba.org" arch="all" @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ source="http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/stable/samba-$pkgver.tar.gz getpwent_r.patch netdb-defines.patch samba-4.5.14-security-2017-11-21.patch + samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch + CVE-2018-1050.patch samba.initd samba.confd @@ -58,6 +60,9 @@ source="http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/stable/samba-$pkgver.tar.gz pkggroups="winbind" # secfixes: +# 4.4.16-r2: +# - CVE-2018-1050 +# - CVE-2018-1057 # 4.4.16-r1: # - CVE-2017-14746 # - CVE-2017-15275 @@ -534,6 +539,8 @@ f0d10a87a2067d0d3accdcb6c9b64ea9 domain.patch 6a220b2471764e6e189829ac9cc81996 getpwent_r.patch 39b8cfa9abe6584d13a13ea63459a2e7 netdb-defines.patch 9d6e5758b443b97b53ef756ca8af43d2 samba-4.5.14-security-2017-11-21.patch +2185126fbe99c8b339c309f1e97d2577 samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch +db3d1e25388a775a819a01ddb121e4d1 CVE-2018-1050.patch c1702b2ad7b68f7d704f50a1bfef3ad3 samba.initd c150433426e18261e6e3eed3930e1a76 samba.confd b7cafabfb4fa5b3ab5f2e857d8d1c733 samba.logrotate" @@ -543,6 +550,8 @@ dcf6a7118297d6567d8ff31c9eff1afffdf2f548db36fd17d00cdf0ffc555fe3 uclibc-xattr-c 7956274b412a268339abb63f8e1bd63b5049cd4ab7c6270235d9d0b9bcf6c81a getpwent_r.patch d4a17891a14d9a4290750097cc28279059e6d971fadf132085e857ed4400d5ed netdb-defines.patch 111d933fbf0fa3954b52b8f3e5f9fef46d2ac62739bc63445ce5648ecefddcc8 samba-4.5.14-security-2017-11-21.patch +67183717ad68d776db7ee059903052f06988c0301e424b89ee54714e961a677b samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch +81e2462191ba4858044b818d6f4439cf5054936eb7afb147d8cee9146ff79ebd CVE-2018-1050.patch 3866a15ab73a9fd704ec8315cff48caf98937c490ba8dc40ce3701cef5ca22c9 samba.initd 1d12f98a7727967b04eb123109b34cfffef320822dc0e8059286b6e3394c3fc0 samba.confd 4c2b7d529126b2fc4f62fb09d99e49a87632d723a2d9d289a61e37dd84145be1 samba.logrotate" @@ -552,6 +561,8 @@ b43809d7ecbf3968f5154c2ded6ed47dae36921f1895ea98bcce50557eb2ad39b736345ffb421465 0d4fd9862191554dc9c724cec0b94fd19afbfd0c4ed619e4c620c075e849cb3f3d44db1e5f119d890da23a3dd0068d9873703f3d86c47b91310521f37356208b getpwent_r.patch 1854577d0e4457e27da367a6c7ec0fb5cfd63cefea0a39181c9d6e78cf8d3eb50878cdddeea3daeec955d00263151c2f86ea754ff4276ef98bc52c0276d9ffe8 netdb-defines.patch 2a900c2519bae2d9bb0ddbc2fc89e25a5080ac6704fec60a64f4466d5cbb28add043ba28bc3475dbaec90dc387ee7e50000ddfc4f8596eb2103be458d47b9a85 samba-4.5.14-security-2017-11-21.patch +1a227f2c7420e6dd67e82ee32361d24921053790b923bb9ca7e1639533fb3c3cfbfa2aad9ef99cfce6f8aeee6fed592e058ef664531ed804d4b59fddc6ab4dd4 samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch +3defbbd40efe5749464aaf7e833b89537136db9a6ab747fab81ea38b7bf2d5d47019ca6bb5158459ebda208acf97e1474aedb5fab825aa23020c9c2f89ac6243 CVE-2018-1050.patch 6bee83aab500f27248b315d8a5f567940d7232269b021d801b3d51c20ed9e4aad513ee0117f356fb388014a63a145beacb55307ef9addbf7997987304b548fcf samba.initd 4faf581ecef3ec38319e3c4ab6d3995c51fd7ba83180dc5553a2ff4dfb92efadb43030c543292130c4ed0c281dc0972c6973d52d48062c5edb39bb1c4bbb6dd6 samba.confd f88ebe59ca3a9e9b77dd5993c13ef3e73a838efb8ed858088b464a330132d662f33e25c27819e38835389dee23057a3951de11bae1eef55db8ff5e1ec6760053 samba.logrotate" diff --git a/main/samba/CVE-2018-1050.patch b/main/samba/CVE-2018-1050.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1669f12e52 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/samba/CVE-2018-1050.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From dff5d43907fd9825f0ba03dab9aa63c31f5a014c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 15:56:03 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 01/14] CVE-2018-1050: s3: RPC: spoolss server. Protect against + null pointer derefs. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11343 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +--- + source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c +index a3c3861202d..fb56e2bf9a6 100644 +--- a/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c +@@ -178,6 +178,11 @@ static void prune_printername_cache(void); + static const char *canon_servername(const char *servername) + { + const char *pservername = servername; ++ ++ if (servername == NULL) { ++ return ""; ++ } ++ + while (*pservername == '\\') { + pservername++; + } +@@ -2073,6 +2078,10 @@ WERROR _spoolss_DeletePrinterDriver(struct pipes_struct *p, + return WERR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + ++ if (r->in.architecture == NULL || r->in.driver == NULL) { ++ return WERR_INVALID_ENVIRONMENT; ++ } ++ + /* check that we have a valid driver name first */ + + if ((version = get_version_id(r->in.architecture)) == -1) { +@@ -2212,6 +2221,10 @@ WERROR _spoolss_DeletePrinterDriverEx(struct pipes_struct *p, + return WERR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + ++ if (r->in.architecture == NULL || r->in.driver == NULL) { ++ return WERR_INVALID_ENVIRONMENT; ++ } ++ + /* check that we have a valid driver name first */ + if (get_version_id(r->in.architecture) == -1) { + /* this is what NT returns */ +-- +2.11.0 + + diff --git a/main/samba/samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch b/main/samba/samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d4c0c0e0e --- /dev/null +++ b/main/samba/samba-4.4.16-CVE-2018-1057.patch @@ -0,0 +1,903 @@ +From 6ff2935f6a1bb2bdfb45beea07d4cb7c69c66a74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 12:43:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 01/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/tests: add a test for password + change with empty delete + +Note that the request using the clearTextPassword attribute for the +password change is already correctly rejected by the server. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python | 2 + + source4/dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..343c5a7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++samba4.ldap.passwords.python.*.__main__.PasswordTests.test_pw_change_delete_no_value_userPassword ++samba4.ldap.passwords.python.*.__main__.PasswordTests.test_pw_change_delete_no_value_unicodePwd +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py +index fb3eee5..c50f2b6 100755 +--- a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py ++++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py +@@ -931,6 +931,55 @@ userPassword: thatsAcomplPASS4 + # Reset the "minPwdLength" as it was before + self.ldb.set_minPwdLength(minPwdLength) + ++ def test_pw_change_delete_no_value_userPassword(self): ++ """Test password change with userPassword where the delete attribute doesn't have a value""" ++ ++ try: ++ self.ldb2.modify_ldif(""" ++dn: cn=testuser,cn=users,""" + self.base_dn + """ ++changetype: modify ++delete: userPassword ++add: userPassword ++userPassword: thatsAcomplPASS1 ++""") ++ except LdbError, (num, msg): ++ self.assertEquals(num, ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) ++ else: ++ self.fail() ++ ++ def test_pw_change_delete_no_value_clearTextPassword(self): ++ """Test password change with clearTextPassword where the delete attribute doesn't have a value""" ++ ++ try: ++ self.ldb2.modify_ldif(""" ++dn: cn=testuser,cn=users,""" + self.base_dn + """ ++changetype: modify ++delete: clearTextPassword ++add: clearTextPassword ++clearTextPassword: thatsAcomplPASS2 ++""") ++ except LdbError, (num, msg): ++ self.assertTrue(num == ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION or ++ num == ERR_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE) # for Windows ++ else: ++ self.fail() ++ ++ def test_pw_change_delete_no_value_unicodePwd(self): ++ """Test password change with unicodePwd where the delete attribute doesn't have a value""" ++ ++ try: ++ self.ldb2.modify_ldif(""" ++dn: cn=testuser,cn=users,""" + self.base_dn + """ ++changetype: modify ++delete: unicodePwd ++add: unicodePwd ++unicodePwd:: """ + base64.b64encode("\"thatsAcomplPASS3\"".encode('utf-16-le')) + """ ++""") ++ except LdbError, (num, msg): ++ self.assertEquals(num, ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) ++ else: ++ self.fail() ++ + def tearDown(self): + super(PasswordTests, self).tearDown() + delete_force(self.ldb, "cn=testuser,cn=users," + self.base_dn) +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 35f8367aa64955d9f34beac9a62f8336e5e6c510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:56:06 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 02/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/password_hash: add a helper + variable for LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c | 14 +++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +index 05b0854..aa3871d 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +@@ -3152,17 +3152,20 @@ static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *r + } + + while ((passwordAttr = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, *l)) != NULL) { +- if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE) { ++ unsigned int mtype = LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags); ++ ++ if (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE) { + ++del_attr_cnt; + } +- if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD) { ++ if (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD) { + ++add_attr_cnt; + } +- if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE) { ++ if (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE) { + ++rep_attr_cnt; + } + if ((passwordAttr->num_values != 1) && +- (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)) { ++ (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)) ++ { + talloc_free(ac); + ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, + "'%s' attribute must have exactly one value on add operations!", +@@ -3170,7 +3173,8 @@ static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *r + return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + } + if ((passwordAttr->num_values > 1) && +- (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE)) { ++ (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE)) ++ { + talloc_free(ac); + ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, + "'%s' attribute must have zero or one value(s) on delete operations!", +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 63c91916d15f355e7179292fac998056c0bd6a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 14:40:59 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 03/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/password_hash: add a helper + variable for passwordAttr->num_values + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c | 9 +++------ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +index aa3871d..690bb98 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +@@ -3153,6 +3153,7 @@ static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *r + + while ((passwordAttr = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, *l)) != NULL) { + unsigned int mtype = LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(passwordAttr->flags); ++ unsigned int nvalues = passwordAttr->num_values; + + if (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE) { + ++del_attr_cnt; +@@ -3163,18 +3164,14 @@ static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *r + if (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE) { + ++rep_attr_cnt; + } +- if ((passwordAttr->num_values != 1) && +- (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)) +- { ++ if ((nvalues != 1) && (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)) { + talloc_free(ac); + ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, + "'%s' attribute must have exactly one value on add operations!", + *l); + return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + } +- if ((passwordAttr->num_values > 1) && +- (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE)) +- { ++ if ((nvalues > 1) && (mtype == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE)) { + talloc_free(ac); + ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, + "'%s' attribute must have zero or one value(s) on delete operations!", +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 895b1d2c9cbbde96646146a3c7b93bd326aada55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:38:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 04/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: only call dsdb_acl_debug() + if we checked the acl in acl_check_password_rights() + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 62e560f..aa1660c 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -989,12 +989,14 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, + sid); ++ goto checked; + } + else if (rep_attr_cnt > 0 || (add_attr_cnt != del_attr_cnt)) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, + sid); ++ goto checked; + } + else if (add_attr_cnt == 1 && del_attr_cnt == 1) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), +@@ -1005,7 +1007,13 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + if (ret == LDB_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS) { + ret = LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + } ++ goto checked; + } ++ ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); ++ return LDB_SUCCESS; ++ ++checked: + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + dsdb_acl_debug(sd, acl_user_token(module), + req->op.mod.message->dn, +-- +1.9.1 + + +From db056b588d40c4c6995ee882286042dbf383f502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:38:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 05/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: remove unused else branches + in acl_check_password_rights() + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index aa1660c..5ec5fd3 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -991,14 +991,24 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + sid); + goto checked; + } +- else if (rep_attr_cnt > 0 || (add_attr_cnt != del_attr_cnt)) { ++ ++ if (rep_attr_cnt > 0) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, + sid); + goto checked; + } +- else if (add_attr_cnt == 1 && del_attr_cnt == 1) { ++ ++ if (add_attr_cnt != del_attr_cnt) { ++ ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), ++ GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, ++ SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, ++ sid); ++ goto checked; ++ } ++ ++ if (add_attr_cnt == 1 && del_attr_cnt == 1) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +-- +1.9.1 + + +From ff82d4c547476751f4506092517952ac682ec38c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 22:59:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 06/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: check for internal controls + before other checks + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 5ec5fd3..56ba988 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -943,10 +943,33 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + unsigned int del_attr_cnt = 0, add_attr_cnt = 0, rep_attr_cnt = 0; + struct ldb_message_element *el; + struct ldb_message *msg; ++ struct ldb_control *c = NULL; + const char *passwordAttrs[] = { "userPassword", "clearTextPassword", + "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL }, **l; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + ++ c = ldb_request_get_control(req, DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID); ++ if (c != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * The "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID" control means that we ++ * have a user password change and not a set as the message ++ * looks like. In it's value blob it contains the NT and/or LM ++ * hash of the old password specified by the user. This control ++ * is used by the SAMR and "kpasswd" password change mechanisms. ++ * ++ * This control can't be used by real LDAP clients, ++ * the only caller is samdb_set_password_internal(), ++ * so we don't have to strict verification of the input. ++ */ ++ ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, ++ sd, ++ acl_user_token(module), ++ GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, ++ SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, ++ sid); ++ goto checked; ++ } ++ + msg = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(tmp_ctx, req->op.mod.message); + if (msg == NULL) { + return ldb_module_oom(module); +@@ -977,20 +1000,6 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + return LDB_SUCCESS; + } + +- if (ldb_request_get_control(req, +- DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID) != NULL) { +- /* The "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID" control means that we +- * have a user password change and not a set as the message +- * looks like. In it's value blob it contains the NT and/or LM +- * hash of the old password specified by the user. +- * This control is used by the SAMR and "kpasswd" password +- * change mechanisms. */ +- ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), +- GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, +- SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +- sid); +- goto checked; +- } + + if (rep_attr_cnt > 0) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 5c92da9918e2ccbcb39db2b060406f05973c0a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:43:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: add check for + DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID control + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 56ba988..00d52fe 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -970,6 +970,26 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + goto checked; + } + ++ c = ldb_request_get_control(req, DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID); ++ if (c != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * The "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID" control, without ++ * "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID" control means that we ++ * have a force password set. ++ * This control is used by the SAMR/NETLOGON/LSA password ++ * reset mechanisms. ++ * ++ * This control can't be used by real LDAP clients, ++ * the only caller is samdb_set_password_internal(), ++ * so we don't have to strict verification of the input. ++ */ ++ ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), ++ GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, ++ SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, ++ sid); ++ goto checked; ++ } ++ + msg = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(tmp_ctx, req->op.mod.message); + if (msg == NULL) { + return ldb_module_oom(module); +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 6417b18bc767d471e3c88935073acdc19448dc54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 15:17:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: add a NULL check for + talloc_new() in acl_check_password_rights() + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 00d52fe..4146cbc 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -948,6 +948,10 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL }, **l; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + ++ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { ++ return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ + c = ldb_request_get_control(req, DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID); + if (c != NULL) { + /* +-- +1.9.1 + + +From bf6c7e1b4510242750de64b0a7a112c2024b4372 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 10:54:37 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 09/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4/dsdb: correctly detect password + resets + +This change ensures we correctly treat the following LDIF + + dn: cn=testuser,cn=users,... + changetype: modify + delete: userPassword + add: userPassword + userPassword: thatsAcomplPASS1 + +as a password reset. Because delete and add element counts are both +one, the ACL module wrongly treated this as a password change +request. + +For a password change we need at least one value to delete and one value +to add. This patch ensures we correctly check attributes and their +values. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python | 2 -- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python +deleted file mode 100644 +index 343c5a7..0000000 +--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba4.ldap.passwords.python ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ +-samba4.ldap.passwords.python.*.__main__.PasswordTests.test_pw_change_delete_no_value_userPassword +-samba4.ldap.passwords.python.*.__main__.PasswordTests.test_pw_change_delete_no_value_unicodePwd +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 4146cbc..7a003df 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -941,6 +941,7 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + { + int ret = LDB_SUCCESS; + unsigned int del_attr_cnt = 0, add_attr_cnt = 0, rep_attr_cnt = 0; ++ unsigned int del_val_cnt = 0, add_val_cnt = 0, rep_val_cnt = 0; + struct ldb_message_element *el; + struct ldb_message *msg; + struct ldb_control *c = NULL; +@@ -1006,12 +1007,15 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + while ((el = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, *l)) != NULL) { + if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(el->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE) { + ++del_attr_cnt; ++ del_val_cnt += el->num_values; + } + if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(el->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD) { + ++add_attr_cnt; ++ add_val_cnt += el->num_values; + } + if (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(el->flags) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE) { + ++rep_attr_cnt; ++ rep_val_cnt += el->num_values; + } + ldb_msg_remove_element(msg, el); + } +@@ -1041,7 +1045,7 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + goto checked; + } + +- if (add_attr_cnt == 1 && del_attr_cnt == 1) { ++ if (add_val_cnt == 1 && del_val_cnt == 1) { + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +@@ -1053,6 +1057,18 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + goto checked; + } + ++ if (add_val_cnt == 1 && del_val_cnt == 0) { ++ ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), ++ GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, ++ SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, ++ sid); ++ /* Very strange, but we get constraint violation in this case */ ++ if (ret == LDB_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS) { ++ ret = LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; ++ } ++ goto checked; ++ } ++ + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return LDB_SUCCESS; + +-- +1.9.1 + + +From fba762e9d7599e4e2f5022a1486f3ab777d18e6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 19:15:49 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 10/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: run password checking only + once + +This is needed, because a later commit will let the acl module add a +control to the change request msg and we must ensure that this is only +done once. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 7a003df..c239c01 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@ static int acl_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) + struct ldb_control *as_system; + struct ldb_control *is_undelete; + bool userPassword; ++ bool password_rights_checked = false; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; + const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.mod.message; + static const char *acl_attrs[] = { +@@ -1242,6 +1243,9 @@ static int acl_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) + } else if (ldb_attr_cmp("unicodePwd", el->name) == 0 || + (userPassword && ldb_attr_cmp("userPassword", el->name) == 0) || + ldb_attr_cmp("clearTextPassword", el->name) == 0) { ++ if (password_rights_checked) { ++ continue; ++ } + ret = acl_check_password_rights(tmp_ctx, + module, + req, +@@ -1252,6 +1256,7 @@ static int acl_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + goto fail; + } ++ password_rights_checked = true; + } else if (ldb_attr_cmp("servicePrincipalName", el->name) == 0) { + ret = acl_check_spn(tmp_ctx, + module, +-- +1.9.1 + + +From bc733fce398658e2c280dae4ba5041113e7cd500 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 15:30:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 11/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/samdb: define + DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID control + +Will be used to pass "user password change" vs "password reset" from the +ACL to the password_hash module, ensuring both modules treat the request +identical. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h | 9 +++++++++ + source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_controls.c | 1 + + source4/setup/schema_samba4.ldif | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h b/source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h +index 0a1d90d..98faa4f 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h +@@ -158,6 +158,15 @@ struct dsdb_control_password_change { + */ + #define DSDB_CONTROL_CHANGEREPLMETADATA_RESORT_OID "1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.25" + ++/* ++ * Used to pass "user password change" vs "password reset" from the ACL to the ++ * password_hash module, ensuring both modules treat the request identical. ++ */ ++#define DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID "1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.33" ++struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation { ++ bool pwd_reset; ++}; ++ + #define DSDB_EXTENDED_REPLICATED_OBJECTS_OID "1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.4.1" + struct dsdb_extended_replicated_object { + struct ldb_message *msg; +diff --git a/source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_controls.c b/source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_controls.c +index 14a80af..7837e05 100644 +--- a/source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_controls.c ++++ b/source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_controls.c +@@ -1281,6 +1281,7 @@ static const struct ldap_control_handler ldap_known_controls[] = { + { DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_STATUS_OID, NULL, NULL }, + { DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID, NULL, NULL }, + { DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID, NULL, NULL }, ++ { DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID, NULL, NULL }, + { DSDB_CONTROL_APPLY_LINKS, NULL, NULL }, + { LDB_CONTROL_BYPASS_OPERATIONAL_OID, NULL, NULL }, + { DSDB_CONTROL_CHANGEREPLMETADATA_OID, NULL, NULL }, +diff --git a/source4/setup/schema_samba4.ldif b/source4/setup/schema_samba4.ldif +index 69aa363..6e184bc 100644 +--- a/source4/setup/schema_samba4.ldif ++++ b/source4/setup/schema_samba4.ldif +@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ + #Allocated: DSDB_CONTROL_PERMIT_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_UAC_OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.23 + #Allocated: DSDB_CONTROL_RESTORE_TOMBSTONE_OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.24 + #Allocated: DSDB_CONTROL_CHANGEREPLMETADATA_RESORT_OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.25 ++#Allocated: DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.3.33 ++ + + # Extended 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.4.x + #Allocated: DSDB_EXTENDED_REPLICATED_OBJECTS_OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.7165.4.4.1 +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 7fc6a5ef5b1bad171dd6d2c019a4fe4c0ec00eb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 15:38:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 12/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb: use + DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID + +This is used to pass information about which password change operation (change +or reset) the acl module validated, down to the password_hash module. + +It's very important that both modules treat the request identical. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index c239c01..17e1e67 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -948,13 +948,22 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *passwordAttrs[] = { "userPassword", "clearTextPassword", + "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL }, **l; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); ++ struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation *pav = NULL; + + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; + } + ++ pav = talloc_zero(req, struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation); ++ if (pav == NULL) { ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); ++ return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ + c = ldb_request_get_control(req, DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID); + if (c != NULL) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = false; ++ + /* + * The "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID" control means that we + * have a user password change and not a set as the message +@@ -977,6 +986,8 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + + c = ldb_request_get_control(req, DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID); + if (c != NULL) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = true; ++ + /* + * The "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES_OID" control, without + * "DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_CHANGE_OID" control means that we +@@ -1030,6 +1041,8 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + + + if (rep_attr_cnt > 0) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = true; ++ + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +@@ -1038,6 +1051,8 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + } + + if (add_attr_cnt != del_attr_cnt) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = true; ++ + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +@@ -1046,6 +1061,8 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + } + + if (add_val_cnt == 1 && del_val_cnt == 1) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = false; ++ + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +@@ -1058,6 +1075,8 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + } + + if (add_val_cnt == 1 && del_val_cnt == 0) { ++ pav->pwd_reset = true; ++ + ret = acl_check_extended_right(tmp_ctx, sd, acl_user_token(module), + GUID_DRS_FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, + SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS, +@@ -1069,6 +1088,14 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + goto checked; + } + ++ /* ++ * Everything else is handled by the password_hash module where it will ++ * fail, but with the correct error code when the module is again ++ * checking the attributes. As the change request will lack the ++ * DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID control, we can be sure that ++ * any modification attempt that went this way will be rejected. ++ */ ++ + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return LDB_SUCCESS; + +@@ -1078,11 +1105,19 @@ checked: + req->op.mod.message->dn, + true, + 10); ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); ++ return ret; + } +- talloc_free(tmp_ctx); +- return ret; +-} + ++ ret = ldb_request_add_control(req, ++ DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID, false, pav); ++ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { ++ ldb_debug(ldb_module_get_ctx(module), LDB_DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "Unable to register ACL validation control!\n"); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ return LDB_SUCCESS; ++} + + static int acl_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) + { +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +index 690bb98..de565bc 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/password_hash.c +@@ -2572,7 +2572,35 @@ static int setup_io(struct ph_context *ac, + /* On "add" we have only "password reset" */ + ac->pwd_reset = true; + } else if (ac->req->operation == LDB_MODIFY) { +- if (io->og.cleartext_utf8 || io->og.cleartext_utf16 ++ struct ldb_control *pav_ctrl = NULL; ++ struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation *pav = NULL; ++ ++ pav_ctrl = ldb_request_get_control(ac->req, ++ DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID); ++ if (pav_ctrl != NULL) { ++ pav = talloc_get_type_abort(pav_ctrl->data, ++ struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation); ++ } ++ ++ if (pav == NULL) { ++ bool ok; ++ ++ /* ++ * If the DSDB_CONTROL_PASSWORD_ACL_VALIDATION_OID ++ * control is missing, we require system access! ++ */ ++ ok = dsdb_module_am_system(ac->module); ++ if (!ok) { ++ return ldb_module_operr(ac->module); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (pav != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * We assume what the acl module has validated. ++ */ ++ ac->pwd_reset = pav->pwd_reset; ++ } else if (io->og.cleartext_utf8 || io->og.cleartext_utf16 + || io->og.nt_hash || io->og.lm_hash) { + /* If we have an old password specified then for sure it + * is a user "password change" */ +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 0815e8653277383918530f8dd8afaeadfe8085d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:11:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 13/13] CVE-2018-1057: s4:dsdb/acl: changing dBCSPwd is only + allowed with a control + +This is not strictly needed to fig bug 13272, but it makes sense to also +fix this while fixing the overall ACL checking logic. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13272 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +index 17e1e67..8d9b780 100644 +--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c ++++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c +@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_message *msg; + struct ldb_control *c = NULL; + const char *passwordAttrs[] = { "userPassword", "clearTextPassword", +- "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL }, **l; ++ "unicodePwd", NULL }, **l; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + struct dsdb_control_password_acl_validation *pav = NULL; + +@@ -1006,6 +1006,15 @@ static int acl_check_password_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + goto checked; + } + ++ el = ldb_msg_find_element(req->op.mod.message, "dBCSPwd"); ++ if (el != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * dBCSPwd is only allowed with a control. ++ */ ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); ++ return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM; ++ } ++ + msg = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(tmp_ctx, req->op.mod.message); + if (msg == NULL) { + return ldb_module_oom(module); +-- +1.9.1 + |