diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssh/APKBUILD | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssh/openssh-curve25519pad.patch | 169 |
2 files changed, 177 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssh/APKBUILD b/main/openssh/APKBUILD index 0a9a9ba3ea..710423374d 100644 --- a/main/openssh/APKBUILD +++ b/main/openssh/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ pkgname=openssh pkgver=6.6_p1 _myver=${pkgver%_*}${pkgver#*_} -pkgrel=4 +pkgrel=5 pkgdesc="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release" url="http://www.openssh.org/portable.html" arch="all" @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ source="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/$pkgname-$_myver.tar. sshd.initd sshd.confd CVE-2014-2653.patch + openssh-curve25519pad.patch " # HPN patches are from: http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh @@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ cd52fe99cb4b7d0d847bf5d710d93564 openssh6.5-peaktput.diff f7d9d6f96940ef66bd3c3a0aa27e57a7 openssh-fix-utmp.diff bcf990d4ef7ff446160cde7dbd32bf1f sshd.initd b35e9f3829f4cfca07168fcba98749c7 sshd.confd -02a7de5652d9769576e3b252d768cd0f CVE-2014-2653.patch" +02a7de5652d9769576e3b252d768cd0f CVE-2014-2653.patch +da797337121f07bc3fac8a21afac20f8 openssh-curve25519pad.patch" sha256sums="48c1f0664b4534875038004cc4f3555b8329c2a81c1df48db5c517800de203bb openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz 83f2b2c07988c6321875240c02a161a83ec84661d592cbd2188ea8c962f9b1ad openssh6.6-dynwindows.diff bf49212e47a86d10650f739532cea514a310925e6445b4f8011031b6b55f3249 openssh6.5-peaktput.diff @@ -123,7 +125,8 @@ c3189ba0e17e60e83851ac2d6f18ad5b08cb90cccfce31d61cccb9fd76d44d59 openssh-fix-in f2748da45d0bc31055727f8c80d93e1872cc043ced3202e2f6d150aca3c08dde openssh-fix-utmp.diff 2a9889ab224be7202ece80a7085aa3e85bbba9432467031b436dcd77cb92a2ac sshd.initd 29c6d57ac3ec6018cadc6ba6cd9b90c9ed46e20049b970fdcc68ee2481a2ee41 sshd.confd -03826427d72f86c68f079acab6c9c86e8f27f7514b66428f404c2f235fd0c0bd CVE-2014-2653.patch" +03826427d72f86c68f079acab6c9c86e8f27f7514b66428f404c2f235fd0c0bd CVE-2014-2653.patch +8b0caf249298eec28aad3cb77256d31a90652c77bdc1a54a00f04e8c1446d5c4 openssh-curve25519pad.patch" sha512sums="3d3566ed87649882702cad52db1adefebfb3ef788c9f77a493f99db7e9ca2e8edcde793dd426df7df0aed72a42a31c20a63ef51506111369d3a7c49e0bf6c82b openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz 3aab8b8e1f86ce04ebc69bbdbf3c70cefd510d7b4080b99067ec49957b5e421b49e3b8a0a62103d17cf644cd7c0b30e9283a62a24988b1bbb0fbdabbdc1202fd openssh6.6-dynwindows.diff e041398e177674f698480e23be037160bd07b751c754956a3ddf1b964da24c85e826fb75e7c23c9826d36761da73d08db9583c047d58a08dc7b2149a949075b1 openssh6.5-peaktput.diff @@ -131,4 +134,5 @@ e041398e177674f698480e23be037160bd07b751c754956a3ddf1b964da24c85e826fb75e7c23c98 cc909f68d9da1b264926973b96d36162b5c588299c98d62f526faf2ef1273d98bb8d8dea4d482770a2aef88bcbf15fa61144401aef9ab916c15e1623bcf449b5 openssh-fix-utmp.diff eeafefcb8a3357b498591480b39dc0116ab3440c88faeaeaddeac0b860f9e268abe6f603bc27893b79945acde06a45a7616d1bdc6ca27201cd8dc522f49b207e sshd.initd b9ae816af54a55e134a9307e376f05367b815f1b3fd545c2a2c312d18aedcf907f413e8bad8db980cdd9aad4011a72a79e1e94594f69500939a9cb46287f2f81 sshd.confd -be48059ae1715669f970a19acde14f262588172c5a8d8d1c84159bc69a60c5750b21c98f39f65df72ae071f7f918046000a2499b9ef16ba2cb4bcd8399bc8e40 CVE-2014-2653.patch" +be48059ae1715669f970a19acde14f262588172c5a8d8d1c84159bc69a60c5750b21c98f39f65df72ae071f7f918046000a2499b9ef16ba2cb4bcd8399bc8e40 CVE-2014-2653.patch +5c946726e9fb472412972ca73c6e4565598b7729558843be2391e04d8935f0e35a992b4fa9f89c8a98917665c12219ea5ad58359269cbe2cf90907f7d1e2cec8 openssh-curve25519pad.patch" diff --git a/main/openssh/openssh-curve25519pad.patch b/main/openssh/openssh-curve25519pad.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c4ff72dcd --- /dev/null +++ b/main/openssh/openssh-curve25519pad.patch @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032494.html + +Hi, + +So I screwed up when writing the support for the curve25519 KEX method +that doesn't depend on OpenSSL's BIGNUM type - a bug in my code left +leading zero bytes where they should have been skipped. The impact of +this is that OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 will fail during key exchange with a +peer that implements curve25519-sha256@libssh.org properly about 0.2% +of the time (one in every 512ish connections). + +We've fixed this for OpenSSH 6.7 by avoiding the curve25519-sha256 +key exchange for previous versions, but I'd recommend distributors +of OpenSSH apply this patch so the affected code doesn't become +too entrenched in LTS releases. + +The patch fixes the bug and makes OpenSSH identify itself as 6.6.1 so as +to distinguish itself from the incorrect versions so the compatibility +code to disable the affected KEX isn't activated. + +I've committed this on the 6.6 branch too. + +Apologies for the hassle. + +-d + +Index: version.h +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/version.h,v +retrieving revision 1.82 +diff -u -p -r1.82 version.h +--- a/version.h 27 Feb 2014 23:01:54 -0000 1.82 ++++ b/version.h 20 Apr 2014 03:35:15 -0000 +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */ + +-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6" ++#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1" + + #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" + #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +Index: compat.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/compat.c,v +retrieving revision 1.82 +retrieving revision 1.85 +diff -u -p -r1.82 -r1.85 +--- a/compat.c 31 Dec 2013 01:25:41 -0000 1.82 ++++ b/compat.c 20 Apr 2014 03:33:59 -0000 1.85 +@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) + { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF}, + { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 }, + { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT}, ++ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH}, ++ { "OpenSSH_6.5*," ++ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD}, + { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, + { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, + { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| +@@ -251,7 +254,6 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop + return cipher_prop; + } + +- + char * + compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) + { +@@ -263,5 +265,18 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) + if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') + fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); + return pkalg_prop; ++} ++ ++char * ++compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop) ++{ ++ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD)) ++ return kex_prop; ++ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); ++ kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); ++ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); ++ if (*kex_prop == '\0') ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); ++ return kex_prop; + } + +Index: compat.h +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/compat.h,v +retrieving revision 1.42 +retrieving revision 1.43 +diff -u -p -r1.42 -r1.43 +--- a/compat.h 31 Dec 2013 01:25:41 -0000 1.42 ++++ b/compat.h 20 Apr 2014 03:25:31 -0000 1.43 +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ + #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 + #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 + #define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x10000000 ++#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x20000000 + + void enable_compat13(void); + void enable_compat20(void); +@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ void compat_datafellows(const char * + int proto_spec(const char *); + char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); + char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); ++char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); + + extern int compat13; + extern int compat20; +Index: sshd.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/sshd.c,v +retrieving revision 1.448 +retrieving revision 1.453 +diff -u -p -r1.448 -r1.453 +--- a/sshd.c 26 Feb 2014 23:20:08 -0000 1.448 ++++ b/sshd.c 20 Apr 2014 03:28:41 -0000 1.453 +@@ -2462,6 +2438,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; + ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, + (time_t)options.rekey_interval); +Index: sshconnect2.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/sshconnect2.c,v +retrieving revision 1.197 +retrieving revision 1.199 +diff -u -p -r1.197 -r1.199 +--- a/sshconnect2.c 4 Feb 2014 00:20:16 -0000 1.197 ++++ b/sshconnect2.c 20 Apr 2014 03:25:31 -0000 1.199 +@@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + } + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, +Index: bufaux.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/bufaux.c,v +retrieving revision 1.62 +retrieving revision 1.63 +diff -u -p -r1.62 -r1.63 +--- a/bufaux.c 4 Feb 2014 00:20:15 -0000 1.62 ++++ b/bufaux.c 20 Apr 2014 03:24:50 -0000 1.63 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -372,6 +372,9 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *b + + if (l > 8 * 1024) + fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l); ++ /* Skip leading zero bytes */ ++ for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++) ++ ; + p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1); + /* + * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to |