From 7ce71a261b936c5390c3a099f38bce164e895ce6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 11:28:39 -0300 Subject: main/haproxy: fixes CVE-2020-11100 See #11389 --- main/haproxy/APKBUILD | 7 +++-- main/haproxy/CVE-2020-11100.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 main/haproxy/CVE-2020-11100.patch diff --git a/main/haproxy/APKBUILD b/main/haproxy/APKBUILD index e1b6eaf91d..5256ceb09f 100644 --- a/main/haproxy/APKBUILD +++ b/main/haproxy/APKBUILD @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc" source="http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/${_pkgmajorver}/src/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz libressl-2.7.patch haproxy.initd - haproxy.cfg" + haproxy.cfg + CVE-2020-11100.patch + " builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver" @@ -56,4 +58,5 @@ package() { sha512sums="bfd65179345285f6f4581a7dce42e638b89e12717d4cb9218afa085759161e04b6c78307d04265a6c97cd484b67949781639da5236edb89137585c625130be4f haproxy-1.8.23.tar.gz 06908ddc3c689f4887bd3ae89bed49c17b5ead7938ce4c8b31128067be9a1a98afbfeacf2f1f9ba784d0ce12ac2042de6123435d03dcdfa911924a89792a9e9c libressl-2.7.patch 3ab277bf77fe864ec6c927118dcd70bdec0eb3c54535812d1c3c0995fa66a3ea91a73c342edeb8944caeb097d2dd1a7761099182df44af5e3ef42de6e2176d26 haproxy.initd -26bc8f8ac504fcbaec113ecbb9bb59b9da47dc8834779ebbb2870a8cadf2ee7561b3a811f01e619358a98c6c7768e8fdd90ab447098c05b82e788c8212c4c41f haproxy.cfg" +26bc8f8ac504fcbaec113ecbb9bb59b9da47dc8834779ebbb2870a8cadf2ee7561b3a811f01e619358a98c6c7768e8fdd90ab447098c05b82e788c8212c4c41f haproxy.cfg +9070591a22adff38d6451e7170f7e91265cac8bce249f09ded61b261025ffeff606ee50c4ffeb26ba619abd701d1caf1925c92603539d84ad037d6f90c1d0a86 CVE-2020-11100.patch" diff --git a/main/haproxy/CVE-2020-11100.patch b/main/haproxy/CVE-2020-11100.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d1dd13a514 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/haproxy/CVE-2020-11100.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From f17f86304f187b0f10ca6a8d46346afd9851a543 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 08:53:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/CRITICAL: hpack: never index a header into the headroom + after wrapping + +The HPACK header table is implemented as a wrapping list inside a contigous +area. Headers names and values are stored from right to left while indexes +are stored from left to right. When there's no more room to store a new one, +we wrap to the right again, or possibly defragment it if needed. The condition +do use the right part (called tailroom) or the left part (called headroom) +depends on the location of the last inserted header. After wrapping happens, +the code forces to stick to tailroom by pretending there's no more headroom, +so that the size fit test always fails. The problem is that nothing prevents +from storing a header with an empty name and empty value, resulting in a +total size of zero bytes, which satisfies the condition to use the headroom. +Doing this in a wrapped buffer results in changing the "front" header index +and causing miscalculations on the available size and the addresses of the +next headers. This may even allow to overwrite some parts of the index, +opening the possibility to perform arbitrary writes into a 32-bit relative +address space. + +This patch fixes the issue by making sure the headroom is considered only +when the buffer does not wrap, instead of relying on the zero size. This +must be backported to all versions supporting H2, which is as far as 1.8. + +Many thanks to Felix Wilhelm of Google Project Zero for responsibly +reporting this problem with a reproducer and a detailed analysis. +CVE-2020-11100 was assigned to this issue. + +(cherry picked from commit 5dfc5d5cd0d2128d77253ead3acf03a421ab5b88) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/hpack-tbl.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/hpack-tbl.c b/src/hpack-tbl.c +index 70d7f35..727ff7a 100644 +--- a/src/hpack-tbl.c ++++ b/src/hpack-tbl.c +@@ -346,9 +346,9 @@ int hpack_dht_insert(struct hpack_dht *dht, struct ist name, struct ist value) + * room left in the tail to suit the protocol, but tests show that in + * practice it almost never happens in other situations so the extra + * test is useless and we simply fill the headroom as long as it's +- * available. ++ * available and we don't wrap. + */ +- if (headroom >= name.len + value.len) { ++ if (prev == dht->front && headroom >= name.len + value.len) { + /* install upfront and update ->front */ + dht->dte[head].addr = dht->dte[dht->front].addr - (name.len + value.len); + dht->front = head; +-- +1.7.10.4 + + -- cgit v1.2.3