diff options
-rw-r--r-- | main/lighttpd/APKBUILD | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508.patch | 354 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508b.patch | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4559.patch | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4560.patch | 12 |
5 files changed, 436 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/main/lighttpd/APKBUILD b/main/lighttpd/APKBUILD index 09a4c2892a..297becee88 100644 --- a/main/lighttpd/APKBUILD +++ b/main/lighttpd/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ pkgname=lighttpd pkgver=1.4.33 _streamver=2.2.0 -pkgrel=2 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="a secure, fast, compliant and very flexible web-server" url="http://www.lighttpd.net/" arch="all" @@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ makedepends="flex pcre-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev bzip2-dev lua-dev pkgconfig automake autoconf openldap-dev libxml2-dev sqlite-dev libev-dev" source="http://download.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/releases-1.4.x/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 http://h264.code-shop.com/download/lighttpd-1.4.18_mod_h264_streaming-$_streamver.tar.gz + CVE-2013-4508.patch + CVE-2013-4508b.patch + CVE-2013-4559.patch + CVE-2013-4560.patch + $pkgname.initd $pkgname.confd $pkgname.logrotate @@ -141,6 +146,10 @@ mod_webdav() { md5sums="e66b8164e5fc5a6beec0823b697fbe1d lighttpd-1.4.33.tar.bz2 ac37885c881a058194405232e7737a7a lighttpd-1.4.18_mod_h264_streaming-2.2.0.tar.gz +a511605bb658386a09892c578dfc1edb CVE-2013-4508.patch +89dba7992857f6173b64305142c0a79d CVE-2013-4508b.patch +a17ed4614cdd6273d6cde40d48dbbf0e CVE-2013-4559.patch +f903d74285300a4323aafb9cd6e59aa0 CVE-2013-4560.patch aa1f130f66607615143b2b497c55b177 lighttpd.initd 0dede109282bfe685bdec6b35f0e4b6b lighttpd.confd ad091c9157134890499f26d170352c9f lighttpd.logrotate @@ -153,6 +162,10 @@ f3363e39832f1b6678468b482d121afb mod_fastcgi.conf aee5947a1abf380b0685a534ca384b42 mod_fastcgi_fpm.conf" sha256sums="2ff2324658c0f90e7d39afd40f08f11ca230903b9019c31a2bbecd8f087f235e lighttpd-1.4.33.tar.bz2 732cf98d823f2c7ddc96a3130a3c88d588b02ed20a0e7f8c9be25a265fbea2d6 lighttpd-1.4.18_mod_h264_streaming-2.2.0.tar.gz +08b2529e527a9810fd46fa2e33529a05f70b58e06b5d908a9c8126778a8f8284 CVE-2013-4508.patch +d5c3740de1322b52d13387a797b191f5fe61aa542c58dfa828e778cedf674580 CVE-2013-4508b.patch +82c2b19fcf807d4d32732aa72a62b7d31a0988290b227c98b0399cfa98da91a4 CVE-2013-4559.patch +d87655bbfc597216476c2674d9018aa556f7b6e592c9313c94c82e141b9bff2f CVE-2013-4560.patch 14a769551522d7c05319db2efd6b03962638413e4a3d58a0ee5f3f4760d33f16 lighttpd.initd 94f69a173dc26610a43532474230537b9bc31ec846fb9f94cb72765f125edf87 lighttpd.confd 503ee1cd454e2c0f9a212ef60dc8321893eda06ccf721ecbe94d189a09e0bc6c lighttpd.logrotate @@ -165,6 +178,10 @@ d1adc1358b5d9e85353caa2e706bfa231d145dd59c075cdcb3f818b3cb5d722e mod_fastcgi.co e7eb047360e09d1a2b693f08d4a912b99954090c5bdea706f46a33554e867043 mod_fastcgi_fpm.conf" sha512sums="f380adb20944846340b409290c43d54188f94e7992fe1e90121ab866f75048dfb7c2c1592b07b1df0af3b6d12b60d1d7e5d41de75c8684b8939b3df736f00762 lighttpd-1.4.33.tar.bz2 12e1b7c8146cccfa78678ce56cd2f704423559b23b90996dff00602634f110512146386086ac234293a3c28900a06c2bec1c97e680e7eed5173372f88177b351 lighttpd-1.4.18_mod_h264_streaming-2.2.0.tar.gz +2f0c876ee11e64cb4df5e1a59fe907c680b7825b8c6acc12d3697bc0ceaf0f3eee223702b04a7f14a9e7e5d55e027b6181b9837a3d5a7476b10f90a9b8b1238e CVE-2013-4508.patch +521e0828009b37d936d15564734568b0e0180b2261d40562d686f3abc10c4a8780524b404788f21d09fecefeabbd588c2cb8dce0c242f6dec693c2f664c296e2 CVE-2013-4508b.patch +63c200180d11658a3341061e3ac0d404504b9ef97927e8673ac78a2c41c8169b0e1c4e37d6da08de9d6c4fc390e452f256207dc850f85f8bdd761c6b4e3f58a7 CVE-2013-4559.patch +c7d699df342ad2822fddf6f20bddac9c069d3eeeaf20067781728ed341a36a9a1cc5c430ff2d5d1e1a422a31c3fcf7e8752bb034df69df15d8de3b179c757024 CVE-2013-4560.patch 3d92f1f2fab79d12570e445d0bfba1c3b53898c6eeb323ec2171a289417c01039746f722c5e00bac36ea7fc433e3e7422b64f8952ad780b3d68e010ef3d8bf61 lighttpd.initd 93a05dddab14ba6355a0345f1da2fe900c8b55fed8f98506295dc12d96c7cef803c4aca77f016b8acea7bbde485be1e09a57d31fdca6f91023fbeb4db9a90a8b lighttpd.confd e1284fe9ab4b9a53c21b40a5ac3e77e66343e187321b8a2f7464db64747f3a99f7e17a9e7c0e298db84a24fa1286cfe344dbff182eddd9de5c0605f5397a6972 lighttpd.logrotate diff --git a/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508.patch b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..416008a599 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508.patch @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c (revision 2912) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c (revision 2913) +@@ -112,20 +112,46 @@ + config_patch_connection(srv, con, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME); + config_patch_connection(srv, con, COMP_HTTP_HOST); + +- if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_ctx) { +- /* ssl_ctx <=> pemfile was set <=> ssl_ctx got patched: so this should never happen */ ++ if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_pemfile_x509 || NULL == con->conf.ssl_pemfile_pkey) { ++ /* x509/pkey available <=> pemfile was set <=> pemfile got patched: so this should never happen, unless you nest $SERVER["socket"] */ + log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", +- "null SSL_CTX for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name); ++ "no certificate/private key for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + +- /* switch to new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension */ +- if (con->conf.ssl_ctx != SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, con->conf.ssl_ctx)) { +- log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", +- "failed to set SSL_CTX for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name); ++ /* first set certificate! setting private key checks whether certificate matches it */ ++ if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, con->conf.ssl_pemfile_x509)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:", ++ "failed to set certificate for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name, ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + ++ if (!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, con->conf.ssl_pemfile_pkey)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:", ++ "failed to set private key for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name, ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ++ } ++ ++ if (con->conf.ssl_verifyclient) { ++ if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_ca_file_cert_names) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:", ++ "can't verify client without ssl.ca-file for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name, ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ++ } ++ ++ SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, SSL_dup_CA_list(con->conf.ssl_ca_file_cert_names)); ++ /* forcing verification here is really not that useful - a client could just connect without SNI */ ++ SSL_set_verify( ++ ssl, ++ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (con->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0), ++ NULL ++ ); ++ SSL_set_verify_depth(ssl, con->conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth); ++ } ++ + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } + #endif +@@ -491,9 +517,100 @@ + NETWORK_BACKEND_SOLARIS_SENDFILEV + } network_backend_t; + ++#ifdef USE_OPENSSL ++static X509* x509_load_pem_file(server *srv, const char *file) { ++ BIO *in; ++ X509 *x = NULL; ++ ++ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); ++ if (NULL == in) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "S", "SSL: BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) failed"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: BIO_read_filename('", file,"') failed"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (NULL == x) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: couldn't read X509 certificate from '", file,"'"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ BIO_free(in); ++ return x; ++ ++error: ++ if (NULL != x) X509_free(x); ++ if (NULL != in) BIO_free(in); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey_load_pem_file(server *srv, const char *file) { ++ BIO *in; ++ EVP_PKEY *x = NULL; ++ ++ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); ++ if (NULL == in) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s", "SSL: BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) failed"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: BIO_read_filename('", file,"') failed"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ x = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (NULL == x) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: couldn't read private key from '", file,"'"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ BIO_free(in); ++ return x; ++ ++error: ++ if (NULL != x) EVP_PKEY_free(x); ++ if (NULL != in) BIO_free(in); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static int network_openssl_load_pemfile(server *srv, size_t ndx) { ++ specific_config *s = srv->config_storage[ndx]; ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++ { ++ data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i]; ++ if ((ndx > 0 && (COMP_SERVER_SOCKET != dc->comp || dc->cond != CONFIG_COND_EQ)) ++ || !s->ssl_enabled) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:", ++ "ssl.pemfile only works in SSL socket binding context as openssl version does not support TLS extensions"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if (NULL == (s->ssl_pemfile_x509 = x509_load_pem_file(srv, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr))) return -1; ++ if (NULL == (s->ssl_pemfile_pkey = evp_pkey_load_pem_file(srv, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr))) return -1; ++ ++ if (!X509_check_private_key(s->ssl_pemfile_x509, s->ssl_pemfile_pkey)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "sssb", "SSL:", ++ "Private key does not match the certificate public key, reason:", ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), ++ s->ssl_pemfile); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif ++ + int network_init(server *srv) { + buffer *b; +- size_t i; ++ size_t i, j; + network_backend_t backend; + + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL +@@ -580,19 +697,8 @@ + long ssloptions = + SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; + +- if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile)) continue; ++ if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile) && buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) continue; + +-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +- { +- data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i]; +- if (COMP_HTTP_HOST == dc->comp) { +- log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:", +- "can't use ssl.pemfile with $HTTP[\"host\"], openssl version does not support TLS extensions"); +- return -1; +- } +- } +-#endif +- + if (srv->ssl_is_init == 0) { + SSL_load_error_strings(); + SSL_library_init(); +@@ -606,6 +712,29 @@ + } + } + ++ if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile)) { ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++ data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i]; ++ if (COMP_HTTP_HOST == dc->comp) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:", ++ "can't use ssl.pemfile with $HTTP[\"host\"], openssl version does not support TLS extensions"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++#endif ++ if (network_openssl_load_pemfile(srv, i)) return -1; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) { ++ s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(s->ssl_ca_file->ptr); ++ if (NULL == s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile) || !s->ssl_enabled) continue; ++ + if (NULL == (s->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()))) { + log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); +@@ -721,45 +850,42 @@ + #endif + #endif + +- if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) { +- if (1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_ca_file->ptr, NULL)) { +- log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", +- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file); +- return -1; +- } +- if (s->ssl_verifyclient) { +- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *certs = SSL_load_client_CA_file(s->ssl_ca_file->ptr); +- if (!certs) { ++ /* load all ssl.ca-files specified in the config into each SSL_CTX to be prepared for SNI */ ++ for (j = 0; j < srv->config_context->used; j++) { ++ specific_config *s1 = srv->config_storage[j]; ++ ++ if (!buffer_is_empty(s1->ssl_ca_file)) { ++ if (1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s->ssl_ctx, s1->ssl_ca_file->ptr, NULL)) { + log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", +- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file); +- } +- if (SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s->ssl_ctx, (void*) &srv, sizeof(srv)) != 1) { +- log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:", +- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s1->ssl_ca_file); + return -1; + } +- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(s->ssl_ctx, certs); +- SSL_CTX_set_verify( +- s->ssl_ctx, +- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (s->ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0), +- NULL ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (s->ssl_verifyclient) { ++ if (NULL == s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s", ++ "SSL: You specified ssl.verifyclient.activate but no ca_file" + ); +- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_verifyclient_depth); ++ return -1; + } +- } else if (s->ssl_verifyclient) { +- log_error_write( +- srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s", +- "SSL: You specified ssl.verifyclient.activate but no ca_file" ++ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_dup_CA_list(s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names)); ++ SSL_CTX_set_verify( ++ s->ssl_ctx, ++ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (s->ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0), ++ NULL + ); ++ SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_verifyclient_depth); + } + +- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) { ++ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile_x509) < 0) { + log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_pemfile); + return -1; + } + +- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file (s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) { ++ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile_pkey) < 0) { + log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_pemfile); + return -1; +@@ -856,7 +982,6 @@ + for (i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; i++) { + data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i]; + specific_config *s = srv->config_storage[i]; +- size_t j; + + /* not our stage */ + if (COMP_SERVER_SOCKET != dc->comp) continue; +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/base.h +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/base.h (revision 2912) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/base.h (revision 2913) +@@ -320,7 +320,11 @@ + off_t *global_bytes_per_second_cnt_ptr; /* */ + + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL +- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; ++ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; /* not patched */ ++ /* SNI per host: with COMP_SERVER_SOCKET, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME, COMP_HTTP_HOST */ ++ EVP_PKEY *ssl_pemfile_pkey; ++ X509 *ssl_pemfile_x509; ++ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ssl_ca_file_cert_names; + #endif + } specific_config; + +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c (revision 2912) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c (revision 2913) +@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ + buffer_free(s->ssl_verifyclient_username); + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL + SSL_CTX_free(s->ssl_ctx); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(s->ssl_pemfile_pkey); ++ X509_free(s->ssl_pemfile_x509); ++ if (NULL != s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names, X509_NAME_free); + #endif + free(s); + } +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/configfile.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/configfile.c (revision 2912) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/configfile.c (revision 2913) +@@ -339,9 +339,13 @@ + + PATCH(ssl_pemfile); + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL +- PATCH(ssl_ctx); ++ PATCH(ssl_pemfile_x509); ++ PATCH(ssl_pemfile_pkey); + #endif + PATCH(ssl_ca_file); ++#ifdef USE_OPENSSL ++ PATCH(ssl_ca_file_cert_names); ++#endif + PATCH(ssl_cipher_list); + PATCH(ssl_dh_file); + PATCH(ssl_ec_curve); +@@ -409,10 +413,14 @@ + } else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.pemfile"))) { + PATCH(ssl_pemfile); + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL +- PATCH(ssl_ctx); ++ PATCH(ssl_pemfile_x509); ++ PATCH(ssl_pemfile_pkey); + #endif + } else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ca-file"))) { + PATCH(ssl_ca_file); ++#ifdef USE_OPENSSL ++ PATCH(ssl_ca_file_cert_names); ++#endif + } else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.honor-cipher-order"))) { + PATCH(ssl_honor_cipher_order); + } else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.empty-fragments"))) { diff --git a/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508b.patch b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc732340b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4508b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c (revision 2924) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/network.c (revision 2925) +@@ -741,6 +741,14 @@ + return -1; + } + ++ /* completely useless identifier; required for client cert verification to work with sessions */ ++ if (0 == SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s->ssl_ctx, (const unsigned char*) CONST_STR_LEN("lighttpd"))) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss:s", "SSL:", ++ "failed to set session context", ++ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + if (s->ssl_empty_fragments) { + #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS + ssloptions &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; diff --git a/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4559.patch b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4559.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e277f2a71d --- /dev/null +++ b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4559.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c (revision 2922) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/server.c (revision 2923) +@@ -820,8 +820,14 @@ + * to /etc/group + * */ + if (NULL != grp) { +- setgid(grp->gr_gid); +- setgroups(0, NULL); ++ if (-1 == setgid(grp->gr_gid)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setgid failed: ", strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (-1 == setgroups(0, NULL)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setgroups failed: ", strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (srv->srvconf.username->used) { + initgroups(srv->srvconf.username->ptr, grp->gr_gid); + } +@@ -844,7 +850,10 @@ + #ifdef HAVE_PWD_H + /* drop root privs */ + if (NULL != pwd) { +- setuid(pwd->pw_uid); ++ if (-1 == setuid(pwd->pw_uid)) { ++ log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setuid failed: ", strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } + } + #endif + #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) diff --git a/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4560.patch b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4560.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd5af70a5c --- /dev/null +++ b/main/lighttpd/CVE-2013-4560.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +Index: lighttpd-1.4.x/src/stat_cache.c +=================================================================== +--- lighttpd-1.4.x/src/stat_cache.c (revision 2920) ++++ lighttpd-1.4.x/src/stat_cache.c (revision 2921) +@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ + FamErrlist[FAMErrno]); + + fam_dir_entry_free(fam_dir); ++ fam_dir = NULL; + } else { + int osize = 0; + |