diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/0001-Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/0001-Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch | 72 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/0001-Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch b/main/openssl/0001-Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 321791251f..0000000000 --- a/main/openssl/0001-Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -From 32cc2479b473c49ce869e57fded7e9a77b695c0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org> -Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 21:06:37 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix IV check and padding removal. - -Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record -after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve) - -For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy) ---- - ssl/s3_cbc.c | 33 ++++++++++++--------------------- - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c -index ce77acd..0f60507 100644 ---- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c -+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c -@@ -139,31 +139,22 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, - unsigned mac_size) - { - unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; -- const char has_explicit_iv = -- s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION; -- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + -- mac_size + -- (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0); -- -- /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant -- * time. */ -- if (overhead > rec->length) -- return 0; -- -- /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning -- * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the -- * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in -- * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the -- * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is -- * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least -- * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe -- * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */ -- if (has_explicit_iv) -+ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; -+ /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ -+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) - { -+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in -+ * non-constant time. -+ */ -+ if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) -+ return 0; -+ /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ - rec->data += block_size; - rec->input += block_size; - rec->length -= block_size; - } -+ else if (overhead > rec->length) -+ return 0; - - padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; - -@@ -190,7 +181,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) - { - /* padding is already verified */ -- rec->length -= padding_length; -+ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; - return 1; - } - --- -1.8.1.2 - |