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-rw-r--r--main/xen/APKBUILD22
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa247-4.9-2.patch109
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa252.patch27
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa253-4.10.patch26
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa254-4.10.patch1373
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa255-1.patch133
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa255-2.patch167
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa256.patch40
8 files changed, 6 insertions, 1891 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD
index 31201ba019..7070edbfa0 100644
--- a/main/xen/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
# Contributor: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@entel.upc.edu>
# Maintainer: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
pkgname=xen
-pkgver=4.10.0
-pkgrel=3
+pkgver=4.10.1
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor"
url="http://www.xen.org/"
arch="x86_64 armhf aarch64"
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ options="!strip"
# - CVE-2018-7540 XSA-252
# - CVE-2018-7541 XSA-255
# - CVE-2018-7542 XSA-256
+# 4.10.1-r0:
+# - CVE-2018-10472 XSA-258
+# - CVE-2018-10471 XSA-259
case "$CARCH" in
x86*)
@@ -159,13 +162,6 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/$pkgname/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgv
http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/zlib-$_ZLIB_VERSION.tar.gz
http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-$_IPXE_GIT_TAG.tar.gz
- xsa252.patch
- xsa253-4.10.patch
- xsa254-4.10.patch
- xsa255-1.patch
- xsa255-2.patch
- xsa256.patch
-
qemu-xen_paths.patch
hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
@@ -416,7 +412,7 @@ EOF
}
-sha512sums="5a37935c382f9cfe3641a35c3be0ba11689bca10c7d3c2401963513e3a834ee8d0c8a0ddcf3716dbf0a795aea1bab78caf19acf1272e5e054bf012cfa06a4690 xen-4.10.0.tar.gz
+sha512sums="236c02bee69e33644703ed26d323d4c491a91fc05bd0ee0990a7368579f7c82f5bb4510845bf80348fd923024d7d60d521f593dfd0365d971dc592f8ef10fbea xen-4.10.1.tar.gz
2e0b0fd23e6f10742a5517981e5171c6e88b0a93c83da701b296f5c0861d72c19782daab589a7eac3f9032152a0fc7eff7f5362db8fccc4859564a9aa82329cf gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2
c2bc9ffc8583aeae71cee9ddcc4418969768d4e3764d47307da54f93981c0109fb07d84b061b3a3628bd00ba4d14a54742bc04848110eb3ae8ca25dbfbaabadb grub-0.97.tar.gz
1465b58279af1647f909450e394fe002ca165f0ff4a0254bfa9fe0e64316f50facdde2729d79a4e632565b4500cf4d6c74192ac0dd3bc9fe09129bbd67ba089d lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
@@ -426,12 +422,6 @@ c2bc9ffc8583aeae71cee9ddcc4418969768d4e3764d47307da54f93981c0109fb07d84b061b3a36
4928b5b82f57645be9408362706ff2c4d9baa635b21b0d41b1c82930e8c60a759b1ea4fa74d7e6c7cae1b7692d006aa5cb72df0c3b88bf049779aa2b566f9d35 tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz
021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
bbcce5e55040e7e29adebd4a5253a046016a6e2e7ff34cf801a42d147e1ec1af57e0297318249bfa9c5bbeac969fe4b37c18cbf845a80b2136d65387a4fc31da ipxe-git-356f6c1b64d7a97746d1816cef8ca22bdd8d0b5d.tar.gz
-63fd6cee56ef04506efd6bf632998dc90514ff967e9435514a5ba8d2c5781735f986241344a479b6f44df9c6e6a278a165ba14834b0b3236064e24f71cd600f1 xsa252.patch
-58f288fb3087ecdd42075031b5604a493adef0754f68d596dce8576fbc46bfe8b1bf3dc429269cab3797b6f193036bdafeb32cf2c7cca34d9c89d5fe95a0453c xsa253-4.10.patch
-f15350c0b44d3a6d5a3056dfac81d25f2af047135c528f6258f3d42ef26e6d87511d8e148a63e8d7d88108e07dc5b3551ed54c915be6dc3fe3f978ab72094321 xsa254-4.10.patch
-d16ead93486beee767c3c80d11981d940dfce55d9aabfe7adee480d02f575a2df074bb83a1e62e455ac754f6d8f3fb83abe7139b93b94b77233c2918b46dc2e2 xsa255-1.patch
-2f0719fbbde261a51e1ec66eb677fb2b17c94e0631d583c0a99357b7c2dfb2c695b6970ebbe8e05f68154344af74fa31e8b47b0d25c778b3aef1b284101ae528 xsa255-2.patch
-3bd2697a8ad66197264af8a713bf97152ed414c4b11910cc986c6adaa85bd86b4d35319675799edccf04aaff9ae48a58ca5c438cb6b5b95f60fffbfeec5e4faf xsa256.patch
1936ab39a1867957fa640eb81c4070214ca4856a2743ba7e49c0cd017917071a9680d015f002c57fa7b9600dbadd29dcea5887f50e6c133305df2669a7a933f3 qemu-xen_paths.patch
f095ea373f36381491ad36f0662fb4f53665031973721256b23166e596318581da7cbb0146d0beb2446729adfdb321e01468e377793f6563a67d68b8b0f7ffe3 hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
77b08e9655e091b0352e4630d520b54c6ca6d659d1d38fbb4b3bfc9ff3e66db433a2e194ead32bb10ff962c382d800a670e82b7a62835b238e294b22808290ea musl-hvmloader-fix-stdint.patch
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa247-4.9-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa247-4.9-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 13737a9bf2..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa247-4.9-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From d4bc7833707351a5341a6bdf04c752a028d9560d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 16:53:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] p2m: Check return value of p2m_set_entry() when
- decreasing reservation
-
-If the entire range specified to p2m_pod_decrease_reservation() is marked
-populate-on-demand, then it will make a single p2m_set_entry() call,
-reducing its PoD entry count.
-
-Unfortunately, in the right circumstances, this p2m_set_entry() call
-may fail. It that case, repeated calls to decrease_reservation() may
-cause p2m->pod.entry_count to fall below zero, potentially tripping
-over BUG_ON()s to the contrary.
-
-Instead, check to see if the entry succeeded, and return false if not.
-The caller will then call guest_remove_page() on the gfns, which will
-return -EINVAL upon finding no valid memory there to return.
-
-Unfortunately if the order > 0, the entry may have partially changed.
-A domain_crash() is probably the safest thing in that case.
-
-Other p2m_set_entry() calls in the same function should be fine,
-because they are writing the entry at its current order. Nonetheless,
-check the return value and crash if our assumption turns otu to be
-wrong.
-
-This is part of XSA-247.
-
-Reported-by: XXX PERSON <XXX EMAIL>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-v2: Crash the domain if we're not sure it's safe (or if we think it
-can't happen)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-index f2ed751892..473d6a6dbf 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-@@ -555,11 +555,23 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
-
- if ( !nonpod )
- {
-- /* All PoD: Mark the whole region invalid and tell caller
-- * we're done. */
-- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn, INVALID_MFN, order, p2m_invalid,
-- p2m->default_access);
-- p2m->pod.entry_count-=(1<<order);
-+ /*
-+ * All PoD: Mark the whole region invalid and tell caller
-+ * we're done.
-+ */
-+ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn, INVALID_MFN, order, p2m_invalid,
-+ p2m->default_access) )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If this fails, we can't tell how much of the range was changed.
-+ * Best to crash the domain unless we're sure a partial change is
-+ * impossible.
-+ */
-+ if ( order != 0 )
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ goto out_unlock;
-+ }
-+ p2m->pod.entry_count -= 1UL << order;
- BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
- ret = 1;
- goto out_entry_check;
-@@ -600,8 +612,14 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
- n = 1UL << cur_order;
- if ( t == p2m_populate_on_demand )
- {
-- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, INVALID_MFN, cur_order,
-- p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access);
-+ /* This shouldn't be able to fail */
-+ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, INVALID_MFN, cur_order,
-+ p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access) )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ goto out_unlock;
-+ }
- p2m->pod.entry_count -= n;
- BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
- pod -= n;
-@@ -622,8 +640,14 @@ p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
-
- page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-
-- p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, INVALID_MFN, cur_order,
-- p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access);
-+ /* This shouldn't be able to fail */
-+ if ( p2m_set_entry(p2m, gpfn + i, INVALID_MFN, cur_order,
-+ p2m_invalid, p2m->default_access) )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ goto out_unlock;
-+ }
- p2m_tlb_flush_sync(p2m);
- for ( j = 0; j < n; ++j )
- set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_x(mfn), INVALID_M2P_ENTRY);
---
-2.15.0
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa252.patch b/main/xen/xsa252.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8615928142..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa252.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: memory: don't implicitly unpin for decrease-reservation
-
-It very likely was a mistake (copy-and-paste from domain cleanup code)
-to implicitly unpin here: The caller should really unpin itself before
-(or after, if they so wish) requesting the page to be removed.
-
-This is XSA-252.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -357,11 +357,6 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
-
- rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
-
--#ifdef _PGT_pinned
-- if ( !rc && test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
-- put_page_and_type(page);
--#endif
--
- /*
- * With the lack of an IOMMU on some platforms, domains with DMA-capable
- * device must retrieve the same pfn when the hypercall populate_physmap
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa253-4.10.patch b/main/xen/xsa253-4.10.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 19e4269358..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa253-4.10.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/msr: Free msr_vcpu_policy during vcpu destruction
-
-c/s 4187f79dc7 "x86/msr: introduce struct msr_vcpu_policy" introduced a
-per-vcpu memory allocation, but failed to free it in the clean vcpu
-destruction case.
-
-This is XSA-253
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index b17468c..0ae715d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -382,6 +382,9 @@ void vcpu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)
-
- vcpu_destroy_fpu(v);
-
-+ xfree(v->arch.msr);
-+ v->arch.msr = NULL;
-+
- if ( !is_idle_domain(v->domain) )
- vpmu_destroy(v);
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa254-4.10.patch b/main/xen/xsa254-4.10.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index deb04bf549..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa254-4.10.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1373 +0,0 @@
-From 910dd005da20f27f3415b7eccdf436874989506b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:54:44 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames
-
-Save all GPRs on entry to Xen.
-
-The entry_int82() path is via a DPL1 gate, only usable by 32bit PV guests, so
-can get away with only saving the 32bit registers. All other entrypoints can
-be reached from 32 or 64bit contexts.
-
-This is part of XSA-254.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: f9eb74789af77e985ae653193f3622263499f674
-master date: 2018-01-05 19:57:07 +0000
----
- tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.c | 1 -
- xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c | 1 -
- xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 2 -
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 7 ++-
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 12 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c | 13 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c | 1 -
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 8 +--
- xen/common/wait.c | 1 -
- xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 105 +++------------------------------
- 10 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.c b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.c
-index 975ddc7..9056610 100644
---- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.c
-@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
- #include <sys/mman.h>
-
- #define cpu_has_amd_erratum(nr) 0
--#define mark_regs_dirty(r) ((void)(r))
- #define cpu_has_mpx false
- #define read_bndcfgu() 0
- #define xstate_set_init(what)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-index 2234128..74e9e66 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
- static void noreturn continue_nonidle_domain(struct vcpu *v)
- {
- check_wakeup_from_wait();
-- mark_regs_dirty(guest_cpu_user_regs());
- reset_stack_and_jump(ret_from_intr);
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-index 2f92645..5f23c2c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-@@ -337,7 +337,6 @@ static int read_io(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
- io_emul_stub_t *io_emul =
- io_emul_stub_setup(poc, ctxt->opcode, port, bytes);
-
-- mark_regs_dirty(ctxt->regs);
- io_emul(ctxt->regs);
- return X86EMUL_DONE;
- }
-@@ -436,7 +435,6 @@ static int write_io(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
- io_emul_stub_t *io_emul =
- io_emul_stub_setup(poc, ctxt->opcode, port, bytes);
-
-- mark_regs_dirty(ctxt->regs);
- io_emul(ctxt->regs);
- if ( (bytes == 1) && pv_post_outb_hook )
- pv_post_outb_hook(port, val);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index ba6e941..3fea54e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
- ENTRY(entry_int82)
- ASM_CLAC
- pushq $0
-- SAVE_VOLATILE type=HYPERCALL_VECTOR compat=1
-+ movl $HYPERCALL_VECTOR, 4(%rsp)
-+ SAVE_ALL compat=1 /* DPL1 gate, restricted to 32bit PV guests only. */
- CR4_PV32_RESTORE
-
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
-@@ -60,7 +61,6 @@ compat_test_guest_events:
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- compat_process_softirqs:
- sti
-- andl $~TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
- call do_softirq
- jmp compat_test_all_events
-
-@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
- pushq $FLAT_USER_CS32
- pushq %rcx
- pushq $0
-- SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+ movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+ SAVE_ALL
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
- movq VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx
- cmpb $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 6066ed8..1dd9ccf 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter)
- pushq $FLAT_KERNEL_CS64
- pushq %rcx
- pushq $0
-- SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+ movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+ SAVE_ALL
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
- testb $TF_kernel_mode,VCPU_thread_flags(%rbx)
- jz switch_to_kernel
-@@ -140,7 +141,6 @@ test_guest_events:
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu */
- process_softirqs:
- sti
-- SAVE_PRESERVED
- call do_softirq
- jmp test_all_events
-
-@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
- pushq $3 /* ring 3 null cs */
- pushq $0 /* null rip */
- pushq $0
-- SAVE_VOLATILE TRAP_syscall
-+ movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-+ SAVE_ALL
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
- cmpb $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx)
- movq VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax
-@@ -207,7 +208,6 @@ UNLIKELY_END(sysenter_nt_set)
- leal (,%rcx,TBF_INTERRUPT),%ecx
- UNLIKELY_START(z, sysenter_gpf)
- movq VCPU_trap_ctxt(%rbx),%rsi
-- SAVE_PRESERVED
- movl $TRAP_gp_fault,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
- movl %eax,TRAPBOUNCE_error_code(%rdx)
- movq TRAP_gp_fault * TRAPINFO_sizeof + TRAPINFO_eip(%rsi),%rax
-@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ UNLIKELY_END(sysenter_gpf)
- ENTRY(int80_direct_trap)
- ASM_CLAC
- pushq $0
-- SAVE_VOLATILE 0x80
-+ movl $0x80, 4(%rsp)
-+ SAVE_ALL
-
- cmpb $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
- UNLIKELY_START(ne, msi_check)
-@@ -253,7 +254,6 @@ int80_slow_path:
- * IDT entry with DPL==0.
- */
- movl $((0x80 << 3) | X86_XEC_IDT),UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
-- SAVE_PRESERVED
- movl $TRAP_gp_fault,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
- /* A GPF wouldn't have incremented the instruction pointer. */
- subq $2,UREGS_rip(%rsp)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-index 2a326be..3652f5f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-@@ -80,15 +80,10 @@ static void _show_registers(
- regs->rbp, regs->rsp, regs->r8);
- printk("r9: %016lx r10: %016lx r11: %016lx\n",
- regs->r9, regs->r10, regs->r11);
-- if ( !(regs->entry_vector & TRAP_regs_partial) )
-- {
-- printk("r12: %016lx r13: %016lx r14: %016lx\n",
-- regs->r12, regs->r13, regs->r14);
-- printk("r15: %016lx cr0: %016lx cr4: %016lx\n",
-- regs->r15, crs[0], crs[4]);
-- }
-- else
-- printk("cr0: %016lx cr4: %016lx\n", crs[0], crs[4]);
-+ printk("r12: %016lx r13: %016lx r14: %016lx\n",
-+ regs->r12, regs->r13, regs->r14);
-+ printk("r15: %016lx cr0: %016lx cr4: %016lx\n",
-+ regs->r15, crs[0], crs[4]);
- printk("cr3: %016lx cr2: %016lx\n", crs[3], crs[2]);
- printk("fsb: %016lx gsb: %016lx gss: %016lx\n",
- crs[5], crs[6], crs[7]);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-index cc334ca..c7ba221 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
-
- #include <xen/domain_page.h>
- #include <asm/x86_emulate.h>
--#include <asm/asm_defns.h> /* mark_regs_dirty() */
- #include <asm/processor.h> /* current_cpu_info */
- #include <asm/xstate.h>
- #include <asm/amd.h> /* cpu_has_amd_erratum() */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 54a2756..820495f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1956,10 +1956,10 @@ decode_register(
- case 9: p = &regs->r9; break;
- case 10: p = &regs->r10; break;
- case 11: p = &regs->r11; break;
-- case 12: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r12; break;
-- case 13: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r13; break;
-- case 14: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r14; break;
-- case 15: mark_regs_dirty(regs); p = &regs->r15; break;
-+ case 12: p = &regs->r12; break;
-+ case 13: p = &regs->r13; break;
-+ case 14: p = &regs->r14; break;
-+ case 15: p = &regs->r15; break;
- #endif
- default: BUG(); p = NULL; break;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/common/wait.c b/xen/common/wait.c
-index 9490a17..c5fc094 100644
---- a/xen/common/wait.c
-+++ b/xen/common/wait.c
-@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ static void __prepare_to_wait(struct waitqueue_vcpu *wqv)
- unsigned long dummy;
- u32 entry_vector = cpu_info->guest_cpu_user_regs.entry_vector;
-
-- cpu_info->guest_cpu_user_regs.entry_vector &= ~TRAP_regs_partial;
- ASSERT(wqv->esp == 0);
-
- /* Save current VCPU affinity; force wakeup on *this* CPU only. */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-index 388fc93..98192eb 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-@@ -17,15 +17,6 @@
- void ret_from_intr(void);
- #endif
-
--#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
--/* Indicate special exception stack frame by inverting the frame pointer. */
--#define SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(offs) \
-- leaq offs(%rsp),%rbp; \
-- notq %rbp
--#else
--#define SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(offs)
--#endif
--
- #ifndef NDEBUG
- #define ASSERT_INTERRUPT_STATUS(x, msg) \
- pushf; \
-@@ -42,31 +33,6 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
- #define ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED \
- ASSERT_INTERRUPT_STATUS(z, "INTERRUPTS DISABLED")
-
--/*
-- * This flag is set in an exception frame when registers R12-R15 did not get
-- * saved.
-- */
--#define _TRAP_regs_partial 16
--#define TRAP_regs_partial (1 << _TRAP_regs_partial)
--/*
-- * This flag gets set in an exception frame when registers R12-R15 possibly
-- * get modified from their originally saved values and hence need to be
-- * restored even if the normal call flow would restore register values.
-- *
-- * The flag being set implies _TRAP_regs_partial to be unset. Restoring
-- * R12-R15 thus is
-- * - required when this flag is set,
-- * - safe when _TRAP_regs_partial is unset.
-- */
--#define _TRAP_regs_dirty 17
--#define TRAP_regs_dirty (1 << _TRAP_regs_dirty)
--
--#define mark_regs_dirty(r) ({ \
-- struct cpu_user_regs *r__ = (r); \
-- ASSERT(!((r__)->entry_vector & TRAP_regs_partial)); \
-- r__->entry_vector |= TRAP_regs_dirty; \
--})
--
- #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
- # define _ASM_EX(p) p-.
- #else
-@@ -236,7 +202,7 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- #endif
-
- #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
--.macro SAVE_ALL op
-+.macro SAVE_ALL op, compat=0
- .ifeqs "\op", "CLAC"
- ASM_CLAC
- .else
-@@ -255,40 +221,6 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- movq %rdx,UREGS_rdx(%rsp)
- movq %rcx,UREGS_rcx(%rsp)
- movq %rax,UREGS_rax(%rsp)
-- movq %r8,UREGS_r8(%rsp)
-- movq %r9,UREGS_r9(%rsp)
-- movq %r10,UREGS_r10(%rsp)
-- movq %r11,UREGS_r11(%rsp)
-- movq %rbx,UREGS_rbx(%rsp)
-- movq %rbp,UREGS_rbp(%rsp)
-- SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(UREGS_rbp)
-- movq %r12,UREGS_r12(%rsp)
-- movq %r13,UREGS_r13(%rsp)
-- movq %r14,UREGS_r14(%rsp)
-- movq %r15,UREGS_r15(%rsp)
--.endm
--
--/*
-- * Save all registers not preserved by C code or used in entry/exit code. Mark
-- * the frame as partial.
-- *
-- * @type: exception type
-- * @compat: R8-R15 don't need saving, and the frame nevertheless is complete
-- */
--.macro SAVE_VOLATILE type compat=0
--.if \compat
-- movl $\type,UREGS_entry_vector-UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
--.else
-- movl $\type|TRAP_regs_partial,\
-- UREGS_entry_vector-UREGS_error_code(%rsp)
--.endif
-- addq $-(UREGS_error_code-UREGS_r15),%rsp
-- cld
-- movq %rdi,UREGS_rdi(%rsp)
-- movq %rsi,UREGS_rsi(%rsp)
-- movq %rdx,UREGS_rdx(%rsp)
-- movq %rcx,UREGS_rcx(%rsp)
-- movq %rax,UREGS_rax(%rsp)
- .if !\compat
- movq %r8,UREGS_r8(%rsp)
- movq %r9,UREGS_r9(%rsp)
-@@ -297,20 +229,17 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- .endif
- movq %rbx,UREGS_rbx(%rsp)
- movq %rbp,UREGS_rbp(%rsp)
-- SETUP_EXCEPTION_FRAME_POINTER(UREGS_rbp)
--.endm
--
--/*
-- * Complete a frame potentially only partially saved.
-- */
--.macro SAVE_PRESERVED
-- btrl $_TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-- jnc 987f
-+#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
-+/* Indicate special exception stack frame by inverting the frame pointer. */
-+ leaq UREGS_rbp(%rsp), %rbp
-+ notq %rbp
-+#endif
-+.if !\compat
- movq %r12,UREGS_r12(%rsp)
- movq %r13,UREGS_r13(%rsp)
- movq %r14,UREGS_r14(%rsp)
- movq %r15,UREGS_r15(%rsp)
--987:
-+.endif
- .endm
-
- #define LOAD_ONE_REG(reg, compat) \
-@@ -330,7 +259,6 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- */
- .macro RESTORE_ALL adj=0 compat=0
- .if !\compat
-- testl $TRAP_regs_dirty,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
- movq UREGS_r11(%rsp),%r11
- movq UREGS_r10(%rsp),%r10
- movq UREGS_r9(%rsp),%r9
-@@ -347,33 +275,16 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
- LOAD_ONE_REG(si, \compat)
- LOAD_ONE_REG(di, \compat)
- .if !\compat
-- jz 987f
- movq UREGS_r15(%rsp),%r15
- movq UREGS_r14(%rsp),%r14
- movq UREGS_r13(%rsp),%r13
- movq UREGS_r12(%rsp),%r12
--#ifndef NDEBUG
-- .subsection 1
--987: testl $TRAP_regs_partial,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
-- jnz 987f
-- cmpq UREGS_r15(%rsp),%r15
-- jne 789f
-- cmpq UREGS_r14(%rsp),%r14
-- jne 789f
-- cmpq UREGS_r13(%rsp),%r13
-- jne 789f
-- cmpq UREGS_r12(%rsp),%r12
-- je 987f
--789: BUG /* Corruption of partial register state. */
-- .subsection 0
--#endif
- .else
- xor %r15, %r15
- xor %r14, %r14
- xor %r13, %r13
- xor %r12, %r12
- .endif
--987:
- LOAD_ONE_REG(bp, \compat)
- LOAD_ONE_REG(bx, \compat)
- subq $-(UREGS_error_code-UREGS_r15+\adj), %rsp
---
-2.1.4
-
-From 57dc197cf0d36c56ba1d9d32c6a1454bb52605bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:56:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm: Always set _PAGE_ACCESSED on L4e updates
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: bd61fe94bee0556bc2f64999a4a8315b93f90f21
-master date: 2018-01-15 13:53:16 +0000
----
- xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h
-index 7502d53..976209b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h
-@@ -144,9 +144,21 @@ static inline l3_pgentry_t unadjust_guest_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e,
- static inline l4_pgentry_t adjust_guest_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e,
- const struct domain *d)
- {
-- if ( likely(l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) &&
-- likely(!is_pv_32bit_domain(d)) )
-- l4e_add_flags(l4e, _PAGE_USER);
-+ /*
-+ * When shadowing an L4 behind the guests back (e.g. for per-pcpu
-+ * purposes), we cannot efficiently sync access bit updates from hardware
-+ * (on the shadow tables) back into the guest view.
-+ *
-+ * We therefore unconditionally set _PAGE_ACCESSED even in the guests
-+ * view. This will appear to the guest as a CPU which proactively pulls
-+ * all valid L4e's into its TLB, which is compatible with the x86 ABI.
-+ *
-+ * At the time of writing, all PV guests set the access bit anyway, so
-+ * this is no actual change in their behaviour.
-+ */
-+ if ( likely(l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ l4e_add_flags(l4e, (_PAGE_ACCESSED |
-+ (is_pv_32bit_domain(d) ? 0 : _PAGE_USER)));
-
- return l4e;
- }
---
-2.1.4
-
-From 234f481337ea1a93db968d614649a6bdfdc8418a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:56:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests
-
-This is a very simplistic change limiting the amount of memory a running
-64-bit PV guest has mapped (and hence available for attacking): Only the
-mappings of stack, IDT, and TSS are being cloned from the direct map
-into per-CPU page tables. Guest controlled parts of the page tables are
-being copied into those per-CPU page tables upon entry into the guest.
-Cross-vCPU synchronization of top level page table entry changes is
-being effected by forcing other active vCPU-s of the guest into the
-hypervisor.
-
-The change to context_switch() isn't strictly necessary, but there's no
-reason to keep switching page tables once a PV guest is being scheduled
-out.
-
-This isn't providing full isolation yet, but it should be covering all
-pieces of information exposure of which would otherwise require an XSA.
-
-There is certainly much room for improvement, especially of performance,
-here - first and foremost suppressing all the negative effects on AMD
-systems. But in the interest of backportability (including to really old
-hypervisors, which may not even have alternative patching) any such is
-being left out here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 5784de3e2067ed73efc2fe42e62831e8ae7f46c4
-master date: 2018-01-16 17:49:03 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 5 +
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 21 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c | 2 +
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 11 +++
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 30 ++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/current.h | 12 +++
- xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 1 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h | 5 +-
- 10 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index b44c95b..f4a3d74 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1507,6 +1507,9 @@ void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
- {
- unsigned long cr4;
-
-+ this_cpu(root_pgt)[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
-+ l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
-+
- cr4 = pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v);
- if ( unlikely(cr4 != read_cr4()) )
- write_cr4(cr4);
-@@ -1676,6 +1679,8 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
-
- ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
-
-+ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+
- cpumask_copy(&dirty_mask, next->vcpu_dirty_cpumask);
- /* Allow at most one CPU at a time to be dirty. */
- ASSERT(cpumask_weight(&dirty_mask) <= 1);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index a7a76a7..6c7d120 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3509,6 +3509,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- struct vcpu *curr = current, *v = curr;
- struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner;
- mfn_t map_mfn = INVALID_MFN;
-+ bool sync_guest = false;
- uint32_t xsm_needed = 0;
- uint32_t xsm_checked = 0;
- int rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
-@@ -3663,6 +3664,8 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- case PGT_l4_page_table:
- rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
-+ if ( !rc )
-+ sync_guest = true;
- break;
- case PGT_writable_page:
- perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
-@@ -3765,6 +3768,24 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- if ( va )
- unmap_domain_page(va);
-
-+ if ( sync_guest )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Force other vCPU-s of the affected guest to pick up L4 entry
-+ * changes (if any). Issue a flush IPI with empty operation mask to
-+ * facilitate this (including ourselves waiting for the IPI to
-+ * actually have arrived). Utilize the fact that FLUSH_VA_VALID is
-+ * meaningless without FLUSH_CACHE, but will allow to pass the no-op
-+ * check in flush_area_mask().
-+ */
-+ unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
-+ cpumask_t *mask = per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu);
-+
-+ cpumask_andnot(mask, pt_owner->domain_dirty_cpumask, cpumask_of(cpu));
-+ if ( !cpumask_empty(mask) )
-+ flush_area_mask(mask, ZERO_BLOCK_PTR, FLUSH_VA_VALID);
-+ }
-+
- perfc_add(num_page_updates, i);
-
- out:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index 1609b62..b1fbb57 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -327,6 +327,9 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
- */
- spin_debug_disable();
-
-+ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
-+
- load_system_tables();
-
- /* Full exception support from here on in. */
-@@ -635,6 +638,187 @@ void cpu_exit_clear(unsigned int cpu)
- set_cpu_state(CPU_STATE_DEAD);
- }
-
-+static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt)
-+{
-+ unsigned long linear = (unsigned long)ptr, pfn;
-+ unsigned int flags;
-+ l3_pgentry_t *pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(linear)]) +
-+ l3_table_offset(linear);
-+ l2_pgentry_t *pl2e;
-+ l1_pgentry_t *pl1e;
-+
-+ if ( linear < DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START )
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ flags = l3e_get_flags(*pl3e);
-+ ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT);
-+ if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE )
-+ {
-+ pfn = (l3e_get_pfn(*pl3e) & ~((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1)) |
-+ (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << (2 * PAGETABLE_ORDER)) - 1));
-+ flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e) + l2_table_offset(linear);
-+ flags = l2e_get_flags(*pl2e);
-+ ASSERT(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT);
-+ if ( flags & _PAGE_PSE )
-+ {
-+ pfn = (l2e_get_pfn(*pl2e) & ~((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1)) |
-+ (PFN_DOWN(linear) & ((1UL << PAGETABLE_ORDER) - 1));
-+ flags &= ~_PAGE_PSE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e) + l1_table_offset(linear);
-+ flags = l1e_get_flags(*pl1e);
-+ if ( !(flags & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ return 0;
-+ pfn = l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ {
-+ pl3e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+ if ( !pl3e )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ clear_page(pl3e);
-+ l4e_write(&rpt[root_table_offset(linear)],
-+ l4e_from_paddr(__pa(pl3e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+ }
-+ else
-+ pl3e = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[root_table_offset(linear)]);
-+
-+ pl3e += l3_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ {
-+ pl2e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+ if ( !pl2e )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ clear_page(pl2e);
-+ l3e_write(pl3e, l3e_from_paddr(__pa(pl2e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(*pl3e) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+ pl2e = l3e_to_l2e(*pl3e);
-+ }
-+
-+ pl2e += l2_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+ if ( !(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ {
-+ pl1e = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+ if ( !pl1e )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ clear_page(pl1e);
-+ l2e_write(pl2e, l2e_from_paddr(__pa(pl1e), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(*pl2e) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+ pl1e = l2e_to_l1e(*pl2e);
-+ }
-+
-+ pl1e += l1_table_offset(linear);
-+
-+ if ( l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(l1e_get_pfn(*pl1e) == pfn);
-+ ASSERT(l1e_get_flags(*pl1e) == flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ l1e_write(pl1e, l1e_from_pfn(pfn, flags));
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
-+
-+static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+ root_pgentry_t *rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+ unsigned int off;
-+ int rc;
-+
-+ if ( !rpt )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ clear_page(rpt);
-+ per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = rpt;
-+
-+ rpt[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] =
-+ idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)];
-+ /* SH_LINEAR_PT inserted together with guest mappings. */
-+ /* PERDOMAIN inserted during context switch. */
-+ rpt[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] =
-+ idle_pg_table[root_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)];
-+
-+ /* Install direct map page table entries for stack, IDT, and TSS. */
-+ for ( off = rc = 0; !rc && off < STACK_SIZE; off += PAGE_SIZE )
-+ rc = clone_mapping(__va(__pa(stack_base[cpu])) + off, rpt);
-+
-+ if ( !rc )
-+ rc = clone_mapping(idt_tables[cpu], rpt);
-+ if ( !rc )
-+ rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), rpt);
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+ root_pgentry_t *rpt = per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu);
-+ unsigned int r;
-+
-+ if ( !rpt )
-+ return;
-+
-+ per_cpu(root_pgt, cpu) = NULL;
-+
-+ for ( r = root_table_offset(DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START);
-+ r < root_table_offset(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END); ++r )
-+ {
-+ l3_pgentry_t *l3t;
-+ unsigned int i3;
-+
-+ if ( !(root_get_flags(rpt[r]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ continue;
-+
-+ l3t = l4e_to_l3e(rpt[r]);
-+
-+ for ( i3 = 0; i3 < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i3 )
-+ {
-+ l2_pgentry_t *l2t;
-+ unsigned int i2;
-+
-+ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ continue;
-+
-+ ASSERT(!(l3e_get_flags(l3t[i3]) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+ l2t = l3e_to_l2e(l3t[i3]);
-+
-+ for ( i2 = 0; i2 < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i2 )
-+ {
-+ if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ continue;
-+
-+ ASSERT(!(l2e_get_flags(l2t[i2]) & _PAGE_PSE));
-+ free_xen_pagetable(l2e_to_l1e(l2t[i2]));
-+ }
-+
-+ free_xen_pagetable(l2t);
-+ }
-+
-+ free_xen_pagetable(l3t);
-+ }
-+
-+ free_xen_pagetable(rpt);
-+}
-+
- static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
- {
- unsigned int order, socket = cpu_to_socket(cpu);
-@@ -673,6 +857,8 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
- free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn));
- }
-
-+ cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu);
-+
- order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES);
- free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order);
-
-@@ -728,6 +914,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NONE);
- set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
-
-+ if ( setup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu) )
-+ goto oom;
-+
- for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1);
- i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i )
- if ( cpu_online(i) && cpu_to_node(i) == node )
-@@ -783,6 +972,8 @@ static struct notifier_block cpu_smpboot_nfb = {
-
- void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
- {
-+ int rc;
-+
- register_cpu_notifier(&cpu_smpboot_nfb);
-
- mtrr_aps_sync_begin();
-@@ -796,6 +987,11 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
-
- stack_base[0] = stack_start;
-
-+ rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0);
-+ if ( rc )
-+ panic("Error %d setting up PV root page table\n", rc);
-+ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
-+
- set_nr_sockets();
-
- socket_cpumask = xzalloc_array(cpumask_t *, nr_sockets);
-@@ -864,6 +1060,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
- #if NR_CPUS > 2 * BITS_PER_LONG
- per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu) = &scratch_cpu0mask;
- #endif
-+
-+ get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
- }
-
- static void
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-index e136af6..b1a4310 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
-@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ void __dummy__(void)
- OFFSET(CPUINFO_processor_id, struct cpu_info, processor_id);
- OFFSET(CPUINFO_current_vcpu, struct cpu_info, current_vcpu);
- OFFSET(CPUINFO_cr4, struct cpu_info, cr4);
-+ OFFSET(CPUINFO_xen_cr3, struct cpu_info, xen_cr3);
-+ OFFSET(CPUINFO_pv_cr3, struct cpu_info, pv_cr3);
- DEFINE(CPUINFO_sizeof, sizeof(struct cpu_info));
- BLANK();
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index 3fea54e..e668f00 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -199,6 +199,17 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
- pushq $0
- movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
- SAVE_ALL
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Lcstar_cr3_okay
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+ neg %rcx
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lcstar_cr3_okay:
-+
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
- movq VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx
- cmpb $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 1dd9ccf..fc38874 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -37,6 +37,32 @@ ENTRY(switch_to_kernel)
- /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
- restore_all_guest:
- ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
-+
-+ /* Copy guest mappings and switch to per-CPU root page table. */
-+ mov %cr3, %r9
-+ GET_STACK_END(dx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rdx), %rdi
-+ movabs $PADDR_MASK & PAGE_MASK, %rsi
-+ movabs $DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START, %rcx
-+ mov %rdi, %rax
-+ and %rsi, %rdi
-+ and %r9, %rsi
-+ add %rcx, %rdi
-+ add %rcx, %rsi
-+ mov $ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT, %ecx
-+ mov root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rsi), %r8
-+ mov %r8, root_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)*8(%rdi)
-+ rep movsq
-+ mov $ROOT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - \
-+ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1, %ecx
-+ sub $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \
-+ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rsi
-+ sub $(ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT - \
-+ ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT - 1) * 8, %rdi
-+ rep movsq
-+ mov %r9, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rdx)
-+ write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+
- RESTORE_ALL
- testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
- jz iret_exit_to_guest
-@@ -71,6 +97,22 @@ iret_exit_to_guest:
- ALIGN
- /* No special register assumptions. */
- restore_all_xen:
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we need to switch to the per-CPU page tables, in
-+ * case we return to late PV exit code (from an NMI or #MC).
-+ */
-+ GET_STACK_END(ax)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rax), %rdx
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(pv_cr3)(%rax), %rax
-+ test %rdx, %rdx
-+ /*
-+ * Ideally the condition would be "nsz", but such doesn't exist,
-+ * so "g" will have to do.
-+ */
-+UNLIKELY_START(g, exit_cr3)
-+ write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+UNLIKELY_END(exit_cr3)
-+
- RESTORE_ALL adj=8
- iretq
-
-@@ -100,7 +142,18 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter)
- pushq $0
- movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
- SAVE_ALL
-- GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Llstar_cr3_okay
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+ neg %rcx
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Llstar_cr3_okay:
-+
-+ __GET_CURRENT(bx)
- testb $TF_kernel_mode,VCPU_thread_flags(%rbx)
- jz switch_to_kernel
-
-@@ -192,7 +245,18 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
- pushq $0
- movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
- SAVE_ALL
-- GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Lsyse_cr3_okay
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+ neg %rcx
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lsyse_cr3_okay:
-+
-+ __GET_CURRENT(bx)
- cmpb $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx)
- movq VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax
- setne %cl
-@@ -228,13 +292,23 @@ ENTRY(int80_direct_trap)
- movl $0x80, 4(%rsp)
- SAVE_ALL
-
-+ GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rcx
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Lint80_cr3_okay
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+ neg %rcx
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx)
-+.Lint80_cr3_okay:
-+
- cmpb $0,untrusted_msi(%rip)
- UNLIKELY_START(ne, msi_check)
- movl $0x80,%edi
- call check_for_unexpected_msi
- UNLIKELY_END(msi_check)
-
-- GET_CURRENT(bx)
-+ __GET_CURRENT(bx)
-
- /* Check that the callback is non-null. */
- leaq VCPU_int80_bounce(%rbx),%rdx
-@@ -391,9 +465,27 @@ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
-
- ENTRY(common_interrupt)
- SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(14)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+ mov %rcx, %r15
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Lintr_cr3_okay
-+ jns .Lintr_cr3_load
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+ neg %rcx
-+.Lintr_cr3_load:
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ xor %ecx, %ecx
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+ testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-+ cmovnz %rcx, %r15
-+.Lintr_cr3_okay:
-+
- CR4_PV32_RESTORE
- movq %rsp,%rdi
- callq do_IRQ
-+ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
- jmp ret_from_intr
-
- /* No special register assumptions. */
-@@ -411,6 +503,23 @@ ENTRY(page_fault)
- /* No special register assumptions. */
- GLOBAL(handle_exception)
- SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(14)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+ mov %rcx, %r15
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .Lxcpt_cr3_okay
-+ jns .Lxcpt_cr3_load
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+ neg %rcx
-+.Lxcpt_cr3_load:
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ xor %ecx, %ecx
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+ testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-+ cmovnz %rcx, %r15
-+.Lxcpt_cr3_okay:
-+
- handle_exception_saved:
- GET_CURRENT(bx)
- testb $X86_EFLAGS_IF>>8,UREGS_eflags+1(%rsp)
-@@ -475,6 +584,7 @@ handle_exception_saved:
- leaq exception_table(%rip),%rdx
- PERFC_INCR(exceptions, %rax, %rbx)
- callq *(%rdx,%rax,8)
-+ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
- testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp)
- jz restore_all_xen
- leaq VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx
-@@ -507,6 +617,7 @@ exception_with_ints_disabled:
- rep; movsq # make room for ec/ev
- 1: movq UREGS_error_code(%rsp),%rax # ec/ev
- movq %rax,UREGS_kernel_sizeof(%rsp)
-+ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
- jmp restore_all_xen # return to fixup code
-
- /* No special register assumptions. */
-@@ -585,6 +696,17 @@ ENTRY(double_fault)
- movl $TRAP_double_fault,4(%rsp)
- /* Set AC to reduce chance of further SMAP faults */
- SAVE_ALL STAC
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(bx)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rbx), %rbx
-+ test %rbx, %rbx
-+ jz .Ldblf_cr3_okay
-+ jns .Ldblf_cr3_load
-+ neg %rbx
-+.Ldblf_cr3_load:
-+ write_cr3 rbx, rdi, rsi
-+.Ldblf_cr3_okay:
-+
- movq %rsp,%rdi
- call do_double_fault
- BUG /* do_double_fault() shouldn't return. */
-@@ -603,10 +725,28 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
- movl $TRAP_nmi,4(%rsp)
- handle_ist_exception:
- SAVE_ALL CLAC
-+
-+ GET_STACK_END(14)
-+ mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-+ mov %rcx, %r15
-+ neg %rcx
-+ jz .List_cr3_okay
-+ jns .List_cr3_load
-+ mov %rcx, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+ neg %rcx
-+.List_cr3_load:
-+ write_cr3 rcx, rdi, rsi
-+ movq $0, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
-+.List_cr3_okay:
-+
- CR4_PV32_RESTORE
- testb $3,UREGS_cs(%rsp)
- jz 1f
-- /* Interrupted guest context. Copy the context to stack bottom. */
-+ /*
-+ * Interrupted guest context. Clear the restore value for xen_cr3
-+ * and copy the context to stack bottom.
-+ */
-+ xor %r15, %r15
- GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs,di)
- movq %rsp,%rsi
- movl $UREGS_kernel_sizeof/8,%ecx
-@@ -616,6 +756,7 @@ handle_ist_exception:
- movzbl UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp),%eax
- leaq exception_table(%rip),%rdx
- callq *(%rdx,%rax,8)
-+ mov %r15, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14)
- cmpb $TRAP_nmi,UREGS_entry_vector(%rsp)
- jne ret_from_intr
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-index 98192eb..fb0fee9 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
-@@ -93,9 +93,30 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
- UNLIKELY_DONE(mp, tag); \
- __UNLIKELY_END(tag)
-
-+ .equ .Lrax, 0
-+ .equ .Lrcx, 1
-+ .equ .Lrdx, 2
-+ .equ .Lrbx, 3
-+ .equ .Lrsp, 4
-+ .equ .Lrbp, 5
-+ .equ .Lrsi, 6
-+ .equ .Lrdi, 7
-+ .equ .Lr8, 8
-+ .equ .Lr9, 9
-+ .equ .Lr10, 10
-+ .equ .Lr11, 11
-+ .equ .Lr12, 12
-+ .equ .Lr13, 13
-+ .equ .Lr14, 14
-+ .equ .Lr15, 15
-+
- #define STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(field) (1 - CPUINFO_sizeof + CPUINFO_##field)
- #define GET_STACK_END(reg) \
-+ .if .Lr##reg > 8; \
-+ movq $STACK_SIZE-1, %r##reg; \
-+ .else; \
- movl $STACK_SIZE-1, %e##reg; \
-+ .endif; \
- orq %rsp, %r##reg
-
- #define GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(field, reg) \
-@@ -177,6 +198,15 @@ void ret_from_intr(void);
- #define ASM_STAC ASM_AC(STAC)
- #define ASM_CLAC ASM_AC(CLAC)
-
-+.macro write_cr3 val:req, tmp1:req, tmp2:req
-+ mov %cr4, %\tmp1
-+ mov %\tmp1, %\tmp2
-+ and $~X86_CR4_PGE, %\tmp1
-+ mov %\tmp1, %cr4
-+ mov %\val, %cr3
-+ mov %\tmp2, %cr4
-+.endm
-+
- #define CR4_PV32_RESTORE \
- 667: ASM_NOP5; \
- .pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "ax"; \
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-index 8984992..b929c48 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
-@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@ struct cpu_info {
- struct vcpu *current_vcpu;
- unsigned long per_cpu_offset;
- unsigned long cr4;
-+ /*
-+ * Of the two following fields the latter is being set to the CR3 value
-+ * to be used on the given pCPU for loading whenever 64-bit PV guest
-+ * context is being entered. The value never changes once set.
-+ * The former is the value to restore when re-entering Xen, if any. IOW
-+ * its value being zero means there's nothing to restore. However, its
-+ * value can also be negative, indicating to the exit-to-Xen code that
-+ * restoring is not necessary, but allowing any nested entry code paths
-+ * to still know the value to put back into CR3.
-+ */
-+ unsigned long xen_cr3;
-+ unsigned long pv_cr3;
- /* get_stack_bottom() must be 16-byte aligned */
- };
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-index 41a8d8c..2962e83 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-@@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ extern idt_entry_t idt_table[];
- extern idt_entry_t *idt_tables[];
-
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
-+DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
-
- extern void init_int80_direct_trap(struct vcpu *v);
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-index 6fb7cd5..05a0334 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/page.h
-@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@
- /* These are architectural limits. Current CPUs support only 40-bit phys. */
- #define PADDR_BITS 52
- #define VADDR_BITS 48
--#define PADDR_MASK ((1UL << PADDR_BITS)-1)
--#define VADDR_MASK ((1UL << VADDR_BITS)-1)
-+#define PADDR_MASK ((_AC(1,UL) << PADDR_BITS) - 1)
-+#define VADDR_MASK ((_AC(1,UL) << VADDR_BITS) - 1)
-
- #define VADDR_TOP_BIT (1UL << (VADDR_BITS - 1))
- #define CANONICAL_MASK (~0UL & ~VADDR_MASK)
-@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ typedef l4_pgentry_t root_pgentry_t;
- : (((_s) < ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT) || \
- ((_s) > ROOT_PAGETABLE_LAST_XEN_SLOT)))
-
-+#define root_table_offset l4_table_offset
- #define root_get_pfn l4e_get_pfn
- #define root_get_flags l4e_get_flags
- #define root_get_intpte l4e_get_intpte
---
-2.1.4
-
-From 7cccd6f748ec724cf9408cec6b3ec8e54a8a2c1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:57:33 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86: allow Meltdown band-aid to be disabled
-
-First of all we don't need it on AMD systems. Additionally allow its use
-to be controlled by command line option. For best backportability, this
-intentionally doesn't use alternative instruction patching to achieve
-the intended effect - while we likely want it, this will be later
-follow-up.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: e871e80c38547d9faefc6604532ba3e985e65873
-master date: 2018-01-16 17:50:59 +0100
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 12 ++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 7 +++++--
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 2 ++
- 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 781110d..49539b4 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1849,6 +1849,18 @@ In the case that x2apic is in use, this option switches between physical and
- clustered mode. The default, given no hint from the **FADT**, is cluster
- mode.
-
-+### xpti
-+> `= <boolean>`
-+
-+> Default: `false` on AMD hardware
-+> Default: `true` everywhere else
-+
-+Override default selection of whether to isolate 64-bit PV guest page
-+tables.
-+
-+** WARNING: Not yet a complete isolation implementation, but better than
-+nothing. **
-+
- ### xsave
- > `= <boolean>`
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index f4a3d74..b357b60 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1505,10 +1505,13 @@ void paravirt_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v)
-
- void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
- {
-+ root_pgentry_t *root_pgt = this_cpu(root_pgt);
- unsigned long cr4;
-
-- this_cpu(root_pgt)[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
-- l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
-+ if ( root_pgt )
-+ root_pgt[root_table_offset(PERDOMAIN_VIRT_START)] =
-+ l4e_from_page(v->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg,
-+ __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
-
- cr4 = pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v);
- if ( unlikely(cr4 != read_cr4()) )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 6c7d120..53295f8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
- if ( !rc )
-- sync_guest = true;
-+ sync_guest = this_cpu(root_pgt);
- break;
- case PGT_writable_page:
- perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index b1fbb57..edf607f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
- spin_debug_disable();
-
- get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-- get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
-+ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = this_cpu(root_pgt) ? __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt)) : 0;
-
- load_system_tables();
-
-@@ -736,14 +736,20 @@ static int clone_mapping(const void *ptr, root_pgentry_t *rpt)
- return 0;
- }
-
-+static __read_mostly int8_t opt_xpti = -1;
-+boolean_param("xpti", opt_xpti);
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
-
- static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
- {
-- root_pgentry_t *rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
-+ root_pgentry_t *rpt;
- unsigned int off;
- int rc;
-
-+ if ( !opt_xpti )
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ rpt = alloc_xen_pagetable();
- if ( !rpt )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-@@ -987,10 +993,14 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
-
- stack_base[0] = stack_start;
-
-+ if ( opt_xpti < 0 )
-+ opt_xpti = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD;
-+
- rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0);
- if ( rc )
- panic("Error %d setting up PV root page table\n", rc);
-- get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
-+ if ( per_cpu(root_pgt, 0) )
-+ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0));
-
- set_nr_sockets();
-
-@@ -1062,6 +1072,7 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
- #endif
-
- get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
-+ get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = 0;
- }
-
- static void
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index fc38874..a8825c8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ restore_all_guest:
- movabs $DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START, %rcx
- mov %rdi, %rax
- and %rsi, %rdi
-+ jz .Lrag_keep_cr3
- and %r9, %rsi
- add %rcx, %rdi
- add %rcx, %rsi
-@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ restore_all_guest:
- rep movsq
- mov %r9, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%rdx)
- write_cr3 rax, rdi, rsi
-+.Lrag_keep_cr3:
-
- RESTORE_ALL
- testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f8bba9e516..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab/ARM: don't corrupt shared GFN array
-
-... by writing status GFNs to it. Introduce a second array instead.
-Also implement gnttab_status_gmfn() properly now that the information is
-suitably being tracked.
-
-While touching it anyway, remove a misguided (but luckily benign) upper
-bound check from gnttab_shared_gmfn(): We should never access beyond the
-bounds of that array.
-
-This is part of XSA-255.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
-v3: Don't init the ARM GFN arrays to zero anymore, use INVALID_GFN.
-v2: New.
-
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -3775,6 +3775,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
- {
- int rc = 0;
- struct grant_table *gt = d->grant_table;
-+ bool status = false;
-
- grant_write_lock(gt);
-
-@@ -3785,6 +3786,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
- (idx & XENMAPIDX_grant_table_status) )
- {
- idx &= ~XENMAPIDX_grant_table_status;
-+ status = true;
- if ( idx < nr_status_frames(gt) )
- *mfn = _mfn(virt_to_mfn(gt->status[idx]));
- else
-@@ -3802,7 +3804,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
- }
-
- if ( !rc )
-- gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn);
-+ gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx, gfn);
-
- grant_write_unlock(gt);
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
- #define INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES 1U
-
- struct grant_table_arch {
-- gfn_t *gfn;
-+ gfn_t *shared_gfn;
-+ gfn_t *status_gfn;
- };
-
- void gnttab_clear_flag(unsigned long nr, uint16_t *addr);
-@@ -21,7 +22,6 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(unsigned
- unsigned long new_gpaddr, unsigned int flags);
- void gnttab_mark_dirty(struct domain *d, unsigned long l);
- #define gnttab_create_status_page(d, t, i) do {} while (0)
--#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i) (0)
- #define gnttab_release_host_mappings(domain) 1
- static inline int replace_grant_supported(void)
- {
-@@ -42,19 +42,35 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
-
- #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) \
- ({ \
-- (gt)->arch.gfn = xzalloc_array(gfn_t, (gt)->max_grant_frames); \
-- ( (gt)->arch.gfn ? 0 : -ENOMEM ); \
-+ unsigned int ngf_ = (gt)->max_grant_frames; \
-+ unsigned int nsf_ = grant_to_status_frames(ngf_); \
-+ \
-+ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, ngf_); \
-+ (gt)->arch.status_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, nsf_); \
-+ if ( (gt)->arch.shared_gfn && (gt)->arch.status_gfn ) \
-+ { \
-+ while ( ngf_-- ) \
-+ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn[ngf_] = INVALID_GFN; \
-+ while ( nsf_-- ) \
-+ (gt)->arch.status_gfn[nsf_] = INVALID_GFN; \
-+ } \
-+ else \
-+ gnttab_destroy_arch(gt); \
-+ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn ? 0 : -ENOMEM; \
- })
-
- #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) \
- do { \
-- xfree((gt)->arch.gfn); \
-- (gt)->arch.gfn = NULL; \
-+ xfree((gt)->arch.shared_gfn); \
-+ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn = NULL; \
-+ xfree((gt)->arch.status_gfn); \
-+ (gt)->arch.status_gfn = NULL; \
- } while ( 0 )
-
--#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn) \
-+#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) \
- do { \
-- (gt)->arch.gfn[idx] = gfn; \
-+ ((st) ? (gt)->arch.status_gfn : (gt)->arch.shared_gfn)[idx] = \
-+ (gfn); \
- } while ( 0 )
-
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
-@@ -65,8 +81,10 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
- } while ( 0 )
-
- #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i) \
-- ( ((i >= nr_grant_frames(t)) && \
-- (i < (t)->max_grant_frames))? 0 : gfn_x((t)->arch.gfn[i]))
-+ gfn_x(((i) >= nr_grant_frames(t)) ? INVALID_GFN : (t)->arch.shared_gfn[i])
-+
-+#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i) \
-+ gfn_x(((i) >= nr_status_frames(t)) ? INVALID_GFN : (t)->arch.status_gfn[i])
-
- #define gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(d) \
- (is_domain_direct_mapped(d) && need_iommu(d))
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
-
- #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) 0
- #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) do {} while ( 0 )
--#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
-+#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
-
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
- do { \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 402b6efe98..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: don't blindly free status pages upon version change
-
-There may still be active mappings, which would trigger the respective
-BUG_ON(). Split the loop into one dealing with the page attributes and
-the second (when the first fully passed) freeing the pages. Return an
-error if any pages still have pending references.
-
-This is part of XSA-255.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
-v4: Add gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, ...) to domain_crash() invocations.
-v3: Call guest_physmap_remove_page() from gnttab_map_frame(), making the
- code unconditional at the same time. Re-base over changes to first
- patch.
-v2: Also deal with translated guests.
-
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -1636,23 +1636,74 @@ status_alloc_failed:
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
--static void
-+static int
- gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
- {
-- int i;
-+ unsigned int i;
-
- for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
- {
- struct page_info *pg = virt_to_page(gt->status[i]);
-+ gfn_t gfn = gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, true, i);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For translated domains, recovering from failure after partial
-+ * changes were made is more complicated than it seems worth
-+ * implementing at this time. Hence respective error paths below
-+ * crash the domain in such a case.
-+ */
-+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+ {
-+ int rc = gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN)
-+ ? 0
-+ : guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn,
-+ _mfn(page_to_mfn(pg)), 0);
-+
-+ if ( rc )
-+ {
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+ "Could not remove status frame %u (GFN %#lx) from P2M\n",
-+ i, gfn_x(gfn));
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ return rc;
-+ }
-+ gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, true, i, INVALID_GFN);
-+ }
-
- BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d);
- if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
- put_page(pg);
-- BUG_ON(pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap);
-+
-+ if ( pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap )
-+ {
-+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+ {
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+ "Wrong page state %#lx of status frame %u (GFN %#lx)\n",
-+ pg->count_info, i, gfn_x(gfn));
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ if ( get_page(pg, d) )
-+ set_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info);
-+ while ( i-- )
-+ gnttab_create_status_page(d, gt, i);
-+ }
-+ return -EBUSY;
-+ }
-+
-+ page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
-+ {
- free_xenheap_page(gt->status[i]);
- gt->status[i] = NULL;
- }
- gt->nr_status_frames = 0;
-+
-+ return 0;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -2962,8 +3013,9 @@ gnttab_set_version(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARA
- break;
- }
-
-- if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 )
-- gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt);
-+ if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 &&
-+ (res = gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt)) != 0 )
-+ goto out_unlock;
-
- /* Make sure there's no crud left over from the old version. */
- for ( i = 0; i < nr_grant_frames(gt); i++ )
-@@ -3803,6 +3855,11 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
- rc = -EINVAL;
- }
-
-+ if ( !rc && paging_mode_translate(d) &&
-+ !gfn_eq(gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx), INVALID_GFN) )
-+ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx),
-+ *mfn, 0);
-+
- if ( !rc )
- gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx, gfn);
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
- (gfn); \
- } while ( 0 )
-
-+#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx) ({ \
-+ _gfn((st) ? gnttab_status_gmfn(NULL, gt, idx) \
-+ : gnttab_shared_gmfn(NULL, gt, idx)); \
-+})
-+
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
- do { \
- share_xen_page_with_guest( \
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
-@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
- #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) 0
- #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) do {} while ( 0 )
- #define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
-+#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx) ({ \
-+ unsigned long mfn_ = (st) ? gnttab_status_mfn(gt, idx) \
-+ : gnttab_shared_mfn(gt, idx); \
-+ unsigned long gpfn_ = get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_); \
-+ VALID_M2P(gpfn_) ? _gfn(gpfn_) : INVALID_GFN; \
-+})
-
- #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
- do { \
-@@ -63,11 +69,11 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
- } while ( 0 )
-
-
--#define gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i) \
-+#define gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i) \
- ((virt_to_maddr((t)->shared_raw[i]) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
-
- #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i) \
-- (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i)))
-+ (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i)))
-
-
- #define gnttab_status_mfn(t, i) \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa256.patch b/main/xen/xsa256.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50ff24e17b..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa256.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/hvm: Disallow the creation of HVM domains without Local APIC emulation
-
-There are multiple problems, not necesserily limited to:
-
- * Guests which configure event channels via hvmop_set_evtchn_upcall_vector(),
- or which hit %cr8 emulation will cause Xen to fall over a NULL vlapic->regs
- pointer.
-
- * On Intel hardware, disabling the TPR_SHADOW execution control without
- reenabling CR8_{LOAD,STORE} interception means that the guests %cr8
- accesses interact with the real TPR. Amongst other things, setting the
- real TPR to 0xf blocks even IPIs from interrupting this CPU.
-
- * On hardware which sets up the use of Interrupt Posting, including
- IOMMU-Posting, guests run without the appropriate non-root configuration,
- which at a minimum will result in dropped interrupts.
-
-Whether no-LAPIC mode is of any use at all remains to be seen.
-
-This is XSA-256.
-
-Reported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index f93327b..f65fc12 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static bool emulation_flags_ok(const struct domain *d, uint32_t emflags)
- if ( is_hardware_domain(d) &&
- emflags != (XEN_X86_EMU_LAPIC|XEN_X86_EMU_IOAPIC) )
- return false;
-- if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) && emflags &&
-+ if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) &&
- emflags != XEN_X86_EMU_ALL && emflags != XEN_X86_EMU_LAPIC )
- return false;
- }
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-29 12:03:44 +0000