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From f16f247d30f868e84f31e24792b4464488f1c009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 15:53:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] vfdecrypt: OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility
Allocate contexts from the heap on all OpenSSL versions, this is needed
since OpenSSL 1.1.0. No attempt is done at addressing issues like global
variables and fixing potential memleaks on error paths.
Compile-tested only with OpenSSL 1.1.0e (Arch Linux) and OpenSSL 1.0.2g
(Ubuntu 16.04), I have no test file.
Fixes https://github.com/Lekensteyn/dmg2img/issues/4
---
vfdecrypt.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/vfdecrypt.c b/vfdecrypt.c
index 56d3530..b1a36d3 100644
--- a/vfdecrypt.c
+++ b/vfdecrypt.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void adjust_v2_header_byteorder(cencrypted_v2_pwheader *pwhdr) {
pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size = htonl(pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size);
}
-HMAC_CTX hmacsha1_ctx;
+HMAC_CTX *hmacsha1_ctx;
AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
int CHUNK_SIZE=4096; // default
@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ void compute_iv(uint32_t chunk_no, uint8_t *iv) {
unsigned int mdLen;
chunk_no = OSSwapHostToBigInt32(chunk_no);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- HMAC_Update(&hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
- HMAC_Final(&hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ HMAC_Update(hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
+ HMAC_Final(hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
memcpy(iv, mdResult, CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE);
}
@@ -212,52 +212,75 @@ void decrypt_chunk(uint8_t *ctext, uint8_t *ptext, uint32_t chunk_no) {
/* DES3-EDE unwrap operation loosely based on to RFC 2630, section 12.6
* wrapped_key has to be 40 bytes in length. */
int apple_des3_ede_unwrap_key(uint8_t *wrapped_key, int wrapped_key_len, uint8_t *decryptKey, uint8_t *unwrapped_key) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
uint8_t *TEMP1, *TEMP2, *CEKICV;
uint8_t IV[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
int outlen, tmplen, i;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+#else
+ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+#endif
+ if (!ctx) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
/* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
TEMP1 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
TEMP2 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
CEKICV = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+#endif
/* reverse order of TEMP3 */
for(i = 0; i < outlen; i++) TEMP2[i] = TEMP1[outlen - i - 1];
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (3) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (4) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+#endif
memcpy(unwrapped_key, CEKICV+4, outlen-4);
free(TEMP1);
free(TEMP2);
free(CEKICV);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+#else
+ free(ctx);
+#endif
return(0);
}
@@ -279,31 +302,46 @@ int unwrap_v1_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v1_header *header, uint8_t *ae
int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v2_pwheader *header, uint8_t *aes_key, uint8_t *hmacsha1_key) {
/* derived key is a 3DES-EDE key */
uint8_t derived_key[192/8];
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
uint8_t *TEMP1;
int outlen, tmplen;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+#else
+ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+#endif
+ if (!ctx) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char*)header->kdf_salt, 20,
PBKDF2_ITERATION_COUNT, sizeof(derived_key), derived_key);
print_hex(derived_key, 192/8);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
/* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
TEMP1 = malloc(header->encrypted_keyblob_size);
/* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
return(-1);
}
outlen += tmplen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ free(ctx);
+#endif
memcpy(aes_key, TEMP1, 16);
memcpy(hmacsha1_key, TEMP1, 20);
@@ -446,8 +484,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
CHUNK_SIZE = v2header.blocksize;
}
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacsha1_ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ hmacsha1_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+#else
+ hmacsha1_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*hmacsha1_ctx));
+#endif
+ if (!hmacsha1_ctx) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: HMAC CTX!\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ HMAC_CTX_reset(hmacsha1_ctx);
+#else
+ HMAC_CTX_init(hmacsha1_ctx);
+#endif
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH * 8, &aes_decrypt_key);
if (verbose >= 1) {
@@ -472,5 +523,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
}
if (verbose) fprintf(stderr, "%"PRIX32" chunks written\n", chunk_no);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmacsha1_ctx);
+#else
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmacsha1_ctx);
+ free(hmacsha1_ctx);
+#endif
return(0);
}
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