diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/libxcursor/CVE-2013-2003.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | main/libxcursor/CVE-2013-2003.patch | 34 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxcursor/CVE-2013-2003.patch b/main/libxcursor/CVE-2013-2003.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4f41e1453 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/libxcursor/CVE-2013-2003.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 8f677eaea05290531d007d1fec2768119926088d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 04:17:28 +0000 +Subject: signedness bug & integer overflow in _XcursorFileHeaderCreate() [CVE-2013-2003] + +When parsing cursor files, a user defined (e.g. through environment +variables) cursor file is opened and parsed. + +The header is read in _XcursorReadFileHeader(), which reads an unsigned +int for the number of toc structures in the header, but it was being +passed to _XcursorFileHeaderCreate() as a signed int to allocate those +structures. If the number was negative, it would pass the bounds check +and could overflow the calculation for how much memory to allocate to +store the data being read, leading to overflowing the buffer with the +data read from the user controlled file. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +--- +diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c +index efe6d4b..ce9de78 100644 +--- a/src/file.c ++++ b/src/file.c +@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ _XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader) + } + + static XcursorFileHeader * +-_XcursorFileHeaderCreate (int ntoc) ++_XcursorFileHeaderCreate (XcursorUInt ntoc) + { + XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader; + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe |