1 files changed, 0 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa20.patch b/main/xen/xsa20.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bedd318f65..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa20.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-VCPU/timers: Prevent overflow in calculations, leading to DoS vulnerability
-
-The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next
-expiry time, and to reinsert itself into the timer queue.  If the
-deadline ends up in the past, Xen never leaves __do_softirq().  The
-affected PCPU will stay in an infinite loop until Xen is killed by the
-watchdog (if enabled).
-
-This is a security problem, XSA-20 / CVE-2012-4535.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
-
-diff -r 478ba3f146df xen/common/domain.c
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -903,6 +903,9 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN
-         if ( set.period_ns < MILLISECS(1) )
-             return -EINVAL;
- 
-+        if ( set.period_ns > STIME_DELTA_MAX )
-+            return -EINVAL;
-+
-         v->periodic_period = set.period_ns;
-         vcpu_force_reschedule(v);
- 
-diff -r 478ba3f146df xen/include/xen/time.h
---- a/xen/include/xen/time.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/time.h
-@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct tm gmtime(unsigned long t);
- #define MILLISECS(_ms)  ((s_time_t)((_ms) * 1000000ULL))
- #define MICROSECS(_us)  ((s_time_t)((_us) * 1000ULL))
- #define STIME_MAX ((s_time_t)((uint64_t)~0ull>>1))
-+/* Chosen so (NOW() + delta) wont overflow without an uptime of 200 years */
-+#define STIME_DELTA_MAX ((s_time_t)((uint64_t)~0ull>>2))
- 
- extern void update_vcpu_system_time(struct vcpu *v);
- extern void update_domain_wallclock_time(struct domain *d);