blob: e851c092f113c6b98da9f6dd9a6ae82d41ad2b76 (
plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
|
From b053d215b80e721f9afdc5794e4f3f4f2aee0141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2013 23:36:13 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] integer overflow in XResQueryClients() [CVE-2013-1988
1/2]
The CARD32 rep.num_clients needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
by sizeof(XResClient) to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation
and writing data from the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
src/XRes.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/XRes.c b/src/XRes.c
index 1ab1db8..c989985 100644
--- a/src/XRes.c
+++ b/src/XRes.c
@@ -130,7 +130,12 @@ Status XResQueryClients (
}
if(rep.num_clients) {
- if((clnts = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResClient) * rep.num_clients))) {
+ if (rep.num_clients < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XResClient)))
+ clnts = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResClient) * rep.num_clients);
+ else
+ clnts = NULL;
+
+ if (clnts != NULL) {
xXResClient scratch;
int i;
--
1.8.2.3
|
