main/openssl: security patches

 * CVE-2009-1377
 * CVE-2009-1378
 * CVE-2009-1379
 * CVE-2009-1387
 * CVE-2009-2409
 * CVE-2009-3555
(cherry picked from commit 58c4a2ed5b63919fd9a7d78a14bd2b93eca96b05)

6 files changed, 241 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
index a4b22a9d..fddbf211 100644
--- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=openssl
 pkgver=0.9.8l
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1"
 url=http://openssl.org
 depends=
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ source="http://www.openssl.org/source/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz
 	openssl-bb-basename.patch
 	openssl-0.9.8k-quote-cc.patch
 	openssl-0.9.8k-padlock-sha.patch
+	openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1377.patch
+	openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1378.patch
+	openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1379.patch
+	openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1387.patch
+	openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-2409.patch
 	"
 	
 build() {
@@ -45,4 +50,9 @@ md5sums="05a0ece1372392a2cf310ebb96333025  openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
 04a6a88c2ee4badd4f8649792b73eaf3  openssl-0.9.8g-fix_manpages-1.patch
 c6a9857a5dbd30cead0404aa7dd73977  openssl-bb-basename.patch
 c838eb8488896cfeb7de957a0cbe04ae  openssl-0.9.8k-quote-cc.patch
-86b7f1bf50e1f3ba407ec62001a51a0d  openssl-0.9.8k-padlock-sha.patch"
+86b7f1bf50e1f3ba407ec62001a51a0d  openssl-0.9.8k-padlock-sha.patch
+36694a8dd1c7164f1021f6f24ef20ab9  openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1377.patch
+80b8c77288a6fde633f8ac3a33e21d31  openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1378.patch
+da60b14279e076a19e783f07d8a60d24  openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1379.patch
+926b151cb1e32dc6e9b1c9a25f218a31  openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1387.patch
+595f5bda14198b3aa83a854b1d4fcfb0  openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-2409.patch"
diff --git a/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1377.patch b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1377.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a3a51f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1377.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=1931&user=guest&pass=guest
+
+Index: openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.2.2.4' '-r1.2.2.5' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c	2005/06/28 12:53:33	1.2.2.4
++++ b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c	2009/05/16 16:18:44	1.2.2.5
+@@ -234,3 +234,17 @@
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+ 	}
++
++int
++pqueue_size(pqueue_s *pq)
++{
++	pitem *item = pq->items;
++	int count = 0;
++	
++	while(item != NULL)
++	{
++		count++;
++		item = item->next;
++	}
++	return count;
++}
+Index: openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.h
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.h,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.2.2.1' '-r1.2.2.2' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.h,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.h	2005/05/30 22:34:27	1.2.2.1
++++ b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.h	2009/05/16 16:18:44	1.2.2.2
+@@ -91,5 +91,6 @@
+ pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter);
+ 
+ void   pqueue_print(pqueue pq);
++int    pqueue_size(pqueue pq);
+ 
+ #endif /* ! HEADER_PQUEUE_H */
+Index: openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.4.2.17' '-r1.4.2.18' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2009/05/16 15:51:59	1.4.2.17
++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2009/05/16 16:18:45	1.4.2.18
+@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@
+     DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ 	pitem *item;
+ 
++	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
++	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
++		return 0;
++		
+ 	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
+ 	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
+ 	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
diff --git a/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1378.patch b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1378.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ec8a9f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1378.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=1931&user=guest&pass=guest
+
+Index: ssl/d1_both.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c.orig
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -561,7 +561,16 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ 	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ 		goto err;
+ 
+-	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
++	/* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
++	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
++	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
++	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64);
++	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
++	
++	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
++	 * too far in the future or the fragment is already in the queue */
++	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
++		msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL)
+ 		{
+ 		unsigned char devnull [256];
+ 
diff --git a/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1379.patch b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1379.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b70772c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1379.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Index: openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.14.2.6' '-r1.14.2.7' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c	2009/04/22 12:17:02	1.14.2.6
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c	2009/05/13 11:51:30	1.14.2.7
+@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
+ 		{
++		unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ 		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ 
+ 		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
+@@ -536,7 +537,7 @@
+ 		if (al==0)
+ 			{
+ 			*ok = 1;
+-			return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
++			return frag_len;
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
diff --git a/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1387.patch b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1387.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8ff15e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-1387.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/270305
+
+fix from upstream
+
+Index: ssl/d1_both.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /usr/local/src/openssl/CVSROOT/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.4.2.7
+retrieving revision 1.4.2.8
+diff -u -p -r1.4.2.7 -r1.4.2.8
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c	17 Oct 2007 21:17:49 -0000	1.4.2.7
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c	2 Apr 2009 22:12:13 -0000	1.4.2.8
+@@ -575,30 +575,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+-	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+-	if ( frag == NULL)
+-		goto err;
++	if (frag_len)
++	{
++		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
++		if ( frag == NULL)
++			goto err;
+ 
+-	memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
++		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ 
+-	if (frag_len)
+-		{
+-		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
++		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */
+ 		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ 			frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+ 		if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ 			goto err;
+-		}
+ 
+-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
++		pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
++		pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+ 
+-	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+-	if ( item == NULL)
+-		goto err;
++		item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
++		pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
++		if ( item == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++	}
+ 
+-	pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ 
+ err:
diff --git a/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-2409.patch b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-2409.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6e485c3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/openssl-0.9.8l-CVE-2009-2409.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/280591
+
+fix from upstream
+
+http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18260
+
+Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.77.2.8' '-r1.77.2.9' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2008/07/13 14:33:15	1.77.2.8
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2009/06/15 14:52:38	1.77.2.9
+@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@
+ 	while (n >= 0)
+ 		{
+ 		ctx->error_depth=n;
+-		if (!xs->valid)
++
++		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
++		 * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
++		 */
++		if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
+ 			{
+ 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+ 				{
+@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@
+ 				if (!ok) goto end;
+ 				}
+ 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+-				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+-				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
+-				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+-				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+-				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+-				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+-				 * been declared trusted. */
+ 				{
+ 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ 				ctx->current_cert=xs;
+
+http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18317
+
+Index: openssl/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/evp/c_alld.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.7' '-r1.7.2.1' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/evp/c_alld.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/crypto/evp/c_alld.c	2005/04/30 21:51:40	1.7
++++ b/crypto/evp/c_alld.c	2009/07/08 08:33:26	1.7.2.1
+@@ -64,9 +64,6 @@
+ 
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void)
+ 	{
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+ 	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4());
+ #endif
+Index: openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+RCS File: /v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c,v
+rcsdiff -q -kk '-r1.12.2.3' '-r1.12.2.4' -u '/v/openssl/cvs/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c,v' 2>/dev/null
+--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c	2007/04/23 23:50:21	1.12.2.3
++++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c	2009/07/08 08:33:27	1.12.2.4
+@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@
+ 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ 	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+ 	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");