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x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQs
- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path
- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ
- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI
- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones
(and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0)
This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -968,14 +968,16 @@ static void domcreate_launch_dm(libxl__e
}
for (i = 0; i < d_config->b_info.num_irqs; i++) {
- uint32_t irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
+ int irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
- LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %"PRIx32, domid, irq);
+ LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %d", domid, irq);
- ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+ ret = irq >= 0 ? xc_physdev_map_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, &irq)
+ : -EOVERFLOW;
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
if ( ret<0 ){
- LOGE(ERROR,
- "failed give dom%d access to irq %"PRId32, domid, irq);
+ LOGE(ERROR, "failed give dom%d access to irq %d", domid, irq);
ret = ERROR_FAIL;
}
}
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
pirq = get_param('irq')
+ rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
+ index = pirq,
+ pirq = pirq)
+ if rc < 0:
+ raise VmError('irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
+
rc = xc.domain_irq_permission(domid = self.getDomid(),
pirq = pirq,
allow_access = True)
@@ -81,12 +87,6 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
#todo non-fatal
raise VmError(
'irq: Failed to configure irq: %d' % (pirq))
- rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
- index = pirq,
- pirq = pirq)
- if rc < 0:
- raise VmError(
- 'irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
back = dict([(k, config[k]) for k in self.valid_cfg if k in config])
return (self.allocateDeviceID(), back, {})
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
/* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
- rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, d->nr_pirqs - 1);
+ rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
/*
* Modify I/O port access permissions.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
goto bind_out;
ret = -EPERM;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
- goto bind_out;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ {
+ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+
+ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+ goto bind_out;
+ }
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( iommu_enabled )
@@ -803,9 +807,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq);
ret = -EPERM;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
- goto unbind_out;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ {
+ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+
+ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+ goto unbind_out;
+ }
if ( iommu_enabled )
{
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ int create_irq(int node)
desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED;
irq = ret;
}
+ else if ( dom0 )
+ {
+ ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq);
+ if ( ret )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n",
+ irq, ret);
+ }
return irq;
}
@@ -280,6 +288,17 @@ void clear_irq_vector(int irq)
void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq)
{
BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq));
+
+ if ( dom0 )
+ {
+ int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq);
+
+ if ( err )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n",
+ irq, err);
+ }
+
dynamic_irq_cleanup(irq);
clear_irq_vector(irq);
}
@@ -1858,7 +1877,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
!(IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) &&
- irq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq)))
+ irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq)))
return -EPERM;
if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= d->nr_pirqs || irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
@@ -1887,17 +1906,18 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
return ret;
}
- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
if ( ret )
{
- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not permit access to irq %d\n",
- d->domain_id, pirq);
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not permit access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
return ret;
}
ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
if ( ret )
- return ret;
+ goto revoke;
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
@@ -1921,8 +1941,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
if ( desc->handler != &no_irq_type )
+ {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: irq %d in use\n",
d->domain_id, irq);
+ pci_disable_msi(msi_desc);
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto done;
+ }
setup_msi_handler(desc, msi_desc);
if ( opt_irq_vector_map == OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV
@@ -1951,7 +1977,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
done:
if ( ret )
+ {
cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+ revoke:
+ if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -2017,10 +2050,11 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d,
if ( !forced_unbind )
cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
if ( ret )
- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not deny access to irq %d\n",
- d->domain_id, pirq);
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not deny access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
done:
return ret;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
if ( irq == -1 )
irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
- if ( irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
+ if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: can't create irq for msi!\n",
d->domain_id);
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <xen/paging.h>
#include <xen/hypercall.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <public/domctl.h>
#include <xsm/xsm.h>
@@ -897,9 +898,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
else if ( xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, allow) )
ret = -EPERM;
else if ( allow )
- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq);
else
- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = pirq_deny_access(d, pirq);
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind
if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= d->nr_pirqs) )
return -EINVAL;
- if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !irq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !pirq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
return -EPERM;
spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
@@ -28,4 +28,22 @@
#define irq_access_permitted(d, i) \
rangeset_contains_singleton((d)->irq_caps, i)
+#define pirq_permit_access(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
+ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_add_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
+ : -EINVAL; \
+})
+#define pirq_deny_access(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
+ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_remove_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
+ : -EINVAL; \
+})
+#define pirq_access_permitted(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ rangeset_contains_singleton(d__->irq_caps, \
+ domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i));\
+})
+
#endif /* __XEN_IOCAP_H__ */
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