main/libxv: upgrade to 1.0.8

6 files changed, 6 insertions, 283 deletions

diff --git a/main/libxv/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch b/main/libxv/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e33952a6..000000000
--- a/main/libxv/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From 79362c764a6df7e7fbe5247756bdbf60f3a58baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:28:34 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Use _XEatDataWords to avoid overflow of rep.length
- shifting
-
-rep.length is a CARD32, so rep.length << 2 could overflow in 32-bit builds
-
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- configure.ac |  6 ++++++
- src/Xv.c     | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 5494b5d..6a335db 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ XORG_CHECK_MALLOC_ZERO
- # Obtain compiler/linker options for depedencies
- PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XV, x11 xext xextproto videoproto)
- 
-+# Check for _XEatDataWords function that may be patched into older Xlib release
-+SAVE_LIBS="$LIBS"
-+LIBS="$XV_LIBS"
-+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_XEatDataWords])
-+LIBS="$SAVE_LIBS"
-+
- # Allow checking code with lint, sparse, etc.
- XORG_WITH_LINT
- XORG_LINT_LIBRARY([Xv])
-diff --git a/src/Xv.c b/src/Xv.c
-index b081e8a..5be1d95 100644
---- a/src/Xv.c
-+++ b/src/Xv.c
-@@ -49,11 +49,27 @@ SOFTWARE.
- **
- */
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-+# include "config.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "Xvlibint.h"
- #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
- #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
- #include <X11/extensions/XShm.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+
-+#ifndef HAVE__XEATDATAWORDS
-+static inline void _XEatDataWords(Display *dpy, unsigned long n)
-+{
-+# ifndef LONG64
-+    if (n >= (ULONG_MAX >> 2))
-+        _XIOError(dpy);
-+# endif
-+    _XEatData (dpy, n << 2);
-+}
-+#endif
- 
- static XExtensionInfo _xv_info_data;
- static XExtensionInfo *xv_info = &_xv_info_data;
-@@ -853,7 +869,7 @@ XvQueryPortAttributes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
- 	      (*num)++;
- 	  }
-       } else
--	_XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+	  _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
-   }
- 
-   UnlockDisplay(dpy);
-@@ -923,7 +939,7 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvListImageFormats (
- 	      (*num)++;
- 	  }
-       } else
--	_XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+	  _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
-   }
- 
-   UnlockDisplay(dpy);
-@@ -976,7 +992,7 @@ XvImage * XvCreateImage (
-   	_XRead(dpy, (char*)(ret->pitches), rep.num_planes << 2);
- 	_XRead(dpy, (char*)(ret->offsets), rep.num_planes << 2);
-    } else
--	_XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+       _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- 
-    UnlockDisplay(dpy);
-    SyncHandle();
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxv/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch b/main/libxv/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 707f99b02..000000000
--- a/main/libxv/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 6e1b743a276651195be3cd68dff41e38426bf3ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:03:03 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] integer overflow in XvQueryPortAttributes()
- [CVE-2013-1989 1/3]
-
-The num_attributes & text_size members of the reply are both CARD32s
-and need to be bounds checked before multiplying & adding them together
-to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid integer overflow
-leading to underallocation and writing data from the network past the
-end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/Xv.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/Xv.c b/src/Xv.c
-index 5be1d95..3cbad35 100644
---- a/src/Xv.c
-+++ b/src/Xv.c
-@@ -851,9 +851,15 @@ XvQueryPortAttributes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
-   }
- 
-   if(rep.num_attributes) {
--      int size = (rep.num_attributes * sizeof(XvAttribute)) + rep.text_size;
-+      unsigned long size;
-+      /* limit each part to no more than one half the max size */
-+      if ((rep.num_attributes < ((INT_MAX / 2) / sizeof(XvAttribute))) &&
-+	  (rep.text_size < (INT_MAX / 2))) {
-+	  size = (rep.num_attributes * sizeof(XvAttribute)) + rep.text_size;
-+	  ret = Xmalloc(size);
-+      }
- 
--      if((ret = Xmalloc(size))) {
-+      if (ret != NULL) {
- 	  char* marker = (char*)(&ret[rep.num_attributes]);
- 	  xvAttributeInfo Info;
- 	  int i;
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxv/0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch b/main/libxv/0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 24e1c1b8b..000000000
--- a/main/libxv/0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 15ab7dec17d686c38f2c82ac23a17cac5622322a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:16:14 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] buffer overflow in XvQueryPortAttributes()
- [CVE-2013-2066]
-
-Each attribute returned in the reply includes the number of bytes
-to read for its marker.  We had been always trusting it, and never
-validating that it wouldn't cause us to write past the end of the
-buffer we allocated based on the reported text_size.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/Xv.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/Xv.c b/src/Xv.c
-index 3cbad35..f9813eb 100644
---- a/src/Xv.c
-+++ b/src/Xv.c
-@@ -864,14 +864,20 @@ XvQueryPortAttributes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
- 	  xvAttributeInfo Info;
- 	  int i;
- 
-+	  /* keep track of remaining room for text strings */
-+	  size = rep.text_size;
-+
- 	  for(i = 0; i < rep.num_attributes; i++) {
-              _XRead(dpy, (char*)(&Info), sz_xvAttributeInfo);
- 	      ret[i].flags = (int)Info.flags;
- 	      ret[i].min_value = Info.min;
- 	      ret[i].max_value = Info.max;
- 	      ret[i].name = marker;
--	      _XRead(dpy, marker, Info.size);
--	      marker += Info.size;
-+	      if (Info.size <= size) {
-+		  _XRead(dpy, marker, Info.size);
-+		  marker += Info.size;
-+		  size -= Info.size;
-+	      }
- 	      (*num)++;
- 	  }
-       } else
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxv/0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch b/main/libxv/0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b80f47a1d..000000000
--- a/main/libxv/0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 59301c1b5095f7dc6359d5b396dbbcdee7038270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:03:03 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] integer overflow in XvListImageFormats() [CVE-2013-1989
- 2/3]
-
-num_formats is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
-by sizeof(XvImageFormatValues) to come up with the total size to allocate,
-to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
-the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/Xv.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/Xv.c b/src/Xv.c
-index f9813eb..0a07d9d 100644
---- a/src/Xv.c
-+++ b/src/Xv.c
-@@ -918,9 +918,10 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvListImageFormats (
-   }
- 
-   if(rep.num_formats) {
--      int size = (rep.num_formats * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues));
-+      if (rep.num_formats < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvImageFormatValues)))
-+	  ret = Xmalloc(rep.num_formats * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues));
- 
--      if((ret = Xmalloc(size))) {
-+      if (ret != NULL) {
- 	  xvImageFormatInfo Info;
- 	  int i;
- 
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxv/0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch b/main/libxv/0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2be6900c3..000000000
--- a/main/libxv/0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 50fc4cb18069cb9450a02c13f80223ef23511409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:03:03 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] integer overflow in XvCreateImage() [CVE-2013-1989 3/3]
-
-num_planes is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before bit shifting
-and adding to sizeof(XvImage) to come up with the total size to allocate,
-to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
-the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/Xv.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/Xv.c b/src/Xv.c
-index 0a07d9d..f268f8e 100644
---- a/src/Xv.c
-+++ b/src/Xv.c
-@@ -992,7 +992,10 @@ XvImage * XvCreateImage (
-       return NULL;
-    }
- 
--   if((ret = (XvImage*)Xmalloc(sizeof(XvImage) + (rep.num_planes << 3)))) {
-+   if (rep.num_planes < ((INT_MAX >> 3) - sizeof(XvImage)))
-+       ret = Xmalloc(sizeof(XvImage) + (rep.num_planes << 3));
-+
-+   if (ret != NULL) {
- 	ret->id = id;
- 	ret->width = rep.width;
- 	ret->height = rep.height;
--- 
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxv/APKBUILD b/main/libxv/APKBUILD
index efb6b1085..bad28362a 100644
--- a/main/libxv/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/libxv/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=libxv
-pkgver=1.0.7
-pkgrel=1
+pkgver=1.0.8
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="X11 Video extension library"
 url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -9,13 +9,8 @@ license="custom"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc"
 depends=
 depends_dev="xproto videoproto libx11-dev libxext-dev"
-makedepends="$depends_dev libtool autoconf automake util-macros"
+makedepends="$depends_dev"
 source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXv-$pkgver.tar.bz2
-	0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-	0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
-	0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
-	0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
-	0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch
 	"
 
 _builddir="$srcdir"/libXv-$pkgver
@@ -26,8 +21,6 @@ prepare() {
 		*.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;;
 		esac
 	done
-	libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoheader && autoconf \
-		&& automake --add-missing
 }
 
 build() {
@@ -42,21 +35,6 @@ package() {
 	rm "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.la || return 1
 	install -D -m644 COPYING "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/COPYING
 }
-md5sums="5e1ac203ccd3ce3e89755ed1fbe75b0b  libXv-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-cbd5367f2b5717cab78b819aaaacd7d9  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-ff8da08c2883bdc98cbac78e448e81e6  0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
-108ba64a9d7d5f3763cfbb00ffe53eb2  0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
-53dbcb31cb08325b3a5329f16ddab3dd  0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
-0844dd0e117d36a70f603019af580f13  0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch"
-sha256sums="5d664aeb641f8c867331a0c6b4574a5e7e420f00bf5fcefd874e8d003ea59010  libXv-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-993a72fc67e9de4df9b19eeedd32c70b325ed5d97fdc9e476a585d5fd151469e  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-583d3d8192bd11902e464213b462f24f632424c449eaa68c238910a2b1b223fb  0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
-7525a4f5df082913d614683219795e5ecaafd999fbe7696ab2e48857f1455b8c  0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
-51edf32e1da0ef2afa7f11ef9b96c29f7d886f1a88b5610118753a36afc140ce  0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
-4debde18842840d7872ba3b367ca9bb5c40b2565d0d7d2c984961b10a2971955  0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch"
-sha512sums="25c81cc6d112a6b07de1c53fa5fc8bb9d886d19cffc2bcd65c4668ba53808051cf4d4720413b5c436ba356bb76f9ca05decf61909839ee19ccf9cbc7263e373b  libXv-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-b4a8c457380ff3d1dd2b4da0b80f83cf577fe1345a3b8c49686e9ad88ce77f49ade7e4a7c5042bf0dff6e43af8a6adcb5706067ea87ecf5b84e74849b65cfbc9  0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-fb07656fcd4779c246546ec8d2cc3dd16b013d77380ecf21cf2b2ee7f37910cf9a5f016c8b97a68e5499b5af88b5cdbbe19399c278136daa72ad3321f343d66a  0002-integer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-1.patch
-2ecc22e831cad3ed4701c42665d25b6c2da358a3464d8a0a29e6f081a83cdd79ce50b67692ee93e6d114f518250a979920df93e7366a5063a36ee69bdc8fd2c8  0003-buffer-overflow-in-XvQueryPortAttributes-CVE-2013-20.patch
-0b63e9966e854b51df7c9db1359f4c8c868f607b0effd0c6f6f5838c9451e57e0951ae32fbe5b2cac14765e6738ba50b688539c9f5c08bc05bb794ef572c27f6  0004-integer-overflow-in-XvListImageFormats-CVE-2013-1989.patch
-628cc07629f6819a435bd29f9e6d79a9cc13ee7ed6abef3c9d322c32cd78a75e386a448191fa38f01fe4597ef66e9347f0e7ed8724bb7974520cb9a7ffd5a7ef  0005-integer-overflow-in-XvCreateImage-CVE-2013-1989-3-3.patch"
+md5sums="224dadca53d9c88f8a2b8945babcea70  libXv-1.0.8.tar.bz2"
+sha256sums="4f00eb5347390909cea4e53a69425839d2a6a44e0e0613321d59e7e4aeaf73d7  libXv-1.0.8.tar.bz2"
+sha512sums="610866deaa7fdb3e10a2d5071fe79987e74320b18604e957e5a4d45e3716a3f9e31b44e42fd10c70cbf0ed8629f4d3e8699a1958e80779f8c1b991aece5cc864  libXv-1.0.8.tar.bz2"