memop: limit guest specified extent order Allowing unbounded order values here causes almost unbounded loops and/or partially incomplete requests, particularly in PoD code. The added range checks in populate_physmap(), decrease_reservation(), and the "in" one in memory_exchange() architecturally all could use PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT, and are being artificially constrained to MAX_ORDER. This is XSA-31 / CVE-2012-5515. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Tim Deegan Acked-by: Ian Jackson diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c index 83e2666..2e56d46 100644 --- a/xen/common/memory.c +++ b/xen/common/memory.c @@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ static void populate_physmap(struct memop_args *a) if ( a->memflags & MEMF_populate_on_demand ) { - if ( guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn, + if ( a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER || + guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn, a->extent_order) < 0 ) goto out; } @@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct memop_args *a) xen_pfn_t gmfn; if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(a->extent_list, a->nr_done, - a->nr_extents-1) ) + a->nr_extents-1) || + a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER ) return; for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ ) @@ -297,6 +299,9 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg) if ( (exch.nr_exchanged > exch.in.nr_extents) || /* Input and output domain identifiers match? */ (exch.in.domid != exch.out.domid) || + /* Extent orders are sensible? */ + (exch.in.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) || + (exch.out.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) || /* Sizes of input and output lists do not overflow a long? */ ((~0UL >> exch.in.extent_order) < exch.in.nr_extents) || ((~0UL >> exch.out.extent_order) < exch.out.nr_extents) ||