| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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After adding the read callback the state is WATCHER_QUEUED and it is
switched to WATCHER_RUNNING only later by an asynchronous job. This means
that a thread that sent a Netlink message shortly after registration
might see the state as WATCHER_QUEUED. If it then tries to read the
response and the watcher thread is quicker to actually read the message
from the socket, it could block on recv() while still holding the lock.
And the asynchronous job that actually read the message and tries to queue
it will block while trying to acquire the lock, so we'd end up in a deadlock.
This is probably mostly a problem in the unit tests.
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Metrics are basically defined to order routes with equal prefix, so ordering
routes by metric first makes not much sense as that could prefer totally
unspecific routes over very specific ones.
For instance, the previous code did break installation of routes for
passthrough policies with two routes like these in the main routing table:
default via 192.168.2.1 dev eth0 proto static
192.168.2.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.2.10 metric 1
Because the default route has no metric set (0) it was used, instead of the
more specific other one, to determine src and next hop when installing a route
for a passthrough policy for 192.168.2.0/24. Therefore, the installed route
in table 220 did then incorrectly redirect all local traffic to "next hop"
192.168.2.1.
The same issue occurred when determining the source address while
installing trap policies.
Fixes 6b57790270fb ("kernel-netlink: Respect kernel routing priorities for IKE routes").
Fixes #1416.
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This allows using manual priorities for traps, which have a lower
base priority than the resulting IPsec policies. This could otherwise
be problematic if, for example, swanctl --install/uninstall is used while
an SA is established combined with e.g. IPComp, where the trap policy does
not look the same as the IPsec policy (which is now otherwise often the case
as the reqids stay the same).
It also orders policies by selector size if manual priorities are configured
and narrowing occurs.
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The kernel policy now considers src and dst port masks as well as
restictions to a given network interface. The base priority is
100'000 for passthrough shunts, 200'000 for IPsec policies,
300'000 for IPsec policy traps and 400'000 for fallback drop shunts.
The values 1..30'000 can be used for manually set priorities.
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This allows two CHILD_SAs with reversed subnets to install two FWD
policies each. Since the outbound policy won't have a reqid set we will
end up with the two inbound FWD policies installed in the kernel, with
the correct templates to allow decrypted traffic.
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We can't set a template on the outbound FWD policy (or we'd have to make
it optional). Because if the traffic does not come from another (matching)
IPsec tunnel it would get dropped due to the template mismatch.
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This allows us to install more than one FWD policy. We already do this
in the kernel-pfkey plugin (there the original reason was that not all
kernels support FWD policies).
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References #1347.
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This moves hydra->kernel_interface to charon->kernel.
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Instead we use the actual IP protocol identifier (the conversion now happens in
child_sa_t and kernel_handler_t).
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