xen: fix error handling of guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand() The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus enabling the caller to lock up Xen. Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself, so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk() in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it. Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log, the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the first place. This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Ian Campbell Acked-by: George Dunlap Acked-by: Ian Jackson diff -r 7c4d806b3753 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Fri Nov 16 15:56:14 2012 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Thu Nov 22 17:02:32 2012 +0000 @@ -1117,6 +1117,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st mfn_t omfn; int rc = 0; + if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) + return -EPERM; + if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) ) return -EINVAL; @@ -1135,8 +1138,7 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st omfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &ot, &a, 0, NULL); if ( p2m_is_ram(ot) ) { - printk("%s: gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", - __func__, ot); + P2M_DEBUG("gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", ot); rc = -EBUSY; goto out; } @@ -1160,9 +1162,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st pod_unlock(p2m); } +out: gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, order); -out: return rc; }