diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/APKBUILD | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | 66 |
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD index 55958c7678..d9cb9a4dd4 100644 --- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD +++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Maintainer: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi> pkgname=openssl -pkgver=1.1.1b +pkgver=1.1.1c _abiver=${pkgver%.*} -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" url="https://www.openssl.org" arch="all" @@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ makedepends_build="perl" makedepends_host="linux-headers" makedepends="$makedepends_host $makedepends_build" subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc libcrypto$_abiver:_libcrypto libssl$_abiver:_libssl" -source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz - CVE-2019-1543.patch" +source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz" case "$CARCH" in s390x) options="$options !check";; # FIXME: test hangs esac @@ -104,5 +103,4 @@ _libssl() { done } -sha512sums="b54025fbb4fe264466f3b0d762aad4be45bd23cd48bdb26d901d4c41a40bfd776177e02230995ab181a695435039dbad313f4b9a563239a70807a2e19ecf045d openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz -f11c7b8e938dca3528eee36ddb64421072e1fdd6d5dfc40452f36e2db954b3e9ae888416bb26dc73068a14c94404eb66352e37a988f04ecc08600554eab16c99 CVE-2019-1543.patch" +sha512sums="8e2c5cc11c120efbb7d7850980cb6eaa782d29b4996b3f3378d37613c1679f852d7cc08a90d62e78fcec3439f06bdbee70064579a8c2adaffd91532a97f646ff openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz" diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4d478c484c..0000000000 --- a/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 - -ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for -every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) -should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and -front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it -also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case -only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are -ignored. - -It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. -Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious -confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the -default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to -the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique -nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a -reused nonce. - -Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the -integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the -integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further -affected. - -Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe -because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user -applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce -length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. - -CVE-2019-1543 - -Fixes #8345 - -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> -Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) - -(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) ---- - crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c -index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 ---- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c -+++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c -@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { - - #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) - -+#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 -+ - static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], - const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) -@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: -- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) -+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) - return 0; - actx->nonce_len = arg; - return 1; |