diff options
7 files changed, 6 insertions, 409 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch b/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bba7803645..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -From cf1a1dc1b9ca34a29d0471da9389f8eae70ddbd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> -Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:47:57 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Use _XEatDataWords to avoid overflow of rep.length - shifting - -rep.length is a CARD32, so rep.length << 2 could overflow in 32-bit builds - -Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> ---- - configure.ac | 6 ++++++ - src/XvMC.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ - 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index b44f80d..f9d59a1 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ XORG_CHECK_MALLOC_ZERO - # Obtain compiler/linker options for depedencies - PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XVMC, x11 xext xv xextproto videoproto) - -+# Check for _XEatDataWords function that may be patched into older Xlib release -+SAVE_LIBS="$LIBS" -+LIBS="$XVMC_LIBS" -+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_XEatDataWords]) -+LIBS="$SAVE_LIBS" -+ - # Checks for library functions. - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([shmat]) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index 5a4cf0d..b3e97ec 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -16,6 +16,18 @@ - #include <sys/time.h> - #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h> - #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> -+#include <limits.h> -+ -+#ifndef HAVE__XEATDATAWORDS -+static inline void _XEatDataWords(Display *dpy, unsigned long n) -+{ -+# ifndef LONG64 -+ if (n >= (ULONG_MAX >> 2)) -+ _XIOError(dpy); -+# endif -+ _XEatData (dpy, n << 2); -+} -+#endif - - static XExtensionInfo _xvmc_info_data; - static XExtensionInfo *xvmc_info = &_xvmc_info_data; -@@ -134,7 +146,7 @@ XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num) - surface_info[i].flags = sinfo.flags; - } - } else -- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - } - - UnlockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -207,7 +219,7 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvMCListSubpictureTypes ( - ret[i].scanline_order = Info.scanline_order; - } - } else -- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - } - - UnlockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -278,7 +290,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_context ( - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; - } else -- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - } - - UnlockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -359,7 +371,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_surface ( - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; - } else -- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - } - - UnlockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -449,7 +461,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_subpicture ( - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; - } else -- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - } - - UnlockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -579,7 +591,7 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, - - } else { - -- _XEatData(dpy, realSize); -+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - UnlockDisplay (dpy); - SyncHandle (); - return -1; --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch b/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7cc7d0631e..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 2712383813b26475dc6713888414d842be57f8ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> -Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 2/6] integer overflow in XvMCListSurfaceTypes() [CVE-2013-1990 - 1/2] - -rep.num is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before multiplying -by sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo) to come up with the total size to allocate, -to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from -the network past the end of the allocated buffer. - -Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> -Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> ---- - src/XvMC.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index b3e97ec..5d8c2cf 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num) - } - - if(rep.num > 0) { -- surface_info = -- (XvMCSurfaceInfo*)Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo)); -+ if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo))) -+ surface_info = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo)); - - if(surface_info) { - xvmcSurfaceInfo sinfo; --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch b/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e6ffa44ecb..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 478d4e5873eeee2ebdce6673e4e3469816ab63b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> -Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 3/6] integer overflow in XvMCListSubpictureTypes() - [CVE-2013-1990 2/2] - -rep.num is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before multiplying by -sizeof(XvImageFormatValues) to come up with the total size to allocate, -to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from -the network past the end of the allocated buffer. - -Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> -Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> ---- - src/XvMC.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index 5d8c2cf..8d602ec 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvMCListSubpictureTypes ( - } - - if(rep.num > 0) { -- ret = -- (XvImageFormatValues*)Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues)); -+ if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvImageFormatValues))) -+ ret = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues)); - - if(ret) { - xvImageFormatInfo Info; --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch b/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 70298e45a4..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From 5fd871e5f878810f8f8837725d548e07e89577ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> -Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 4/6] integer overflow in _xvmc_create_*() - -rep.length is a CARD32 and should be bounds checked before left-shifting -by 2 bits to come up with the total size to allocate, though in these -cases, no buffer overflow should occur here, since the XRead call is passed -the same rep.length << 2 length argument, but the *priv_count returned to -the caller could be interpreted or used to calculate a larger buffer size -than was actually allocated, leading them to go out of bounds. - -Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> ---- - src/XvMC.c | 9 ++++++--- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index 8d602ec..d8bc59d 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_context ( - context->flags = rep.flags_return; - - if(rep.length) { -- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); -+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) -+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); - if(*priv_data) { - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; -@@ -366,7 +367,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_surface ( - } - - if(rep.length) { -- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); -+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) -+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); - if(*priv_data) { - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; -@@ -456,7 +458,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_subpicture ( - subpicture->component_order[3] = rep.component_order[3]; - - if(rep.length) { -- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); -+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) -+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2); - if(*priv_data) { - _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2); - *priv_count = rep.length; --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch b/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fcefc106ee..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -From e9415ddef2ac81d4139bd32d5e9cda9394a60051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> -Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 01:20:08 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Multiple unvalidated assumptions in XvMCGetDRInfo() - [CVE-2013-1999] - -The individual string sizes is assumed to not be more than the amount of -data read from the network, and could cause buffer overflow if they are. - -The strings returned from the X server are assumed to be null terminated, -and could cause callers to read past the end of the buffer if they are not. - -Also be sure to set the returned pointers to NULL, so callers don't try -accessing bad pointers on failure cases. - -Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> -Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> ---- - src/XvMC.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index d8bc59d..cb42487 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -499,7 +499,6 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, - XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy); - xvmcGetDRInfoReply rep; - xvmcGetDRInfoReq *req; -- char *tmpBuf = NULL; - CARD32 magic; - - #ifdef HAVE_SHMAT -@@ -510,6 +509,9 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, - here.tz_dsttime = 0; - #endif - -+ *name = NULL; -+ *busID = NULL; -+ - XvMCCheckExtension (dpy, info, BadImplementation); - - LockDisplay (dpy); -@@ -568,31 +570,31 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, - #endif - - if (rep.length > 0) { -- -- int realSize = rep.length << 2; -- -- tmpBuf = (char *) Xmalloc(realSize); -- if (tmpBuf) { -- *name = (char *) Xmalloc(rep.nameLen); -- if (*name) { -- *busID = (char *) Xmalloc(rep.busIDLen); -- if (! *busID) { -- XFree(*name); -- XFree(tmpBuf); -- } -- } else { -- XFree(tmpBuf); -+ unsigned long realSize = 0; -+ char *tmpBuf = NULL; -+ -+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { -+ realSize = rep.length << 2; -+ if (realSize >= (rep.nameLen + rep.busIDLen)) { -+ tmpBuf = Xmalloc(realSize); -+ *name = Xmalloc(rep.nameLen); -+ *busID = Xmalloc(rep.busIDLen); - } - } - - if (*name && *busID && tmpBuf) { -- - _XRead(dpy, tmpBuf, realSize); - strncpy(*name,tmpBuf,rep.nameLen); -+ name[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0'; - strncpy(*busID,tmpBuf+rep.nameLen,rep.busIDLen); -+ busID[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0'; - XFree(tmpBuf); -- - } else { -+ XFree(*name); -+ *name = NULL; -+ XFree(*busID); -+ *name = NULL; -+ XFree(tmpBuf); - - _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); - UnlockDisplay (dpy); --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch b/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 725c99339d..0000000000 --- a/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 8c164524d229adb6141fdac8336b3823e7fe1a5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 14:47:30 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH 6/6] Multiple unvalidated patches in CVE-2013-1999 - -Al Viro pointed out that Debian started segfaulting in Xine for him, - -Reported-by: Al Viro -Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> ---- - src/XvMC.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c -index cb42487..74c8b85 100644 ---- a/src/XvMC.c -+++ b/src/XvMC.c -@@ -585,15 +585,15 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, - if (*name && *busID && tmpBuf) { - _XRead(dpy, tmpBuf, realSize); - strncpy(*name,tmpBuf,rep.nameLen); -- name[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0'; -+ (*name)[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0'; - strncpy(*busID,tmpBuf+rep.nameLen,rep.busIDLen); -- busID[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0'; -+ (*busID)[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0'; - XFree(tmpBuf); - } else { - XFree(*name); - *name = NULL; - XFree(*busID); -- *name = NULL; -+ *busID = NULL; - XFree(tmpBuf); - - _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); --- -1.8.2.3 - diff --git a/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD b/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD index 61c9dc6b8e..8f45ff7cc3 100644 --- a/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD +++ b/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=libxvmc -pkgver=1.0.7 -pkgrel=1 +pkgver=1.0.8 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="X11 Video Motion Compensation extension library" url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/" arch="all" @@ -10,26 +10,9 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev" depends= depends_dev="xproto videoproto libxv-dev libx11-dev libxext-dev" makedepends="$depends_dev libtool autoconf automake util-macros" -source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXvMC-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch - 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch - 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch - 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch - 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch - 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch - " +source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXvMC-$pkgver.tar.bz2" _builddir="$srcdir"/libXvMC-$pkgver -prepare() { - cd "$_builddir" - for i in $source; do - case $i in - *.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;; - esac - done - libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoheader && autoconf \ - && automake --add-missing -} build() { cd "$_builddir" @@ -42,24 +25,6 @@ package() { make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install || return 1 rm "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.la } -md5sums="3340c99ff556ea2457b4be47f5cb96fa libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2 -839450035994be7232f049c3256967fd 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch -c02e3cc2530cd053a2ce47b0627bfdff 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch -6a87be93e8e173fb132eb2607abea6eb 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch -4eb70517ff9e5d14ddd676de60a72fd4 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch -0aedb6b617afe07376c243e401b1f417 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch -cbd25dbf846b42f2a5ba9a60f32005f3 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch" -sha256sums="28f085fc8518a3dadfe355360705d50153051f09898093e69af806c0b437cea3 libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2 -87f764bdb3a36c370f8f5e16ca29b9ed8ee7f57dc1f5470d3c9c2a320ec3329d 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch -475e39742256f1e09f0b84a640ab1a43c88ed6a05498978fdebb5d727a7ecab3 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch -dc08b02502ca6620d7db4d60868bbf0bac7537a1e2ee3007b1107071b106f82e 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch -98eb319ef77103b823af9ea0a33396797f2f63e0160c90efa1159d811b6496b7 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch -f40ac752770cf248b182c4074dde59a46b8cbab1cf48252ac4dac4d35f7a5309 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch -e7d2d21f5ed2109f3d62e6509bb85c020ba988d32667158bb1c4a7a16e561780 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch" -sha512sums="c52175990062a2fb1636b7db589565e61d2e056e56a0954a8b98c1ccf8d72bf3182cd6f482762bf5ee4137fc24553a4d1b9c1e588671499b3b69b390f31c81e9 libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2 -abd782276434449c2691eb4255e5b51625272191b38d7b3454c2dd3b958b24db1ac4fa1c93dfec060b9eacb3921542ee007b6848c94f299b6491f9a02dec23e8 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch -5cec81d9649a70eedd87ffb961030612271830cf9d45686614d54698a331a09c49fbb1a1d0d60266e5b649dcbe8d6ab766422655fe623e0d4db8b393c7912721 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch -e9f9f7bbff45f34b53b11c50a130135a594e49c1e95e2e3b75a74c951cde374a6c74542ccb3a25ff17d0b1fdf97d6ea41d59e7c56fd9565aa38ecd0e1bf0ec8b 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch -eda4d1a3710f6237c827485fdc93b302aa49a7293f509719f8f17a5250f20505c995323089d713ba5f9142d9deb3c158d54ed31515c416dd00b1fbbb4c77ac6a 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch -688efc3d0185af471e6829444f49f39204eb41c46a51cb861c78135b88b44b9a237d6e48c1524f13cc07615ada3945bf30f3374c582d496ed502bb61773c8eb1 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch -3c390b9c804c1a2d4b3a5c38ecdaa35770bc78e4e2dcd7ce10c2bcf80db41fb9ecbe135c1136635b35062fadcb122857047f59f53529282e5379969554fe18a6 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch" +md5sums="2e4014e9d55c430e307999a6b3dd256d libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2" +sha256sums="5e1a401efa433f959d41e17932b8c218c56b931348f494b8fa4656d7d798b204 libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2" +sha512sums="781a53ad1d60a06019ed24150b85a96f2608e6ca0d876de9f06511c0e086cdf837804994e33b51ee8b3714150dc1d6060449e89ab7458476c8535b5b336147bf libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2" |