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-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa304-4.11-1.patch71
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa304-4.11-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa304-4.11-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f78d15220f..0000000000
--- a/main/xen/xsa304-4.11-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/vtd: Hide superpage support for SandyBridge IOMMUs
-
-Something causes SandyBridge IOMMUs to choke when sharing EPT pagetables, and
-an EPT superpage gets shattered. The root cause is still under investigation,
-but the end result is unusable in combination with CVE-2018-12207 protections.
-
-This is part of XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-index fb7edfaef9..d698b1d50a 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu);
- int __must_check me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain,
- u8 bus, u8 devfn, int map);
- void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *);
-+void quirk_iommu_caps(struct iommu *iommu);
-+
- bool_t platform_supports_intremap(void);
- bool_t platform_supports_x2apic(void);
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-index f242e30caf..8712d3b4dc 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -1211,6 +1211,8 @@ int __init iommu_alloc(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
- if ( !(iommu->cap + 1) || !(iommu->ecap + 1) )
- return -ENODEV;
-
-+ quirk_iommu_caps(iommu);
-+
- if ( cap_fault_reg_offset(iommu->cap) +
- cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) * PRIMARY_FAULT_REG_LEN >= PAGE_SIZE ||
- ecap_iotlb_offset(iommu->ecap) >= PAGE_SIZE )
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-index d6db862678..b02688e316 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-@@ -540,3 +540,28 @@ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
- break;
- }
- }
-+
-+void __init quirk_iommu_caps(struct iommu *iommu)
-+{
-+ /*
-+ * IOMMU Quirks:
-+ *
-+ * SandyBridge IOMMUs claim support for 2M and 1G superpages, but don't
-+ * implement superpages internally.
-+ *
-+ * There are issues changing the walk length under in-flight DMA, which
-+ * has manifested as incompatibility between EPT/IOMMU sharing and the
-+ * workaround for CVE-2018-12207 / XSA-304. Hide the superpages
-+ * capabilities in the IOMMU, which will prevent Xen from sharing the EPT
-+ * and IOMMU pagetables.
-+ *
-+ * Detection of SandyBridge unfortunately has to be done by processor
-+ * model because the client parts don't expose their IOMMUs as PCI devices
-+ * we could match with a Device ID.
-+ */
-+ if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
-+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x2a ||
-+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x2d) )
-+ iommu->cap &= ~(0xful << 34);
-+}