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-rw-r--r--main/libxrandr/0005-integer-overflow-in-XRRGetOutputProperty-CVE-2013-19.patch81
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 81 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxrandr/0005-integer-overflow-in-XRRGetOutputProperty-CVE-2013-19.patch b/main/libxrandr/0005-integer-overflow-in-XRRGetOutputProperty-CVE-2013-19.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 225924c639..0000000000
--- a/main/libxrandr/0005-integer-overflow-in-XRRGetOutputProperty-CVE-2013-19.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 289a1927949e6f278c18d115772e454837702e35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 4 May 2013 21:37:49 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 5/7] integer overflow in XRRGetOutputProperty() [CVE-2013-1986
- 3/4]
-
-If the reported number of properties is too large, the calculations
-to allocate memory for them may overflow, leaving us returning less
-memory to the caller than implied by the value written to *nitems.
-
-(Same as reported against libX11 XGetWindowProperty by Ilja Van Sprundel)
-
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XrrProperty.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XrrProperty.c b/src/XrrProperty.c
-index 50382bf..707a28d 100644
---- a/src/XrrProperty.c
-+++ b/src/XrrProperty.c
-@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ XRRGetOutputProperty (Display *dpy, RROutput output,
- XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
- xRRGetOutputPropertyReply rep;
- xRRGetOutputPropertyReq *req;
-- long nbytes, rbytes;
-+ unsigned long nbytes, rbytes;
-
- RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, 1);
-
-@@ -282,34 +282,40 @@ XRRGetOutputProperty (Display *dpy, RROutput output,
-
- *prop = (unsigned char *) NULL;
- if (rep.propertyType != None) {
-+ int format = rep.format;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Protect against both integer overflow and just plain oversized
-+ * memory allocation - no server should ever return this many props.
-+ */
-+ if (rep.nItems >= (INT_MAX >> 4))
-+ format = -1; /* fall through to default error case */
-+
- /*
- * One extra byte is malloced than is needed to contain the property
- * data, but this last byte is null terminated and convenient for
- * returning string properties, so the client doesn't then have to
- * recopy the string to make it null terminated.
- */
-- switch (rep.format) {
-+ switch (format) {
- case 8:
- nbytes = rep.nItems;
- rbytes = rep.nItems + 1;
-- if (rbytes > 0 &&
-- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
-+ if (rbytes > 0 && (*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
- _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes);
- break;
-
- case 16:
- nbytes = rep.nItems << 1;
- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1;
-- if (rbytes > 0 &&
-- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
-+ if (rbytes > 0 && (*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
- _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes);
- break;
-
- case 32:
- nbytes = rep.nItems << 2;
- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1;
-- if (rbytes > 0 &&
-- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
-+ if (rbytes > 0 && (*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
- _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes);
- break;
-
---
-1.8.2.3
-