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-rw-r--r--main/libxinerama/0002-integer-overflow-in-XineramaQueryScreens-CVE-2013-19.patch76
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/main/libxinerama/0002-integer-overflow-in-XineramaQueryScreens-CVE-2013-19.patch b/main/libxinerama/0002-integer-overflow-in-XineramaQueryScreens-CVE-2013-19.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a0ce966b92..0000000000
--- a/main/libxinerama/0002-integer-overflow-in-XineramaQueryScreens-CVE-2013-19.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 99c644fc8488657bdd106717df7446d606f9ef22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 19:55:55 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] integer overflow in XineramaQueryScreens()
- [CVE-2013-1985]
-
-If the reported number of screens is too large, the calculations to
-allocate memory for them may overflow, leaving us writing beyond the
-bounds of the allocation.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/Xinerama.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/Xinerama.c b/src/Xinerama.c
-index 04189b6..67a35b5 100644
---- a/src/Xinerama.c
-+++ b/src/Xinerama.c
-@@ -303,24 +303,36 @@ XineramaQueryScreens(
- return NULL;
- }
-
-- if(rep.number) {
-- if((scrnInfo = Xmalloc(sizeof(XineramaScreenInfo) * rep.number))) {
-+ /*
-+ * rep.number is a CARD32 so could be as large as 2^32
-+ * The X11 protocol limits the total screen size to 64k x 64k,
-+ * and no screen can be smaller than a pixel. While technically
-+ * that means we could theoretically reach 2^32 screens, and that's
-+ * not even taking overlap into account, Xorg is currently limited
-+ * to 16 screens, and few known servers have a much higher limit,
-+ * so 1024 seems more than enough to prevent both integer overflow
-+ * and insane X server responses causing massive memory allocation.
-+ */
-+ if ((rep.number > 0) && (rep.number <= 1024))
-+ scrnInfo = Xmalloc(sizeof(XineramaScreenInfo) * rep.number);
-+ if (scrnInfo != NULL) {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < rep.number; i++) {
- xXineramaScreenInfo scratch;
-- int i;
--
-- for(i = 0; i < rep.number; i++) {
-- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(&scratch), sz_XineramaScreenInfo);
-- scrnInfo[i].screen_number = i;
-- scrnInfo[i].x_org = scratch.x_org;
-- scrnInfo[i].y_org = scratch.y_org;
-- scrnInfo[i].width = scratch.width;
-- scrnInfo[i].height = scratch.height;
-- }
--
-- *number = rep.number;
-- } else
-- _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
-+
-+ _XRead(dpy, (char*)(&scratch), sz_XineramaScreenInfo);
-+
-+ scrnInfo[i].screen_number = i;
-+ scrnInfo[i].x_org = scratch.x_org;
-+ scrnInfo[i].y_org = scratch.y_org;
-+ scrnInfo[i].width = scratch.width;
-+ scrnInfo[i].height = scratch.height;
-+ }
-+
-+ *number = rep.number;
- } else {
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- *number = 0;
- }
-
---
-1.8.2.3
-