diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/linux-grsec/0001-sock_diag-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-sock_diag_hand.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | main/linux-grsec/0001-sock_diag-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-sock_diag_hand.patch | 36 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/linux-grsec/0001-sock_diag-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-sock_diag_hand.patch b/main/linux-grsec/0001-sock_diag-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-sock_diag_hand.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9124b975d --- /dev/null +++ b/main/linux-grsec/0001-sock_diag-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-sock_diag_hand.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From ecc18050ef1ebd1dd63ebab44297d09a48360fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> +Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to + sock_diag_handlers[] + +Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY +with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of +sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this +condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening +doors for a privilege escalation. + +Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> +Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> +--- + net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c +index 849f809..5e8d4a9 100644 +--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c ++++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c +@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); + if (hndl == NULL) + err = -ENOENT; +-- +1.8.1.4 + |