| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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In some scenarios an IKE_SA might get restarted multiple times (e.g.
due to retransmits and delayed INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies) so that
two IKE_SA_INIT messages might be sent that only differ in the
previously randomly generated NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload.
This could cause an authentication failure on the responder if the two
peers don't use the same IKE_SA_INIT message in their InitiatorSignedOctets.
While the payload is generated in a reproducible way it will still change
when the daemon is restarted, which should make detecting the payloads
as fake a bit harder (compared to e.g. just using 0.0.0.0:0 as address).
Fixes #1131.
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These might have changed by a peer-initiated MOBIKE address update.
Fixes #1125.
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deleting the SA
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This allows us to DELETE CHILD_SAs on failures that occur before we
retrieved the selected proposal.
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information
Since we only support single protocols we could probably guess it and always
send a DELETE.
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When retrying due to a DH group mismatch this is already done by the
child-create task itself. And in other cases where the task returns
NEED_MORE we actually will need access to a possible proposal to properly
delete it.
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mismatch
If the responder declines our KE payload during a CHILD_SA rekeying migrate()
is called to reuse the child-create task. But the child-rekey task then
calls the same method again.
Fixes: 32df0d81fb46 ("child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()")
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Even when there is no error the CREATE_CHILD_SA response should be sent
in the context of the existing IKE_SA.
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The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to
the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in
the correct context.
A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch,
which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA
was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA,
that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected
by several plugins.
Fixes #862.
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authentication
Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an
initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were
complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK
authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate
and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid
certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted.
Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other
aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not
enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue
responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client.
And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into
sending plaintext passwords.
This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's
authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator
starts with its own authentication.
Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
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Since another nonce gets allocated later (if any was allocated already)
this would have resulted in a leaked nonce context ID when used in charon-tkm.
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As with ike-init we can't return NULL in the task constructor.
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Returning FAILED in the constructor is wrong, but returning NULL doesn't work
either as it's currently assumed tasks always can be created.
Therefore, delay this check until we actually try to allocate a nonce.
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This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the
ike init task. In the TKM use-case the nonce generator cannot be
destroyed before the ike init task is finalized, otherwise the created
nonce is detected as stale.
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This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the
child create task. In the TKM use-case, it is required to reset the
nonce context if the created nonce is not consumed. This happens if the
child SA negotiation fails and it is detected before the SA is
established via the TKM kernel plugin (i.e. rekey collision).
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The parameter indicates if the alert is raised upon failure to establish
the first CHILD SA of an IKE SA.
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If additional tasks get queued before/while rekeying an IKE_SA, these get
migrated to the new IKE_SA. We previously did not trigger initiation of these
tasks, though, leaving the task unexecuted until a new task gets queued.
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This is mostly for testing.
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Under some conditions it can happen that the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange for
rekeying the IKE_SA initiated by the peer is successful, but the delete message
does not follow. For example if processing takes just too long locally, the
peer might consider us dead, but we won't notice that.
As this leaves the old IKE_SA in IKE_REKEYING state, we currently avoid actively
initiating any tasks, such as rekeying or scheduled DPD. This leaves the IKE_SA
in a dead and unusable state. To avoid that situation, we schedule a timeout
to wait for the DELETE message to follow the CREATE_CHILD_SA, before we
actively start to delete the IKE_SA.
Alternatively we could start a liveness check on the SA after a timeout to see
if the peer still has that state and we can expect the delete to follow. But
it is unclear if all peers can handle such messages in this very special state,
so we currently don't go for that approach.
While we could calculate the timeout based on the local retransmission timeout,
the peer might use a different scheme, so a fixed timeout works as well.
Fixes #742.
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As we now use the same reqid for multiple CHILD_SAs with the same selectors,
having marks based on the reqid makes not that much sense anymore. Instead we
use unique marks that use a custom identifier. This identifier is reused during
rekeying, keeping the marks constant for any rule relying on it (for example
installed by updown).
This also simplifies handling of reqid allocation, as we do not have to query
the marks that is not yet assigned for an unknown reqid.
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Path probing is enabled if the current path is not available anymore.
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This will probably never be more than 1 since we only have one task queued
at a time and we don't migrate running tasks.
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Because we only queue one MOBIKE task at a time, but destroy superfluous
ones only after we already increased the counter for pending MOBIKE updates,
we have to reduce the counter when such tasks are destroyed. Otherwise, the
queued task would assume another task is queued when it is running and
ignore any successful response.
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