diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/krb5')
-rw-r--r-- | main/krb5/APKBUILD | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/krb5/CVE-2014-5353.patch | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/krb5/CVE-2014-5354.patch | 113 |
3 files changed, 185 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/main/krb5/APKBUILD b/main/krb5/APKBUILD index d77754fc3e..7c8a9827e6 100644 --- a/main/krb5/APKBUILD +++ b/main/krb5/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=krb5 pkgver=1.13 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 case $pkgver in *.*.*) _ver=${pkgver%.*};; @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-server $pkgname-server-ldap:ldap $pkgname-pkinit $pkgname-libs" source="http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/${_ver}/krb5-$pkgver-signed.tar mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch + CVE-2014-5353.patch + CVE-2014-5354.patch krb5kadmind.initd krb5kdc.initd @@ -120,16 +122,22 @@ libs() { md5sums="fa5d4dcd7b79e2165d0ec4affa0956ea krb5-1.13-signed.tar c84a0c7d8014e3528524956ffdd1c3e9 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +491f8cdf54124ab52eb414b8075c6be7 CVE-2014-5353.patch +ec1e83cc8fd39af0a0e47041d21998d1 CVE-2014-5354.patch 29906e70e15025dda8b315d8209cab4c krb5kadmind.initd 47efe7f24c98316d38ea46ad629b3517 krb5kdc.initd 3e0b8313c1e5bfb7625f35e76a5e53f1 krb5kpropd.initd" sha256sums="dc8f79ae9ab777d0f815e84ed02ac4ccfe3d5826eb4947a195dfce9fd95a9582 krb5-1.13-signed.tar 84007c7423f67db7a8b248b9643c49ef25f2d56ce15c2574eb41ecbf51bcd3f2 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +fcdfd81dc63abbdeaca4eb5bbcd3c3088c44e3a96aa7fe191f82c341d38f360c CVE-2014-5353.patch +616362df107bb63fd060ed3084e98d3523bbea245ff1cef6bd2074a27838ae61 CVE-2014-5354.patch c7a1ec03472996daaaaf1a4703566113c80f72ee8605d247098a25a13dad1f5f krb5kadmind.initd 709309dea043aa306c2fcf0960e0993a6db540c220de64cf92d6b85f1cca23c5 krb5kdc.initd 86b15d691e32b331ac756ee368b7364de6ab238dcae5adfed2a00b57d1b64ef4 krb5kpropd.initd" sha512sums="99cf647ab39f5a34acaf2049908f91d3f3822f4afd3b9dad1630b31c72518398069f4f3d3840168122cb12aa5e5540466729bc714fbda96eb9403e635f88d244 krb5-1.13-signed.tar 5a3782ff17b383f8cd0415fd13538ab56afd788130d6ad640e9f2682b7deaae7f25713ce358058ed771091040dccf62a3bc87e6fd473d505ec189a95debcc801 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +736753afb36bc494bc42f3cd33fc013ad49625e8d90672b85784f9f4fe96ff8d3f8c014aa1678d8892cb4204243369ee583232047fa9178fcdff03ab4087b171 CVE-2014-5353.patch +e795258f958cd5ce86ff9930bdb7b119253d694bff32c0e4a9a414f184678d52f556a1f24af8032e447a2ecb24de24a50e8590d33019be2028ce452c8915daa9 CVE-2014-5354.patch 561af06b4e0f0e130dda345ad934bcdb9984ec00cc38d871df1d3bb3f9e1c7d86f06db5b03229707c88b96ad324e3a2222420f8494aa431002cacea0246b1153 krb5kadmind.initd d6d0076886ce284fc395fafc2dc253b4b3ee97b2986dea51388d96a1e1294680fb171f475efc7844559e2c6aac44b26678a9255921db9a58dcf2e7164f0aeec5 krb5kdc.initd f97d33fa977c132a470d95fd539d8e8db018e03f28dbc9d3e04faf78ebb7392196e7d5135f138c2390979bf37b3ae0265e6827f0c17b44b277eb2dfff0a96f77 krb5kpropd.initd" diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5353.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5353.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e96c36092b --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5353.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From d1f707024f1d0af6e54a18885322d70fa15ec4d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu> +Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 14:01:39 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix LDAP misused policy name crash [CVE-2014-5353] + +In krb5_ldap_get_password_policy_from_dn, if LDAP_SEARCH returns +successfully with no results, return KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY instead of +returning success with a zeroed-out policy object. This fixes a null +dereference when an admin attempts to use an LDAP ticket policy name +as a password policy name. + +CVE-2014-5353: + +In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC +database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference +by attempting to use a named ticket policy object as a password policy +for a principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who +has the elevated privilege for setting password policy by adding or +modifying principals. + +Queries to LDAP scoped to the krbPwdPolicy object class will correctly +not return entries of other classes, such as ticket policy objects, but +may return success with no returned elements if an object with the +requested DN exists in a different object class. In this case, the +routine to retrieve a password policy returned success with a password +policy object that consisted entirely of zeroed memory. In particular, +accesses to the policy name will dereference a NULL pointer. KDC +operation does not access the policy name field, but most kadmin +operations involving the principal with incorrect password policy +will trigger the crash. + +Thanks to Patrik Kis for reporting this problem. + +CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C + +[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score] + +ticket: 8051 (new) +target_version: 1.13.1 +tags: pullup +--- + src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_pwd_policy.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_pwd_policy.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_pwd_policy.c +index 522773e..6779f51 100644 +--- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_pwd_policy.c ++++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_pwd_policy.c +@@ -314,10 +314,11 @@ krb5_ldap_get_password_policy_from_dn(krb5_context context, char *pol_name, + LDAP_SEARCH(pol_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "(objectclass=krbPwdPolicy)", password_policy_attributes); + + ent=ldap_first_entry(ld, result); +- if (ent != NULL) { +- if ((st = populate_policy(context, ld, ent, pol_name, *policy)) != 0) +- goto cleanup; ++ if (ent == NULL) { ++ st = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY; ++ goto cleanup; + } ++ st = populate_policy(context, ld, ent, pol_name, *policy); + + cleanup: + ldap_msgfree(result); diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5354.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5354.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01aef2c0ed --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2014-5354.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From 04038bf3633c4b909b5ded3072dc88c8c419bf16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> +Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 12:04:46 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354] + +Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or +"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with +no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return +NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in +krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(). + +Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key +principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and +slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more +appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when +n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both +entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library, +the correct behavior for a keyless principal. + +However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP +library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get +a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only +add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a +Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional +on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean. + +CVE-2014-5354: + +In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC +database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL +dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which +contains no long-term keys. + +In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry +from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the +LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a +NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the +LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array +did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present, +returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was +unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP +operations to perform. + +Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for +principal entries to have no long-term key material, and +therefore are not vulnerable. + + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C + +ticket: 8041 (new) +tags: pullup +target_version: 1.13.1 +subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries +--- + src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c | 25 +++++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c +index 3e560d9..10b5982 100644 +--- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c ++++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c +@@ -406,14 +406,14 @@ krb5_encode_krbsecretkey(krb5_key_data *key_data_in, int n_key_data, + int num_versions = 1; + int i, j, last; + krb5_error_code err = 0; +- krb5_key_data *key_data; ++ krb5_key_data *key_data = NULL; + +- if (n_key_data <= 0) ++ if (n_key_data < 0) + return NULL; + + /* Make a shallow copy of the key data so we can alter it. */ + key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(*key_data), &err); +- if (key_data_in == NULL) ++ if (key_data == NULL) + goto cleanup; + memcpy(key_data, key_data_in, n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data)); + +@@ -467,9 +467,8 @@ krb5_encode_krbsecretkey(krb5_key_data *key_data_in, int n_key_data, + free(key_data); + if (err != 0) { + if (ret != NULL) { +- for (i = 0; i <= num_versions; i++) +- if (ret[i] != NULL) +- free (ret[i]); ++ for (i = 0; ret[i] != NULL; i++) ++ free (ret[i]); + free (ret); + ret = NULL; + } +@@ -1036,9 +1035,19 @@ krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry, + bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data, + entry->n_key_data, mkvno); + +- if ((st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey", +- LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey)) != 0) ++ if (bersecretkey == NULL) { ++ st = ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; ++ } ++ /* An empty list of bervals is only accepted for modify operations, ++ * not add operations. */ ++ if (bersecretkey[0] != NULL || !create_standalone_prinicipal) { ++ st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey", ++ LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ++ bersecretkey); ++ if (st != 0) ++ goto cleanup; ++ } + + if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) { + memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); |