| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
... | |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The addresses can actually change as plugins are loaded/unloaded for
each test case.
Fixes #551.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In some situations we expect strongswan.conf to not exist, for instance,
when running the unit tests before installation.
|
|
|
|
| |
Also adds several missing ones.
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Adds AEAD support to the TLS stack, currently supporting AES-GCM. Brings fixes
for TLS record fragmentation, enforcing TLS versions < 1.2 and proper signature
scheme support indication.
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
It is important to have them mapped correctly, as we use these official TLS
identifiers to configure specific TLS suites.
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
While a hardcoded 1.2 version is fine when we offer that in Client Hello, we
should include the actually offered version if it has been reduced before
starting the exchange.
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Fixes fragment reassembling if a buffer contains more than one record, but
the last record contains a partial TLS record header. Thanks to Nick Saunders
and Jamil Nimeh for identifying this issue and providing a fix for it.
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Additionally, we now query plugin features to find out what schemes we exactly
support.
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
To better separate the code path for different TLS versions and modes of
operation, we introduce a TLS AEAD abstraction. We provide three implementations
using traditional transforms, and get prepared for TLS AEAD modes.
|
|/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The salt, or often called implicit nonce, varies between AEAD algorithms and
their use in protocols. For IKE and ESP, GCM uses 4 bytes, while CCM uses
3 bytes. With TLS, however, AEAD mode uses 4 bytes for both GCM and CCM.
Our GCM backends currently support 4 bytes and CCM 3 bytes only. This is fine
until we go for CCM mode support in TLS, which requires 4 byte nonces.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Works around issues related to system time changes and kernel backends using
that system time, such as Linux XFRM.
|
|
|
|
| |
Fixes evaluation of ikev2/ocsp-untrusted-cert.
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Limits cached OCSP verification to responses signed by the CA, a directly
delegated signer or a pre-installed OCSP responder certificate. Disables
auth config merge for revocation trust-chain strength checkin, as it breaks
CA constraints in some scenarios.
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
To avoid considering each cached OCSP response and evaluating its trustchain,
we limit the certificates considered for OCSP signing to:
- The issuing CA of the checked certificate
- A directly delegated signer by the same CA, having the OCSP signer constraint
- Any locally installed (trusted) certificate having the OCSP signer constraint
The first two options cover the requirements from RFC 6960 2.6. For
compatibility with non-conforming CAs, we allow the third option as exception,
but require the installation of such certificates locally.
|
|/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This behavior was introduced with 6840a6fb to avoid key/signature strength
checking for the revocation trustchain as we do it for end entity certificates.
Unfortunately this breaks CA constraint checking under certain conditions, as
we merge additional intermediate/CA certificates to the auth config.
As key/signature strength checking of the revocation trustchain is a rather
exotic requirement we drop support for that to properly enforce CA constraints.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This allows using const strings etc. for lookups without cast. And keys
are not modifiable anyway.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Simply using the pointer is not optimal for our hash table
implementation, which simply masks the key to determine the bucket.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
More specific decoders might still be needed, but the x509
plugin should not care which ones.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
accouting updates
Fixes #528.
|
|
|
|
| |
Fixes #533.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The DH transform is optional for ESP/AH proposals. The initiator can
include NONE (0) in its proposal to indicate that while it prefers to
do a DH exchange, the responder may still decide to not do so.
Fixes #532.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
For the config snippets the options are now explicitly ordered before
subsections.
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
(Re-)Introduces X.509 Attribute Certificate support in IKE, and cleans up the
x509 AC parser/generator. ACs may be stored locally or exchanged in IKEv2
CERT payloads, Attribute Authorities must be installed locally. pki --acert
issues Attribute Certificates and replaces the removed openac utility.
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The same functionality is now provided by the pki --acert subcommand.
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This validator checks for any attribute certificate it can find for validated
end entity certificates and tries to extract group membership information
used for connection authorization rules.
|