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* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.10.3Paul Morgan2018-05-082-5/+5
| | | | | Plus: fix the libressl patch to align with this upstream PR: https://github.com/duosecurity/duo_unix/pull/116
* community/duo_unix: fix rebuild against libressl-2.7Natanael Copa2018-04-062-3/+18
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* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.10.2Paul Morgan2018-01-091-3/+3
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* community/duo_unix: update the license for SPDX variantPaul Morgan2018-01-091-1/+1
| | | | | Commit 63f5e7d295659 assigned the SPDX 3 license. This commit refines the license to show the exact variant.
* community/duo_unix: update source URL to use githubPaul Morgan2018-01-091-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | What's different about the source at the URLs? * New URL: Github is the raw, authoritative source URL. * Old URL: The vendor takes the Github source, runs './bootstrap', and posts it to their download site. This commit makes the build process more transparent. Why change the URL now? The vendor has tagged a new version of duo_unix on github but has not yet made the new version available at their official download site.
* [various]: unify names of licenses according to SPDXJakub Jirutka2017-12-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit updates $license variable in all APKBUILDs to comply with short names specified by SPDX version 3.0 [1] where possible. It was done using find-and-replace method on substrings inside $license variables. Only license names were updated, not "expressions" specifying relation between the licenses (e.g. "X and Y", "X or Y", "X and (Y or Z)") or exceptions (e.g. "X with exceptions"). Many licenses have a version or multiple variants, e.g. MPL-2.0, BSD-2-Clause, BSD-3-Clause. However, $license in many aports do not contain license version or variant. Since there's no way how to infer this information just from abuild, it were left without the variant suffix or version, i.e. non SPDX compliant. GNU licenses (AGPL, GFDL, GPL, LGPL) are especially complicated. They exist in two variants: -only (formerly e.g. GPL-2.0) and -or-later (formerly e.g. GPL-2.0+). We did not systematically noted distinguish between these variants, so GPL-2.0, GPL2, GPLv2 etc. may mean GPL-2.0-only or GPL-2.0-or-later. Thus GNU licenses without "+" (e.g. GPL2+) were left without the variant suffix, i.e. non SPDX compliant. Note: This commit just fixes format of the license names, no verification has been done if the specified license information is actually correct! [1]: https://spdx.org/licenses/
* community/duo_unix: rebuild against libressl-2.6Natanael Copa2017-11-091-1/+1
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* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.10.1Paul Morgan2017-08-221-2/+2
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* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.10.0Paul Morgan2017-06-232-12/+3
| | | | | Remove libressl patch because it's in upstream duo_unix as of https://github.com/duosecurity/duo_unix/commit/c539ba7aa3ec064
* community/duo_unix: modernize abuildtmpfile2017-06-091-18/+6
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* community/duo_unix: security upgrade to 1.9.21 (DUO-PSA-2017-002)Paul Morgan2017-06-032-6/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Duo Product Security Advisory ============================= Advisory ID: DUO-PSA-2017-002 Publication Date: 2017-05-31 Revision Date: 2017-05-31 Status: Confirmed, Fixed Document Revision: 1 Overview -------- Duo Security has identified an issue in duo_unix, which, under certain uncommon configurations, could enable attackers to bypass second-factor user authentication. Duo has no evidence that this vulnerability has actively been exploited and we believe this specific configuration is extraordinarily uncommon. This issue was resolved in version 1.9.21 of duo_unix. Customers using an affected configuration should update to the latest version as soon as possible (see "Solution" section below). Description ----------- Prior to version 1.9.21, duo_unix (which includes both login_duo and pam_duo), supported setting an HTTP proxy configuration through the standard 'http_proxy' environment variable. Under some uncommon configurations (examples listed below), however, it is possible for an untrusted user to set a value for the 'http_proxy' variable prior to initiating a Duo authentication attempt. If an invalid proxy host (e.g. '0.0.0.0') is selected, then login_duo/pam_duo will ultimately fail to connect to Duo's API, and as a result, trigger the configured "failmode" behavior. If "failmode" is set to "safe" (which is the default), then this could result in a bypass of second-factor authentication. Duo has identified two specific configuration scenarios in which an untrusted user may be able to control the value of the 'http_proxy' environment variable. 1. login_duo with nonstandard sshd "AcceptEnv" configurations: OpenSSH can permit clients to forward environment variables to servers. By default, OpenSSH server distributions generally allow only a whitelisted set of variables (which does not include 'http_proxy') to be forwarded in this way. It is possible, however, for an administrator to configure a less-restrictive policy using the AcceptEnv keyword in sshd_config. If a server has been configured with a non-default AcceptEnv policy that permits clients to send an 'http_proxy' environment variable, and is using login_duo to add Duo 2FA to ssh logins, then this configuration could result in a bypass of Duo 2FA. This scenario only applies to login_duo; when used with OpenSSH, pam_duo is unaffected by this issue. 2. pam_duo with local authentication (e.g. su / sudo): While pam_duo is not affected by this issue when used with OpenSSH, when pam_duo is being used to perform 2FA in other contexts - particularly, to authenticate system-local actions performed by untrusted users - it may be possible for untrusted users to control the value of the 'http_proxy' environment variable prior to initiating an authentication attempt. In particular, Duo has confirmed that configurations which use pam_duo to add Duo 2FA to the "su" and "sudo" commands are impacted by this issue. Version 1.9.21 of duo_unix has been released to resolve this issue. It removes support for configuring an HTTP Proxy via an environment variable. Impact ------ Attackers may be able to bypass second-factor authentication on impacted configurations which accept attacker-controlled environment variables. Affected Product(s) ------------------- All versions of duo_unix prior to 1.9.21 are impacted when used in one of the following configuration scenarios: * login_duo is performing 2FA for SSH logins, and sshd has been configured with a permissive (non-default) AcceptEnv policy * pam_duo is performing 2FA for scenarios other than SSH logins Workaround ---------- Customers using login_duo in an affected configuration may work around this issue by ensuring that their AcceptEnv configuration for sshd (e.g. in /etc/ssh/sshd_config) does not permit clients to send an 'http_proxy' variable. Customers using pam_duo in an affected configuration must upgrade to the latest version of duo_unix. Solution -------- Customers should upgrade to the latest version of the duo_unix client as discussed above. Clone the latest version from: * https://github.com/duosecurity/duo_unix For more information on upgrading duo_unix, see https://duo.com/docs/duounix Vulnerability Metrics --------------------- Vulnerability Class: CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/454.html Remotely Exploitable: [No] Authentication Required: [Partial] Severity: [High] CVSSv2 Overall Score: 5.0 CVSSv2 Group Scores: Base: 6.0, Temporal: 5.0 CVSSv2 Vector: AV:L/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C References ---------- * CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/454.html * Duo Unix Reference - https://duo.com/docs/duounix Timeline -------- 2017-05-19 * Duo privately receives report of a security vulnerability in Duo Unix * Duo acknowledges receipt of report and begins investigation 2017-05-22 * Duo confirms vulnerability exists in related case to original report 2017-05-30 * Duo completes development and testing of fixes 2017-05-31 * Advisory released to all Duo customers using duo_unix Credits/Contact --------------- Technical questions regarding this issue should be sent to support@duosecurity.com and reference "DUO-PSA-2017-002" in the subject, or to your Customer Success Manager, if appropriate. Duo Security would like to thank Fred Emmott for reporting this issue.
* community/duo_unix: rebuild against libressl 2.5Natanael Copa2017-04-181-1/+1
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* community/duo_unix: rebuild against libresslNatanael Copa2016-10-101-2/+2
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* community/duo_unix: fix dependsNatanael Copa2016-08-151-3/+3
| | | | let abuild pull in the needed libraries
* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.9.19Paul Morgan2016-08-151-4/+4
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* community/duo_unix: upgrade to 1.9.18Paul Morgan2016-01-221-5/+5
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* community/duo_unix: move from testingPaul Morgan2016-01-191-0/+49