| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Such a task is not initiated unless a certain time has passed. This
allows delaying certain tasks but avoids problems if we'd do this
via a scheduled job (e.g. if the IKE_SA is rekeyed in the meantime).
If the IKE_SA is rekeyed the delay of such tasks is reset when the
tasks are adopted i.e. they get executed immediately on the new IKE_SA.
This hasn't been implemented for IKEv1 yet.
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over local ones
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
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Some peers send an INITIAL_CONTACT notify after they received our XAuth
username. The XAuth task waiting for the third XAuth message handles
this incorrectly and closes the IKE_SA as no configuration payloads are
contained in the message. We queue the INFORMATIONAL until the XAuth
exchange is complete to avoid this issue.
Fixes #1434.
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Fixes #1410.
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An old (already rekeyed) CHILD_SA would get switched back into CHILD_REKEYING
state. And we actually want to change the currently installed CHILD_SA to
that state and later CHILD_REKEYED and properly call e.g. child_rekey() and
not do this again with an old CHILD_SA. Instead let's only check installed
or currently rekeying CHILD_SAs (in case of a rekey collision). It's also
uncommon that there is a CHILD_SA in state CHILD_REKEYED but none in state
CHILD_INSTALLED or CHILD_REKEYING, which could happen if e.g. a peer deleted
and recreated a CHILD_SA after a rekeying. But in that case we don't want
to treat the new CHILD_SA as rekeying (e.g. in regards to events on the bus).
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Fixes #1421.
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enumerator
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This moves hydra->kernel_interface to charon->kernel.
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According to the mode-config draft there is no prefix sent for
IPv6 addresses in IKEv1. We still accept 17 bytes long addresses for
backwards compatibility with older strongSwan releases.
Fixes #1304.
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When charon rekeys a CHILD_SA after a soft limit expired, it is only
deleted after the hard limit is reached. In case of packet/byte limits
this may not be the case for a long time since the packets/bytes are
usually sent using the new SA. This may result in a very large number of
stale CHILD_SAs and kernel states. With enough connections configured this
will ultimately exhaust the memory of the system.
This patch adds a strongswan.conf setting that, if enabled, causes the old
CHILD_SA to be deleted by the initiator after a successful rekeying.
Enabling this setting might create problems with implementations that
continue to use rekeyed SAs (e.g. if the DELETE notify is lost).
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If it was necessary to pass the local certificates we could probably
clone the config (but we don't do that either when later looking for the
key to actually authenticate).
Passing auth adds the same subject cert to the config over and over
again (I guess we could also try to prevent that by searching for
duplicates).
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Output is now identical to that of the IKEv2 pubkey authenticator.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
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If we mistakenly detect a new IKE_SA as a reauthentication the client
won't request the previous virtual IP, but since we already migrated
it we already triggered the assign_vips() hook, so we should reassign
the migrated virtual IP.
Fixes #1152.
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A DPD timeout job is queued whenever a DPD is sent, i.e. after the
DPD delay already has elapsed, so we have to compensate for that.
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Fixes #1138.
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message
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configurable
Fixes #1128.
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are handled delayed
If we haven't received the third QM message for multiple exchanges the
return value of NEED_MORE for passive tasks that are not responsible for
a specific exchange would trigger a fourth empty QM message.
Fixes: 4de361d92c54 ("ikev1: Fix handling of overlapping Quick Mode exchanges")
References #1076.
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In some cases the third message of a Quick Mode exchange might arrive
after the first message of a subsequent Quick Mode exchange. Previously
these messages were handled incorrectly and the second Quick Mode
exchange failed.
Some implementations might even try to establish multiple Quick Modes
simultaneously, which is explicitly allowed in RFC 2409. We don't fully
support that, though, in particular in case of retransmits.
Fixes #1076.
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If multiple certificates use the same subjects we might choose the wrong
one otherwise. This way we use the one referenced with leftcert and
stored in the auth-cfg and we actually do the same thing later in the
pubkey authenticator.
Fixes #1077.
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This is needed to handle DELETEs properly, which was previously done via
CHILD_REKEYING, which we don't use anymore since 5c6a62ceb6 as it prevents
reauthentication.
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Fixes Quick Mode negotiation when PFS is in use.
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While such a change is not unproblematic, keeping status_t makes the API
inconsistent once we introduce return values for the public value operations.
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OpenBSD's isakmpd uses the latest ISAKMP SA to delete other expired SAs.
This caused strongSwan to delete e.g. a rekeyed SA even though isakmpd
meant to delete the old one.
What isakmpd does might not be standard compliant. As RFC 2408 puts
it:
Deletion which is concerned with an ISAKMP SA will contain a
Protocol-Id of ISAKMP and the SPIs are the initiator and responder
cookies from the ISAKMP Header.
This could either be interpreted as "copy the SPIs from the ISAKMP
header of the current message to the DELETE payload" (which is what
strongSwan assumed, and the direction IKEv2 took it, by not sending SPIs
for IKE), or as clarification that ISAKMP "cookies" are actually the
SPIs meant to be put in the payload (but that any ISAKMP SA may be
deleted).
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Some clients like iOS/Mac OS X don't do a mode config exchange on the
new SA during re-authentication. If we don't adopt the previous virtual
IP Quick Mode rekeying will later fail.
If a client does do Mode Config we directly reassign the VIPs we migrated
from the old SA, without querying the attributes framework.
Fixes #807, #810.
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Since we keep them around until they finally expire they otherwise would block
IKE_SA rekeying/reauthentication.
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The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some
peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error).
Fixes #819.
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As we now use the same reqid for multiple CHILD_SAs with the same selectors,
having marks based on the reqid makes not that much sense anymore. Instead we
use unique marks that use a custom identifier. This identifier is reused during
rekeying, keeping the marks constant for any rule relying on it (for example
installed by updown).
This also simplifies handling of reqid allocation, as we do not have to query
the marks that is not yet assigned for an unknown reqid.
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