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-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch54
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch51
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch82
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/APKBUILD46
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/crypto_tls_openssl_c.patch69
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/libressl-compat.patch22
-rw-r--r--main/hostapd/musl-fix-types.patch29
7 files changed, 108 insertions, 245 deletions
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 82c26398b6..0000000000
--- a/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- /*
- * buffer and ACK the fragment
- */
-- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- data->in_frag_pos += len;
- if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
-@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- return NULL;
- }
- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
--
-+ }
-+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
- EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
- EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
-@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
- */
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
-- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
- (int) len);
-- data->in_frag_pos += len;
- pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- len = data->in_frag_pos;
- }
---
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bfc4c74e95..0000000000
--- a/main/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- /*
- * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
- */
-- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
- "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
-@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- }
- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- data->in_frag_pos += len;
-+ }
-+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
- (int) len);
- return;
-@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
- */
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
-- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
-- data->in_frag_pos += len;
- pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- len = data->in_frag_pos;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
---
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/hostapd/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch b/main/hostapd/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index acad6be0a4..0000000000
--- a/main/hostapd/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
-
-WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
-characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
-STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
-WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
-
-This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
-the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
-an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
-such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
-could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- src/utils/common.h | 1 +
- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
-index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.c
-+++ b/src/utils/common.c
-@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
- }
-
-
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+ size_t i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
-index 701dbb2..a972240 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.h
-+++ b/src/utils/common.h
-@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
-
- char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
- int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
-diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644
---- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
- cred->key_len--;
- #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
- }
-+
-+
-+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
-+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
-+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
-+ cred->key, cred->key_len);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
---
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/main/hostapd/APKBUILD b/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
index 4bd35e67fe..a445780ca9 100644
--- a/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/hostapd/APKBUILD
@@ -1,21 +1,18 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=hostapd
-pkgver=2.5
-pkgrel=3
+pkgver=2.6
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="daemon for wireless software access points"
url="http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd/"
arch="all"
license="custom"
depends=
-makedepends="openssl-dev libnl3-dev linux-headers"
+makedepends="libressl-dev libnl3-dev linux-headers"
install=
subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
patches="
- musl-fix-types.patch
CVE-2012-4445.patch
- 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
- 0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
- 0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+ libressl-compat.patch
"
@@ -26,18 +23,18 @@ source="http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
$pkgname.confd"
-_builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver/hostapd
+builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver/hostapd
prepare() {
- local conf="$_builddir/.config"
+ local conf="$builddir/.config"
- cd "$_builddir"/..
+ cd "$builddir"/..
for i in $patches; do
msg $i
patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1
done
- cd "$_builddir"
+ cd "$builddir"
sed -i -e "s:/etc/hostapd:/etc/hostapd/hostapd:g" \
hostapd.conf
@@ -60,14 +57,14 @@ prepare() {
}
build() {
- cd "$_builddir"
+ cd "$builddir"
make || return 1
msg "nt_password_hash"
- make nt_password_hash || return 1
+ make nt_password_hash || return 1
}
package() {
- cd "$_builddir"
+ cd "$builddir"
install -d "$pkgdir"/etc/hostapd
install hostapd.conf hostapd.accept hostapd.deny hostapd.eap_user \
hostapd.radius_clients hostapd.sim_db hostapd.wpa_psk \
@@ -88,27 +85,18 @@ package() {
|| return 1
}
-md5sums="69f9cec3f76d74f402864a43e4f8624f hostapd-2.5.tar.gz
-7568486221987c93041b4877eced7317 musl-fix-types.patch
+md5sums="eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7 hostapd-2.6.tar.gz
0d01d4641e0c33f79c1f4372613655bf CVE-2012-4445.patch
-ae911963ddb5426e4daeb080901f971d 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-0bafbab0d6dbd17172b92e4e52a745a7 0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-09372e008bac7534dc807b3740e35fe6 0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+a4d1949ad55c3cb6c6f774a95ed6a3c8 libressl-compat.patch
29b561d4ee34dc22a8a0ae0bf1db5c45 hostapd.initd
c91382209042defa04e79d0ae841a29e hostapd.confd"
-sha256sums="8e272d954dc0d7026c264b79b15389ec2b2c555b32970de39f506b9f463ec74a hostapd-2.5.tar.gz
-f296013d432740478f24de7214d07ff897e6e38cbfd01a73a3158014f94fd771 musl-fix-types.patch
+sha256sums="01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d hostapd-2.6.tar.gz
06dc7df2159fb0604191f66d35164caa5927963eebe77b5f2c389bd7590e2a49 CVE-2012-4445.patch
-1ac039b13d88ff78ade418182cbef6e6c13f4ca9624fd4b3ce623b0442b43769 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-4b6503e7ad4e049cb9566af7c220c451f65e35794962e239e908a1460c38a626 0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-560bab824aa2a0bbeb549e2d3df49b23aed1b1dd12ca8685eae16cc24669b077 0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+663bf347be3d95650be72ac1b465078bccf77cac879ddff05d3989448229c120 libressl-compat.patch
cae79127d088c047c1460d5b63eb67da1a830eb725a8c95e50070e516ad02800 hostapd.initd
6c14e88b14bb9a93d2dca69239d829f435e93180e621319aeed0f3987290dfba hostapd.confd"
-sha512sums="bbb0547c29f4925aff8639cae3291ed020c2a9d989dd267be831b2418880916d2ec69003e36ecc796c348476086397cca8f63c52633f91c11a9c2ab72e1c83c0 hostapd-2.5.tar.gz
-6ccdca29bc3a6b87d6e3f581c4f4725f0684bb88f39d46f875e9bdb0c41ee5b8be3b7908084c6631bffddece82cb2f2222e159d842944b6f2b7b639ef2de609c musl-fix-types.patch
+sha512sums="e60baaa092786250b8de9935f5417c7626f5d749210cce9f83d776b65c19fc92a8141f41923389f05c16295d482a15ae8d8b744f4667425040c99e3c2f5b1bda hostapd-2.6.tar.gz
619acce84516dead1e03e5da71657ea4c4b6f3ca8271574409773aeb316cbddc88095b50320804f457f001f4f3fe83053e660c008d8409f59bb4d3bfe058b601 CVE-2012-4445.patch
-c1a222b75cfbec77a88d83adfb2dbf93c040b5e3541e225aa218de1a8a11ed129946852247252fe993a0a6e8229293312a63b30824cd45ca7e81fb02d2df376f 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-e29a0a3c88041c9a9d11801d311543c6c056b09d39798170e76cadeb407a3209d28f699a25cf58cc3484a60c420b2f5405cac56b1d03f8e7910469cb03971c28 0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
-e9ae7a6504cd6376f0fb24f79a21bc3996732451b474fe186769e1b098e47fdaedb08167fd90de900eb961e148577f24f24770d94050e60daa3a3f8de36a92c8 0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+e6428a7fde025550e8d8252a04dd3a9009f95b6cab064c1f76bf4e5c321bc6acba9a21511e25f996fe98f6c9f1c057bc5af7aa9e6dd19e0bbc537b2be67d494f libressl-compat.patch
b54b7c6aa17e5cb86a9b354a516eb2dbefb544df18471339c61d82776de447011a2ac290bea1e6c8beae4b6cebefafb8174683ea42fb773e9e8fe6c679f33ba3 hostapd.initd
0882263bbd7c0b05bf51f51d66e11a23a0b8ca7da2a3b8a30166d2c5f044c0c134e6bccb1d02c9e81819ca8fb0c0fb55c7121a08fe7233ccaa73ff8ab9a238fe hostapd.confd"
diff --git a/main/hostapd/crypto_tls_openssl_c.patch b/main/hostapd/crypto_tls_openssl_c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45bae24ae2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/crypto_tls_openssl_c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+$OpenBSD: patch-src_crypto_tls_openssl_c,v 1.3 2015/09/29 11:57:54 dcoppa Exp $
+
+Compatibility fixes for LibreSSL
+
+--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig Sun Sep 27 21:02:05 2015
++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c Mon Sep 28 13:43:46 2015
+@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_data *data, SSL
+ }
+
+ if (certs) {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
+ while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
+@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_data *data, SSL
+ /* Try to continue anyway */
+ }
+ sk_X509_free(certs);
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ res = SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl,
+ SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK |
+ SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR);
+@@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ctx, struct tl
+ if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ ssl = conn->ssl;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->s3 == NULL || ssl->session == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ctx, struct tl
+ #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
+ static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *h;
+ int md_size;
+@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ static int openssl_tls_prf(struct tls_connection *conn
+ "mode");
+ return -1;
+ #else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ SSL *ssl;
+ u8 *rnd;
+ int ret = -1;
+@@ -3394,7 +3394,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void *tls_ctx, stru
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1);
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ #if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST)
+ if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) {
+ /*
+@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void *secret, int *
+ struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
+ int ret;
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
diff --git a/main/hostapd/libressl-compat.patch b/main/hostapd/libressl-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d7c12bcf6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/hostapd/libressl-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index 19e0e2b..b3d1b07 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ void crypto_cipher_deinit(struct crypto_cipher *ctx)
+
+ void * dh5_init(struct wpabuf **priv, struct wpabuf **publ)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ DH *dh;
+ struct wpabuf *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
+ size_t publen, privlen;
+@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ err:
+
+ void * dh5_init_fixed(const struct wpabuf *priv, const struct wpabuf *publ)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ DH *dh;
+
+ dh = DH_new();
diff --git a/main/hostapd/musl-fix-types.patch b/main/hostapd/musl-fix-types.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 988e2c9fb5..0000000000
--- a/main/hostapd/musl-fix-types.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
---- ./src/ap/vlan_init.c.orig
-+++ ./src/ap/vlan_init.c
-@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
- args[1] = if_index;
-
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, br_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
-- ifr.ifr_data = (__caddr_t) args;
-+ ifr.ifr_data = (void *) args;
-
- if (ioctl(fd, SIOCDEVPRIVATE, &ifr) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
- /* No error if interface already removed. */
-@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
- args[1] = if_index;
-
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, br_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
-- ifr.ifr_data = (__caddr_t) args;
-+ ifr.ifr_data = (void *) args;
-
- if (ioctl(fd, SIOCDEVPRIVATE, &ifr) < 0) {
- if (errno == EBUSY) {
-@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
-
- os_memset(ifindices, 0, sizeof(ifindices));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, br_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
-- ifr.ifr_data = (__caddr_t) arg;
-+ ifr.ifr_data = (void *) arg;
-
- if (ioctl(fd, SIOCDEVPRIVATE, &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "VLAN: %s: BRCTL_GET_PORT_LIST "
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-18 08:19:54 +0000