main/openswan: securiy fix remote buffer overflow in atodn() (CVE-2013-2053)

patches are from http://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2013-2053/

fixes #1897

6 files changed, 849 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/main/openswan/APKBUILD b/main/openswan/APKBUILD
index 28cc3c2ec..f126798a8 100644
--- a/main/openswan/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openswan/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Borys Zhukov <mp5@mp5.im>
 pkgname=openswan
 pkgver=2.6.38
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="IPsec Implementation which Allows Building of VPNs"
 url="http://www.openswan.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ makedepends="gmp-dev bison flex coreutils bash"
 install=""
 subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
 source="http://download.openswan.org/openswan/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
+	openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
+	openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
+	openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
+	openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
 	ipsec.initd setup.patch"
 
 _builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -51,5 +55,23 @@ package() {
 
 }
 md5sums="13073eb5314b83a31be88e4117e8bbcd  openswan-2.6.38.tar.gz
+500e936c90ad27545d0ab6450fd888aa  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
+6dcfd099ed2cf90231c36ba305e46348  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
+578f171370c373e3501b85de7efc3045  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
+730a94960fe593f12b8d1f4ff9266d2a  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
 f019d1fa23627d54462054fedc9de03b  ipsec.initd
 fd3cd27f9da9140fabd935377c3d6921  setup.patch"
+sha256sums="bdd3ccf31df1f3e8530887986ea8b6702a3db139486738213f5de8d8690b3723  openswan-2.6.38.tar.gz
+8595019c0ae7e1d00579c8d4ca2ba81b68e3be7b99f099b24e6ea1fd35b2bd7d  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
+84a5e1c309ff707504a8b2f8ef47865adf6e3d9f0c60f3d1a19c5a8464bdfefb  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
+c36316a70d29553995cf89f7b4b2abcf0e05f1e35d725913cae6bfe161bb81a9  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
+2390ab47cf5763c832dd9d652ff8ff6766547067502e1719031bac23b977d34a  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
+02fd160fb8d64f93a094c9f8a0912ed9cb47789601647f4a72ba3f736b220290  ipsec.initd
+6425c491cf1dc366e03e832a1d78bb2846f172ba6fe658b122707157099f9576  setup.patch"
+sha512sums="0963a9df548c901eb562185f97d844f57539668f11fbe2a43712223773053895c761b1d5d0be4fffa64014baf58ff2d7cf23676a3da51c5a5134b0639796ad10  openswan-2.6.38.tar.gz
+c670392e2e9968f0c9269c50858d24b5dc71126c3e066cbca9ceda53b16ad6fe892d4b32a58054a9cdfa14a81553a219098847b8c79ead00b6b8d05dbd18731d  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
+14e466379a90c01f26997921c7e4967dfc76de1f58f7370e9755e04e1e351b8a7d8fad8b14af3f4a73d3358cc5271e4a89313aad239f12e92ab596c9d7dd0b02  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
+3204d412bbd194ab49a6a5d465cbe38c0bc33266d096bc6bcc0cb6d4214fc05505eef0694036f40da4d2b56f9b50950cfe9816f1e4540431b49d859f7fb7e690  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
+05c4a026b8baa91766717a58308cee0415403b1dc0632d805e36da906ec22b91c95b92ee701ca2b6d248f641f124d4ab32ed4fe7f42127aa6e3e308bf170ced3  openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
+7aefcc624b0e2a50e26f84db6197278c0633eeb38b064c613fbd635cbe606acd1e1280213db7c19f882d809d7eb6ea59a0c47e1b47dfe43de4f1c6deb08d38c4  ipsec.initd
+92152006ef3765c89d28462743bca25ab139c0205187bfb0a2c5992159e390939dc3f5f95c7ccb135d3ad674a756d776b7a7d7db903fd22994cf24478b7a71c8  setup.patch"
diff --git a/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch b/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a34a67789
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openswan/CVE-2013-2052.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA256
+
+commit 7d0ca355a5c7f8337130d4b0b3e7686f2fa4d4c2
+Author: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
+Date:   Thu Apr 25 12:44:55 2013 -0400
+
+    * security: atodn() / atoid() buffer overflow
+    
+    lib/libswan/x509dn.c:atodn() does not perform any length checking
+    whatsoever on the output buffer.
+    
+    Affected:
+    - Libreswan 3.0 and 3.1 (3.2 disabled the oe= option)
+    - Openswan versions up to and including 2.6.38
+    - Possibly certain strongswan 3.x/4.x versions
+    
+    This overflow is exposed (pre-authentication) only in opportunistic
+    encryption mode. When it is called via receiving a certificate
+    via IKEv1 or IKEv2, and when it is loaded from disk, the buffers
+    passed to atodn() are big enough.
+    
+    This means this vulnerability can only be triggered when:
+    - Opportunistic Encryption is enabled (oe=yes)
+    - The attacker is local in the same network and adds a malicious
+      reverse DNS record to the client's IP, or
+    - The attacker can trigger an OE DNS lookup to a client fully
+      configured with OE and their own key.
+    
+    Libreswan and openswan versions do not enable Opportunistic Encryption
+    per default.  Most distributions like RHEL, Fedora, Debian and Ubuntu
+    also do not enable OE per default.
+    
+    This patch addresses the vulnerability in atodn() and further limits the
+    atoid() call not to traverse into the ASN1 case when triggered by non-cert
+    cases such as opportunistic encryption.
+    
+    Vulnerability discoverd by Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> of the
+    Red Hat Product Security Team.
+    
+    Patch by D. Hugh Redelmeier <hugh@mimosa.com> and Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
+
+diff --git a/include/asn1.h b/include/asn1.h
+index d69ebf9..b812488 100644
+- --- a/include/asn1.h
++++ b/include/asn1.h
+@@ -84,8 +84,10 @@ typedef enum {
+ #define ASN1_BODY	0x20
+ #define ASN1_RAW	0x40
+ 
+- -#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH     0xffffffff
++#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH     (~(size_t) 0)	/* largest size_t */
+ 
++#define ASN1_MAX_LEN	(1U << (8*3))	/* don't handle objects with length greater than this */
++#define ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN    4	/* no coded length takes more than 4 bytes. */
+ 
+ /* definition of an ASN.1 object */
+ 
+diff --git a/include/id.h b/include/id.h
+index d1825b4..b440a11 100644
+- --- a/include/id.h
++++ b/include/id.h
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ extern const struct id *resolve_myid(const struct id *id);
+ extern void set_myFQDN(void);
+ extern void free_myFQDN(void);
+ 
+- -extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok);
++extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only);
+ extern void iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id);
+ extern unsigned char* temporary_cyclic_buffer(void);
+ extern int idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
+diff --git a/lib/libswan/id.c b/lib/libswan/id.c
+index 4442971..31ca7e5 100644
+- --- a/lib/libswan/id.c
++++ b/lib/libswan/id.c
+@@ -58,27 +58,29 @@ temporary_cyclic_buffer(void)
+ 
+ /* Convert textual form of id into a (temporary) struct id.
+  * Note that if the id is to be kept, unshare_id_content will be necessary.
++ * This function should be split into parts so the boolean arguments can be
++ * removed -- Paul
+  */
+ err_t
+- -atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
++atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only)
+ {
+     err_t ugh = NULL;
+ 
+     *id = empty_id;
+ 
+- -    if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
++    if (!oe_only && myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_MYID;
+     }
+- -    else if (streq("%fromcert", src))
++    else if (!oe_only && streq("%fromcert", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_FROMCERT;
+     }
+- -    else if (streq("%none", src))
++    else if (!oe_only && streq("%none", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_NONE;
+     }
+- -    else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
++    else if (!oe_only && strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
+     {
+ 	/* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
+ 	id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
+     {
+ 	if (*src == '@')
+ 	{
+- -	    if (*(src+1) == '#')
++	    if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '#')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
+ 		 * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
+@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
+ 		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
+ 			      , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+ 	    }
+- -	    else if (*(src+1) == '~')
++	    else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '~')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
+ 		* we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
+@@ -134,7 +136,7 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
+ 		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
+ 			      , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+ 	    }
+- -	    else if (*(src+1) == '[')
++	    else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '[')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier ([) on the line
+ 		 * we interprete this as a text ID_KEY_ID, and we remove
+diff --git a/lib/libswan/secrets.c b/lib/libswan/secrets.c
+index 6e9466b..8ff80e0 100644
+- --- a/lib/libswan/secrets.c
++++ b/lib/libswan/secrets.c
+@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ lsw_process_secret_records(struct secret **psecrets, int verbose,
+ 		}
+ 		else
+ 		{
+- -		    ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE);
++		    ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 		}
+ 		
+ 		if (ugh != NULL)
+diff --git a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
+index 61407e5..7731856 100644
+- --- a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
++++ b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
+@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
+   {"TCGID"        , {oid_TCGID, 12}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING}
+ };
+ 
+- -#define X501_RDN_ROOF   24
++#define X501_RDN_ROOF   elemsof(x501rdns)
+ 
+ /* Maximum length of ASN.1 distinquished name */
+ #define ASN1_BUF_LEN	      512
+@@ -775,11 +775,11 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+         UNKNOWN_OID =	4
+     } state_t;
+ 
+- -    u_char oid_len_buf[3];
+- -    u_char name_len_buf[3];
+- -    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
+- -    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
+- -    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
++    u_char oid_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char name_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
+ 
+     chunk_t asn1_oid_len     = { oid_len_buf,     0 };
+     chunk_t asn1_name_len    = { name_len_buf,    0 };
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+ 
+     err_t ugh = NULL;
+ 
+- -    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
++    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 1 + ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN;	/* leave room for prefix */
+ 
+     state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
+ 
+@@ -885,25 +885,37 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+ 		code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
+ 
+ 		/* encode the relative distinguished name */
+- -		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
+- -		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+- -		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
+- -		/* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
+- -		*dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+- -		    && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
+- -		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
+- -
+- -		/* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
+- -		dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
+- -
+- -		/* reset name and change state */
+- -		name = empty_chunk;
+- -		state = SEARCH_OID;
++		if (IDTOA_BUF <  dn_ptr - dn->ptr
++		+ 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len	/* set */
++		+ 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len	/* sequence */
++		+ 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len	/* oid len, oid */
++		+ 1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len  /* type name */
++		) {
++		    /* no room! */
++		    ugh = "DN is too big";
++		    state = UNKNOWN_OID;
++		    /* I think that it is safe to continue (but perhaps pointless) */
++		} else {
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
++		    /* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
++		    *dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
++			&& !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
++
++		    /* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
++		    dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
++
++		    /* reset name and change state */
++		    name = empty_chunk;
++		    state = SEARCH_OID;
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 	case UNKNOWN_OID:
+@@ -911,9 +923,9 @@ atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+ 	}
+     } while (*src++ != '\0');
+ 
+- -    /* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
+- -    code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
+- -    dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
++    /* complete the distinguished name sequence: prefix it with ASN1_SEQUENCE and length */
++    code_asn1_length((size_t)dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
++    dn->ptr += ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN + 1 - 1 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
+     dn->len =  1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
+     dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
+     *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+diff --git a/programs/pluto/connections.c b/programs/pluto/connections.c
+index e8d326b..f08521b 100644
+- --- a/programs/pluto/connections.c
++++ b/programs/pluto/connections.c
+@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ extract_end(struct end *dst, const struct whack_end *src, const char *which)
+     }
+     else
+     {
+- -	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
++	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE, FALSE);
+ 
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	{
+diff --git a/programs/pluto/dnskey.c b/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
+index 5525d12..78f1d0a 100644
+- --- a/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
++++ b/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
+@@ -277,8 +277,12 @@ decode_iii(char **pp, struct id *gw_id)
+     if (*p == '@')
+     {
+ 	/* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
+- -	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
+ 
++	if(strspn(p,' ') >= IDTOA_BUF) {
++	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": ID too large for IDTOA_BUF");
++	}
++
++	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE, TRUE); /* only run OE related parts of atoid() */
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+ 			     , ugh);
+diff --git a/programs/pluto/myid.c b/programs/pluto/myid.c
+index bdd0e12..2e92f25 100644
+- --- a/programs/pluto/myid.c
++++ b/programs/pluto/myid.c
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *idstr)
+     if (idstr != NULL)
+     {
+ 	struct id id;
+- -	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
++	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	{
+diff --git a/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c b/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
+index 1725357..7d5072c 100644
+- --- a/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
++++ b/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
+@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static void
+ key_add_request(const struct whack_message *msg)
+ {
+     struct id keyid;
+- -    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
++    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 
+     if (ugh != NULL)
+     {
+diff --git a/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c b/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
+index c9fe9cf..bf87080 100644
+- --- a/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
++++ b/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct secret *pick_key(struct secret *host_secrets
+     struct secret *s;
+     err_t e;
+ 
+- -    e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE);
++    e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+     if(e) {
+ 	printf("%s: key '%s' is invalid\n", progname, idname);
+ 	exit(4);
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diff --git a/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..524a75b20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-atodn.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/include/asn1.h openswan-2.6.32/include/asn1.h
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/include/asn1.h	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/include/asn1.h	2013-04-24 13:11:05.799140126 -0400
+@@ -84,8 +84,10 @@
+ #define ASN1_BODY	0x20
+ #define ASN1_RAW	0x40
+ 
+-#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH     0xffffffff
++#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH     (~(size_t) 0)	/* largest size_t */
+ 
++#define ASN1_MAX_LEN	(1U << (8*3))	/* don't handle objects with length greater than this */
++#define ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN    4	/* no coded length takes more than 4 bytes. */
+ 
+ /* definition of an ASN.1 object */
+ 
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/include/id.h openswan-2.6.32/include/id.h
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/include/id.h	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/include/id.h	2013-04-24 13:11:05.799140126 -0400
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
+ extern const struct id *resolve_myid(const struct id *id);
+ extern void set_myFQDN(void);
+ 
+-extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok);
++extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only);
+ extern void iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id);
+ extern unsigned char* temporary_cyclic_buffer(void);
+ extern int idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/id.c openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/id.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/id.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/id.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.799140126 -0400
+@@ -57,27 +57,29 @@
+ 
+ /* Convert textual form of id into a (temporary) struct id.
+  * Note that if the id is to be kept, unshare_id_content will be necessary.
++ * This function should be split into parts so the boolean arguments can be
++ * removed -- Paul
+  */
+ err_t
+-atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
++atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok, bool oe_only)
+ {
+     err_t ugh = NULL;
+ 
+     *id = empty_id;
+ 
+-    if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
++    if (!oe_only && myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_MYID;
+     }
+-    else if (streq("%fromcert", src))
++    else if (!oe_only && streq("%fromcert", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_FROMCERT;
+     }
+-    else if (streq("%none", src))
++    else if (!oe_only && streq("%none", src))
+     {
+ 	id->kind = ID_NONE;
+     }
+-    else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
++    else if (!oe_only && strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
+     {
+ 	/* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
+ 	id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@
+     {
+ 	if (*src == '@')
+ 	{
+-	    if (*(src+1) == '#')
++	    if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '#')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
+ 		 * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
+@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@
+ 		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
+ 			      , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+ 	    }
+-	    else if (*(src+1) == '~')
++	    else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '~')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
+ 		* we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
+@@ -133,7 +135,7 @@
+ 		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, (char *)id->name.ptr
+ 			      , strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+ 	    }
+-	    else if (*(src+1) == '[')
++	    else if (!oe_only && *(src+1) == '[')
+ 	    {
+ 		/* if there is a second specifier ([) on the line
+ 		 * we interprete this as a text ID_KEY_ID, and we remove
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/secrets.c openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/secrets.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/secrets.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/secrets.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.800140140 -0400
+@@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@
+ 		}
+ 		else
+ 		{
+-		    ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE);
++		    ugh = atoid(flp->tok, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 		}
+ 		
+ 		if (ugh != NULL)
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.801140153 -0400
+@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@
+   {"TCGID"        , {oid_TCGID, 12}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING}
+ };
+ 
+-#define X501_RDN_ROOF   24
++#define X501_RDN_ROOF   elemsof(x501rdns)
+ 
+ /* Maximum length of ASN.1 distinquished name */
+ #define ASN1_BUF_LEN	      512
+@@ -746,11 +746,11 @@
+         UNKNOWN_OID =	4
+     } state_t;
+ 
+-    u_char oid_len_buf[3];
+-    u_char name_len_buf[3];
+-    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
+-    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
+-    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
++    u_char oid_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char name_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
++    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN];
+ 
+     chunk_t asn1_oid_len     = { oid_len_buf,     0 };
+     chunk_t asn1_name_len    = { name_len_buf,    0 };
+@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@
+ 
+     err_t ugh = NULL;
+ 
+-    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
++    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 1 + ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN;	/* leave room for prefix */
+ 
+     state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
+ 
+@@ -841,25 +841,37 @@
+ 		code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
+ 
+ 		/* encode the relative distinguished name */
+-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
+-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
+-		/* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
+-		*dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+-		    && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
+-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
+-
+-		/* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
+-		dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
+-
+-		/* reset name and change state */
+-		name = empty_chunk;
+-		state = SEARCH_OID;
++		if (IDTOA_BUF <  dn_ptr - dn->ptr
++		+ 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len	/* set */
++		+ 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len	/* sequence */
++		+ 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len	/* oid len, oid */
++		+ 1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len  /* type name */
++		) {
++		    /* no room! */
++		    ugh = "DN is too big";
++		    state = UNKNOWN_OID;
++		    /* I think that it is safe to continue (but perhaps pointless) */
++		} else {
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
++		    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
++		    /* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
++		    *dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
++			&& !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
++		    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
++
++		    /* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
++		    dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
++
++		    /* reset name and change state */
++		    name = empty_chunk;
++		    state = SEARCH_OID;
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 	case UNKNOWN_OID:
+@@ -867,9 +879,10 @@
+ 	}
+     } while (*src++ != '\0');
+ 
+-    /* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
+-    code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
+-    dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
++    /* complete the distinguished name sequence: prefix it with ASN1_SEQUENCE and length */
++    
++    code_asn1_length((size_t)dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
++    dn->ptr += ASN1_MAX_LEN_LEN + 1 - 1 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
+     dn->len =  1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
+     dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
+     *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/connections.c openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/connections.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/connections.c	2013-04-24 13:10:30.520656796 -0400
++++ openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/connections.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.802140167 -0400
+@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@
+     }
+     else
+     {
+-	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
++	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE, FALSE);
+ 
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	{
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/dnskey.c openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/dnskey.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/dnskey.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/dnskey.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.803140181 -0400
+@@ -289,8 +289,12 @@
+     if (*p == '@')
+     {
+ 	/* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
+-	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
+ 
++	if(strspn(p," ") >= IDTOA_BUF) {
++	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": ID too large for IDTOA_BUF");
++	}
++
++	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE, TRUE); /* only run OE related parts of atoid() */
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+ 			     , ugh);
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/myid.c openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/myid.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/myid.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/myid.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.803140181 -0400
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
+     if (idstr != NULL)
+     {
+ 	struct id id;
+-	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
++	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 
+ 	if (ugh != NULL)
+ 	{
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c	2013-04-24 13:10:30.392655041 -0400
++++ openswan-2.6.32/programs/pluto/rcv_whack.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.803140181 -0400
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
+ key_add_request(const struct whack_message *msg)
+ {
+     struct id keyid;
+-    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
++    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE, FALSE);
+ 
+     if (ugh != NULL)
+     {
+diff -Naur openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c openswan-2.6.32/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c
+--- openswan-2.6.32-orig/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c	2010-12-17 20:23:54.000000000 -0500
++++ openswan-2.6.32/programs/showhostkey/showhostkey.c	2013-04-24 13:11:05.804140194 -0400
+@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@
+     struct secret *s;
+     err_t e;
+ 
+-    e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE);
++    e = atoid(idname, &id, FALSE, FALSE);
+     if(e) {
+ 	printf("%s: key '%s' is invalid\n", progname, idname);
+ 	exit(4);
diff --git a/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75dbe3b63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_3des.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From acdd65497d164082e0462b3f2d4407f0c50ccf71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2013 10:32:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/10] do_3des: Abort on failure
+
+The routine cannot signal encryption failures to the caller
+and would leave the buffer unencrypted on error.
+---
+ lib/libopenswan/pem.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/libopenswan/pem.c b/lib/libopenswan/pem.c
+index 36da401..d42655a 100644
+--- a/lib/libopenswan/pem.c
++++ b/lib/libopenswan/pem.c
+@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ void do_3des_nss(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
+     memcpy(&symkey, key, key_size);
+     if (symkey == NULL) {
+ 	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_3des: NSS derived enc key is NULL \n");
+-	goto out;
++	abort();
+     }
+ 
+     ivitem.type = siBuffer;
+@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ void do_3des_nss(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
+     secparam = PK11_ParamFromIV(ciphermech, &ivitem);
+     if (secparam == NULL) {
+ 	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_3des: Failure to set up PKCS11 param (err %d)\n",PR_GetError());
+-	goto out;
++	abort();
+     }
+ 
+     outlen = 0;
+@@ -505,8 +505,15 @@ void do_3des_nss(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
+     }
+ 
+     enccontext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(ciphermech, enc? CKA_ENCRYPT: CKA_DECRYPT, symkey, secparam);
++    if (enccontext == NULL) {
++        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_3des: PKCS11 context creation failure (err %d)\n", PR_GetError());
++        abort();
++    }
+     rv = PK11_CipherOp(enccontext, tmp_buf, &outlen, buf_len, buf, buf_len);
+-    passert(rv==SECSuccess);
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_3des: PKCS11 operation failure (err %d)\n", PR_GetError());
++        abort();
++    }
+ 
+     if(enc) {
+ 	memcpy(new_iv, (char*) tmp_buf + buf_len-DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+@@ -518,7 +525,6 @@ void do_3des_nss(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
+     PR_Free(tmp_buf);
+     PR_Free(new_iv);
+ 
+-out:
+     if (secparam) {
+ 	SECITEM_FreeItem(secparam, PR_TRUE);
+     }
+-- 
+1.8.1.4
+
diff --git a/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aedb4d34a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-do_aes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From ee267f812f6d72da400cc24265c399c3e9048a8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2013 10:33:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/10] do_aes: Abort on failure
+
+The routine cannot signal encryption failures to the caller
+and would leave the buffer unencrypted on error.
+---
+ programs/pluto/ike_alg_aes.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/programs/pluto/ike_alg_aes.c b/programs/pluto/ike_alg_aes.c
+index 1d4aada..95999bb 100644
+--- a/programs/pluto/ike_alg_aes.c
++++ b/programs/pluto/ike_alg_aes.c
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *
+ 
+     if (symkey == NULL) {
+ 	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_aes: NSS derived enc key in NULL\n");
+-	goto out;
++	abort();
+     }
+ 
+     ivitem.type = siBuffer;
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *
+     secparam = PK11_ParamFromIV(ciphermech, &ivitem);
+     if (secparam == NULL) {
+ 	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_aes: Failure to set up PKCS11 param (err %d)\n",PR_GetError());
+-	goto out;
++	abort();
+    }
+ 
+    outlen = 0;
+@@ -69,8 +69,15 @@ do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *
+     }
+ 
+     enccontext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(ciphermech, enc? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT, symkey, secparam); 
++    if (enccontext == NULL) {
++        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_aes: PKCS11 context creation failure (err %d)\n", PR_GetError());
++        abort();
++    }
+     rv = PK11_CipherOp(enccontext, tmp_buf, &outlen, buf_len, buf, buf_len);
+-    passert(rv==SECSuccess);
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "do_aes: PKCS11 operation failure (err %d)\n", PR_GetError());
++        abort();
++    }
+     PK11_DestroyContext(enccontext, PR_TRUE);
+     memcpy(buf,tmp_buf,buf_len);  
+ 
+@@ -81,8 +88,6 @@ do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *
+     memcpy(iv, new_iv, AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+     PR_Free(tmp_buf);
+ 
+-out:
+- 
+ if (secparam)
+     SECITEM_FreeItem(secparam, PR_TRUE);
+ DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("NSS do_aes: exit"));
+-- 
+1.8.1.4
+
diff --git a/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d4129377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openswan/openswan-libreswan-backport-949437-x509dn.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+diff --git a/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c b/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c
+index 7731856..43c4bb5 100644
+--- a/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c
++++ b/lib/libopenswan/x509dn.c
+@@ -477,11 +477,25 @@ static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
+ /* Maximum length of ASN.1 distinquished name */
+ #define ASN1_BUF_LEN	      512
+ 
++static void format_chunk(chunk_t *ch, const char *format, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(2);
++
+ static void
+-update_chunk(chunk_t *ch, int n)
++format_chunk(chunk_t *ch, const char *format, ...)
+ {
+-    n = (n > -1 && n < (int)ch->len)? n : (int)ch->len-1;
+-    ch->ptr += n; ch->len -= n;
++    if (ch->len > 0) {
++	size_t len = ch->len;
++	va_list args;
++	va_start(args, format);
++	int ret = vsnprintf((char *)ch->ptr, len, format, args);
++	va_end(args);
++	if (ret < 0 || ret > len) {
++	    ch->ptr += len;
++	    ch->len = 0;
++	} else {
++	    ch->ptr += ret;
++	    ch->len -= ret;
++	}
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -612,9 +626,7 @@ dn_parse(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *str)
+     err_t ugh;
+ 
+     if(dn.ptr == NULL) {
+-	const char *e = "(empty)";
+-	strncpy((char *)str->ptr, e, str->len);
+-	update_chunk(str, strlen(e));
++	format_chunk(str, "(empty)");
+ 	return NULL;
+     }
+     ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
+@@ -632,19 +644,17 @@ dn_parse(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *str)
+ 	if (first)		/* first OID/value pair */
+ 	    first = FALSE;
+ 	else			/* separate OID/value pair by a comma */
+-	    update_chunk(str, snprintf((char *)str->ptr,str->len,", "));
++	    format_chunk(str, ", ");
+ 
+ 	/* print OID */
+ 	oid_code = known_oid(oid);
+ 	if (oid_code == OID_UNKNOWN)	/* OID not found in list */
+ 	    hex_str(oid, str);
+ 	else
+-	    update_chunk(str, snprintf((char *)str->ptr,str->len,"%s",
+-			      oid_names[oid_code].name));
++	    format_chunk(str, "%s", oid_names[oid_code].name);
+ 
+ 	/* print value */
+-	update_chunk(str, snprintf((char *)str->ptr,str->len,"=%.*s",
+-			      (int)value.len,value.ptr));
++	format_chunk(str, "=%.*s", (int)value.len, value.ptr);
+     }
+     return NULL;
+ }
+@@ -684,9 +694,9 @@ void
+ hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str)
+ {
+     u_int i;
+-    update_chunk(str, snprintf((char *)str->ptr,str->len,"0x"));
++    format_chunk(str, "0x");
+     for (i=0; i < bin.len; i++)
+-	update_chunk(str, snprintf((char *)str->ptr,str->len,"%02X",*bin.ptr++));
++	format_chunk(str, "%02X", *bin.ptr++);
+ }
+ 
+