1 files changed, 0 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch b/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bca2bb0260..0000000000
--- a/main/libxres/0004-integer-overflow-in-XResQueryClientResources-CVE-201.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From f468184963e53feda848853c4aefd0197b2cc116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2013 23:36:13 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] integer overflow in XResQueryClientResources()
- [CVE-2013-1988 2/2]
-
-The CARD32 rep.num_types needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
-by sizeof(XResType) to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation
-and writing data from the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XRes.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XRes.c b/src/XRes.c
-index c989985..51e905f 100644
---- a/src/XRes.c
-+++ b/src/XRes.c
-@@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ Status XResQueryClientResources (
-     }
- 
-     if(rep.num_types) {
--        if((typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types))) {
-+        if (rep.num_types < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XResType)))
-+            typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types);
-+        else
-+            typs = NULL;
-+
-+        if (typs != NULL) {
-             xXResType scratch;
-             int i;
- 
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-